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RESUMO 
 
"O Sistema Solarístico" propõe explorar o potencial específico do cinema 
para colocar questões ontológicas e epistemológicas sobre o real, a realidade 
e a sua reprodução. O título é deduzido da ‘ciência solarística’, uma ciência 
fictícia introduzida no enredo do filme "Solaris" de Andrei Tarkovsky. Na 
presente dissertação este filme é abordado como uma metáfora para a 
apreensão humana do real da realidade, sob a premissa do real enquanto 
espaço reservado para a verdade ontológica.  
O objectivo da ‘filosofia solarística’, que será gradualmente introduzida, 
é a investigação dos conceitos e princípios de pensamento levantados pela 
existência do planeta Solaris que constitui um desafio inatingível para o 
conhecimento humano. Apesar de orgânico, o planeta Solaris é reminiscente 
de um aparato comparável ao cinematógrafo: reproduz seres que parecem 
reais, mas que, tal como as fotografias ou as personagens fílmicas, são 
estranhos no seu estatuto ontológico. O principal conceito estético do filme 
apresenta-se como uma presença de algo ausente ou um ser sem ser. Este 
princípio transcendente, de uma existência que não é, evoca os conceitos de 
Real de Jacques Lacan assim como a relação entre o ser e o Nada presente 
no pensamento de Martin Heidegger. Convoca também alguns dos mais 
importantes princípios cinematográficos definidos por Stanley Cavell, Gilles 
Deleuze, Roland Barthes. Solaris estabelece-se assim como um exemplo da 
densa auto-reflexividade do cinema.  
O sistema solarístico propõe uma ontologia específica do cinema que 
parte da sua natureza catalisadora de um modelo múltiplo de realidade, do 
dispositivo não humano e tecnológico que convoca uma mudança 
epistemológica, e, por fim, da reprodução automática do ser e do real da 
realidade.  
A nossa investigação estabelece um estatuto privilegiado do cinema 
enquanto matriz da realidade, que a "reproduz directamente" de forma 
diferente das outras artes (Pasolini). Contudo, a análise desta completa 
reprodução audio-fotográfica da realidade constitui um complexo desafio 
ontológico, que não pode ser expresso sem apresentar uma interrogação 
metafísica: se a realidade é reproduzível, qual é então a sua natureza 
fundamental? 
Palavras-chave: cinema, filosofia solarística, Martin Heidegger, o real da 
realidade, a reprodução da realidade  
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SUMMARY 
"The solaristic system” is the title of our project to explore the specific 
potential of film to raise epistemological and ontological questions about the 
real, reality and its reproduction. The title is derived from the “solaristic 
science", a fictitious science introduced in the film “Solaris" by Andrei 
Tarkovsky. In the present thesis this film is understood as a metaphor for the 
human comprehension of the 'real of reality', under the premise to take the 
real as a placeholder for ontological truth.  
The main proposition of the ‘solaristic philosophy’, which is gradually 
introduced, is bound to the concepts and principles of thought raised by the 
ficticious planet Solaris whose nature is an unattainable challenge for human 
knowledge. Although an organic entity the planet is reminiscent of the 
cinematographic apparatus: it reproduces beings which seem to be real, but 
who - just as photographs or film characters - are puzzling in their 
ontotological status.  
This transcendent principle of an existence which is not, evokes the 
Lacanian Real as well as the Heideggerian correlation of being and Nothing 
and constitutes one of the most crucial concepts pertaining to film. This 
principle will be elucidated. Moreover, this thesis refers to and analyses some 
of the most important principles of film defined by Cavell, Deleuze, Bazin, 
among others. Through this analysis “Solaris” is established as an example of 
dense self-reflexivity of the medium film.  
The solaristic system is the proposal of an ontology of cinema based 
on the catalysing nature of a multiple model of reality, on the analysis of a 
non-human and technnological aparatus, which evokes an epistemological 
change, and on the investigation of an automatic reproduction of the being 
and the real of reality. 
Our investigation thereby privileges film as a matrix of reality, different 
from the other arts, in virtue of it “directly reproducing reality” (Pasolini). 
Anyhow, the analysis of this audio-photographic reproduction of reality 
constitutes a complex ontological challenge, which cannot be phrased without 
presenting a more radical, metaphysical enquiry: If reality is reproducible, 
what then is its fundamental nature?  
Key-words: Cinema, solaristic philosophy, Martin Heidegger, the real of 
reality, cinematographic reproduction of reality 
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RESUMO DESENVOLVIDO 
 
A reprodução técnica da realidade é uma das principais questões filosóficas 
levantadas pelo surgimento do cinema no final do século XIX, e leva a um 
questionamento da natureza ontológica tanto da realidade como do cinema. 
No entanto, a análise desta reprodução da realidade audio-fotográfica e em 
movimento constitui um complexo desafio ontológico, que não pode ser 
expressa sem apresentar uma interrogação metafísica também sobre a 
realidade: se a realidade é reproduzível, qual é então a sua natureza 
fundamental? Como podemos no fundo afirmar que é reproduzível aquilo que 
se retira à inteligibilidade? Se a realidade muda de qualidade pela reprodução 
fílmica, o que exactamente da realidade é reproduzível? Como podemos em 
diante chamar a alguma coisa uma reprodução, quando sendo uma re-
apresentação escapa à representação e é contudo diferente de um duplo? 
Diversos termos e conceitos devem ser esclarecidos e tornam necessária a 
construção de um sistema. 
A proposta desta dissertação consiste pois no desenvolvimento de 
uma ontologia específica do cinema intitulada "sistema solarístico". O 
neologismo designa uma proposta de desenvolvimento de uma tecno-
ontologia do cinema, que se apropria de ideias estéticas e princípios de 
pensamento presentes no filme de ficção científica "Solaris" de Andrei 
Tarkovsky (1972). Escolhemos este filme como sintomático da auto-
reflexividade do medium e da sua complexa correlação com a realidade, 
tecnologicamente condicionada. A nossa proposta é analisar, aprofundar e 
desenvolver as interrogações levantadas pelo cinema sobre a natureza da 
realidade, e, gradualmente, apresentar o sistema solarístico. O termo 
"solarístico" é deduzido da "ciência solarística", uma ciência fictícia introduzida 
pela diegese do filme e, de certo modo, expandida pela nossa análise. Esta 
ciência dedica-se à investigação do planeta Solaris 1, um desafio inatingível 
                                                
1 O filme “Solaris” difere do planeta fictício Solaris, que dá nome ao filme. Assim distinguimos 
o primeiro do segundo usando aspas quando nos referimos ao filme e retirando-as quando 
queremos mencionar o planeta. 
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para o conhecimento humano. No filme, o planeta é reminiscente de um 
aparato comparável ao cinematógrafo enquanto aparelho orgânico: suspeita-
se que seja um cérebro gigante que (re)produz fragmentos da realidade sob 
a forma de objectos e de seres. Assim, a apreensão do filme "Solaris" baseia-
se na sua extraordinária auto-reflexividade do meio fílmico, num duplo 
sentido. 
Primeiramente, "Solaris" é auto-reflexivo porquanto reflecte sobre o status 
ontológico e epistemológico do filme apenas como qualquer outro filme o faz: 
representa a análise das características essenciais do cinema, um medium, que 
desde o seu aparecimento sempre levantou discussões sobre questões 
ontológicas e epistemológicas. No entanto, o "sistema solarístico" procura 
acrescentar a esta reflexão um aspecto novo: é nossa intenção trabalhar a 
essência do cinema através da análise próxima e detalhada de um filme 
específico; além disso, argumentamos que essa análise acrescenta novas 
ideias filosóficas sobre a própria natureza da realidade.  
Isso leva-nos ao segundo aspecto da auto-reflexividade de "Solaris" 
enquanto filme específico. Os seus princípios estéticos, a mise-en-scène, a 
dramaturgia e a narrativa funcionam como uma alegoria das várias tentativas 
de apreensão humana do real da realidade e do confronto com a sua 
reprodução por intervenção não-humana. Para prever duas exemplificações: 
"Solaris" mantém como princípio ontológico uma condição a que poderíamos 
chamar 'ser sem ser'. Este conceito alude ao princípio de 'presença da 
ausência', frequentemente referido como uma das principais proposições do 
cinema sobre a sua misteriosa essência ontológica, oriunda da fotografia. 
Além disso, o planeta Solaris é reminiscente de um aparato comparável ao 
cinematógrafo, apesar de ser um aparelho orgânico: Solaris é um reprodutor 
de seres que parecem humanos, mas que, tal como as fotografias ou as 
personagens fílmicas, são estranhos no seu estatuto quer ôntico quer 
ontológico.  
A primeira parte da dissertação "A Emergência do Sistema Solarístico" 
funciona como introdução. Depois de algumas interrogações preliminares, a 
ideia do sistema solarístico é brevemente aflorada e são delineados alguns 
pensamentos necessários para justificar a sua emergência e os seus 
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métodos, tal como o desafio ontológico da reprodução fotográfica da 
realidade e a auto-reflexividade deste tema no filme "Solaris", que se afirma 
como especialmente apto para o desenvolvimento de uma filosofia solarística. 
Entre outros filósofos Martin Heidegger é apresentado como uma das mais 
importantes referências para apoiar uma análise do estatuto ontológico da 
reprodução da realidade quando interrogamos a natureza fundamental do 
cinema. Uma vez que Heidegger reflecte sobre a presença e a ausência do 
ser, o seu trabalho sobrepõe-se conceptualmente com algumas das mais 
cruciais questões levantadas pelo surgimento do cinema: o que podemos 
dizer sobre o ser do cinema? 
Além disso, oferece-se uma descrição detalhada do plot e da mise-en-
scène do filme “Solaris” para dar ao leitor a oportunidade de mergulhar na 
densidade do filme sem o ver. Adicionalmente, uma breve história da filosofia 
do cinema permite-nos introduzir as principais posições que justificam o 
surgimento do sistema solarístico. Apontando a relevância para esta análise 
de anteriores posturas na filosofia do cinema, esboçamos então quer a 
posição de "Solaris" enquanto peça filosófica, quer as suas principais 
interrogações filosóficas. 
Gilles Deleuze e Stanley Cavell são aqui escolhidos como os dois 
principais filósofos na introdução da reflexão sobre o cinema no seu âmbito 
filosófico. Ambos ainda hoje dominam as principais correntes da filosofia do 
cinema. Apesar de serem referências incontornáveis, o sistema solarístico é 
uma tentativa de ir além dos projectos destes dois filósofos que integram as 
questões levantadas pelo cinema na sua respectiva corrente teórica. 
Na segunda parte da análise, intitulada “Enredos Solarísticos”, são 
delineados os primeiros passos de aproximação ao sistema solarístico, bem 
como o subjacente entendimento da realidade e da sua reprodução no 
cinema. Assim são gradualmente apresentadas três distintas mas 
correlacionadas definições de cinema, que fundamentalmente caracterizam a 
relação intrincada entre cinema e realidade. 
Estas definições são primeiramente a do cinema como catalisador de 
um modelo múltiplo de realidade, seguidamente a do cinema como 
dispositivo não humano (um aparato tecnológico) que convoca uma mudança 
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epistemológica, e, por fim, a do cinema como uma reprodução automática do 
ser e do real da realidade. São aqui introduzidos também alguns dos 
conceitos mais essenciais para o âmbito da nossa análise, tais como o de 
"real da realidade" ou o de "ser da realidade", e interpeladas as questões da 
sua reprodução no cinema.  
A terceira parte desta análise, intitulada “Implicações Solarísticas”, 
consiste em rematar alguns aspectos elaborados até aqui, considerando 
agora ramificações e especificações, bem como uma imersão mais profunda 
no sistema de pensamento de Heidegger. Numa apropriação da teoria da 
morte e do pensamento-projecto (Entwurfsdenken) heideggerianos, é 
desvelada então uma dimensão post-mortem do cinema (no sentido de 
sobrevivência das entidades reproduzidas).  
É aqui ainda analisado o conceito do Nada de Heidegger. O seu 
subjacente conceito de aniquilação (‘Nichtung’ em Alemão), o nada em acção, é 
comparado com o Real lacaniano e com a ideia do vazio no pensamento de 
Alain Badiou. Acresce, a ontologia quântica2 de Karen Barad, especialmente o 
seu conceito de “enredamento intra-activo”3, que evoca um agenciamento do 
“dispositivo”4, que pode ser analisado na sua aplicação ao planeta Solaris no 
filme. É pois nossa intenção mostrar como os princípios de pensamento, 
presentes em “Solaris” e em Heidegger, Barad, Badiou e outros, convergem na 
expansão do entendimento ontológico do ser e como estes podem ser aplicados 
a um pensamento sobre a realidade e o cinema; sendo que este último traz uma 
nova condição tecno-ontológica que implica uma mudança radical para o 
pensamento humano. Esta mudança é comparada ao pensamento de Barad 
que argumenta a favor de uma nova causalidade, que ultrapassa o 
representacionalismo, e combate o dualismo que divide matéria e significado. 
                                                
2 A ontologia quântica de Barad baseia-se na física quântica de Niels Bohrs. 
3 O termo “enredamento intra-activo” (“intra-active entanglements”) foi cunhado por Karen 
Barad em Meeting the Universe Halfway e designa uma relação inter-activa entre objectos 
que precede e chega até a causar a sua existência. 
4 O conceito de “apparatus” de Barad é desenvolvido a partir do termo "dispositivo" de 
Foucault (em francês “dispositif”) e aplicado no nosso contexto, mas também num sentido 
técnico como o utilizado por Walter Benjamin (“Apparatur”).  
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Continuando o resumo: para complementar Heidegger, é considerada 
a “object oriented ontology” de Graham Harman, bem como alguns aspectos 
da leitura especulativa de Slavoj Žižek do ‘Real’ lacaniano e o radical passo 
de Badiou de acrescentar à ontologia a teoria dos conjuntos da matemática 
(Georg Cantor). A nossa abordagem de Badiou foca-se na sua análise do ser 
enquanto múltiplo, o que é um dos aspectos do ser-no-cinema e do ser-em-
Solaris (planeta). A ideia de imagem – subjacente à nossa análise - é 
também vista numa dimensão própria, pois não pertence nem à mente, nem 
à matéria. A ideia de Heidegger de evento sustenta inesperadamente a nossa 
abordagem da imagem real enquanto evento. 
Finalmente, a quarta parte, a que chamámos "Conclusões Solarísticas 
- as Ligações do Sistema Solarístico", conclui a presente análise revelando 
uma estrutura quadriplicada do sistema solarístico (sob a forma de um 
catálogo de 45 teses), uma revelação que não deixa de acrescentar alguns 
novos aspectos – baseados na tardia ideia de quádruplo [Geviert] de 
Heidegger e na apropriação desta última assumida por Harman. 
 
 
  
  
10 
 
 
 
 
 
THE SOLARISTIC SYSTEM 
 
Christine Reeh 
 
Doctoral dissertation supervised by  
Prof. Dr. Carlos João Nunes Correia 
(Faculdade de Letras, Universidade de Lisboa) 
co-supervised by Prof. Dr. Markus Gabriel 
(Institut für Philosophie, Universität Bonn) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For my parents (in memoriam)  
so that we can meet on Solaris 
 
 
 
  
  
12 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
I want to thank my supervisors, who have both created the best conditions to 
guarantee the development of this thesis. Carlos João Correia has 
accompanied with best advice the whole process in all kind of aspects, and 
has given inspiring feedback and causes for thought. I also thank Markus 
Gabriel for the support, inspiring advice and feedback. Specially to be 
mentioned is the summer school of 2012 on the ontological turn in 
contemporary philosophy, which has given me new insight, and has motivated 
the reformulation of the project of this thesis.  
I want to thank the FCT-Foundation in Portugal for the four years of 
doctoral grant, which have permitted an exclusive dedication and sustained 
networking throughout the world in the area of philosophy of film, as well as a 
prolonged stay for research and thesis development in Germany.  
I want to thank Patricia Pisters and Josef Früchtl for having invited me to 
Amsterdam and given inspiring feedback, furthermore Hyun Kang Kim in 
Bonn who has given me important insights. I also want to thank Diana Khamis 
for her kindness and ability to edit this work according to the correct use of 
English language. 
 
Additionally I want to thank my family and friends for having personally 
supported me, namely Maike Warnholz, Nils Warnholz, Adrian Peters, Tim 
Peters, Silke Reeh, Isabel Machado, Joana Ferreira, Susanne Malorny, José 
João Louro and Marcelo Felix, who have accompanied the process under 
different perspectives. 
 
 
  
13 
Contents 
 
 
PART 1 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE SOLARISTIC SYSTEM 
 
 
17 
 
 
Chapter I. Preliminary Interrogations 
 
18 
 
Chapter II. The Proposal of the Solaristic System  
 
22 
 
Chapter III. Further Development 
 
28 
 
Chapter IV. Some Remarks on the Terminology  
 
34 
 
Chapter V. Summary of the Structure 
 
34 
 
Chapter VI. The Plot of the Movie “Solaris” 
 
54 
 
Chapter VII. A Short History of Philosophy of Film 
 
 
78 
     1. From Jean Epstein’s Robot-Philosopher to Benjamin’s Apparatus  78 
 2. The Breakthrough of Philosophy of Film 84 
 3. Recent Positions 93 
 
PART 2 
SOLARISTIC TWISTS –  
ON BEING, REALITY AND ITS REPRODUCTION 
 
 
99 
 
  
Short Preview 100 
  
14 
Chapter VIII. What Happens to Reality in Film? 
 
100 
1. The Ontological Puzzle of Being in Reproduction 103 
2. The Being of Reality 109 
3. Being in Time as film 112 
 
Chapter IX. Twisted Reality and its Reproduction 
 
 
118 
1. Multifold Models of Reality 119 
2. The World as image 123 
3. Overcoming Correlationism 125 
4. The Reproducibility of Multifold Reality 130 
      
Chapter X. Asking for the Real of Reality 
 
 
134 
1. The Concept 134 
2. Being without Being 139 
3. From Badiou’s Ontology of the Void to the White Hole of the   
     Whole of Images 
 
 
 
148 
PART 3 
SOLARISTIC IMPLICATIONS 
 
156 
      
Chapter XI. Men’s Broken Link with Reality and Being-in-Film 
 
 
158 
1. The Real Image and the Broken Link  158 
2. Being-in-Film 166 
3. World as Film and Film as World 171 
4. Being-in as the Link 175 
5. “Solaris” as Suicide-Machine 
 
180 
  
15 
Chapter XII. The Myth of Total Cinema and the Cinematic Suicide of  
Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk 
 
 
183 
1. Total Enchantment: an Ontological Principle of Cinema 183 
2. Death Wish and Total Enchantment 187 
3. The Not-Yet-Cinema 192 
4. Death, Myth and Cinema 196 
 
Chapter XIII. The Solaristic Apparatus of Film 
 
 
203 
   1. On the Entanglement of Mind and Matter 205 
   2. From Benjamin’s Apparatus to the Solaristic Brain 209 
   3. Worldmaking Measurements 221 
 
Chapter XIV. The Real, the Virtual and the Subjective Side of Knowledge 
 
 
229 
1. The Virtuality of Reality 229 
2. The Reality of the Virtual 234 
3. “Solaris” as a Simulation Hypothesis 236 
4. On Solaristic Love and Subjective Knowledge 244 
5. The Nothing as an Open Concept of Reality 249 
 
 
 
 
PART 4 
SOLARISTIC CONCLUSIONS 
 
254 
 
Chapter XV. Raising a Solaristic Fourfold 
 
 
255 
1. Point of Departure: Heidegger’s Fourfold 255 
2. Drawing the Idea of a Solaristic Fourfold 260 
3. Contextualizing Harman’s Real Object in our Scope of Analysis 263 
  
16 
4. Solaristic Allusion 268 
5. Harman’s Fourfold 270 
 
6. On Essence, Causation and Allure 278 
7. The Hypothesis of a Solaristic Fourfold 282 
 
Chapter XVI. Conclusions and Cardinal Tenets of the Solaristic System 
 
289 
 
1. Philosophy and Fiction 
 
289 
2. 45 Theses on the Solaristic System 295 
3. Further Perspectives 301 
  
 
Bibliography 
 
304 
 
 
  
  
17 
 
 
 
PART 1 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE SOLARISTIC 
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I.  
PRELIMINARY INTERROGATIONS 
 
 
 
The question of mechanical reproduction of reality is one of the very 
philosophical questions raised by the emergence of film at the end of the 
XIXth Century, inquiring into the ontological nature of both reality and film. Yet 
the nature of this audio-photographic and moving reproduction of reality 
constitutes an ontological puzzle, which has been disregarded as a main topic 
of enquiry with direct consequences for philosophy. It is therefore my aim to 
reassess the over a hundred-year-old interrogation “What is cinema?” as an 
ontological-epistemological analysis on the nature of film and its relation with 
reality and the real. What of reality exactly is reproduced by film? In truth, this 
interrogation cannot be phrased without presenting a more radical, 
metaphysical enquiry into reality: If reality is reproducible, what then is its 
fundamental nature? We will see throughout how these interrogations can be 
analyzed or reformulated by closer examination. 
The filmic reproduction of reality constitutes a kind of ontological 
aporia, which so far has been insufficiently taken into account. It is prevailingly 
argued that the reflection on perception would include the reflection on film, as 
we perceive the world already as one. Such a claim ignores the ontological 
difference between the “natural” image and the apparatus-based image of 
reality. It is furthermore a contradictory meta-position: if we compare natural 
perception to film we have firstly to define what film is and the way it is 
perceived. The world as film is a modern standpoint originated by the 
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reflection on film and has influenced the way in which we relate to reality.  
The claim has been anticipated by Henri Bergson, and firstly 
formulated by Gilles Deleuze5. Therefore, it is not the case, that the reflection 
on the sensory perception of reality has to be applied to film, but that the 
reflection on film can add something new to the reflection on the perception of 
reality. I will argue throughout that in cinema and film we are facing the 
images made by a technological apparatus, which do not integrate with but 
penetrate into that which has been natural human perception. This apparatus 
is selecting, recording and shaping a web of reproduced and assembled 
reality, producing reality thereby. By watching this tissue of reality, we are not 
submitted to an illusory appearance like in Plato’s Allegory of the Cave, but, 
as Alain Badiou suggests, we even learn something new about the real: 
“Cinema is a new relationship to the Real itself. (…) It is the absence of the 
Real but as a new form of knowledge.”6  
Thereby Badiou adds to our ontological as well as metaphysical 
question yet an epistemological level: What could this new form of knowledge 
of “the Real” be? How can we learn something about that which is absent? Is 
it further a property of this real to be reproducible? And how at all can we 
claim to reproduce that, which withdraws from intelligibility? Since reality 
changes its quality by filmic reproduction, what exactly of reality is 
reproducible, and is this something of reality the ‘real of reality’?7 How can we 
then call something a reproduction, when it, being a re-presentation, escapes 
representation, yet is different from a double? Many terms and concepts need 
to be elucidated; a system needs to be built. 
Let me briefly reinforce the necessity of my approach by the attempt of 
arguing against the hypothesis that there is a difficulty of grasping that which 
                                                
5 “(I)t is the universe as cinema in itself, a metacinema.” Cf. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema I – The 
Movement-Image, p. 59 
6 Alain Badiou, Cinema and Philosophy, keynote lecture given on 27th of November 2014 at 
UNSW Arts & Social Sciences, Australia 
7 The “real of reality” is a central term of this analysis, which will be developed throughout and 
may even function as a placeholder for ontological truth, to be distinguished from the absolute 
truth of metaphysics.  
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film reproduces. Firstly, one may say that film obviously reproduces time and 
space. Yet this answer is incomplete and only partly correct; along with the 
grasp of reality it evokes another problem involving perception: since the era 
of Aristotle the negativity of time, as well as its reciprocity to space, 
constitutes a philosophical puzzle of its own, raising the concept of space-
time. Of course, filmic reproduction cannot be separated from space-time, just 
like physical reality and sensory perception cannot. This inseparability relies 
on an idea of space-time disclosing reality’s continuity, whether in film, or 
beyond film. Yet this continuity of reality is beyond the possibility of a 
sustained explanation: why is time a flow? How does one moment reach the 
next one, if both are too small to be grasped? Asking after the nature of time 
can help us to inquire more precisely into reproduction: what of reality is exactly 
transported by space-time that continuously is and becomes reproducible by 
film?  
Another argument for neglecting the approach of seeking a real of 
reality in film could be that film reproduces moving images of reality. But this 
answer merely displaces the problem into another area, equally problematic, 
without breaking the circle: what exactly is an image of reality in movement? 
And what is an image? Isn’t it exactly that which bears and carries the real of 
reality? That will be one of the major questions of this analysis, to be gradually 
approached. Henri Bergson, one of the first philosophers to evoke cinema and 
photography in the realm of epistemology, claims that the universe is an 
aggregate of images and that images are equal to matter, in constant 
movement of becoming. Yet if image is equal to matter, can we have an 
image without matter? Or is the film-image just the machinic perception of this 
image, detached from its preceptor, but not to be called an image in itself? 
In the wake of these questions the material quality of the filmic 
reproduced becomes thus the next issue: an image is linked to visibility and 
light. Yet counter to Bergson’s claim, common sense grasps light as different 
from matter: it grasps light as a quality which turns space visible, like a light 
ubiquitous tissue wrapping matter. From the point of view of this analysis, 
based on Bergson, light bears space, because light bears image, which 
implies space, as it is equal to matter. Thereby the image is only one possible 
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property of light, the visible light, an event out of a rupture or accident. Most of 
the light is invisible and therefore implies an infinity of possible or virtual 
images, which are not yet visible and may never become visible. Visibility is 
only achieved by light when it hits matter and is perceived from a certain point 
of view: any point in matter allows an infinity of possible images, as multiple 
as reality. I will argue throughout that the photographic and then (even more 
complicated) the filmic image disclose this virtual character of an infinitely 
multiple reality.  
At any rate, it should be sufficiently clear by now that the understanding 
of reality and of the concept of the real is conditioning the proposed approach; 
its complexity will be fulfilled and will project corpus and meaning within the 
scope of analysis.  
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II. 
THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOLARISTIC SYSTEM 
 
 
 
Regarding the preliminary interrogations and topics raised for analysis, my 
proposition consists in the development of a specific ontology of film entitled 
‘the solaristic system’. The neologism designates the proposal to develop a 
techno-ontology of film, which appropriates the aesthetic ideas and principles 
of thought present in the 1972 sci-fi movie "Solaris" by Andrei Tarkovsky. I 
have chosen this film as symptomatic for the medium’s philosophical self-
reflexivity and its intriguing correlation with reality. I thereby define film as an 
apparatus based audio-visual reproduction of reality, technologically conditioned. 
It is my ambition to analyze, deepen and develop the raised inquiries on the 
nature of film, and in conclusion to present the solaristic system, to be 
gradually introduced. The word "solaristic" is deduced from the term "solaristic 
science", a fictitious science introduced in the movie’s diegesis. It is dedicated 
to the investigation of the planet Solaris8, an unattainable challenge for human 
knowledge. In the film, the planet is reminiscent of an apparatus comparable to 
the cinematograph, as an organic device: It is suspected to be a giant brain, 
which (re)produces fragments of reality in the form of objects and beings. 
Therefore the apprehension of the movie “Solaris” is based on its outstanding 
self-reflexivity of the filmic medium, in a double sense.   
                                                
8  The film “Solaris” differs from the fictive planet Solaris, which gives the film its name. 
Therefore I distinguish the one from the other by using quotation marks when referring to the 
movie, and no quotation marks when referring to the planet. 
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 Firstly, “Solaris” is self-reflexive insofar as it reflects on the ontological 
and epistemological status of film just as any other movie: It represents the 
analysis of the essential features of film, a medium, which has raised 
discussion as to its ontological and epistemological conditions ever since its 
emergence. The ‘solaristic system’ attempts to give this reflection a new shift. 
It is closely working on the essence of film by analyzing one specific film, 
within the delineated context. It is further claiming that this analysis leads us 
to new philosophical insight on the very nature of reality.  
 This brings us to the second aspect of the self-reflexivity of “Solaris” as 
a specific movie. Its aesthetic principles, mise-en-scène, dramaturgy and 
storytelling work as an allegory for the various attempts of human 
apprehension of the real of reality and the confrontation with its reproduction 
by non-human intervention. To preview two exemplifications: "Solaris" holds 
as a main aesthetic principle a status we shall call ‘being without being’. This 
concept reminds us of the principle of ‘presence of absence’, often referred to 
as one of the main principles of film regarding its puzzling ontological essence, 
originating in photography9. Furthermore, the planet itself is reminiscent of an 
apparatus comparable to the cinematograph, although it is not a technological 
device: Solaris is the reproducer of beings who resemble humans, but are 
puzzling in their ontic as well as ontological status, similar to photographs or 
film characters.   
 Let me briefly introduce the storyline of the movie. The main character, 
psychologist Kris Kelvin, is send to a decaying space station at the orbit of the 
planet Solaris, because disturbing reports have arrived from the three 
scientists remaining there. In the center of the film are the so-called “visitors”. 
As far as it can be understood, the visitors are both key to and mirror of the 
characters’ identities and consciences. Like ghosts they simply appear out of 
nowhere, explained as “the stabilization of neutrinos”. They are immortal and 
attached in their identity to the humans. They are the somehow transformed 
                                                
9 In the context of philosophy of film Stanley Cavell famously claims on the photographic 
image: “We do not know what a photograph is; we do not know how to place it ontologically.” 
(Cf. Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed, pp. 17-18) Cavell regards the photographic image as 
the basis of the filmic image, and applies the ontological feature of one to the other. 
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energy of human emotional needs and thought processing, a kind of 
communicative interface between humans, their desires and the planet, who 
is a transformer. Actually Solaris seems to investigate the humans, proposing, 
in a way, a form to meet each other. Presence thereby plays a central role. 
The visitors somehow reflect the essence of human nature in their way of 
being, and are driven by the question that the humans are looking for: to know 
who or what they really are. This search is crucial for the film.  
 By what has been said until now, I would like to propose the solaristic 
philosophy as a complement to or deduction from the preexisting framework 
of philosophy of film. As such, solaristic philosophy is neither set as a 
philosophical interpretation of film, nor as an exemplification of philosophy 
through film; it aspires instead to new insights and consequences for both, the 
ontological thinking of film and on reality. The solaristic system further 
reassesses some of the main scopes of film theory such as Walter Benjamin’s 
assembled “permeation of reality”, André Bazin’s “myth of total cinema” or the 
Bergsonian-Deleuzian “universe as meta-cinema”. It inquires into the features of 
the ontological essence of film, proposing concepts such as the solaristic 
cine-thinking, cine-real and cine-being, the first evoking Gilles Deleuze, the 
second evoking André Bazin, the latter evoking the most important 
philosopher of the modern reflection on being, Martin Heidegger, who has 
radically reformulated the question about being.  
 In order to be able to inquire into these interrogations I will try to briefly 
delineate what is the intention behind the solaristic philosophy of film. Some 
parts of the thesis function as a ground to sustain the appropriation of the 
movie and its fictitious principles as an expansion to the philosophical questions 
I have introduced so far. In a certain way, I seek hereby the idea to set 
philosophy as a form of art. The solaristic system might be understood as an 
artistic approach, a form of conceptual art, just in the sense as Graham Harman 
mentions: 
 
For centuries, philosophy has aspired to the conditions of a rigorous science, 
allying itself at various times with mathematics or descriptive psychology. Yet 
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what if the counter-project of the next four centuries were to turn philosophy 
into an art?10  
 
Stemming from a sustained analysis of the movie “Solaris”, its narrative 
and its principles of thought, the solaristic system establishes a set of key 
epistemic notions, which establish the cinematographic image as a 
reproduction of reality in movement. This reproduction is based on certain, 
photographic apparatus-technologies, and capture one actual being of reality. 
On one level the thesis attempts an analysis of the underlying concepts and 
roots, which have led to the development of the solaristic system.   
A special role therein is played by the Heideggerian interpretation of 
being, referring to the ancient Greeks, for whom "entities are grasped in their 
Being as 'presence'; this means that they are understood with regard to a 
definite mode of time – the 'Present; that is they are conceived as 
presence.'"11 This being present means being close, lying-before-us12: “To be 
present is to come close by (an-wesen), to be here in contrast and conflict 
with to be away (ab-wesen).”13 Yet Heidegger still distinguishes another kind of 
presence, much more important: the “presence of what is present.”14 This 
“presence itself”15 is a concept, which Harman developed further by referring 
to withdrawing real objects (“the third table”16). According to Heidegger the 
“presence itself” always remains: “Presence itself is precisely the presence of 
what is present, and remains so even if we specifically stress its various 
traits.”17 
Actually, and as Harman underlines, “being is time”18 for Heidegger, but 
time is not reduced to the present of the presence: “It would be a mistake (…) 
                                                
10 Graham Harman, “The Third Table - Notebook 85” in: 100 Notes – 100 Thoughts, pp. 14-15 
11 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, §6, p. 48 
12 Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?,  p. 236 
13 Ibid., p. 236 
14 Ibid., p. 235 
15 Ibid., p. 237 
16 Graham Harman, op. cit. 
17 Martin Heidegger, op. cit., p. 237 
18 Graham Harman, Heidegger Explained: From Phenomenon to Thing, p. 1 
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for us to take the view that Being of beings meant merely, for all time, the 
presence of what is present.”19 Heidegger actually claims that time consists in 
the unity of three ecstases, the past, the present and the future20. Therefore, 
even in the present, the two other ecstasies remain, although absent, a 
presence of absence, as Heidegger argues: “also this not-present-any-more is 
immediately present in its absence [west in seinem Abwesen unmittelbar 
an]”21. This kind of presence rhymes with the presence of the visitors on 
Solaris and evokes one of the most important characteristics of film and 
photography in general: the presence of absence, which Stanley Cavell 
describes.  
The photographic image precisely evokes that which is not present or 
there now, our displacement in space and time, which in film appears in form of 
a photographic, displaced time-flow. It has no physical, yet a sensible 
presence. This characteristic is simultaneously the main principle of the movie 
Solaris, embodied by the visitors, as if a realization of the absent. Their physical 
tactility is a contingent artifice.  
On a second level, and organically interweaved with the first one, I will 
outline the solaristic system itself, introduce a network of names and 
explanations deriving from the ontological, aesthetic and narrative principles 
present in the movie. To give an example, the characters of the movie will 
function not only as archetypes and dramatis personae, but also as 
conceptual personae22; their inner and outer conflicts process the solaristic 
key-notions, catalyzing their meanings and allude to the Heideggerian Dasein. 
Furthermore, the planet Solaris itself is to be understood as an intra-active 
apparatus or processor of the real. 
Yet fundamental to the development of the solaristic system is the 
ontological nature of film itself and its relation with reality and the real. The 
                                                
19 Martin Heidegger, op.cit., p. 235 
20 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 377 
21 Martin Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 13 
22 Deleuze and Guattari introduce the idea of “conceptual personae” who convey movement 
of thought in philosophy: “The conceptual persona is the becoming or the subject of a 
philosophy (…).” (Cf. Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 63) 
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film-image becomes literally a material and transcendent event in “Solaris”, 
something Dasein enters and exits. Where are we in this movie – in film, at the 
cinema or on Solaris? Has Dasein doubled or tripled, or are we out of the 
world?  
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III. 
FURTHER DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
 
A certain current of film theory has stressed the origin of film in photography. 
André Bazin, one of its main defenders, claims about the photographic image:  
“the photographic image is the object itself, (…) it shares, by virtue of the very 
process of its becoming, the being of the model of which it is the reproduction; 
it is the model.”23 This famous quote of Bazin is often interpreted in two ways: 
firstly as if reproduction would give the model an indexical reference or, 
secondly, as if reproduction would be an entity identical to its model, which 
would be a logical contradiction to be rejected. Within this treatise I will argue 
that both readings are not correct. Bazin’s claim “the photographic image is 
the model” goes in my interpretation of the French original beyond the 
indexical reading frequently established in anglophone film theory.  
Bazin further mentions a “transference of reality from the thing to its 
reproduction” 24  and somehow presupposes, without reflecting on it, an 
equalization of being and reality, two different terms, which usually are 
distinguished in the sense of incorporating different meanings. The traditional 
distinction of ‘being’ and ‘reality’ is reflected in the history of philosophy by the 
division between ontology and metaphysics, between the inquiry into being 
and about the fundamental nature of reality.  Yet both terms are 
                                                
23 André Bazin, What is Cinema?, p. 14 
24 Ibid., p. 14 
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equiprimordially25 entangled: reality is conceptually to be grasped as that kind 
of uniting totality in which being(s) unfold(s) and incorporates a more abstract 
level, whereas being is determining the more concrete characteristics of 
existing entities: for example, the being of a fish, a stone, a human being. 
There is no being without reality, and no reality without being. Being is 
inscribed into reality, yet reality is distinct from being, something larger than 
being, enfolding being. Although reality is composed by infinitely many being 
entities, it is also not the sum of beings, further not their being as such: the 
word reality refers to something else, which makes the being entities real, and 
which I propose to set as a kind of unknown variable for now.  
Often reality designates “the world” in which the entities are, just as 
Martin Heidegger describes it: being-in is the way in which being is, it always 
is a being-in-the-world26. Furthermore, the being of entities can be illusory, not 
real, whereas reality is always a part of the real. Can there be a pure being 
without reality? Is there at all such thing as “reality”? The labyrinth of 
questions coming up shows how we have to work carefully and try to define 
each of the terms, reality and being, before using composite terms like ‘the 
reality of being’ or ‘the being of reality’. This dissertation attempts to deal with 
this chain of questions.   
As we will see in closer examination, Bazin states that “to be the 
model” is something which can be shared by transfer of reality. This makes 
the being of the depicted object an entity which is transferable by reality, and 
vice versa, reality becomes transportable by being. This is then what the 
reproduction of reality means and even discloses. When I propose to unite 
being and reality (inspired by Bazin) composing the neologism ‘being of 
reality’, I want to stress that being, although relying on it, differs from reality: 
not reality is reproduced by film, but the being of reality.  
                                                
25 ‘Equiprimordial’ is first used in 1960 by John Macquarrie who has translated with this word 
Heidegger’s neologism “gleichursprünglich” in Being and Time. It means something existing 
since the beginning together, equally fundamental, conditioning each other. 
26 “‘Being-in’ is (…) the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-
in-the-world as its essential state.” (Cf. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 80) 
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The idea of the reproducibility of this being grounds the heart of the 
solaristic system and has given me reason to choose Heidegger as one of the 
central philosophical references in this dissertation: Heidegger has re-
introduced the question about being into modern philosophy. The solaristic 
system concerns this puzzling condition of film: we look at something 
indissociable from the model it refers to. Film is not representational, but, as 
Cavell, the American pioneer of philosophy of film claims, presentational, a 
characteristic which causes confusion:  
“A photograph does not present us with “likeness” of things; it presents us, we 
want to say, with the things themselves. But wanting to say that may well 
make us ontologically restless. (…) We do not know what a photograph is; we 
do not know how to place it ontologically.” 27 
Cavell thereby seems to ignore that the puzzling question already lies in the 
ontological condition of being itself:  we do not know what being is nor “how to 
place it ontologically”, and that is why, I argue, we do not know what the 
photographic reproduction of being is. On the other hand, what comes up by 
this specific reflection on the ontological nature of the photographic image or 
better, the object it depicts, is the following: to be reproducible is a quality of 
the being of reality. Therefore the connection between the photograph and the 
object lies in Bazin’s approach to describe the photographic image as a 
“transference of reality from the thing to its reproduction” 28.  
I propose to ask, in a Heideggerian way, for the being of objects in film 
and in the world (reality, although distinct from “nature”) and furthermore, 
building on Heidegger and his complex conception of “presence of what is 
present” 29, to ask for the ‘real of reality’ (and the ‘reality of the real’), which is 
shared by beings and can be the transferred into the photograph: a kind of 
essence of reality, which makes the being of the photograph real – it is not 
fictitious and it is not an illusion. Even if it was not the first intention of 
                                                
27 Stanley Cavell, op. cit., pp. 17-18 
28 André Bazin, op. cit., p. 14 
29 Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, p. 237 
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disclosure for Bazin, “to be the model” 30 is referred to as something which 
can be shared by transfer of reality. This being will be compared to the 
Heideggerian presence of what is present. 
 I further propose to compare this being with the Bergsonian concept of 
image. What an image exactly is matters in a special way for film, as it is the 
image of the ‘being of reality’ of the depicted object we are facing through 
photographic reproduction in motion. Or, as Cavell points it famously: “a 
painting is a world; a photograph is of the world”31. In summary, I will argue 
that the conclusions about the nature of filmic reproduction are to be sought in 
the area of the ‘being of reality’. It is this being of reality, a pure being out of 
time and space, which becomes reproducible in film, and this being transports 
the real of reality. 
It is further my intention to explore a post-mortem dimension of cinema 
(in the sense of surviving the reproduced entities) by appropriating 
Heidegger’s theory of death and his thought on projection (Entwurfsdenken). 
Thereby Heidegger’s concept of the nothing will be analyzed. His concept of 
nihilation (‘Nichtung’ in German), the nothing in action, will be compared to the 
Lacanian Real and to the void in Badiou’s thought. Furthermore, Karen 
Barad’s quantum ontology, especially her concept of intra-active 
entanglement 32 , calls for an apparatus-based agentialism, which can be 
analyzed by its metaphorical application to the planet Solaris in the movie. It is 
thereby my aim to show how the principles of thought present in “Solaris” and 
the ones of Heidegger, Barad, Badiou and others converge, expanding an 
ontological understanding of being - in reality and in film; the latter is providing 
a new techno-ontological condition which means a shift for human thought. 
This shift will be compared to Barad’s claims regarding a new causality which 
overcomes representationalism by arguing against the division between 
matter and meaning.  
                                                
30 André Bazin, op. cit., p. 14 
31 Stanley Cavell, op. cit., p. 24 
32 The term “intra-active entanglements” has been coined by Karen Barad in Meeting the 
Universe Halfway and designates an interactive relation between objects, which precedes 
and even causes their existence. Its detailed meaning will be further introduced. 
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To continue the preview: to complement Heidegger, Graham Harman’s 
object oriented ontology is to be taken into consideration, as well as aspects 
of Slavoj Žižek’s speculative reading of the Lacanian ‘Real’ and Badiou’s 
move, introducing mathematic set theory into ontology. The main approach to 
Badiou focuses on reality as multiple being, which is one aspect of being-in-
film and being-on-Solaris (the planet). The underlying idea of image is 
regarded as a dimension of its own – it does not belong nor to the mind, nor to 
matter. Heidegger’s idea of event will unexpectedly sustain our approach of 
the real image as event. 
To resume this chain of philosophical references to build on, the most 
important aspect to build the solaristic system on has to be mentioned: an 
intrinsic relation of film and philosophy. Cavell explicitly argues: “Film is made 
for philosophy,” he says,  “it shifts or puts different light on whatever 
philosophy has said about appearance and reality, about actors and 
characters, about skepticism and dogmatism, about presence and 
absence.“33 This position evokes and complements a further one, formulated 
decades earlier by Jean Epstein, who argues that film will raise a new 
philosophy, naming other topics as a basis for this philosophy of film:  
 
Animated images bring out the components of a general representation of the 
universe, which tends to modify thought as a whole in various ways. Hence, 
very old, perennial problems – antagonisms between matter and mind, 
continuity and discontinuity, movement and stasis, or the nature of space and 
time, and the existence and inexistence of any reality – come into view under 
a brand new light. A philosophy may then emerge from this play of light and 
shadow (…).34 
 
There is then a link between philosophy and film which is so deeply 
embedded in film, that film not only changes the way we philosophically deal 
with reality, but also, as Epstein and Cavell independently from one another 
claim, albeit in different terms, film may be ultimately linked to the complex 
                                                
33 Stanley Cavell, Reflections on a Life of Philosophy: An Interview with Stanley Cavell, p. 19  
34 Jean Epstein, The Intelligence of a Machine, p. xi 
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plane of reality, in terms of reproduction. I therefore propose to make a list of 
these pairs of terms on which film would change thought and even 
philosophy, fusing the positions of Epstein and Cavell: 
 
1. appearance and reality 
2. presence and absence 
3. actors and characters 
4. matter and mind 
5. continuity and discontinuity 
6. movement and stasis 
7. nature of space and time 
8. the existence and non-existence of any reality 
 
By what we have been referring until now, I would further add to that list: 
 
9. being and nothing 
10. life and death 
11. image and reality 
12. subject and object 
13. world and thought 
 
Thereby I have left out the pair “skepticism and dogmatism” because in my 
consideration it seems too much linked to Cavell’s specific project of 
philosophy. The addition of the points 9. to 13. will be further elucidated 
throughout; in a certain way they are domains, which naturally become an 
issue when one reflects on what is mentioned in  1. to 8. In the conclusions I 
will explicitly pick up these pairs of antagonisms to lay out the fourfold 
structure of the solaristic system in a summarized way. 
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IV. 
SOME REMARKS ON THE TERMINOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
Before exposing the detailed structure of this analysis chapter by chapter, I 
propose to give some further remarks clarifying the most important 
terminology I am using throughout. First of all, to consider the term ontology 
and its use throughout: what is ontology in general and what is it in our 
specific context, the proposal to develop an ontology of film? Ontology is 
generally understood as a branch of philosophy concerned with the 
fundamental nature of being of everything that may exist. An ontology of film 
proposes then to analyze the specific nature of film’s being; but such an 
analysis cannot be separated from the challenge of dealing with reality: the 
being of film is also of, dependent on and entangled with that which is called 
‘reality’ (I recall the ‘unknown variable’) – because the being of reality is that 
which film reproduces, its raw material. Therefore an ontology of film is always 
also an impossible ontology of reality with epistemological and metaphysical 
features: What is the being of reality - a “real of reality”? What makes the film 
images real if not their being? A film somehow is a metaphysical unity, in 
which each filmic frame reproduces the same metaphysical domain called 
reality, whether we define it as fluid and multiple or not. Furthermore, with the 
extended proposal of the solaristic system being a “techno-ontology” I want to 
call attention for the extension of ontological condition, which is a techno-
  
35 
ontological one when it comes to cinema and film: the consciousness of a 
technological apparatus is reproduced. 
 Secondly, we need to define and distinguish the terms “film” and 
“cinema”. Gilbert Cohen-Séat pioneered in the 1940ies with an early 
distinction between a filmic and a cinematic fact:  
 
The filmic fact consists of the expression of life (the life of the world, the spirit, 
the imagination, of beings and things), through a system of combined images 
(visual – natural or conventional – and auditory – sounds and words). The 
cinematic fact, instead, consists of social circulation of sensations, ideas, 
feelings, and materials that come from life itself and that cinema shapes 
according to its desires.35  
 
It is according to this definition of filmic and cinematic fact, that I will 
use the word film or cinema throughout this thesis, although with some slight 
modifications: With “film” I mean any kind of audiovisual reproduction of being 
and of reality in general, whether structured in cinematic form or not, whether 
recorded digitally, by video or on celluloid. The singular form of film is “a film”, 
which designates one specific single piece of audiovisual reproduction to be 
described in its unique characteristics. With “cinema” I mean the kind of 
audiovisual reproduction of reality, which is structured through certain 
characteristics like storytelling, affection, dramaturgy, mise-en-scène, whether 
fictional or not. Cinema is the general term, of which “movie” is the single 
form: one piece of audiovisual reproduction of reality structured through 
certain characteristics like storytelling, affection, dramaturgy, mise-en-scène, 
whether fictional or not. Anyway, I regard movies as representatives for film 
since they present the general audiovisual features, which define film.  
The term “philosophy of film” has become established in substitution of 
“philosophy of cinema”: film embodies both cinema and other forms of 
audiovisual reproduction. This distinctive terminology is of contemporary 
relevance, as cinema has become expanded first through video in the 1980ies 
                                                
35  Gilbert Cohen-Séat, Essai sur les principes d'une philosophie du cinéma : notions 
fondamentales et vocabulaire de filmologie, p.57 (translation mine – C.R.) 
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and later through the digital, since the new millennium in a mobile way. 
Therefore the most correct expression would be to speak of “technologically 
apparatus-based media of the real image in movement” to include all forms of 
technological, visual reproduction of reality. It is thereby evident for me that 
cinema has been the first such medium and is thus a representative for all the 
following technologically apparatus-based media of the real image in 
movement, even those, which contemporarily dominate our perception and 
relation to reality with much more power, as McLuhan describes: “Today after 
more than a century of electric technology, we have extended our central 
nervous system itself in a global embrace, abolishing both space and time as 
far as our planet is concerned.”36 Cinema was the first medium to abolish 
natural space and time by replacing them. 
  
                                                
36 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, p. 3 
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V. 
SUMMARY OF THE STRUCTURE 
 
The first part “The Emergence of the Solaristic System” (consisting of 
chapters I to VII) is an introduction. After some preliminary interrogations, the 
idea of the solaristic system is briefly heralded and some developing thoughts 
necessary to justify its methods and emergence outlined, such as the 
ontological puzzle of apparatus-based reproduction of reality and the self-
reflexivity of this theme in the movie “Solaris”, justifying it as especially apt to 
be the base-ground for the development of a philosophy of film to be called 
the solaristic system. Among other philosophers Martin Heidegger is 
introduced as one of the most important references to underpin this analysis 
concerning reality in film and its ontological nature. Since Heidegger is a 
philosopher reflecting on the presence and absence of being and time, his 
work conceptually overlaps with some of the most crucial questions raised by 
the emergence of film: what can we say about the being of film? 
Moreover, a detailed description of the plot and mise-en-scène of the 
film “Solaris” is given, to give the reader the opportunity to immerse himself 
into the density of the movie without watching it. Additionally, a short history of 
philosophy of film introduces the main positions important to justify the rise of 
the solaristic system as a necessary step for advancing within the realm of 
philosophy of film. Pointing out the relevance of former positions of philosophy 
of film for the scope of analysis, the movie “Solaris” is justified as a piece of 
philosophy and its main philosophical interrogations are sketched. Gilles 
Deleuze and Stanley Cavell are then chosen and discussed as the two main 
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philosophers to have introduced the reflection about film in their own 
philosophical scope of approach. Cavell and Deleuze still today dominate the 
main currents of philosophy of film. The solaristic system is an attempt to go 
beyond the projects of these two philosophers. 
 
In the second part of analysis entitled “Solaristic Twists” (chapters VIII to 
X) the first steps towards the solaristic system will be delineated, as well as 
the underlying understanding of reality and its reproduction in film. Thereby 
three different although correlated definitions of film will be gradually 
presented, fundamentally characterizing film’s entangled relation with reality. 
These are firstly, film as the catalyzer of a multifold model of reality, secondly 
film as a non-human tool (a technological apparatus) evoking epistemological 
change and thirdly film as an automatic reproduction of the real of reality. 
Further concepts fundamental for our scope of analysis will be introduced such 
as the “real of reality” and the “being of reality”, and the question of their 
reproduction in film will be asked. 
 
Chapter VIII named “What Happens to Reality in Film?” proceeds on Cavell’s 
puzzling statement that a photographic image (which constitutes the film image) 
presents us “with the things themselves”37 and not with any kind of similarity or 
representation, therefore concluding that we “do not know” how to “place a 
photograph” “ontologically”38. Our analysis starts where Cavell refers to magic: 
what is the being of a photograph? Cutting back to Bazin, on whom Cavell is 
basing his observation, we find out that there is “transference of reality from the 
thing to its reproduction” 39 , from the model to its image. Therefore Bazin 
concludes “the model is the image” 40.  I will give a reading of this assumption, 
that reaches beyond the indexical. Although having started with a question 
about reality, we have now turned to a reflection on being, which in light of 
photographic reproduction becomes a new predicate: it can be transferred, is 
                                                
37 Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed, p. 16 
38 Ibid., p. 16 
39 André Bazin, op. cit., p. 14 
40 Ibid., p. 14 
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thus shareable and reproducible. How can being be shared and how does it so 
through the photographic image? Moreover, how can we even pose this 
question without asking about being in the first place?   
By arguing so, the investigation is now compelled to look for Martin 
Heidegger who has reintroduced the question about being in modern 
philosophy, claiming that we do not know what being is. Therefore Heidegger 
attempts, in Being and Time, to consider being from Dasein’s point of view, 
conditioned by temporality. Being becomes then a being-towards-death, and 
most importantly: being is time for Heidegger. “Our provisional aim is the 
interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding 
whatsoever of Being.“41 Film is often described as time-based art and for 
Tarkovsky filmmaking is best described as sculpting in time, as film enables 
the possibility to bring time back. Film is reproduced being. This kind of time-
based “cine-being” is characteristic of the being in and on the planet Solaris, a 
being of memory images (in a Bergsonian sense), simultaneously evoking a 
death-driven and spectral character of film. 
After having elucidated this first sense of being in film, we should come 
back to the term „being of reality“ which becomes reproducible in film, and ask 
after the term reality: how can we reflect on film and its relation to reality, if we 
have not clarified what reality is? 
 
Therefore chapter IX entitled “Twisted Reality and its Reproduction” aims to 
develop further the concept of reality we are talking about, referring to 
different models of multifold reality. Although the analysis mentions the 
dichotomy of idealism - materialism, its main focus lies on the contemporary 
comeback of materialism and realism, presenting a new speculative twist 
concerning the knowledge of reality and the problem of human access. This 
new twist has hardly been explored in the context of aesthetics, and even less 
in the context of film. The chapter develops the idea of multifold reality, with an 
infinity of possible worlds. Thereby special attention is given to Henri Bergson, 
who can be seen as an early pioneer of speculative materialism, and who 
                                                
41 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 1 
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claims that perception corresponds to the reality of the perceived object: the 
world is image for Bergson, itself composed of images, which interact. Mind 
and matter are thereby equally real, in the sense that both are images, 
whereby interiority and exteriority are only relations among images. 
Furthermore, there are some images which are not perceived. Reality is then 
defined as a multitude of image(s).  
In contemporary philosophy the discussion on reality and its perception 
has taken an ontological turn; speculative realism in particular has given the 
reflection on reality a new realist or materialist twist, delineating an ontological 
framework and considering its epistemological implications. The common aim 
is to overcome „correlationism“, the claim that thought cannot get outside 
itself, yet the positions in materialism and realism are differing from each 
other. Correlationism is also a position, which Bergson would have rejected, 
whereas Heidegger presents correlationist aspects, although a realist reading 
of it can be given. Graham Harman (object-oriented-ontology) and Markus 
Gabriel (new realism) are mentioned as examples of speculative realism, 
whereas Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek are considered transcendental 
materialists, together with Gilles Deleuze as a precursor. In all cases we are 
confronted with complex and multifold models of reality. Gabriel’s theory on 
reality is of special relevance to our context: he postulates the existence of 
fields of sense, which can interact and overlap, yet rejects the unifying 
category of reality as such. An interesting comparison can be drawn between 
Gabriel’s concept of field and Bergson’s idea of image, and it is, in our 
context, worth to think about the reproduction of what we will call fields of 
images. 
The reproduction of reality must then be multifold and composed of 
different kinds of fields. Yet is such a multifold being of reality reproducible?  
The answer at that state of analysis is that the different multifold areas are 
interconnected, we cannot separate them; for example, we cannot reproduce 
only physical reality. On the other hand we cannot reproduce all the fields of 
images at once, the whole of manifoldness. Why is that so? Similarly to 
Markus Gabriel, for the pioneer thinker and filmmaker Epstein reality as such 
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is non-existing because it consists of a “sum of unrealities” 42, and he argues 
that this nature of reality (its unrealness) is disclosed by film. In that way film 
unveils properties of reality which otherwise would have remained withdrawn. 
Even recognizing the possibility of manifoldness of reality being reproduced, 
we have so far rather presupposed the reproduction of reality than actually 
defined the principle of reproduction: what of reality is shared and reproduced 
in film, which transmits manifoldness? 
 
Chapter X, entitled “Asking for the Real of Reality” is one of the most 
important chapters of the thesis. It attempts to elaborate a definition of what of 
reality is being reproduced in film, proceeding from Alain Badiou’s claim 
“Cinema is a new relationship to the Real itself” 43. According to Bergson the 
world is image, but what is an image? And is the reproduced image we see in 
film the same as its original? For Bergson “interiority and exteriority are only 
relations among images”44  and therefore not to be separated. As Pasolini 
argues the film spectator has the impression to be “right inside reality”45 - but 
where are we actually when we watch a movie? What is it of reality that 
makes film reality be as real as reality? And how can this real of reality be 
transferred from life to celluloid?  
This apparent paradox of cinema and reality is symptomatic for the 
fundamental nature of such a real: the real of reality lies beyond reality’s 
physical side and is independent of time and space. This would attribute to the 
real of reality a kind of fluid and immaterial existence: it is a characteristic of 
being, yet to be characterized as a being without being - the main feature of 
“Solaris’” central character Harey, who is also its main conceptual persona 
(CP). 
Cavell stands in accordance to this line of reasoning when he 
characterizes objects in film: He actually describes their presence as referring 
                                                
42 Jean Epstein, op. cit., p. 15 
43 Alain Badiou, op. cit. 
44 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, p. 13 
45 Pier Paolo Pasolini, Pasolini on Pasolini: Interviews with Oswald Stack, p. 29 
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“to their absence, their location in another place.” 46  Film then is real by 
negating the presence of what is real, which again is negated. It is referring to 
an absence which negates its absence, as it simultaneously evokes presence 
– a negation of negation of the real, similar to Badiou’s claim: “It [cinema] is 
the absence of the Real but as a new form of knowledge.”47 This absence 
recasts film as a phantasmagoric scenario of the dead ones, as on Solaris. 
CP Harey stands for cine-being and her existence permits new kind of 
conclusion. Death has been accessed by film. The hypothesis of film-as-death 
reassesses Heidegger’s concepts of being, time and death. Film-as-death, is 
furthermore a possibility for doubled Dasein experiencing a being-in-death 
without dying.  
Also, Cavell’s idea of presence in film (which is an absence) is actually 
based on Heidegger. The latter actually distinguishes between being present 
as “lying-before-us” and “presence itself”: “Presence itself is precisely the 
presence of what is present.“ 48  Heidegger roots presence in the Greek 
parousía, which he translates into German conveying it a sense of dwelling in 
time, a sense of permanence opposed to a mere presence in the present, 
which is neither being nor time for Heidegger. Time consists for Heidegger in 
the unity of three ecstases (past, present and future). Even in the present, the 
two other ecstases remain, although absent, as a presence of absence. He 
says: “this not-present-any-more is immediately present in its absence [west 
in seinem Abwesen unmittelbar an]” 49 .  Being as presence itself thus 
implicates the possibility of its own not-being-any-more. It is the presence of 
CP Harey, which is not anymore, evoking a transcendental materiality of film. 
This evokes transcendental materialism, of which Badiou is to be considered 
a pioneer. 
Two central concepts of Badiou’s thought are then analyzed as being 
important to our context: the ontology of multiplicity and the void of Lacan’s 
                                                
46 Stanley Cavell, op. cit., p. xvi 
47 Alain Badiou, op. cit. 
48 Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, p. 237 
49 Martin Heidegger (translation mine – C.R.), Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 13 
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concept of the Real. Does it make sense that this Real in film is becoming a 
transcending real of reproduction? 
In Being and Event Badiou fuses the set theory of mathematician 
Georg Cantor with Heideggerian ontology. Following Cantor, Being is for 
Badiou not ‘one’ and also not ‘one multiple’50 because ‘one’ simply is not. 
Instead Being is infinite multiplicity for Badiou, an idea grounded in Cantor’s 
set theory where absolutely infinite multiplicity is designated as inconsistent51. 
This inconsistency refers to a pure non-being and represents the idea of the 
unthinkable, therefore Badiou names it “the void”52. Transferring this concept 
to the solaristic system, CP Harey is then the embodiment of being as a void. 
Grounded in Cantor, thinking the Real for Badiou presents a way to think the 
impossible 53  and film may be one possible tool for thinking such an 
“impossible Real” in terms of its of reproduction. Badiou further grounds his 
concept of the Real in Lacan, who designates the Real as „that which resists 
symbolization absolutely“ and which is a void because "it is the world of words 
that creates the world of things”54. The concept of the void establishes thus an 
equalization between being and “the Real”. Now it does not seem a paradox 
anymore, that the real of reality or the being of reality is conveyed by the 
“transference of reality” 55 in film, as mentioned by Bazin. 
The Lacanian idea maintained by Badiou – that of setting the Real 
inside the subject – indicates one more reason why film is so especially 
suitable for this inquiry into being and reality: film is the pure being of 
                                                
50 “(B)eing is neither one (because only presentation itself is pertinent to the count-as-one), 
nor multiple (because the multiple is solely the regime of presentation).” Ibid., p. 24 
51 Badiou quotes Cantor: “On the one hand, a multiplicity may be such that the affirmation 
according to which all its elements ‘are together’ leads to a contradiction, such that it is 
impossible to conceive the multiplicity as a unity, as a ‘finite thing’. These multiplicities, I 
name them absolutely infinite multiplicities, or inconsistent.”  (Ibid., pp. 41-42) 
52 Ibid., p. 52 
53 “I think that the impossible is precisely the name of the Real. “ Alain Badiou, The Critique of 
Critique: Critical Theory as a New Access to the Real, (available online) 
54 Jacques Lacan, "The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis", in: 
Écrits: A Selection, p. 65 
55 Bazin, What is Cinema?, p. 14 
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subjectivity (which is a void), yet in objectified form: it is recorded and 
reproducible; its material quality discloses an immateriality under very specific 
conditions of projection. Adrian Johnston claims that there is a “more-than-
materiality negativity”, which transposed to our context fits not only the being 
in film but also the visitors on Solaris, when one recalls their presence-of-
absence condition. The material quality of film - “as light as light”56 - becomes 
then next issue. How does the idea of a more-than-material negativity of film 
fit the quality of light? Invisible light, to distinguish from visible light or image, 
implies an infinity of possible images, and simultaneously is a void: a white 
hole of the whole of possible images.  
 
The third part called “Solaristic Implications” (chapter XI to XIV) consists of 
the completions of some of the aspects elaborated so far, considering 
ramifications and specifications. 
 
Chapter XI entitled “Man’s Broken Link with Reality and Being-in-Film” 
starts with the evocation of Bazin’s myth of total cinema 57, describing a film 
that would recreate the world in its integrity, and thus substitute reality. In our 
context that would be a film which would convey the real of reality as an 
actuality, the whole white hole becoming image – the total real as image, as a 
totality, as the “real image”. In the movie “Solaris” it adopts a physical 
dimension, as if translating itself into the human. The planet is the white whole 
of total cinema, an actualization of all possible images as a reality, “The 
material universe, the plane of immanence”58. Bazin’s evocation of total cinema 
has been inverted into a skeptical hypothesis employed by Deleuze: Modern 
man no longer believes in the world and faces it as if watching a (bad) movie.  
Are we living in a film? How can we distinguish the images of film and the 
ones of natural perception? Our relation towards reality has changed: that which 
Deleuze calls the link between modern man and the world has broken because 
                                                
56 Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed, p. 24 
57 André Bazin, op. cit., p. 21 
58 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, p. 61 
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under the influence of film, of reproduced past, we feel reality as it surrounds us - 
a mere contingency of the real. In this sense reality is one film, which wakes the 
longing for total cinema, for the absolute, real image, but cannot achieve it.  
The chapter then focuses on the neologism being-in-film, which has been 
mentioned before, but not explained in detail, stemming from Heidegger’s being-
in-the world (which from now on is understood as our being in reality). Being-in-
film is a state of Dasein while watching a movie, and it simultaneously 
becomes a way of being a spectator of reality. Heidegger stresses that the 
signification of being-in-the-world entails completeness: “A structure that is 
primordially and constantly whole.”59 Yet, a fundamental problem for Heidegger 
is grasping being-in-the-world as a whole: it presupposes Dasein’s death. I 
argue that in film we can grasp the whole of the being-in-the-world, as long as 
being-in-the-world is being-in-film. This disclosure has to do with the deathlike 
nature of film; film is fundamentally closed in itself, forming a whole in the sense 
we have previously set up. Dasein is always still there after the film-death, as it 
has doubled.  
With this in mind it is now possible to reassess the presupposition of the 
chapter, namely Deleuze’s claim of the broken link. Deleuze’s approach only 
takes into account the spectator-Dasein; he describes, in fact, a being-towards-
film; therefore the Deleuzian problem is to not access being-in-film, Dasein’s 
most important catalyst of film as world. However it is argued, that the main 
question of the link addresses neither film, nor the world, but the “in” of being-in 
to be considered the link of Dasein with one or the other. Further aspects of the 
link seem to lie in the nature of time.  
For Heidegger, Being is time, experienced by Dasein; Dasein’s standpoint 
on being-in is temporality. A lacking link between Dasein and world would then 
imply a lack of actuality or temporal presence. Yet what in time makes the actual 
real be present in both, film and world? I propose to think in terms of double 
negation when regarding film as world and world as film. We have defined this 
negation of negation in film before, concerning the reproduced real of reality in 
film: Film is real by negating the presence of what is real, which again is 
                                                
59 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 225 
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negated. It is referring to an absence which negates its absence, as it 
simultaneously evokes presence. Hegel applies a similar principle of the 
negation of negation to time and space, thus enabling Derrida’s principle of the 
trace [le trace]: a becoming-space of time and a becoming-time of space. 
 I argue in what follows that the trace is exactly the characteristic of 
time, which shapes film into reality and reality into film. I therefore propose to 
regard the trace as the Deleuzian link between Dasein and world, and the link 
between Dasein and film, the in of being-in of Being as time. Filming is tracing 
and tracing is filming. Film captures and reproduces the presence of the 
presence of the moment of the now. Being-in-the-world is tracing, as is being-
in-film. A bundle of new questions emerges: how is this principle of life that 
which persists as a secret of time and space, that which makes the real of 
reality real? How is it possible that the visitors in Solaris can stabilize out of 
nothing, neutrinos, which are reflected human energy? How does the now of 
being catalyze the future into the past? And how can Dasein come to 
process constantly towards that which it projects?  
 
Chapter XII, entitled “The Myth of Total Cinema and the Cinematic Suicide of 
Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk” builds on the claim that the solaristic longing for 
death is a cinematographic principle actually anchored in German romanticism. 
Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk, the ‘total work of art’, which is regarded as the 
precursor artform, has anticipated cinema’s main aesthetic principles, and 
fulfills this solaristic longing for death as an aesthetic principle. The smashing 
and overwhelming principle of ‘total enchantment’ (Totalverzauberung) is 
thereby the twist to how the death wish is driven forward and realized. It 
provokes the dissolution of the spectator as well as the annihilation of the 
character on stage (at the end of the play). The implied switch of realities, 
which by Walter Benjamin is enabled by what he calls “distraction”, resembles 
Bazin’s principle of total cinema: the wishful thinking of the complete 
substitution of reality. This desire is equivalent to an epistemic search for 
knowledge, for truth or for some manifestation of the real; it longs for the 
disclosure of that which Heidegger calls "Sein als Ganzes" - "being-a-whole", 
achieved in death. The wish to go to the cinema corresponds then to a wish for 
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knowledge as well as a wish for death, corresponding to the romantic 
“Todessehnsucht”, a dominant idea among artists at Wagner’s time. 
Simultaneously, the spectator meets the dead ones in film: he is confronted 
with that which has already passed, with a “show of specters” 60, and indirectly 
experiences death (that Dasein doubles by being-in-film has been explained 
in the previous chapter). Cinema thereby corresponds to the continuing need 
of Dasein to close or conclude the "permanently-unsolved" of being, to reach 
"being-as-a-whole" (Seiendes im Ganzen). This wish causes in Dasein an 
existential desire for death. Death implies in cinema its own transcendence, 
constantly, a double negation of Hegelian character: it is precisely our finitude, 
which makes us look for transcendence of any kind and at any instant. Death 
also is a narrative principle in the sense of closure. Therefore, as long as we 
are mortal, we will search for meaning and for narrative.  
In “Solaris” the desire for death is the main endeavor of central character 
and conceptual persona Harey. “Solaris” can therefore be designated a 
“suicide machine”. 
 
Chapter XIII entitled as “The Solaristic Apparatus” approaches the idea 
to set the planet Solaris as a techno-organic device and thereby evokes 
Benjamin’s cine-apparatus as well as Karen Barad’s intra-actively entangled 
apparatus, which she develops from Foucault’s “dispositif”. Barad’s theory is 
thereby transposed into the context of film and to the solaristic system, 
whereas Benjamin’s cine-apparatus is deepened by a brief look on his 
conception of technology. We thereby firstly introduce the idea of intra-active 
entanglement of mind and matter, arguing with Henri Bergson, to better 
understand the concept within our scope of analysis. For Bergson the world is 
image and thereby he defines matter as an aggregate of images which interact 
with each other61 and where „interiority and exteriority are only relations among 
images.” 62  Mind and material world, subjectivity and reality are related for 
                                                
60 See:  Jean-Louis Leutrat, Vie des fântomes – Le Fantastique au Cinéma, p. 41 
61 “I call matter the aggregate of images and perception of matter these same images referred 
to the eventual action of one particular image, my body.” (Cf. Henri Bergson, op. cit., p. 7) 
62 Ibid., p. 13 
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Bergson. According to Barad, mind and world, meaning and matter, are intra-
actively entangled by diffraction, a position actually based on Niels Bohr’s 
quantum physics. In “Solaris” reality is reproduced while a mysterious process 
is taking place, in which the reproduced reality starts to interact in form of the 
visitors who materialize by intra-action. That is why Solaris itself is set as a 
conceptual persona, a cosmic apparatus, an unknown form of organic 
machine, a huge brain. Its dynamism fits Barad’s reconfiguring of “space-time 
matters as part of the ongoing dynamism of becoming.”63 
Walter Benjamin’s apparatus is defined as a mechanical device 
penetrating into reality, further selecting, recording, shaping and assembling 
the reproduced reality, producing thereby immediate reality, more real for the 
viewer than the reality it depicts. It stresses the positive sense in which 
Benjamin relies on technology, as the filmic apparatus gives access to what 
remains sealed otherwise: “immediate reality” 64 which we have defined as a 
synonym for the real of reality. This position opposes and is not to be 
confused with the “apparatus-theory” emerging in the 1960ies. This theory 
claims an illusory effect of cinema based on the invisibility of the cine-
apparatus, deceiving the cine-spectator, just as the cave dwellers in Plato’s 
allegory of the cave are deceived. Contemporary philosophy - and Colin 
McGinn is hereby referred to as an example - claims the opposite and gives a 
new and different reading on Plato’s cave and its relation to film: cinema is to 
be read in the platonic sense as a medium, which gives us access to truth, a 
reading much more close to Benjamin’s position (claiming to access 
“immediate reality”). Furthermore, Benjamin’s apparatus (whose nature is 
technological) anticipates a conflation and reconcilement between technology 
and nature, which becomes explicit in the narrative of the film “Solaris” as 
well. The planet-brain Solaris is a super-intelligent, organic machine, in the 
sense of a cyborg, an organic, intelligent machine. Solaris is not human yet 
creates post-human and trans-human circumstances, tending towards Bazin’s 
                                                
63 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter 
and Meaning, Duke University Press, 2007, p.142 and p. 146 
64 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”, in: Illuminations, p. 
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total cinema, or towards the realization of a universal “worldbrain” 65: a utopian 
network, where the organic and the technological sphere would be connected 
and accessible via the brain. 
The solaristic brain is further intra-actively entangled with matter, 
thereby relying on a new form of diffractional thinking, to be distinguished from 
reflection, which Barad proposes. Based on Bohr’s ideas of quantum physics 
this kind of thinking calls for a new kind of causality, wherein measurement 
plays a central role, yet in a new non-dualist sense: measurements are 
worldmaking and that is what the planet Solaris does, as well as cinema. 
 
Chapter XIV is entitled “The Real, the Virtual and the Subjective Side of 
Knowledge”. Departing from Plato’s Cave, insinuating that we are deluded by 
our perception, this chapter asks for skeptical tradition in philosophy: can we be 
sure that we are not sitting in Plato’s cave? René Descartes questions whether 
we can distinguish the actual reality from dreaming. He argues that although we 
cannot be sure of such distinction, thoughts are true and give a clue as to the 
truth of our existence. Descartes thereby sets up the dualist thought of 
modernity, setting oppositional dichotomies like interior and exterior, body and 
mind, the illusory (fictional) as opposed to true reality and knowledge. The only 
way out for Descartes is to trust thought and logic. 
Descartes’ position here reflects what I summarize with the term 
virtuality of reality alluding to a dominant postmodern idea, which questions – 
influenced by the omnipresence of mediated reality of the new media 
(cyberspace, computer games etc.) – whether we can at all distinguish 
between reality and fiction. Fiction thereby refers to the new computer 
generated virtual worlds or “virtual realities”. 
For contemporary philosophers like Gilles Deleuze, the term virtual has 
a complete other meaning and refuses dualism: he distinguishes between the 
virtual and actual, whereby both are equally real. Building on this position, 
Slavoj Žižek reverts the hypothesis of the “virtual reality” into the “reality of the 
virtual”, which is, according to Žižek, isomorphic to the Lacanian Real. Žižek 
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further refers to quantum physics and evokes the example of light, strikingly 
resembling the white hole of the whole of all possible images we have 
introduced in chapter X. 
The chapter then analyzes Nick Bostrom’s “simulation hypothesis” 
asking if we could be living in a computer simulation, a question which we apply 
here to “Solaris”: we could think about the happenings on the space station as 
a selective computer generated simulation, set up for unknown purposes by the 
solaristic brain. The visitors would have then the same nature as some of the 
humans, designed to measure reactions on Kelvins mind. This hypothesis 
would emphasize the inhuman pressure felt by the characters of the film, 
invoking a special emphasis on the emotional and indirect approach between 
Kelvin and Harey, one taking place by love. 
Anticipating thus Harman’s hypothesis of approaching that which cannot 
be known, namely the real object, other then indirectly, for example by love, we 
can name an allusional principle of solaristic philosophy, relying on a 
deliberately subjective method to access the real. This kind of approach is then 
compared to Žižek’s claim that the “human eye expands perception” 66 , 
because “it inscribes what it ‘really sees’ into the intricate network of 
memories and anticipations” 67 . Žižek’s next step consists in assuming 
subjectivity to be an incompleteness, and as such a part of totality, yet an 
incomplete one. He further claims that the “thickness of objectivity resisting 
the subject’s grasp is precisely the subjective moment” 68 which completes 
reality to a whole. To conclude the chapter I shall draw a correspondence of 
the Heideggerian nothing and the domain of the real, setting them as a 
cinematographic condition – the need for projection to escape the void. 
 
The fourth part of the analysis called “Solaristic Conclusions – the Links of 
the Solaristic System” (consisting in the final chapters XV and XVI) aims to 
conclude this analysis by unfolding a fourfold structure of the solaristic system, 
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67 Ibid., p.4 
68 Slavoj Žižek, Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism, p. 807 
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a disclosure based on what has been said so far, as well as adding some new 
aspects.  
 
Chapter XV is entitled “Raising a Solaristic Fourfold” and traces the 
development of such a fourfold model to summarize the solaristic system. Yet 
how to build a systematic structure apt for summarizing the conclusions on 
what is the solaristic system as it has been described so far? As a help 
construction we will firstly introduce Heidegger’s fourfold and then rely on 
Harman’s object-oriented ontology (OOO) as an example on how to transpose 
this fourfold thinking into new contexts. Such a fourfold method – to develop a 
network of relations based on four poles - will then be applied to the solaristic 
system. 
 Heidegger’s fourfold is thereby not only the point of departure but also 
the point of arrival of this chapter. Its four poles are especially apt to be applied 
to the movie “Solaris”: Earth, sky, divinities and mortals become in the solaristic 
system Earth, planet Solaris, visitors and humans - and the mortality of the 
latter ones in fact plays a major role. Heidegger describes in this context death 
as a turning principle for the mortals to be able to face “Being as Being” in the 
following sense: “As the shrine of Nothing, death harbors within itself the 
presencing of Being. As the shrine of Nothing, death is the shelter of Being.”69 
Harman asserts that the fourfold is the kernel of Heidegger’s monotonous 
philosophy (the dichotomy of presence and absence) and of his tool-analysis, 
stressing that it consists in four poles, mainly ignoring the four entities named 
by Heidegger which correspond so well to “Solaris”. 
Harman gives a new reading on Heidegger’s tool analysis and based on 
this reading he develops his object-oriented approach, relying on a fourfold 
structure. Harman’s step consists in designating readiness-to-hand of tools 
(entities) as the real of objects, and their presence-to-hand as their sensual 
properties. He then distinguishes between all of real objects, real qualities, 
sensual objects and sensual qualities. These four poles are linked through a 
network of relations, of which I have specially focused on causation and allure 
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as especially relevant for the solaristic system. 
According to Harman, the domain of the real is withdrawing from any 
possible relation of access: “If there were nothing but real objects and real 
qualities, there would be no experience and no causal relations at all. Everything 
would withdraw into private seclusion, devoid of contact.” 70  But then he 
continues: “We know them [the real qualities of real objects] indirectly, 
allusively.”71 That is why, a disruption to the regular condition of the domain of 
the real is needed, although not as a fissure, but as a fusion with the domain of 
the sensual. This kind of fusion is what Harman names allure: “When this occurs 
between a withdrawn real object and its sensual qualities, we can speak of 
allure, since there is something allusive about the way the object signals to us.”72 
This reminds us, of course, of the solaristic principle of being without being, 
and the presence of absence of the objects in film, mentioned by Cavell.  
Furthermore, this is what happens on the planet Solaris with the 
visitors: they were sensual objects, perceptive memories, and by human 
allure, they have become real images, real objects. This is how Harey 
emerges. We might as well speak of solaristic causation here. Indeed, allure 
and causation are nearly the same for Harman: “causation and allure are so 
closely related that they turn out to be one and the same.” 73  
Harman calls causation the fusion between real objects and real 
qualities, which normally withdraw in essence. This inaccessible essence, for 
Harman, “can never come to view”.74 Yet causation is different from essence, 
as it is not the withdrawing tension, but the fusion, thus the disturbance of 
essence; and in this sense an event in an area, which has to remain 
eventless, yet occurring in this domain of the real: “But when real objects are 
fused with real qualities allied with it for the first time, we can speak of 
causation, since this is where consequences unfold for the world.”75 
                                                
70 Graham Harman, Bells and Whistles, p. 63  
71 Graham Harman, ibid., p. 64 
72 Ibid., p. 69 
73 Graham Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, p. 214 
74 Graham Harman, Bells and Whistles, p. 69 
75 Ibid., p. 69 
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The last part of the chapter then focuses on the hypothesis to 
transpose Heidegger’s fourfold to the solaristic system, by firstly clarifying the 
concepts of the entities constituting the fourfold. To give then an example of 
the emerging relations within the fourfold, I propose to think about the real 
image as a causation as well as allure, continuing with the following question: 
What is an image for the solaristic fourfold? 
 
Chapter XVI entitled “Conclusions and Cardinal Tenets of the Solaristic 
System” aims to finally summarize the solaristic system as a fourfold structure, 
naming its links and relations between the four poles. These poles, although 
relying on Heidegger and Harman, pick up the oppositional pairs defined by 
Epstein and Cavell (mentioned in the introduction), on which film would 
automatically philosophically reflect. These pairs are then divided into four 
groups, one group for each entity of the fourfold. The structure outline of the 
solaristic system consists in 45 theses, as an attempt to embody what has 
been said so far on the solaristic system in a systematic way. The chapter 
concludes by briefly reflecting on related issues and perspectives for further 
analysis. 
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VI. 
THE PLOT OF THE MOVIE “SOLARIS” 
 
 
 
 
 
With this chapter I aim to give a detailed description of the narrative plot and 
diegesis of “Solaris”, as well as some impressions on the dramaturgy. 
Although I recommend the reader to have seen the movie before engaging 
into this analysis, I want to guarantee the accessibility of my writing to those 
who do not know the movie at all or have seen it many years ago. Also it is 
necessary to clarify the underlying understanding of the narrative meaning of 
the movie. I will also include, as part of the detailed plot description, some 
observations on the mise-en-scène, the kind of framing and montage 
Tarkvosky uses, as well as some other relevant aesthetic choices regarding 
image, sound, framing and camera movement.  
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PART 1 
 
The film opens on Earth. It is summer. Floating seaweeds and leaves in a 
stream of water. Lingering on their rhythm smoothly moving in the water flow 
is meditative. As the camera goes up passing on reeds, bushes and very tall 
grass, we meet the middle-aged protagonist Kris Kelvin during a walk into 
nature. We can feel the heat and the smell of green trees and grass, the 
flowers and the insects, suggested by zoom in and long pans in movement, 
extremely close and a tactile use of sound. A beautiful black horse steps by.  
 
 
 
Kris Kelvin, now on ¾ scale, is revealed as immersed in his thoughts; 
he walks near his father’s home (as we understand later), an old-fashioned, 
big wooden countryside house, yet with a modern country road nearby. Kelvin 
observes from far away how a visitor (named Berton) arrives by car 
accompanied by a child and is welcomed by a man we later learn to be 
Kelvin’s father. They wave and call for Kelvin, who doesn’t seem willing to 
speak and would rather be alone.  
The father and the visitor are conversing and we understand that 
Kelvin is a “solaristic scientist” who now takes daily morning walks into nature 
for at least one hour, because sometimes he works for the whole night. We 
come into the house. The fact that it is wooden and full of small objects 
indicates a homage to the classical human culture, a balanced harmony 
between knowledge and nature: old measurement instruments, a cage with 
birds, white busts of admired people from former times, graphics from balloon 
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aviation, selected wooden furniture; flowers and tree branches from the 
countryside in vases reinforce the peaceful, harmonic ambience. The photo of 
a woman with long blond hair, looking right into the camera, receives some 
instants of attention. Her intense gaze makes her very present. 
We further understand from the talking, that soon Kelvin will have to 
leave Earth for a mission on a space station and that his first report will be of 
crucial importance for the continuation of the station. Berton expresses his 
concern, that messages from there seem confusing or even 
incomprehensible. If Kelvin confirms this impression, the space station will be 
taken off the Solaris orbit. Berton came to speak with Kelvin not to 
prematurely rush a regretful decision. He also admires the house; the father 
explains that he has actually reconstructed his grandfather’s home, as he 
despises modern culture. Rain starts, a heavy, warm summer rain, illuminated 
by the sun. 
 
 
 
 
Kelvin stands outside on the terrace of the house, in a melancholic mood. The 
rain is soaking his clothes and hair, but he enjoys it, to feel nature. On the 
table lie apples, the leftovers of a tea session, and bread in a bowl. The tea 
set is old-fashioned, from the XIX Century; it is made of traditional, white-blue 
porcelain. The rain soddens everything on the table. For a moment, Kelvin 
gets cold. The rain stops; the countryside blubbers. As well here the camera 
frames details on an exteremely close scale and the sound seems tactile. 
Back inside. The father goes away because he says that he has seen 
what Berton has brought with him too many times already. In the presence of 
Anna, who is the sister of the father, Kelvin and Berton watch an old video 
report, in black and white images. The situation shows Berton many years 
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ago, visibly younger, while he testified before a kind of military court 
consisting of scientists as well. Berton had worked on the Solaris space 
station as a pilot. When he became part of a rescue team in search of a lost 
aircraft, he got lost himself, swallowed by an odd and uncanny fog. On court 
Berton claims to have observed how part of the ocean surface began to 
change, transmuting into a gardenlike island. The assembled court members 
seem shocked and unwilling to believe him: a garden millions of miles away 
from Earth? Berton evokes the evidence of the video recording he made 
during the flight. Surprisingly it turns out that the camera tape only shows 
clouds and fog. Berton has no explanation. He is very confused now. He 
continues to report, in spite the increasing disbelief of his audience. After the 
garden he sighted a living being: an oversized, rightfully gigantic child, 
covered by a slimy skin, swimming naked in the ocean. He had never seen 
this child before and felt disgust. All the specialists, except one, discredit 
Berton. They accuse him to have been suffering from hallucinations due to the 
different climate conditions of the planet.  
 
 
 
Berton stops the videotape. He is upset and confused by his own memories. 
He still is convinced of the truth of his experience. He asks Kelvin for a private 
conversation. They go into the garden. 
Outside the boy who came with Berton has sighted the black horse in 
the stable and is afraid, because he doesn’t know what that is which is “staring 
at me from the dark!” Anna goes with him to the stable, explaining that the 
horse is gentle and beautiful. 
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Kelvin discredits Berton, categorizing him as one of those who have 
helped to create the impasse of "solaristics" (the fact-based science about the 
planet), by excessive fantasizing. He explains he will officially declare the 
failure of solaristic science by removing the station, or, take extreme 
measures and bomb the planet with high intensity beams if necessary. 
Berton, again humiliated, protests and distances himself from such a kind of 
knowledge obtained “at any prize”. Knowledge has to stay connected to the 
foundations of morality. Kelvin thinks that morality is a category, which is too 
human, and closes with the remark that Berton must admit that he cannot be 
sure himself, that the being he saw, had not been a hallucination. Berton gets 
now so furious that he puts an end to the fruitless conversation announcing 
his departure. Kelvin’s father then gets upset, scolding Kelvin for being so 
arrogant to Berton. “It is dangerous to send men like you to the cosmos, which 
is so fragile”, so he claims. “Even on Earth the damage would already have 
been too big!” But Kelvin is not convinced at all.  
Inside Anna and the father watch a TV report about the space station 
Solaris. The planet is suspected to be an enormous brain, or the ocean 
covering it - a “thinking substance”. In any case, both promising hypotheses 
could hitherto not be substantiated. Although Solaris has been under scientific 
investigation for nearly a century, its nature, structure and logic are to be 
sought beyond human comprehension. Solaristic science is both, scientifically 
and logically refuted but some continue to “believe”. Currently, from all the 85 
scientists who have been brought to the space station for investigation, only 
three have remained: the astro-biologist Sartorius, the cyberneticist Snout and 
the physiologist Gibarian. The TV-news show portraits of each of them. 
The program is interrupted by a video-call from Berton on his way back 
into town. He says he must add something he has never talked about, and 
which he should have told Kris: the child he had seen on Solaris after all had 
the same appearance as the son of a former Solaris scientist who had died on 
that mission. Berton met the real child later on Earth, in natural, biological 
size. When he had sighted the oversized child on Solaris, he had not known 
the child on Earth yet. He wishes Kelvin to still consider this occurrence. He 
says that Kevin should not think about it before he leaves, but when he is 
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there, it might matter. The camera turns away from the monitor and we see 
that Kelvin was standing in a corner of the room and has heard the 
conversation between Berton and the father. 
 
 
 
Some outlandishness is transmitted in the sequence which follows: 
Berton calls from the car and we see him driving on big crowded highways. 
Tarkovsky gives a big emphasis on filming the movement and the speed, and 
contrasts the over-crowdedness outside with the solitude inside Berton’s car. 
Sometimes the image passes to black and white, as if we suddenly would be 
into memories; then, the last shot of the sequence shows a cross of several 
highways, some on bridges. One highway, in the middle of the image just 
dissolves into another highway (see image above); again, it is as if something 
would be remembered rather than really being there. 
At night, Kelvin burns some old documents in his father’s garden. 
Thereby a photograph of a young woman is shown; we later know to be his 
deceased wife Harey. It is characteristic for this photograph that she looks 
with a serious expression right into the camera, as if questioning the person 
watching her. It gives the photograph a strange and vivid presence, also 
characteristic for the photograph of the mother, which we have seen before in 
the house. Her absence suggests she is also dead. Kelvin mentions to the 
father a film with a campfire, which he will also take with him on his journey. 
Anna steps away because she cannot hide her tears. The nocturnal 
landscape seems to comfort her. 
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Kelvin leaves into outer space. The cosmic journey is filmed merely by 
the juxtaposition of two shots: Kelvin’s face in a helmet, which turns upside 
down. From a radio transmitted voice off we understand that the journey to 
Solaris is not free of trouble. Then we see the dark cosmos, with the planet 
and the station finally being approached. Kelvin calls for reception and 
answer, but there is no reaction from the station. When he gets out of the ship 
(which we never see), with just one big bag, nobody receives him at the 
disembarking hall. He calls for human presence, yet, again, nobody answers. 
The door to the inside of the station opens automatically.  
 
 
 
The first thing Kelvin sees of the station is a corridor with walls with 
vein-like cables. He passes more and more cables hanging from the walls in 
disorder, as if violence took place. Strange garbage lies around. One cable 
sparks electricity. Kelvin snaps down the cable to prevent fire. A kind of alarm 
noise starts and Kelvin goes after the noise. 
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At a long, curved corridor, he finds a door bearing the name of Dr. 
Snout. He knocks, opens the door, but nobody is inside. When he closes the 
door he hears some jingling bells from behind. Kelvin looks back and just 
sees the foot of a girl disappearing behind the corner of the corridor. 
Simultaneously she has thrown a colored plastic ball into his direction. As he 
kneels down to catch the ball, he hears somebody singing crazily. He gets up 
and turns around. The door of Snout’s cabin is open now. Snout stands near 
the entrance and seems to make signs to someone outside the frame, in the 
back of his cabin room. Mostly surprised, Kelvin calls for Snout, who now 
turns around. We can see that he is completely scared by Kelvin’s presence 
and can hardly speak. Kelvin enters and introduces himself as the 
psychologist Kelvin. Snout stares at him, as if doubting that he is real. Kelvin 
asks whether Snout has received the radiogram announcing his coming. 
Snout, who has a bandage at his wrist, sits down and confirms. His voice is 
husky. 
 
 
Kelvin gets nearer but Snout starts to behave aggressively. Kelvin asks 
him why he is so antsy, to which Snout apologizes. Kelvin wants to know 
about the other two, Sartorius and Gibarian. Snout answers that the first one 
had locked himself up, and that the other one is dead. He explicates that it 
was suicide, and we can see how much it has affected him. Kelvin is shocked, 
knowing that Gibarian would never have acted like this under normal 
circumstances. Snout explains that Gibarian was in a profound state of 
depression. He mentions a mysterious disorder. He then recommends that 
Kelvin have some rest, install himself in a room and come back in one hour. 
Kelvin insists on speaking with Sartorius. Snout doubts Sartorius would 
receive anybody, reiterating that he locked himself up in the laboratory.  
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Kelvin says that he is beginning to understand that something truly 
extraordinary has happened, yet he believes that he could maybe help. He 
pauses mid-sentence, because something seems to have emerged behind 
Snout: some hanging bed sheets are shaking rhythmically. Reacting to that, 
Snout quickly pushes Kelvin towards the door. He tells Kelvin to come back in 
one hour; and if he were to see someone or something other than Sartorius or 
him, he should not lose his head. When the horrified Kelvin asks as to what 
he could possibly see, Snout mysteriously answers that this would only 
depend on himself. Most importantly, Snout reminds Kelvin that whatever he 
sees is no hallucination, and also – that they are not on Earth. Snout gets 
visibly nervous, as the moving noise reinforces. He obviously wouldn’t want 
Kelvin to see the source of the noise. Kelvin suddenly sees the head of a boy, 
when Snout literally closes the door in his face. 
 
 
 
 
Kelvin walks around the corridor and finds an empty room. He brings in 
his bag, when he hears a noise. He reacts to it, stepping out again. He finds 
Gibarian’s cabin. On the door hangs a child’s drawing of a man, entitled 
“human being”. Inside Gibarian’s cabin, there is a big mess, a weird 
decoration seemingly arranged by somebody completely crazy. A note is 
stuck on a big monitor: “for K. Kelvin”. Kelvin switches on the tape recorder 
near the monitor. Gibarian tells him about his intention of suicide. He defends 
himself; he says he is not mad; it merely is a question of conscience. The 
problem is that nobody could explain what had happened to him. At least here 
(on Solaris), ‘it’ could happen to everyone. Gibarian also claims to share the 
opinion of Sartorius: it is advisable to bomb the plasma of the planet with high-
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powered x-rays, because there is no other choice to stop what is going on, 
and to get in touch with “this monster”...  
 
 
 
 
Kelvin interrupts the tape preview as he hears somebody at the door 
who makes his presence known by jingling bells. It is the girl with the ball! 
Kelvin presses himself against the door and waits her to leave. He then takes 
the tape and a revolver he has found among Gibarian’s scattered personal 
things. He leaves the room. On the corridor, Kelvin thinks about returning to 
Snout, yet sees him through the door, standing and looking, as if afraid that 
somebody could enter. Kelvin therefore decides to explore the station. The 
whole time we have the feeling of the presence of a strange energy, which is 
suggested through hollow electronic sound waves and which makes Kelvin 
sweat and feel uncomfortable. He knocks at the door of Sartorius, who has 
installed himself at another part of the station.  
 
Sartorius comes out only after some talking, insistent on not letting 
Kelvin into the laboratory. We can feel something moving inside. Sartorius is 
arrogant, judges Gibarian’s suicide and Kelvin’s “over-emotional” responses, 
because the only thing, which would interest him is the duty towards science. 
A strange dwarf suddenly bursts out of the room; Sartorius manages to catch 
him and put him back inside the lab. He recommends Kelvin to adapt first 
before they have a talk. Then Sartorius locks himself up again. Kelvin goes 
back to one of the round big windows nearby, but the outer view, one of total 
darkness before, is now of such a bright white light that it hurts the eyes.  
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Outside the window we see the strange ocean-covered surface of the 
planet, a blue-grey, slowly moving soup with sparkling lights and emanating 
yellow fog. In the soundtrack we hear again the hollow sound, and then the 
bells of the girl. She passes by. Kelvin turns around, deciding to follow her. 
She leads him to the freezing room, where he finds Gibarian’s body, wrapped 
in transparent plastic blankets. 
Kelvin goes back to Snout, who this time seems to be expecting him. 
Kelvin wants to know who the little girl was, whether she was human, and 
whether Snout also saw her. Strangely, Snout doesn’t like this questioning, and, 
as if scandalized, asks Kelvin: “And you, how will I know who you are?” The girl 
passes by the door, and in the following conversation the rules of space 
continuity are broken. Kelvin begs Snout for an explanation, but things prove too 
difficult for Snout to explain. The camera turns in slow circles; this way Kelvin and 
Snout appear and disappear, yet in unexpected positions. As Snout doesn’t 
answer, Kelvin goes to his cabin. He closes the door; the image fades to black 
and white. 
Kelvin makes sure the door is closed and even puts two heavy metal 
boxes in front. Then he switches on the tape from Gibarian. The girl who Kelvin 
had just seen on the corridor, steps into the frame: she obviously is familiar with 
Gibarian and dressed in the exactly same way. Gibarian doesn’t explain her 
unexplainable presence; he just asks, if Kelvin could see her. He repeats that 
he is not mad, and that ‘it’ is connected to his conscience. After watching, 
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Kelvin lies down, exhausted, the revolver at his side; again he feels disturbed, 
this feeling is enhanced by a hollow sound. He falls asleep.  
At dawn we suddenly notice the presence of a young woman with long 
brown hair. The image is now back to color. After staring a while into the 
emptiness without moving, she approaches Kelvin, who lies on his bed. His 
eyes are open. His face expression suggests that he doesn’t know, whether 
he is sleeping or not. The woman lies down next to Kelvin, kissing him in a 
way that implies an everyday love relationship. Kelvin now is completely 
horrified, but tries not to show emotion – yet he seems to know his visitor and 
calls her Harey. He asks her how she got here; at the same time he feels 
threatened by her, groping secretly for the revolver. They get up; she behaves 
completely naturally, looking for her shoes, as if she would have been here 
yesterday and before already. She finds the photograph we saw earlier in the 
film, on Earth: it is hers. She looks at the photograph without recognizing 
herself; then, she sees her reflection in a mirror behind: “Kris, it’s me!” She 
doesn’t understand and says she doesn’t seem to remember anything about 
herself. She only knows she is Kelvin’s wife. Harey believes to have forgotten 
all the rest because of a strange illness. This feeling causes her some 
unsettlement.  
 
 
 
We understand that surprisingly she also has no awareness of just having 
appeared out of nothing, and that she is not supposed to exist. She probably is 
the double of the woman from the photograph; yet she claims to be in love with 
Kelvin. When Kelvin tells her he has to go to work, she insists to come with him. 
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She doesn’t know why, but feels she must always be with him. Kelvin gives her a 
space suit, and dresses himself another one. To get her out of the clothes she is 
wearing, Kelvin has to cut up her dress, which strangely has no zipper or even 
seam.  
To get rid of her spooky presence, Kelvin sets Harey a trap at the 
disembarking-hall: he tells her to enter a rocket-like space shuttle; he would 
have to do something first, and then follow her.  As she enters, Kelvin quickly 
presses the bottom to close the spaceship’s door and then another one for 
takeoff. Harey is sent into outer space; we can hear her scream inside the 
rocket as it is taking off. Kelvin forgets to leave the room on time and gets hurt 
by the rocket’s ignition, as he has to extinguish a fire on his suit. 
 
PART 2 
 
Snout joins Kelvin in his cabin room; he wants to know what happened 
because he heard voices. Snout laughs out as Kelvin confirms. He cynically 
asks how many attempts of violence were necessary? But somehow he seems 
relieved, now that Kelvin has the same problem as the other scientists on the 
station – at any rate, he becomes more friendly and helpful, taking care of 
Kelvin’s wounds. Kelvin explains that the woman was his wife who had 
committed suicide a few years ago. Snout recounts that the phenomenon 
began after the scientists had struck the ocean with x-rays. Apparently, the 
planet has reacted by scanning the humans’ minds as they sleep. As a result, 
humanoid beings materialize out of their memory: they are the so-called 
“visitors”, and each visitor is individually shaped, depending on the life and 
conscience of the human they are attached to. Snout says that Kelvin’s visitor 
will come back as soon as he sleeps, but as another one, not knowing about 
the first. His prediction is right.  
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Kelvin falls asleep, and in the dark room Harey suddenly is there again, 
searching for him: “Kris?” He tenderly calls for her to come to him and she 
approaches while undressing. She already knows how to undress by tearing 
the dress. Lying calmly down with him she doesn’t seem to remember she 
has been there before. In the morning Kelvin wakes up earlier than her and 
sees the dress of the former Harey lying on the table. He grabs the clothes 
quickly and leaves the cabin to hide them in a corner outside. From the inside, 
we hear Harey scream and something begins to pound at and press against 
the cabin door with violent force. It is Harey. Within seconds she has smashed 
the door and falls to Kelvin’s feet, bleeding, losing consciousness from the 
effort. Shocked, he lifts her up and brings her to bed, as she remains 
senseless. Seconds later he gets back to her with the disinfection materials, 
but realizes that her wounds have already healed nearly completely. The 
phone rings: Snout invites Kelvin to join him and Sartorius at the laboratory. 
To their surprise, Kelvin brings Harey with him, and introduces her as 
his wife. Snout seems undecided, yet Sartorius is mistrusting and talks about 
the “visitors”, without wanting to shake hands with Harey. He then reveals his 
most recent insights: the visitors are made of neutrinos, which stabilize 
through the field force of Solaris. Snout leaves angrily, because he cannot 
stand Harey’s humanlike behavior and her acceptance by Kelvin, so in 
contrast with Sartorius’ cynical, emotionless approach to the situation. Kelvin 
takes a blood sample from Harey, and discovers her blood always 
regenerates, even if solved in acid. She is immortal! Sartorius asks then if 
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Kelvin intends to take the examination of Harey scientifically seriously. Kelvin 
protests: Harey has emotions and feelings. Besides, she is his wife!  He 
condemns any kind of experiment on her as inhuman. Sartorius warns Kelvin 
that he has established emotional contact. They separate in dissension, 
Kelvin ironically proclaiming himself “guilty”. 
 
 
 
The ocean of Solaris is turning in circles, forming a vortex. Kelvin shows 
Harey the film he brought from Earth, the one with the “campfire” he has 
mentioned to his father. In the film we see Kelvin as a child and adolescent, the 
mother, the father and finally Harey, dressed like she is now, waving to the 
camera operator. The mother and also Harey stare directly into the camera, 
staying several moments immobile.  
 
 
 
When the film ends, Harey goes to the mirror and looks at herself. She 
claims that she doesn’t know herself; she cannot even remember her own face, 
when she closes her eyes. She asks Kelvin, if he does know himself. Kelvin’s 
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answer “Sure, just as any human being” sounds cruel. Harey then insists to 
have some memories of her own, but we have the impression they are 
invented; they don’t match with Kelvin’s, who finally gives up correcting her. He 
tells her instead a lie: that she didn’t want to go with him to another town and 
they never saw each other again. We know this is not even half of the truth, but 
Harey agrees as if she would remember it. 
 
In the next scene, Harey sleeps, while Kelvin is thoughtful. Snout knocks 
on the door and Kelvin opens. Snout tells him that during three or four hours 
the regeneration will be slowed down and the arrival of visitors suspended. 
They continue to talk because Snout has the idea that they could try to send 
bundled x-rays of thoughts to the planet, to suggest to the planet to stop the 
visitors. The conversation is heard in voice off, while we see Harey’s face 
sleeping. Suddenly she opens her eyes, and thus hears the talk. Snout 
suggests that Kelvin should be the one transmitting his thoughts. But Kelvin 
has doubts; he asks what would happen if in his subconscious he wants 
Harey to disappear! And how could they trust “this strange soup out there”? 
Sartorius’ second proposal, which Snout communicates, is to activate an 
annihilator, which would destabilize the neutrino systems. Kelvin refers to this 
choice of juxtaposed unpleasant actions as extortion. Snout then invites 
Kelvin to come with him to see Sartorius, as Harey seems sleeping: “she 
already sleeps, this will end badly”.  
Kelvin accepts and leaves with Snout. We see Harey struggling in her 
bed, trying to calm down and not to run after Kelvin. Apparently she has heard 
the conversation. Kelvin suddenly has doubts and runs back to her. He finds 
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Harey half-conscious and asks her for forgiveness while she recovers. Again, 
the planet’s ocean changes his surface color, continuously turning in vortices. 
 
 
 
In the middle of the night, Harey cannot sleep and urges Kelvin to talk 
to her. While he has been sleeping she has had a talk with Sartorius. He has 
told her that she is the double of a woman named Harey, who was married to 
Kelvin and killed herself on Earth. She thus concludes not to be Harey, but 
“something else”. As she grasps now the weird circumstances of her 
existence, she says: “I feel as if somebody is fooling us around”. She insists 
on knowing the story of Harey’s death. Kelvin tells her about the separation 
and that he had left ampoules with a poison in the fridge. He was worried, but 
not enough, and when he came back after three days, he found her dead. 
Harey asks why she had done it, and Kelvin answers that maybe it was 
because she felt he hadn’t loved her enough. He also assures Harey that now 
he is truly in love with her. Harey believes him and calms down. 
In the library Harey and Kelvin, together with Sartorius, wait for Snout, 
who had announced the celebration of his birthday. The library symbolizes the 
highpoints of human knowledge and classical culture: woodenly paneled 
walls, thousands of old books, busts of certain admired figures, old globes, 
instruments, Chinese vases and paintings on the wall before the rise of 
modern art. When Snout finally shows up, he is in quite a state: his suit has a 
big scratch as if from a fight; he is emotionally nettled, probably drunk. The 
conversation again revolves around Harey’s condition of not being human, a 
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condition Sartorius despises, accusing Kelvin of lying in bed with his ex-wife 
instead of doing serious scientific investigation.  
Harey defends herself, claiming that she is becoming human: she has 
her own feelings and memories. She has learned to be alone and started to 
sleep. She also says that Kelvin is better than Sartorius and Snout because he 
is worried about human aspects in non-human conditions; whereas Sartorius and 
Snout are ignoring their visitors and only hate them. She further claims the 
visitors would just be them: what they hate about themselves would be their own 
conscience. Sartorius leaves disgusted, and Snout gets drunk, walking around 
singing. As Kelvin keeps him some company, he announces that at 5pm there 
will be thirty seconds of non-gravity on the station. In sudden panic Kelvin runs 
back to the library and finds Harey in a contemplative state, smoking a cigarette 
and looking at Peter Bruegel’s painting “Hunters in the Snow”.  
 
 
 
Tarkovsky films the painting with tactile movement that is accompanied 
by a soundtrack evoking such an impressive realism, as if Harey had the 
power to awaken the painting when she looked at it. Kelvin and Harey 
celebrate together the moment of non-gravity, floating through the library. 
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But the desire to commit suicide is part of Harey’s process to become 
human: she knows she is not supposed to exist, at the same time 
understanding that in order to be really human she has to become mortal. 
Harey therefore tries to kill herself by drinking liquid oxygen. Of course she 
fails: as much as she hurts herself, she will always resurrect. The scene 
opens as Kelvin finds her frozen body lying on the curved corridor. Snout 
passes by as she resurrects and he is disgusted. He can hardly stand the 
process, while Kelvin tries to comfort her with a blanket. 
 
 
 
When she comes back she is in a complete nervous crisis. She does 
not know who she is, she feels disgusting, she has doubts about Kelvin, about 
who he is (is he like her?) and about how he can love her. Her suffering has 
reached its peak at this point of the story. 
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Time has passed by. Harey and Kelvin recognize now the depth of 
their love. Therefore he proposes not to return to Earth: they could live at the 
space station forever.  Harey is afraid. She is also concerned about Kelvin, 
who visibly got sick. Half delirious, he walks around in a fever. In the corridor 
he meets Snout, who is at a window, staring at the ocean’s surface. Snout 
says: “The ocean’s activity is increasing. Your encephalogram may be the 
cause.” But Kelvin is mentally not present. His speech is not coherent and he 
circles around suffering. Then suddenly, as if something would attack him 
inside his head: “No, I don’t believe that, I cannot accept that…”  
He now looks himself at the ocean, which is in high activity, changing its 
color into green and violet again, swirling in continuous vortex movement. In off 
we hear his voice: “Let’s suppose I love you. Love is something we can feel, but 
never explain. One can only explain the idea. You love that which you can lose. 
Yourself, a woman, your country… Until today, humanity, the world, had no 
way to reach love. There are so few of us! Perhaps the reason we are here, is 
to understand, for the first time, human beings as a reason to love?” 
 
  
It seems as if the intent and meaning Tarkovsky wants to transmit by 
making this film is concentrated in this statement. The theme of love will still 
deserve our further attention throughout. 
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Kelvin continues his fever walk through the corridors of the space 
station, asking for Gibarian’s reasons for suicide, claiming he did not die of 
fear but of shame and that the salvation of humanity would lie in its shame. 
Snout and Harey brace him while he is walking. As they pass by the windows, 
the light coming in is partly so strong, that from time to time it merges the 
whole image into white. These white flashes get stronger and longer, until we 
enter into a universe of fever-dreams, where any logic has become subjective. 
 
 
 
Short frame shots of the father’s house on Earth in sepia-color. Then, 
back to color, Kelvin lying on his Solaris-bed, which is located in an unreal 
chamber made of mirrors; further away a vase with earthly flowers at his bed’s 
side. Harey comes in, caresses Kelvin’s head; then she looks up, directly into 
the camera. It is a look so emotionless that she does not seem human. It is a 
look as much out of time as the one on the photographs (on Earth). 
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The camera turns around and we see several Harey’s and the mother, 
even the dog from Earth. We are now in Kelvin’s cabin room on Solaris, 
decorated with flowers and fruits from Earth. Then, in a black-and white 
sequence Kelvin meets his mother in a strange room decorated with elements 
from Earth as well as the space station. She seems younger than him. He 
apologizes for being two hours late; she asks about the trip. He says it was ok, 
just a bit tiring. 
 
 
 
We learn he doesn’t feel happy and is very lonely, which she feels 
sorry about. She reproaches him for not having phoned. We have the 
impression that the conversation is not only absurd for being a dream: the 
mother is dead, and she doesn’t seem conscious about that fact. She tells 
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Kelvin to take better care of himself, since he seems out of shape and 
neglected (he wears a pair of pajamas). She discovers that his arm is full of 
dirt. Thus she brings water and washes his arm. She kisses him, as if he were 
a child. He starts crying, but she leaves. He wakes up. He lies in a room on 
the space station; Snout is taking care of him. Kelvin asks for Harey. 
Snout reads a farewell letter from Harey to him. While he has been 
hallucinating in his fever-dreams, Harey conspired with Sartorius and Snout. 
She writes that it was her own decision and asks him not to blame anybody: it 
would only be for the best. Snout explains, that she did it for him.  Kelvin has 
now to process the shock.  
In the room there are leftovers from the fever dreams, like the jug with 
which the mother has brought water to wash Kelvin’s arm, the flowers in the 
vase or Harey’s scarf. In voice over, Snout and Kelvin have a philosophical 
conversation about losing their mind in the cosmos. Snout tells that after they 
had sent Kelvin’s encephalogram to the planet, none of the visitors have 
shown up. Something new, beyond their understanding, is happening to the 
planet, because small islands have begun to form on the surface. Outside the 
room we see Sartorius listening to the conversation, lacking the courage to 
enter. Then he fades out. 
In a scene at the library, Snout and the recuperated Kelvin are in a 
melancholic mood, thinking about the sense of life, in voice over. “Yet to 
preserve all the simple human truths, we need mysteries. The mystery of 
happiness, death, love.” In conclusion: when humans don’t know their date of 
death, they feel like immortals.  Kelvin does not know what to do next and 
hesitates whether to go back to Earth or to wait for Harey’s unlikely return. We 
hear his continuous voice over as we fly in the image over white Solaris-fog. 
The film ends similarly to how it has started: on Earth, in nature, at the 
exact same place as in the opening scene, with the only difference that it is 
winter now. The lake is half frozen, the grass is ugly, grey and wet, and the 
trees without leaf. Kelvin advances to his father’s home; his dog welcomes him. 
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When Kelvin approaches the house, he stops at the window, astonished 
about that which he beholds inside: his father is cleaning books, but it rains 
inside the house and the rain is hot and fuming. The father looks up, spots 
Kelvin and comes out. Kelvin knees in front of him; the father lays his hand on 
his son’s head. As the image zooms out into a perspective from outer space, 
we understand that we are not on Earth. The scene we just saw has 
happened on the surface of the planet Solaris, which has produced one small 
earthlike island, out of the memory of Kelvin... 
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VII. 
A Short History Of Philosophy Of Film 
 
 
 
1. From Jean Epstein’s Robot-Philosopher  
to Benjamin’s Apparatus 
 
Let me finish this first part with a short excursion into the history of philosophy 
of film, a realm to which the solaristic system belongs and builds on: through 
explaining the state of the art, the emergence of the solaristic system 
becomes comprehensible as a necessary step for advancing within the realm 
of philosophy of film. I thereby propose to evoke those film-philosophical and 
theoretical positions, which reflect on and through film in a way relevant to our 
scope of analysis, treating issues such as film’s relation to reality or the 
ontological self-reflexivity of the medium, but also other topics, less obvious 
now, although important for the further development. The most relevant 
authors will be referred to throughout and embedded into our context. We 
cannot isolate the concerns of philosophy of film from the problems of 
philosophy in general, such as the question of reality, or from the subject of 
philosophy itself. The solaristic system builds on the claim of inseparability of 
philosophy and film that I have previously mentioned relying on Cavell: “Film 
is made for philosophy” 76.  
  
                                                
76 Stanley Cavell, Reflections on a Life of Philosophy: An Interview with Stanley Cavell, p. 19  
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I suggest a chronological approach from the very beginning of film 
theory, which already is pervaded by philosophical concerns, albeit 
undermined in their input. These early reflections have been continuously 
subject to new readings, and their full philosophical potential is still to be 
explored. One of the first explicit claims for the rise of philosophy of film was 
pronounced in a time when the medium was still developing and discovering 
its own aesthetic possibilities. “The philosophy of cinema has still to be 
raised”77, said Jean Epstein in 1921, immediately followed by the observation 
that movies are “a new poetic and philosophy”78, yet without any further 
explication on his anticipatory intuition. 25 years later, in 1946, the same 
author finally publishes “The Intelligence of a Machine” where he anticipates 
the Deleuzian approach of “cine-thinking”.  
Epstein, who was both a theorist and a film director, designs film to be 
a manifold of time and defends an immanent thinking of truth, which is put into 
praxis by the cinematograph, “the robot-philosopher”79, a thinking machine 
with its own intelligence, which develops “cinematographic thought”80. Again, 
this idea is remarkable, insofar as it has become - in one way or the other - 
the most grounding argument for the emergence of philosophy of film. Epstein 
previews cinema as a pioneer of a variety of thinking machines81 to come, 
characterized by producing virtual realities, which he describes as unreal. In 
my consideration this position is not to be understood as anti-realist, but 
rather as beyond such distinction as reality or non-reality. According to 
Epstein, reality is somehow not existent, because it is composed of a “sum of 
unrealities”82, deriving from continuity (time) and discontinuity (coexistence in 
                                                
77 Jean Epstein, “Bonjour Cinéma”, in: Ecrits sur le cinema, p. 91 (translation mine – C.R.) 
78 Ibid., p. 94 
79 Jean Epstein, Bonjour Cinéma und andere Schriften zum Kino, p. 83 (translation mine – 
C.R.) 
80 Jean Epstein, The Intelligence of a machine, p. 66 
81 “No, the thinking machine is not exactly a utopia any longer; the cinematograph, like the 
computing machine, represents its first implementation, already working far better than a 
rough model.” (Cf. Ibid., p. 65) 
82 Ibid., p. 15 
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space), two different “interchangeable modes of unreality”83, which he also 
calls perspectives: 
 
The cinematograph (…) shows time to be merely a perspective resulting from 
the succession of phenomena, the way space is merely a perspective of the 
coexistence of things. Time contains nothing we might call time-in-itself, no 
more so than space comprises space-in-itself. (…) Thus, after having taught 
us about the unreality of both, continuity and discontinuity, the cinematograph 
rather abruptly ushers us into the unreality of space-time.84 
 
The cinematograph discloses the non-temporal nature of time and the non-
spatial nature of space and produces thinking based on the conflation of time 
and space into space-time.  
Epstein is only one example of a range of early theorists of cinema who 
have pioneered the attempt to define the very nature of film. Rudolf Arnheim, 
Hugo von Hofmannsthal or Hugo Münsterberg hold clearly non-realist 
positions, by defining film as an art and as the substitution of reality85. Sergei 
Eisenstein has argued for the editing of cinema being the producer of 
cinematic expression and has therefore studied different patterns of montage 
inspired by Japanese haiku poetry. He argued for an assembled reality in film, 
involved into an eidetic process of thought, which Gilles Deleuze describes as 
a shock on the cerebral cortex, deriving from the movement of the image. This 
context of relating the human mind, reality and film evokes Henri Bergson who 
compares in “Creative Evolution” the way we obtain knowledge with the way 
the cinematograph registers and reproduces reality 86.  
                                                
83 Ibid., pp. 15-16 
84 Ibid., pp. 24-25 
85 Münsterberg was followed by Jean Mitry and finally Christian Metz, who used semiology to 
analyze film; their positions are too representationalist to be fruitful for the solaristic system 
which argues for film beyond symbolism. 
86 “This is what the cinematograph does. With photographs, each of which represents the 
regiment in a fixed attitude, it reconstitutes the mobility of the regiment marching. (…)The 
movement does indeed exist here; it is in the apparatus. (…) Such is the contrivance of the 
cinematograph. And such is also that of our knowledge. (…) We take snapshots, as it were, 
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I certainly agree that ‘film substitutes reality’, even if for other reasons 
then early film theory. In my perspective, the following chain is correct: film is 
reality and therefore film substitutes reality while it unfolds (whatever we mean 
by reality, recalling the unknown variable). This substitution constitutes the 
logical backside of the claim that film reproduces and therefore produces 
reality. Remember: On the one hand we have the image of reality, while on the 
other hand this image dominates reality, because it substitutes reality, 
becoming real in itself (each time it is unfolded within space-time). Thereby 
Hugo Münsterberg’s psychology-driven assertion, which compares the way 
we perceive reality and the way we perceive film, somehow explains the 
impetuous power of the specific reality of film on the human mind.  
In clear opposition stand the so-called ontological realists of film theory 
like Erwin Panofsky, André Bazin and Pier Paolo Pasolini, who literally claim 
that film is a reproduction of reality outside any symbolism or system of 
representation. Curiously Panofsky takes a similar position as Epstein by 
characterizing cinema as “a dynamization of space and respectively a 
spacialization of time”87. Both Bazin and Kracauer argue for the photographic 
basis of film and its privileged position among the arts as to recording physical 
reality. Thereby Bazin is interested in the ontogenesis of the cinematographic 
image. It is on this realist position that the solaristic system will build some of 
its claims, analyzing what exactly the puzzling idea of photographic 
reproduction of reality through film means (ontologically). Pasolini claims, 
“The cinema is a language [in Italian ‘linguaggio’ and not ‘lingua’], which 
expresses reality with reality”88 and would thus function as a system of signs 
                                                                                                                                      
of the passing reality, and, as these are characteristic of the reality, we have only to string 
them on a becoming, abstract, uniform and invisible, situated at the back of the apparatus of 
knowledge, in order to imitate what there is that is characteristic in this becoming itself. (…) 
We may therefore sum up what we have been saying in the conclusion that the mechanism of 
our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographical kind.” (Cf. Henri Bergson, Creative 
Evolution, pp. 305-306) 
87 “(…) Dynamisierung des Raumes und entsprechend als Verräumlichung der Zeit.” (Cf. 
Erwin Panofsky, Stil und Medium im Film, p. 25; translation mine – C.R.) 
88 Pier Paolo Pasolini, op. cit., p. 29 
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of reality itself – yet beyond any symbolic filter: “There is no symbolic or 
conventional filter between me and reality, as there is in literature.”89 
Yet these realist positions share a clumsy definition of the term “reality” 
and are delimiting its dimension to outer physical reality. We have already 
received several indications that the understanding of reality is conditioning 
our enquiry, based on a paradoxical interrogation: How can we describe the 
reproduction of something, which is already hard to grasp in its fundamental 
nature? And above all, how can we call something a reproduction, which has 
an effect on us very similar to our perception of reality, but which escapes 
representation as it is a re-presentation, although not a double? What of 
reality is exactly reproduced by film? In the second part of this analysis, within 
a separate section, I will exclusively focus on this question and thereby 
delineate the underlying understanding of reality of the solaristic system by 
evoking some positions of speculative realism. 
A special claim on film as well as on technology is designed by Walter 
Benjamin, who comments on film in one single, yet famous essay, “The Work 
of Art in the Age of its Mechanical Reproduction” (1936). Like Epstein’s 
approach, also Benjamin’s analysis of cinema escapes the categorical 
distinction of reality versus unreality of film. According to Benjamin the most 
important question on the nature of cinema is how it affects us, how it has 
changed reality and/or our relation to reality. Cinema is the reproduction of 
reality (which is a realist position), but it does so by taking slices of reality from 
the inside, then assembling its pieces. This “reality montage” of cinema, is just 
a new way of aesthetic perception, which I will call ‘cine-perception’90, an 
assemblage of reality, giving access to what Benjamin calls “immediate 
reality”91 composed by the very elements of reality obtained by “permeation of 
reality with mechanical equipment”92. 
Not only has this cine-perception transformed completely the nature of 
                                                
89 Ibid., p. 29 
90  The terms “reality montage” and “cine-perception” are my interpretative resumé of 
Benjamin’s main concepts. 
91 Walter Benjamin, op. cit., p. 233 
92 Ibid., p. 234 
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art, it also has changed our relation towards reality. According to Benjamin, 
this transformation is grounded on the emergence of those new media which 
rely on mass reproduction, enabled by the intervention of technological 
equipment, the apparatus, particularly photography and, above all, cinema.93 
Benjamin points out that the traditional contemplative and individual 
perception is replaced with the collective and distracted perception on which 
cinema rests. In parallel the traditional cult value of the artwork is successively 
suppressed by its growing exhibition value94: “With the different methods of 
technical reproduction of a work of art, its fitness for exhibition increased to 
such an extent that the quantitative shift between its two poles turned into a 
qualitative transformation of its nature95. The emergence of this new kind of 
artworks brings the masses closer to reality (Benjamin actually says: “to bring 
things ‘closer’ spatially and humanly” 96). Furthermore, due to the permanent 
possibility of mass reproduction, any fact or event has lost its authenticity and 
uniqueness97, just as the work of art has lost its “aura”. 
Benjamin demonstrates in detail all the possible changes, which the 
loss of aura evokes for the realm of art and aesthetic perception. However, 
the implicit consequence for the human relation to reality is of special 
importance for our scope of analysis. Reality itself has lost its authenticity 
through the emergence of cinema. Reality is in permanent competition to a 
potential other reality, the filmed one, which pretends to be a reality free of 
                                                
93  “Earlier much futile thought had been devoted to the question of whether photography is 
an art. The primary question – whether the very invention of photography had not transformed 
the entire nature of art – was not raised. Soon the film theoreticians asked the same ill-
considered question with regard to the film. But the difficulties which photography caused 
traditional aesthetics were mere child’s play as compared to those raised by the film.” (Cf. 
ibid., 227) 
94 Ibid., p. 225 
95 Ibid., p. 225 
96 Ibid., p. 223 
97 “(…) the desire of the present-day masses to bring things ‘closer’ to things spatially and 
humanly, which is just as ardent as their bent toward overcoming the uniqueness of every 
reality [Überwindung des Einmaligen in der Gegebenheit] by accepting its reproduction.” (Cf. 
ibid., p. 223) 
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any technical equipment and with a huge impact on the masses: the access to 
“immediate reality”.  As a result, the non-filmed reality loses its unique reality 
status, and switches to be just any possible reality among many others filmed 
realities. This virtualization of reality, which anticipates that which later is 
designated by Deleuze with “cinematic consciousness” 98 and “the world as 
metacinema” (actually a Bergsonian proposal famously quoted by Deleuze), is 
another implication of the solaristic system: on the planet Solaris, we are 
facing reality, which at the end, as we might discover, may have been a virtual 
one from the very beginning, a meta-reality out of the Bergsonian 
metacinema. Somehow Benjamin’s argumentation supports the idea of a shift 
of perspective for human thought through cinema, giving it a political sense: 
“The adjustment of reality to the masses and of the masses to reality is a 
process of unlimited scope as much for thinking as for perception.”99 
 
 
 
 
2. The Breakthrough of Philosophy of Film 
 
In the 1970ies Stanley Cavell has pioneered to regard film as an explicit issue 
of philosophical concern. Some of his general reflections on the ontology of 
film will be considered throughout this treatise as crucial to the constitution of 
the solaristic system.100   
We already have referred to Cavell’s position that “film is made for 
philosophy” and its implication for our scope of analysis. Yet in his further 
                                                
98  I argue here that it is possible to compare Gilles Deleuze’s concept of “cinematic 
consciousness” (which originally is the consciousness of the camera and the plan) to a fusion 
of Epstein’s thinking of film and what I have called Benjamin’s concept of cine-perception. 
99 Walter Benjamin, op. cit., p. 223 
100 In the area of philosophy of film, Cavell is until today one of the most quoted and referred 
authors within the English-speaking world. As one of the few American examples there are, 
Cavell tries to reconcile American pragmatism and transcendentalism with continental 
philosophy (referring to authors like Kant, Heidegger, Derrida, Wittgenstein). 
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reflections on the nature of film Cavell invokes those realists of film theory 
who evince an ontological concern; he gives a special emphasis to André 
Bazin’s “Ontology of the Photographic Image” adopting the claim of the origin 
of film in photography. By reassessing Bazin from the point of view of 
philosophy, Cavell raises questions on the ontological status of film and on 
the reproduced reality that film projects: “What happens to reality when it is 
projected and screened?”101 He is thereby concerned with the spectator’s 
point of view and defines “the material basis of the medium” as “a succession 
of automatic world projections”102 . This main concern leads Cavell to an 
epistemological inquiry into skepticism. Hence he claims “film is a moving 
image of skepticism”103 because “movies convince us of the world’s reality in 
the only way we have to be convinced (…): by taking views of it.”104 In this 
sense, the human inquiry into the physical world and to the world of movies 
disquiets Cavell profoundly. He argues that these two worlds are intertwined 
as the fantasy of the spectator drives the perception of both, “the world is 
already drawn by fantasy” 105 106. 
Furthermore, Cavell is often called a post-structuralist interested in the 
quotidian and trivial of both language and cinema. In his writings on the 
philosophy of film, he focuses exclusively on Hollywood entertainment films. 
While analyzing concrete examples Cavell creates an emancipated dialogue 
between philosophy and film: the latter does not exemplify but explain and 
even deepen aspects of philosophy. Inversely, Cavell uses philosophy as a 
tool to better understand the essential features and aesthetics of film. 
                                                
101 Stanley Cavell, op. cit., p. 16 
102 Ibid., p. 72 
103 Ibid., pp. 188-189 
104 Ibid., p. 102 
105 Ibid., p. 102 
106 This position of Cavell reminds Hugo Münsterberg’s “The Photoplay – A Psychological 
Study” (1916) in which the perception of film and of reality are compared to each other, both 
described as relying on the principles of attention, memory and imagination. Yet on the 
contrary to Münsterberg’s psychological approach (film reflects not the world but the mind and 
is specially apt to create emotions), this reliance on fantasy is for Cavell the evidence that film 
convinces us “of the world’s reality”.  
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Throughout this coining reassessment of film in the context of philosophy, 
Cavell enhances the self-reflexivity of the medium and even names it as a 
criterion of significance: 
 
…The kinds of revelation of the medium I expect to find in any significant film 
– a significant film being one precisely on the basis of which such revelations 
of the medium are most significantly made. (…) The aesthetic significance of 
a given film is a function of the way in which and degree to which it reveals or 
acknowledges this fact of its origin in the medium of film.107 
 
I have taken this proposition of self-reflexivity as a premise for the proposal to 
ground an entire ontology of film on one single movie, to explore how far a 
film’s aesthetic significance can go for what has been delineated so far. In the 
case of the chosen film, Tarkovsky’s “Solaris”, all the important aesthetic 
principles match the frame. After reading the outline of “Solaris” and 
reproducing the movie in front of one’s inner eye, one could argue that this 
film is philosophically rich, and a philosophical interpretation is worth the effort, 
but to make it the foundation of an ontology of film would be an overvaluation. 
I think I have already given plenty of arguments, yet the main argument 
remains: that not only do I base my solaristic philosophy on the self-reflexivity 
of film. I argue that “Solaris” itself doubles and catalyzes this self-reflexivity: 
the film uses, tells, shows and develops the aesthetic principles of film in a 
density, hence is of a special significance. I expect new insights on the named 
ontological features/ topics of philosophical thought, which I have formerly 
divided into three groups, based on Epstein and Cavell. I recall the list of 
antagonistic pairs: 
• Appearance and reality, image and reality, presence and absence, 
the existence and inexistence of any reality, being and nothing, 
actors and characters, matter and mind, objects and perception, 
subject and object, world and thought, continuity and discontinuity, 
movement and stasis, nature of space and time, life and death. 
 
                                                
107 Stanley Cavell, Cavell on Film, p. 119 
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Each pair stands for the self-reflexivity of film and has its place in the solaristic 
system, as we will see throughout and with a special emphasis in the 
conclusions.  
 
A different idea of the medium’s self-reflexivity has been introduced by 
the second crucial philosopher of film, Gilles Deleuze, who advances in 
France with proper consequences for philosophy through film. Deleuze had 
surprised many of his followers, when in the 1980s he came up with a 
systematic attempt to integrate film into philosophy by investigating how 
cinema produces concepts, which change our perception and relation to the 
external world(s) and to reality. He thereby designs an intrinsic relation 
between film and thought, which is reminiscent of Epstein’s position, for 
whom, as previously mentioned, cinema is a time-thinking machine. 
Curiously, both Epstein and Deleuze are influenced by the theory of 
knowledge of Henri Bergson’s philosophy of time. 
For Deleuze, cinematic consciousness goes beyond film (in the sense 
that the world becomes a film) and the identification of cine-thinking is driven 
by the philosophical need for a renewal of philosophy itself, by looking for 
“new philosophical expression” 108  through film. Deleuze’s positions are 
prefigured, on side with Jean Epstein, by the writings of French film critics like 
Serge Daney and Pascal Bonitzer or Jean-Louis Schefer; Schefer has written 
philosophically on cinema from the spectator’s point of view. Further, Deleuze 
joins Pasolini in his critique of Metz’s semiology of film. In opposition to Metz, 
Pasolini argues for a common protolanguage of reality and film: “the first and 
foremost of the human languages can be considered to be action itself”109 and its 
smallest entities “the objects, forms, and acts of reality that we perceive with our 
senses”110, designated as kinemes. 
Yet in difference to Stanley Cavell, Deleuze relies in his two volumes 
“The Movement-Image – Cinema 1” and “The Time-Image – Cinema 2” 
                                                
108 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. xxi 
109Pier Paolo Pasolini, p. 198 
110 Ibid., Heretical Empericism, p. 200 
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mainly on artistic and avant-garde movies. Furthermore, and in similarity to 
Cavell, his main theoretical references are not to be found in the theory of 
film, but in the realm of philosophy. Deleuze mainly reassesses the 
epistemology of Henri Bergson, who preconditions the concepts of 
“movement-image” and “time-image” and further dissolves the difference 
between image and matter.  
As a second important reference Deleuze evokes the semiotics of 
Charles Sanders Peirce, who has presented the photographic image as 
indexical. Both philosophers, Peirce and Bergson have reacted to the very 
beginning of photography and film in the 19th Century; they have immediately 
started to integrate the reflection about these media in the realm of 
philosophy. Their writings have somehow anticipated the significance of 
cinema for philosophical thought. Deleuze reassesses Bergson’s claim of a 
metacinematic universe: “The material universe, the plane of immanence, is 
the machinic assemblage of movement-images. Here Bergson is startlingly 
ahead of his time: it is the universe as cinema in itself, a metacinema.”111  
In parallel to philosophy of film, the branch of philosophy of technology 
has been developing, and builds on authors such as Walter Benjamin or 
Gilbert Simondon. (Deleuze appropriates from the latter further concepts like 
becoming and individuation, singularity, the crystalline or the membrane, 
which are identifiable in the cinema books.) Philosophy of technology has 
been inquiring into the techno-ontological condition of man, whether critically 
(like Heidegger) or with enthusiasm (like Benjamin). But such a techno-
ontological condition, I argue, has been envisioned by cinema in the sense of 
an image-creating-machine, raising a new kind of techno-consciousness. As 
we have mentioned before, Jean Epstein, had already theorized about a 
thinking machine or robot, and referred to “the intelligence of a machine”, 
“mechanical philosophy”112 or even cinematic thinking as a robotic machine-
thought - the consciousness of a machine in form of technological images. 
What do these images mean to us, the non-machines? 
                                                
111 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement Image , p. 61 
112 Jean Epstein, The Intelligence of a Machine, p. 61 
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It might be elucidadting in this context to consider the following idea: 
Slavoj Žižek points out that Heidegger’s term to designate technology 
(“Technik” in German) Gestell - in English frame - is to be understood as an 
attitude towards the world: 
 
When Heidegger speaks about the ‘essence of technology’, he has in mind 
something like the frame of a fundamental fantasy, which, as a transparent 
background, structures the way we relate to reality. Gestell, Heidegger’s word 
for the essence of technology, is usually translated into English as 
‘enframing’. At its most radical, technology does not designate a complex 
network of machines and activities, but the attitude towards reality which we 
assume when we are engaged in such activities: technology is the way reality 
discloses itself to us in contemporary times. The paradox of technology as the 
concluding moment of Western metaphysics is that it is a mode of enframing 
which poses a danger to enframing itself: the human being reduced to an 
object of technological manipulation is no longer properly human; it loses the 
very feature of being ecstatically open to reality.113 
 
Žižek chooses a highly cinematic vocabulary: enframing of reality, a 
technological attitude towards reality, in which man loses access to reality by 
himself. Applied to our context, film is to be regarded as an example of such a 
technological medium to structure the way of how we relate to reality and to 
determine the way how reality presents itself to us; therefore we can compare 
technology to the world as metacinema, which is such an “attitude towards 
reality”. The world as metacinema would be then a consequence of 
Heidegger’s Gestell but conversely we can speak of a new techno-ontological 
condition envisioned by film (together with photography or any audio-visual 
reproduction of reality).  
Deleuze has indirectly taken this position and named some of its 
ontological consequences, namely cinematographic consciousness, an own 
state of relating with the universe provided by film in which “We are no longer 
faced with subjective or objective images; we are caught in a correlation 
                                                
113 Slavoj Žižek, Event – Philosophy in Transit, pp. 30-31 
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between a perception-image and a camera consciousness which transforms 
it.”114 This idea constitutes “a pure form”, “beyond the subjective and the 
objective”, and has been developed by Deleuze departing from Pasolini’s free 
indirect image. Cinematographic consciousness is a frame of reality, it is the 
consciousness of the film itself. 
To Deleuze, film then is in a special way relevant to creating new 
philosophical expression: “the search for a new means of philosophical 
expression (…) must be pursued today in relation to the renewal of certain 
other arts, such as the theatre or cinema.”115 But what is exactly so special 
about cine-thinking for philosophy, why does cinema have this power for 
renovation? “The cinema provokes us to see, to feel, to sense, and finally to 
think differently” writes Flaxman about Deleuze’s endeavor, which enables us 
to deterritorialize “the cogito, the rigid ‘image of thought’” of classical 
philosophy. But how? For Deleuze filmmakers invent “blocks of movement-
duration”: 
 
 
If I say, you do cinema, what are you doing? (…) I just say that you invent, 
but not concepts, that is not your business, that you invent that which could 
be called blocks of movement-duration.116 
 
What happens then between these blocks of movement duration in 
confrontation with philosophy? How do they come to be integrated into 
philosophy with the power of change? I think that Deleuze claims a self-
renewal of philosophy, because philosophy has to accomplish a translation 
                                                
114 Gilles Deleuze, op. cit.,  p. 76 
115 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. xxi 
116 Translated by the author from the French original: “Je dis que je fais de la philosophie, 
c’est à dire, j’essaie d’inventer des concepts. J’essaie pas de réfléchir sur autre chose. Si je 
dis, vous qui faites du cinéma, qu’est-ce que vous faites ? (…) Je dirai juste ce que vous 
inventez, ce n’est pas des concepts, ce n’est pas votre affaire, ce que vous inventez c’est ce 
que l’on pourrait appeler des blocs de mouvements-durée. (…) Je peux dire que la peinture 
invente, (…)  supposons que ce soit des blocs de lignes-couleurs.” (Cf.  Gilles Deleuze, 
Qu’est-ce que l’acte de creation? – Conférence donnée dans le cadre des mardis de la 
fondation Femis – 17/05/1987, available online)  
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work, translating the blocks of movement-duration into concepts, which are 
the concepts of cinema: 
 
A theory of cinema is not ‘about’ cinema, but about concepts that cinema 
gives rise to and which are themselves related to other concepts (…) The 
theory of cinema does not bear on the cinema but on the concepts of the 
cinema, which are no less practical, effective or existent than cinema itself.117 
 
Yet Deleuze’s philosophy of film is inseparable from his broader project as a 
philosopher; therefore the reader would have trouble understanding the two 
volumes on cinema without knowing some basic concepts of Deleuzian 
thought: the plane of immanence, the rhizome, the sensory thinking and the 
idea of the image of thought, a concept he creates from classical philosophy 
before introducing the images of film and the thought of film. A more detailed 
immersion into the Deleuzian universe would exceed the scope of our 
analysis at this point. This prerequisite expertise on Deleuze’s thought has 
contributed to the fact that it took over ten years before Deleuze’s writing on 
cinema was seriously appreciated in the realms of philosophy and theory of 
film. Nonetheless, nowadays the field of interpretation and continuation has 
been growing and the Deleuzian film–philosophy and the hypothesis of cine-
thinking has become established as something of its own kind.  
A whole branch has been established, busy with commenting on Gilles 
Deleuze’s cinema books. “Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine” (1997) by D.N. 
Rodowick and “The brain is the screen” (2000) edited by Gregory Flaxman 
are to be mentioned as the first systematic attempts of film-philosophical 
reception in the English-speaking world, long overdue. D.N. Rodowick 
highlights how difficult it was for Deleuze’s book on cinema to be received in 
American film-theory, evoking one question: “why does Deleuze turn to 
cinema to address questions of image, movement, and time raised in his 
earlier books?” 118  Assessing this position, Flaxman clearly situates the 
                                                
117 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: TheTime-image, p. 280 
118  D.N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, Duke University Press, Durham and 
London, 1997, p. xviii 
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meaning of Deleuze’s endeavor to integrate film into philosophy as a need of 
renewal for philosophy itself: 
 
Whatever their intricacies and digressions, The Movement-Image and The 
Time-Image fundamentally contend that, beyond all other arts, the cinema 
opens the possibility for deterritorializing the cogito, the rigid ‘image of 
thought’ that in one form or another has dominated Western philosophy. The 
cinema provokes us to see, to feel, to sense, and finally to think differently, 
and while this induces Deleuze to write his two volumes, those volumes in 
turn compel us to return to the cinema, to see its images in the light of our 
own captivity for the rituals of representation, the philosophical-narrative 
program we have been running.119 
 
Deleuze’s project has often been underestimated in the realm of philosophy 
and has evoked controversial reactions, as the question of faith was seen as 
esoteric, and the claim of salvation as even pretentious: how can philosophy 
be renewed or even saved by something, which is situated outside 
philosophy?  
 In any case, many contemporary receptors of Deleuze’s film 
philosophy seem to ignore this claim of his books on film, the renovation or 
salvation of philosophy. They are not busy with saving philosophy, but rather 
with understanding, interpreting, applying, appropriating and even expanding 
Gilles Deleuze’s concept of film to contemporary cinema. One of the best and 
most substantial examples of further development of Deleuzian thought is 
Patricia Pisters’ concept of the neuro-image, which is endeavoured to 
describe the image of film after the Deleuzian time-image. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
119 Gregory Flaxman, “Introduction”, in: The Brain Is The Screen, p. 3 
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3. Recent Positions 
 
Cavell and Deleuze have laid the foundation for philosophy of film and until 
today their efforts have to be mentioned within any further attempt. The 
solaristic system ambitions to to step out of the projects of these two 
philosophers for film, although referring to them; and like them it intends to 
make philosophy of film a project for philosophy. In general, since the 
beginning of the new millennium the entanglement of film and philosophy has 
been growing and even become a fashion. In consequence, philosophy of film 
has been established as an academic (sub)discipline in the field of aesthetics 
and philosophy of art especially in the United States (relying on Cavell) and as 
a branch of studies for Deleuzian scholars in France and worldwide.  
 Many continental philosophers nowadays rely on film to illustrate 
philosophical problems, and film theorists have increasingly searched for a 
philosophical interpretation of movies and alerted to their philosophical 
potential. Against this background, the creation of the solaristic system 
intends to draw a consequence from the fact that films are a form of doing 
philosophy, within the realm of philosophy. It goes beyond the mere repetition 
of that thesis taking Solaris as a mere example of it. Instead, the solaristic 
system is to be understood as a contribution to the old and ongoing debate on 
the nature of reality, disclosing new insights only possible through philosophy 
of film and by treating “Solaris” as a work of philosophy. 
 In what ways has cinema altered the discipline of philosophy? The 
solaristic system presupposes Deleuze’s ambition to renew philosophy and to 
engage the concepts of film and transfer them into philosophy. Yet instead of 
using a catalogue of film examples as Deleuze and many film philosophers 
do, the solaristic approach relies on one special movie alone, which 
significantly catalyzes the self-reflexivity of film. The solaristic system is the 
proposal to appropriate principles of thought and concepts to be engaged with 
from this movie and to base a philosophical system on them, meta-fictional in 
its expression, philosophical in its character. 
To continue the main line: In parallel to Deleuze and the late Cavell 
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some new aspects on the spectral nature of film have been raised in France 
by Jean-Louis Leutrat and also by Jacques Derrida, who curiously proclaims 
his position while being a character in the film “Ghost Dance”: “I am a 
ghost” 120 . Both defend the haunted character of film, emphasizing film’s 
death-driven and spectral essence: film shows that which has already passed.  
 
The most recent and structured impact on the area of philosophy and 
film comes from the Anglo-Saxon world. Noël Carroll has advanced from an 
analytical viewpoint a definition of the ontology of film and further given a non-
essentialist definition of film, questioning the earlier “creationist” and “realist” 
approaches; in the latter Carroll includes Cavell, whose agreeable positions 
he carefully summarizes in three main relevant points: “1) that film enables us 
to escape the burden of response; 2) that film overcomes subjectivity; and 3) 
that film relieves the anxiety of solipsism”121, the latter opening “the possibility 
of the world existing independently of my mind”122 . Although Carroll can 
appreciate these points, he refutes Cavell’s claim of the photographic image 
as an essential feature of film because we now have films with entirely 
computer-generated sequences; therefore, according to Carroll, the difference 
between painting and photography has to be defined again. As the solaristic 
philosophy of film reassesses the realist position, a closer look to Carroll’s 
refutation is appropriate. 
Instead of the realist approach, Carroll proposes that cinema is able “to 
convey moving fictions visually” 123 , thus including animation and digitally 
produced films in this statement. He recognizes that the realist argument 
concerning the essence of film has been “one of the most enduring”, yet 
points out: “audiences are not looking for reality at the movies, but something 
                                                
120 Ghost Dance is a 1983 British film directed by Ken McMullen. The film is centered on 
Derrida, who claims his position of an hauntology of film, characterizing ghosts as presence 
of absents. 
121 Noël Carroll, “Introduction”, in: Philosophy of Film and Motion Pictures - An Anthology, p. 
54 
122 Ibid., p. 55 
123 Ibid., p. 57 
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unreal”124. Even so, Carroll discards the dream hypothesis: “We know next to 
nothing about dreams. Indeed, we probably know more about films and 
filmmaking than we know about dreams and dream-making”125. Carroll also 
criticizes the third frequent hypothesis, the “film-as-language motif” 126, as 
being too metaphorical, as film is generated in images, not in words.  
He therefore proposes to get free of “the film as something else 
approach”127  and defends film as moving images, although this definition 
problematically encompasses something broader than film: it includes video 
and computer generated images, which all indicate something else than what 
we usually understand by film. Carroll’s positions have been appreciated, and 
raised worldwide discussion, mainly in the field of analytical philosophy. His 
method essentially consists in addressing and inquiring into the most different 
hypothesis of defining film, including his own. Yet Carroll also addresses 
common sense or practical questions relating philosophy and film, such as the 
ones regarding the objectivity or truth of documentaries, or whether film can 
be philosophy or not; he also addresses topics concerning film cultures like 
“the cinematic” or the praxis of filmmaking, as well as the difference between 
movies in general and artistic or avant-garde films.  
 I agree with Carroll that we should give up any attempts “to define film 
as something else”, yet I have to admit that the solaristic approach tries to 
define film ‘as reality’ although not in that simple way. It rather inverts the 
strain of argumentation: film is made of the reproduction of reality, so by 
analyzing film, we can come to new conclusions about the nature of reality. I 
further do not think, that Carroll’s reference to digitally transformed and 
computer generated images weakens the argument that the film image relies 
on the photographic image. Even if nowadays we have movies, which are 
composed of such computer-generated images, those try to imitate the 
photographic image, to imitate the reproduction of reality; painting has already 
had the means to paint naturalistically “like photography” before 
                                                
124 Ibid., p. 57 
125 Ibid., p. 60 
126 Ibid., p. 60 
127 Ibid., p. 61 
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photography’s invention (even if in the last century it could get freed of such a 
doctrine). When movies show “unreal “things like unknown planets, parallel 
worlds, monsters or dinosaurs, they use computer-generated imagery, trying 
to make them real: in film we look for extraordinary, impactful experiences 
which are in continuity with our world. Unreal objects become even more 
powerful, if they convey the real of reality. It does thereby not matter if they 
are a real reproduction or only pretend to be a reproduction of reality. Also we 
have to object to Cavell that filmdesign and film architecture has already 
created non-realist scenarios since the very beginnings of film. The attempts 
of German expressionism (for example the 1920 film “Das Kabinett des Dr. 
Caligari” – “The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari”) to use scenarios, which actually look 
like modern non-realistic paintings (such as cubist or expressionist ones) have 
been quickly abandoned. Murnau has discovered with the making of 
“Nosferatu” that the uncanny and horrible only is effective when it comes 
within a realistic approach, embedded in a realist world. 
 
A different film-philosophical approach is proposed by Stephen Mulhall, 
who has advocated for a controversial position, namely that philosophy is 
actually put into praxis through movies: “films are not philosophy’s raw 
material, nor a source for its ornamentation; they are philosophical exercises, 
philosophy in action – film as philosophizing.” 128  Mulhall’s position goes 
beyond that of Deleuze, who concedes to film the possibility of cine-thinking 
but keeps a certain distance from the idea of film as philosophy: cinema thinks 
by its own means, and philosophy picks up the concepts of cinema, 
integrating them into philosophical thought.  
Mulhall has observed a self-reflexivity of the films he investigates; a 
self-reflexivity, which sets films as a form of philosophy of film, since they 
reflect upon the cinematic medium:  
 
These questions, about the nature of the cinematic medium, are perhaps 
those which we might expect any philosophical book on film to address – they 
                                                
128 Stephen Mulhall, On Film, p. 4 
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are what is typically referred to when philosophers refer to ‘the philosophy of 
film’; (…) these films (…) themselves address such questions – because (…) 
in their reflections on human embodiment, they find themselves reflecting 
upon what makes it possible for them to engage in such reflections, upon the 
conditions for the possibility of film. In other words, a fundamental part of the 
philosophical work of these films is best understood as philosophy of film.129 
 
To conclude this section, I want to recapitulate that we have two different 
approaches to philosophy of film: the anglophone and the European, whereby 
the French and the Deleuzian thinking plays a special role. Yet the 
anglophone, analytically coined branch widely ignores any of the French or 
Deleuzian reflection. I will not resolve this underlying conflict nor is it the 
purpose of my thesis to do so; therefore I have decided to regard the different 
approaches as parallel streams, distinct from each other.  In any case, we can 
say that the analytically influenced, mainly anglophone approach is more 
concerned with a definition of the essential features of film, and how films are 
a kind of philosophizing in praxis (one of the recent popular examples is 
“Filmosophy” by Daniel Frampton, who actually defends filmosophizing), than 
with thinking about the consequences of film for philosophy and how to 
intertwine concepts of philosophy and film.  
The anglophone school seems convinced that philosophical concerns are 
to be clearly grasped through words and are determined by a dominant logic 
of linear thought in English language. The analytical approach usually refers 
as little as possible to continental philosophy or to anything outside its strictly 
defined scope, with some exceptions, whereby philosophers like Heidegger or 
Plato are recurrent names. Deleuze, as the opposite extreme, presents a 
baroque and rhizomatic thinking, full of entangled links and cross-references 
in order to sustain the constant creation of new nuances and concepts, to 
keep philosophy inspired by a flow of philosophical consciousness, to let it 
breath organically and multilayered. Indeed, for Deleuze, philosophy is a 
creative endeavor by itself; the creation of concepts can take entangled 
inspiration from any other creative act, like art or cinema or literature, and may 
                                                
129 Ibid., p.5 
  
98 
touch areas, which are not necessarily graspable by words.  
 
It is inevitable that the reflection upon the cinematic medium, which 
“Solaris” addresses, is the proof that, just in the sense Mulhall has mentioned, 
“Solaris” is a piece of philosophy of film. Furthermore the solaristic system is 
needed to engage the movie’s concepts for philosophy. Which kind of real of 
reality and which kind of truth does “Solaris” convey? Which consequences 
can we expect within the ontological and epistemological areas? What kind of 
thought and what kind of being (even if virtual) of both, the characters and the 
spectators, is made possible? These are the underlying guiding interrogations 
for starting the analysis that builds the solaristic system. 
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PART 2 
SOLARISTIC TWISTS - 
ON BEING, REALITY AND ITS 
REPRODUCTION  
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SHORT PREVIEW 
 
 
 
The philosophical reliance on a film or any kind of work of art is often 
underestimated as a device for reasoning; yet works of art can potentially turn 
out to be a unique tool of thought, especially in an area of the unutterable. 
This withdrawal from verbal intelligibility is the case when we ask for the real 
of reality in reproduction. In this first part of analysis I will gradually introduce 
this aforementioned real of reality for which being-in-film and being-on-Solaris 
become self-reflexive vehicles. I will gradually sketch this elusive real, which 
would become discernible through film; this real is present although absent in 
both reality and its reproduction, thereby reaching an area of presence of 
absence or being without being. I propose to develop this presence of 
absence as based on Heidegger’s presence of what is present, and as one of 
the main self-reflexive principles of the movie “Solaris”.  
The movie functions in a metaphorical way, as a fictionally based 
model of explanation of reality, comparable to Plato’s allegory of the cave: 
both examples are metaphors on reality and our access to it, yet somehow 
“Solaris” goes one step further for being not only a narrative, but as well a 
self-reflexive instance of what it describes and conceptually evokes.  Plato’s 
metaphor of imprisoned cave dwellers is about reality’s elusive character and 
the danger of perceptual illusion. In „Solaris“ the events of Kris Kelvin meeting 
his own memories in materialized form is symptomatic for the unfolding of an 
unutterable real of reality present in reproduction in a double sense: as a 
narrative and as a medium presenting reality directly, going beyond any other 
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form of art: somehow any film in its characteristic of being a film can function 
as such an allegory, although of a different kind: not necessarily as a 
particular narrative, as it is the case of „Solaris“ (and some other movies 
presenting a self-reflexive narrative like „Matrix“ or „Inception“, to name well-
known examples), but as a narrative medium of own characteristics: film does 
not represent reality, but re-presents it in a direct way.  
The self-reflexivity of “Solaris” enables the solaristic system to unfold 
conceptually, processing the movie’s inherent aesthetic sentiments into an 
epistemic setting as principles of thought around the development of the 
concept of the real of reality, relying on a “transference of reality” (Bazin). This 
epistemic setting evolves a range of correlated concepts like being, reality, 
world, time, space, matter, image, light, transcendence, death, the (in)finite, 
the void and finally the Lacanian Real. All of them are fundamental to delve 
into the nature of both film and reality, in an ontological as well as 
epistemological perspective. Further they are characteristic key concepts of 
the narrative of the movie “Solaris”. Therefore, the wide range of philosophical 
subjects raised by this movie stand as self-reflexive for the ontological 
principles of film in general, and indicate an intrinsic relationship between 
philosophy and film. Film turns thus into that which the ontological realists of 
film theory propose: “reality without any symbolic filter” (Pasolini) or 
“immediate reality” (Benjamin). Such a setting expands the reflection on 
reality grounding the solaristic system as a new kind of multifold model, 
including reproduction as an ontological premise of the being of reality. In its 
ultimate consequence, this also means that the real of reality becomes the 
most essential feature for the attempt to define film in philosophical terms: the 
real is a kind of essence of reality disclosed by film. By arguing so, the 
solaristic proposal gradually develops into a philosophical structure attempting 
to deal with the realm of the real, which is proposed as a placeholder for 
ontological truth.  
To sum up: the first steps of the solaristic system, the underlying 
understanding of reality and its reproduction in film will be conceptualized in 
this part of the analysis. Therefrom three different definitions of film will be 
gradually presented, fundamentally characterizing film’s entangled relation 
  
102 
with reality. Throughout they are explored and expanded as the fundamental 
principles of the solaristic philosophy. The three concepts are:  
 
1. film as the catalyzer of a multifold model of reality 
2. film as a non-human tool (technological apparatus) evoking 
epistemological change  
3. film as an automatic reproduction of the real of reality  
 
As suggested so far these concepts complement and condition each other. 
We cannot separate them; by analyzing one, we come via intra-active cross 
connections to the others. This way of reflecting on reality synthetizes different 
possibilities of entangled multiplicity. As both reproducer and continuator of 
reality, the filmic medium becomes a catalyzer, which makes the possibilities of 
reality manifold. 
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VIII.  
WHAT HAPPENS TO REALITY IN FILM? 
 
 
1. The Ontological Puzzle of Being  
in Reproduction 
“What happens to reality when it is projected and screened?”130 asks Stanley 
Cavell right at the beginning of The World Viewed. In the text preceding this 
question Cavell interprets the claims of André Bazin - “The cinema [is] of its 
essence a dramaturgy of Nature”131 - and of Erwin Panofsky - “The medium of 
the movies is physical reality as such”132 - as not to be taken literally, but 
rather as referring to film’s reliance on the photographic medium. Cavell thus 
says that the question of photography and film has to be a question of reality: 
What Panofsky and Bazin have in mind is that the basis of the medium of 
movies is photographic, and that a photograph is of reality or nature. If to this 
we add that the medium is one in which the photographic image is projected 
                                                
130 Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed, p. 16 
131 André Bazin, op. cit., p. 110 
132 Erwin Panofsky, “Style and Medium in the Moving Pictures”, in: Film, p. 31 
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and gathered on a screen, our question becomes: What happens to reality 
when it is projected and screened? 133 
To start with this inquiry on what happens to reality in film, let us try to inquire 
into this idea that “a photograph is of reality or nature”. What exactly does it 
mean, that a picture is of the same as that which it depicts, its model? Cavell 
certainly is right when he explains: 
 A photograph does not present us with ‘likeness’ of things; it presents us, we 
want to say, with the things themselves. But wanting to say that may well 
make us ontologically restless. 134 
What lies behind this ‘ontological restlessness’, which derives from the 
equalization of the thing itself with its photographical other or double? The 
equation must appear as a contradiction, because, these two, the thing and its 
photographic double, cannot be considered as identical; indeed, their 
equation must appear as a paradox. Cavell finds an elegant escape when he 
characterizes the problem of photography as provoking an ontological 
restlessness, further describing its connection to reality as a human limit of 
epistemic capacity of knowledge: 
 Such troubles in notating so obvious a fact suggest that we do not know what 
a photograph is; we do not know how to place it ontologically. We might say 
that we don’t know how to think of the connection between a photograph and 
what it is the photograph of. The image is not a likeness; it is not exactly a 
replica or a relict, or a shadow, or an apparition either, though all these 
natural candidates share a striking feature with photographs – an aura or 
history of magic surrounding them.135 
However, Cavell has not attempted to describe, in terms other than 
“mysterious”, this characterization of the photographic image, ontologicallly a 
                                                
133 Stanley Cavell, op. cit., p. 16 
134 Ibid., pp. 17 -18 
135 Ibid., pp. 17-18 
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puzzle and a mystery, as well in epistemological terms. Cavell thereby aptly 
formulates the sense in which the photographic image is mysterious: 
 
(T)he mysteriousness of the photograph lies not in the machinery which 
produces it, but in the unfathomable abyss between what it captures (its 
subject) and what is captured for us (this fixing of the subject), the 
metaphysical wait between exposure and exhibition, the absolute authority or 
finality of the fixed image.136 
 
It is this “unfathomable abyss” which we will try to understand better in what 
follows. Cavell starts his reflection relying on Bazin, claiming that Bazin would 
misspell the identity between the thing and its image in photography, when in 
truth wanting to call attention to the fact that we are not facing a 
representation. For Cavell it is obvious in this context, that the thing on the 
photographic image “is not actually present to us either (anyway, obviously 
not present with us) when it appears on the screen.”137 But is that so, and is 
the problem, which Bazin raises, the one of a mere misspelling? To better 
approach this question I propose to look back at Bazin’s writing in detail. What 
does Bazin exactly claim about the relation between the photographic image 
and its model? I have already mentioned the proposal of interpretation of the 
claim “the photographic image is the model” 138, which will be elucidated in 
what follows.  
I will hereby argue that Bazin’s assertion is to be understood beyond 
the indexical interpretation which has become established in film theory. A 
close regard on his formulations can cast some light onto the “mysterious” 
problem Cavell describes, exactly because Bazin does not emphasize a 
relation of indexicality when he sketches the perplexing relation between the 
photographic image and its model. In my view, the widespread indexical 
interpretation relies on a kind of misunderstanding, which goes back to the 
English translation of Bazin’s writing. Actually Bazin’s ontology of the 
                                                
136 Ibid., p. 185 
137 Ibid., p. 166 
138 André Bazin, op. cit., p. 14 
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photographic image was for the first time understood as an indexical reading 
by Peter Wollen in 1969, two years after the English translation of Hugh Gray. 
Wollen refers Bazin in the context of semiology, grounding on Peirce’s 
indexical class of signs, drawing a physical connection between objects and 
their photographical representation: “we know that in certain aspects they are 
exactly like the objects they represent”139. Wollen thereby claims that Bazin’s 
“conclusions are remarkably close to those of Peirce”140 and points out: 
Time and again Bazin speaks of photography in terms of a mold, a death-
mask, a Veronica, the Holy Shroud of Turin, a relic, an imprint. Thus Bazin 
speaks of “the lesser plastic arts, the molding of death-masks for example, 
which likewise involves a certain automatic process. One might consider 
photography in this sense as a molding, the taking of an impression, by the 
manipulation of light.” 141 
The English translation of Bazin quoted here by Wollen has dropped the word 
reproduction, to be found in the French original. “Un certain automatisme 
dans la reproduction”142 has been translated into English by Gray as quoted 
above: “a certain automatic process” 143. Yet in truth Bazin names here what 
he is interested in: the automatic reproduction of the dead one and not just 
any process. The word reproduction designates a specific kind of process. 
This dropping is a symptomatic example for the change of meaning that the 
English translation provokes, thus favoring Wollen’s indexical understanding. 
Let us look closer at the context of Wollen’s quote of Bazin. In order to 
engage photography as an imprint, Wollen has actually quoted a footnote of 
                                                
139 Charles Sanders Peirce, What is a Sign? (1894), quoted by Peter Wollen, Signs and 
Meaning in the Cinema, p. 103 
140 Peter Wollen, op.cit., p. 105 
141 Ibid., p. 105 
142 André Bazin, Qu’est-ce que le cinéma?, p. 12 
143 The whole Bazinian footnote quoted by Wollen says in the French original: “Il y aurait lieu 
cependant d’étudier la psychologie de genres plastiques mineurs, comme le moulage de 
masques mortuaires qui présentement, eux aussi, un certain automatisme dans la 
reproduction. En ce sens on pouvait considérer la photographie comme un moulage, une 
prise d’empreinte de l’objet par le truchement de la lumière.” (Cf. Ibid., p. 12) 
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Bazin, meant to complement an observation on photography as a 
“psychological fact”. Thereby, for Bazin, “the solution is not to be found in the 
result achieved but in the way of achieving it [our underlining].” 144  This 
reinforces the reading that Bazin’s emphasis lies not in the obtained “imprint” 
(Wollen), but in the way of automatic reproduction it has been achieved: “le 
moulage de masques mortuaires qui présentement, eux aussi, un certain 
automatisme dans la reproduction”145 says Bazin. 
I therefore will argue that Gray’s translation reduces the ontological 
dimension of Bazin’s proposal as well as its philosophical complexity. This will 
be clarified even further through the example I will give in what follows. The 
reason behind Gray’s translation might have been theoretical simplification, 
because the philosopheme presented by Bazin appears as paradoxical as 
Cavell has observed – “the model is the image”, whereas the indexical 
interpretation cannot provoke any kind of “ontological restlessness”, therefore 
stands against that which Cavell emphasizes on Bazin.  
Let me consider again Bazin’s way of argumentation. In the French 
version he starts with the following affirmation: 
L’objectif seul nous donne de l’objet une image capable de ‘défouler’, du fond 
de notre inconscient, ce besoin de substituer à l’objet mieux qu’un décalque 
approximatif [our underlining – C.R.].146  
This statement says, that only the photographic lens can satisfy our profound 
need to substitute the (depicted) object in a better way than an ‘approximative 
decal’. It means the photographic lens gives us something more than a decal, 
as the latter is merely approximate. This something more is not named. Yet 
Gray’s translation suggests the opposite: he names the something more as 
the decal, which already is “more than a mere approximation”; and therefore it 
                                                
144 André Bazin, What is Cinema?, p. 12. In the French original: “la satisfaction complète de 
notre appétit d’illusion par une reproduction mécanique dont l’homme est exclu. La solution 
n’était pas dans le résultat mais dans la genèse.” (Cf. André Bazin, Qu’est-ce que le cinéma?, 
p. 12) 
145 Ibid., p. 12 
146 Ibid., p. 14 
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would satisfy the deep human need for the substitution of the object. Let me 
quote his translation:  
Only a photographic lens can give us the kind of image of the object that is 
capable of satisfying the deep need man has to substitute for it something 
more than a mere approximation, a kind of decal or transfer [our underlining – 
C.R.].147  
Indeed, this English translation can give ground for an indexical 
reading of Bazin’s argumentation, which is not emphasized in the French 
original where Bazin in fact asserts that the photographic image must be more 
than an approximate decal. And this he says immediately before he claims 
that “the photographic image is the model” – “elle est le modèle”148. This 
clearly favors my reading that Bazin’s emphasis lies on the word being.  
Yet what does it mean – to be the model? This sentence, in English 
and quoted out of context, wrongly evokes identity of the object and its 
photographic existence. Rather it is to consider the problem which Cavell 
emphasizes by reflecting further on Bazin: “The photographic mystery is that 
you can know both the appearance and the reality, but that nevertheless the 
one is unpredictable from the other.”149 
However, if Cavell had considered the French original of Bazin, would 
he have taken into consideration that the English version reduces and hides 
the full meaning of the question of the being of the photographic image, which 
cannot be found elsewhere as in the ontological status of being itself? I ask 
this because in my view it is exactly this ontological status of the being of the 
photographic image which matters for analysis. Thereby, only philosophy, not 
film theory, has the tools to reflect on being itself and its ontological meaning, 
and only philosophy can then regard the ontological and epistemological 
status of the being of the photograph. Since philosophical analysis is a rather 
recent way to look at film, translator Gray may have wanted to prepare a way 
                                                
147 André Bazin, What is Cinema?, p. 14  
148 André Bazin, Qu’est-ce que le cinéma?, p. 14 
149 Stanley Cavell, op. cit., pp. 185-186 
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for film theory to deal with the question without having to confront this kind of 
complexity of natural language, apparently evoking insurmountable 
paradoxes.  
Regarding what has been said throughout this chapter, I propose in 
what follows, to center my analysis on the question of being through film. It is 
rather my proposal that by further reflection on the being of film, we can 
describe the reproducibility as a property of being - instead of designating this 
property as an “unfathomable abyss” between the thing and its reproduction. 
It is this claim I will try to explain further. 
 
 
 
 
2. The Being of Reality 
 
Obviously it has not been the intention of Bazin to reflect on the ontological 
meaning of being and its conceptual entanglement with reality or its 
reproduction; that would clearly have transcended his intentions, consisting in 
the attempt to define film for a mere theoretical use, and not to unfold its 
philosophical complexity. Yet Bazin has unexpectedly been stepping into the 
realm of the most complex questions of ontology and epistemology without 
noticing. Therefore, in defining the ontological status of the being of the 
photographic image, from a philosophical point of view, being itself is at stake.  
By reassessing the ontological sense of the being of the model present 
in Bazin’s original text, an unexpected ontological quality of being comes 
along, namely its infinite shareability in reproduction. Where does this 
reproducibility of being in form of the image come from? How can being be 
reproduced and how does it so through the image? Bazin evokes at the origin 
of the photographic image, and of art in general, the Egyptian mummy “as a 
defense against the passage of time”:  
The religion of ancient Egypt, aimed against death, saw survival as 
depending on the continued existence of the corporeal body. Thus, by 
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providing a defense against the passage of time is satisfied a basic 
psychological need in man, for death is but the victory of time. To preserve, 
artificially, his bodily appearance is to snatch it from the flow of time, to stow it 
away neatly, so to speak, in the hold of life.150 
The power of photography to stop time and of film to reproduce it indicates 
that something of the nature of being is to be shared; something which 
unfolds in time, but affects us through the photographic image in a special 
way, different from all the other arts: namely by the instrumental and 
automatic intervention of “a non-living agent” (reminding the apparatus 
conception of Walter Benjamin in The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction) that transfers reality “from the thing to its reproduction”. 
For the first time, between the originating object and its reproduction there 
intervenes only the instrumentality of a non-living agent. For the first time an 
image of the world is formed automatically, (…). All the arts are based on the 
presence of man, only photography derives an advantage from his absence. 
The production by automatic means has radically affected our psychology of 
the image (…) we are forced to accept as real the existence of the object 
reproduced, actually re-presented, set before us, that is to say, in time and 
space. Photography enjoys a certain advantage in virtue of this transference 
of reality from the thing to its reproduction.151 
                                                
150  André Bazin, What is Cinema?, p. 9. The French original as follows: “La religion 
égyptienne dirigée tout entire contre la mort, faisait dépendre la survie de la pérennité 
materielle du corps. Elle satisfaisait par lá à un besoin fundamental de la psychologie 
humaine: la defense contre le temps. La mort n’est que la victoire du temps. Fixer 
artificiellement les apparences charnelles de l’être c’est l’arracher au fleuve de la durée: 
l’arrimer à la vie.” (Cf. André Bazin, Qu’est-ce que le cinema?, p.9) 
151 André Bazin, What is Cinema?, p. 13-14. The French original as follows: “Cette genèse 
automatique a bouleversé radicalement la psychologie de l’image. L’objectivité de la 
photographie lui confère une puissance de crédibilité absente de toute oeuvre picturale. 
Quelles que soient les objections de notre esprit critique nous sommes obliges de croire à 
l’éxistence de l’objet représenté, effectivement  re-présenté, c’est-à-dire rendu present dans 
le temps et dans l’espace. La photographie bénéficie d’un transfert de réalité de la chose sur 
sa reproduction.” (Cf. André Bazin, Qu’est-ce que le cinema?, p.13-14) 
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This transfer of reality is thus done in the absence of man, therefore we can 
call it a trans-human or even post-human ability, an aspect to be developed 
later. On the other hand, this “transference of reality from the thing to its 
reproduction” evokes an equivalence of being and reality. A similar point is 
made by Louis-Georges Schwartz, when he refers that in Bazin, for the 
French reader, “reality and appearance are brought very close together, 
almost conflated” 152 , which doesn’t happen for the English reader. 
Remarkably, Schwartz also fiercely defends disconnecting Bazin from any 
reading of indexicality, through the example of the Egyptian “mummy 
complex”: 
Bazin calls the mummy – the preservation of appearance in the medium of 
reality – the first statue. The mummy is already a plastic art, already an 
image, already somehow an aesthetic production. This short sentence shows 
us that what interests Bazin is not the index, whatever both his supporters 
and detractors claim. The mummy as an image ontologically connected to its 
model, the mummy is its model in flesh and bone. It prefigures the 
photograph of which Bazin will write that it is its model. Index describes 
neither mummy nor photograph. The word never appears in the essay for an 
index may be caused or inscribed by what it expresses, but is an entity 
different from what it expresses. The mummy and the one who might survive 
are one being.153 
Obviously I agree on this point with Schwartz; it is my understanding 
that the idea of an ontology of the image as a relation to its model identifies 
the being of the image with the one of its model, a relation, which Bazin 
originates in the Egyptian mummies: the survival of being is at stake and in 
film it is achieved. Such an idea is clearly opposed to the understanding of the 
image as an index of the model and goes beyond the historical evidence of 
something that factually ‘has been’.  
                                                
152 Louis-Georges Schwartz, “Deconstruction avant la lettre – Jacques Derrida Before André 
Bazin”,  in: Dudley Andrews (Ed.), Opening Bazin: Postwar Film Theory and its Afterlife, 
Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 99 
153 Ibid., p. 99 
  
112 
Furthermore, the fact that something is or has been, doesn’t say 
anything about the nature of its being. I will argue that the conclusions about 
the nature of the film image are to be sought in the area of the being of reality, 
which is not different in physical reality or its filmic reproduction. This being of 
reality, which becomes shareable in film, is a pure being, out of time and 
space. This approach gives a new view of film and inquires into the 
understanding of the concepts of being and of reality, by questioning film’s 
being and its relation to reality. That could be a possible answer to our 
question about what happens to reality in film: its being is shared by 
“mechanical reproduction” (technology), to evoke Walter Benjamin on who we 
will rely later. Yet is this a satisfying answer, or does it only lead to further 
questions?  
 
 
 
 
3. Being in Time as Film 
 
Considering the described entanglement of being and reality, which has been 
unfolded by analyzing Bazin’s chain of argumentation, Cavell’s question “what 
happens to reality when it is projected and screened?”154 can be transformed 
into “what happens to being when it is projected and screened?” Whether 
being-in-reality or being-in-film – it is always being we are referring to, an 
observation evolved throughout the solaristic system by asking: what happens 
to being on the planet Solaris? ‘Being-on-Solaris’ is hereby understood as a 
projected cine-being: the solaristic visitors are cinematic protagonists, since 
they share the same being as their models. Therefore, that which we can 
assert about the planet and its relation to the scientists is applicable to 
                                                
154 Stanley Cavell, op. cit., p. 16 
  
113 
cinema155. Cavell claims that “we do not know what a photograph is; we do 
not know how to place it ontologically.”156 Yet he ignores the fact that we are 
puzzled already by the ontological condition of being itself: we do not know 
what being is, therefore we are puzzled by its reproduction, even more its 
reproduction in time, which shares the temporal-ontological dimension of 
being. Right at the beginning of his major work Being and Time Heidegger 
has reintroduced the question of being into philosophy claiming that it has 
never been resolved in a proper way: 
Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by 
the word ‘being’ [Sein]? Not at all. So it is fitting that we should raise anew the 
question of the meaning of Being. But are we nowadays even perplexed at 
our inability to understand the expression ‘Being’? Not at all. So first of all we 
must reawaken an understanding for the meaning of this question. Our aim in 
the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of Being and 
to do so concretely. Our provisional aim is the Interpretation of time as the 
possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being.157  
I believe that this special status, which being has for film, will become more 
understandable when thought through the Heideggerian tools of thinking, and 
vice versa: the fact that being can be reproduced by film, that being-in-the-
world becomes ‘being-in-film’, adds a new characteristic and opens new 
ground for ontological consequences, which can expand Heidegger’s 
appreciation of being and time. Indeed, Heidegger’s conception of the 
inseparability of being and time (being is time for Heidegger), is reflected in 
film’s being in time. The entwinements of this will become clear throughout 
and developed gradually. For now, let me add that the condition of time 
receives a special treatment in “Solaris”.  
                                                
155 This idea anticipates a later conclusion of analyzing the neologism ‘being-in-film’ as well as 
the comparison of the ‘solaristic apparatus’ and the ‘filmic apparatus’, elucidating the 
aforementioned self-reflexivity of the medium film present in the movie “Solaris”. 
Stanley Cavell, op. cit., p. 17 
157 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 1 
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According to the director Andrei Tarkovsky to make film literally is 
“sculpting in” or “of” time, an idea I will follow up later. Moreover, Bazin has 
stressed, that the dimension which cinema adds to the photography has its 
anchorage in time:  
Viewed in this perspective, the cinema is objectivity in time158. The film is no 
longer content to preserve the object, enshrouded as it were in an instant 
(…). Now, for the first time, the image of things is likewise the image of their 
duration, change mummified as it were.159 
Of crucial importance in this context is Heidegger’s theory of death, and his 
not-yet projection of the possibilities of being. Both are consequences of this 
idea of associating being and time, of Dasein’s temporality, its being 
conditioned by time. In its application to film the spectral and death-driven 
character of film in general and the movie “Solaris” in particular will be 
revealed, all in the fourth and fifth chapter of this part of the analysis.  
Before going any further, I would like to introduce Tarkovsky’s 
underlying understanding of film or cinema and time, to better understand 
what lies behind the temporal conception of „Solaris“. Film as the art of the 
moving image relies on time and, as briefly mentioned, for Tarkovsky 
filmmaking is best described as sculpting in time. His aesthetic theory further 
confronts us directly with some of our concerns on the nature of reality, and is 
connected to the idea of factuality of film: that which Bazin calls “objectivity in 
time”. Tarkovsky refers to as time in factual form - a moving state in which all 
real objects (or subjects) manifest themselves and which can be recorded and 
brought back in film: 
 
                                                
158 The French original is less affirmative and richer, referring to an achievement of objectivity 
in time: “Dans cette perspective, le cinema apparaît comme l’achèvement dans le temps de 
l’objectivité photographique.” (Cf. André Bazin, Qu’est-ce que le cinema?, p. 14). This 
achievement enables the possibility to still reflect on its nature, instead of using the term ‘is’, 
which is, as we have shown, ontologically a puzzling term. 
159 André Bazin, What is Cinema?, p. 14-15 
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In what form does cinema print time? Let us define it as factual. And fact can 
consist of an event, or a person moving, or any material object; and 
furthermore the object can be presented as motionless and unchanging, in so 
far as that immobility exists within the actual course of time. That is where the 
roots are to be sought of the specific character of cinema. 160 
 
This factuality of objects is, for Tarkovsky, the natural state of things in 
the flow of real time, an idea reminiscent of Henri Bergson, for whom the world 
moves in a constant flow of becoming. (The artifice in such a context is then the 
stable, the fix, the non-moving.) As an example for the impact of the factual 
form of time in film Tarkovsky refers to a famous sequence of early cinema: the 
shot of the approaching train by Auguste Lumière. When it had been screened 
for the first time, the spectators had been so frightened that they fled out of the 
room. Not only was the fact that they did not distinguish between the screen 
and the physical world remarkable; but also, for Tarkovsky, a completely "new 
aesthetic principle" was born:  
 
For the first time in the history of the arts, in the history of culture, man found 
the means to take an impression of time. And simultaneously the possibility of 
reproducing that time on screen as often as he wanted, to repeat it and go 
back to it. (…) He acquired a matrix for actual time. Once seen and recorded, 
time could now be preserved in metal boxes over a long period (theoretically 
forever).161 
 
It seems that this factuality of time is what for Tarkovsky conveys the 
real dimension of film: because of how it plays out temporally, and because of 
the way it is recorded in photographic image and sound, cinema is real and 
interferes with reality – as an artwork and simply as a film, as a moving image. 
Tarkovsky further relates the referred factual time of film to the concept of 
                                                
160 Andrej Tarkovsky, Sculpting in Time, p. 63 
161 Ibid., p. 62 
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rhythm of the course of time162. This rhythm relies on a certain pressure of 
time163, and therefore does not derive from the editing (the juxtaposition of 
shots); the rhythm already exists within the shots, it is life. Thus Tarkovsky 
writes, on the opening sequence of “Solaris”: 
 
Rhythm in cinema is conveyed by the life of the object visibly recorded in the 
frame. Just as from the quivering of a reed you can tell what sort of current, 
what pressure there is in a river, in the same way I know the movement of 
time from the flow of the life-process reproduced in the shot.164 
 
Tarkovsky describes how film appropriates the actual life of different 
beings and objects in their manifest motion in time, their rhythm. Film as a 
continuation of reality then prolongs the life of the spectators as an experience 
of condensed time – because it gives back time in compressed form: Tarkovsky 
points out a flower can perish in film in a minute.165 Therefore film has a 
different status among the arts concerning the relation with reality and often is 
considered reality’s (bodiless) continuation. It conveys this continuation in 
such a hypnotic way that the spectator merges into it as if it were equal to 
reality.  
Furthermore, according to Tarkovsky’s understanding of time, the past 
(memory) is more consistent and real than the present, which permanently 
flees and decomposes. Film gives this wonderful new possibility to impress 
and reproduce time, thus film is recorded memory and as such provides us 
with memories as if they were coming from real life experience; film images are 
memories of memories, a kind of meta-memories.  
                                                
162 “The dominant, all-powerful factor of the film image is rhythm, expressing the course of 
time within the frame.” (Cf. Ibid., p. 113) 
163 “The distinctive time running through the shots makes the rhythm of the picture; and 
rhythm is determined not by the length of the edited pieces, but by the pressure of the time 
that runs through them.” (Cf. Ibid., p. 117) 
164 Ibid., p. 120 
165  “(…) cinema, like no other art, widens, enhances and concentrates a person's 
experience—and not only enhances it but makes it longer, significantly longer. That is the 
power of cinema.” (Cf. Ibid., p. 63) 
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“Solaris” operates with this mechanism going still one step further: 
human dreams are a kind of transforming processor of memories and the 
threshold to pass from memory to matter: memory literally becomes life on the 
planet, not only in factual, but also in material form. In this sense, the main 
aesthetic and conceptual principle of cine-being in “Solaris” can be described 
as an actualized form of past being or the presence of something, which is 
absent. Thereby arises the idea that the being of reality, which is grasped by 
film, is the same as in memory while we are remembering. It is a being of 
memory images in a Bergsonian sense: for Bergson the world is composed by 
images which interact. Memory-images or “image-rememberance” is for 
Bergson the registered form of “pure memory” 166. As I will show in the third 
chapter, this transcendent and displaced form of being reflects the very 
characteristics of photography and film. It evokes its spectral and somehow 
death-driven character, relying on the cinematographic imaging transcending 
matter and preserving time.  
But before doing so, let us try to complete the evolvement of the being 
of reality, which becomes shareable in filmic reproduction. After having drawn 
some first considerations on being and time, I propose to reflect in the 
following on what we mean when we refer to reality: how can we reflect on 
film and its relation to reality, if we have not clarified what reality is? And 
regarding further film’s intra-active engagement with reality (evident in reality’s 
transference by film), this inquiry seems a promising project for reflection for a 
simple reason: In philosophy we have to describe reality, translate it into 
another system, the one of words; whereas film directly operates with reality by 
recording its images and sounds in movement: we are facing the reproduction 
of reality in the form of its being.  
 
 
  
                                                
166 See: Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 
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IX.  
TWISTED REALITY AND ITS REPRODUCTION 
 
 
Let us resume the reflection on Bazin – he draws an inseparability of being 
and reality and claims that in the photographic image the depicted object is 
the model ontologically. Hereby I propose to step back for a moment from 
Cavell’s interpretation of Bazin that film is of reality (or, in our terms, of being-
in-reality), and propose instead, that film is reproduced reality because the 
being of reality is what is shared in filmic reproduction. Reproduction thereby 
is twofold. On the one hand it consists of recording (grasping and preserving) 
reality; on the other hand, by this doubling it is in continuity with reality and thus 
substituting reality. Yet this fact can only be understood if we presuppose and 
seek a multifold model of reality. 
Therefore, instead of reflecting further on the nature of the 
technological reproduction of reality in moving image and sound, it is my 
proposal for this chapter to first develop further the concept of reality we are 
talking about – an unusual approach in the area of philosophy of film. What 
the word “reality” refers to – when we speak of the reproduction of reality or 
distinguish film from reality – seems to belong to general and universally held 
knowledge. Yet I will argue that it is as problematic as the term being: we do 
not know what reality is; it escapes when we try to grasp it. The intelligibility of 
reality presents one of the biggest challenges of the history of philosophy: 
how can we know or describe what reality really is if we only experience it 
from the inside, by being-in-reality? And which kind of reality is film, since 
reality is transferred into it? 
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1. Multifold Models of Reality 
 
Since the time of the pre-Socratics and of Plato, the potential of illusion 
that can befall sensory perception has been stressed, and the distinction 
between reality and perception of reality has been established. In the further 
course of the history of philosophy, subjective and relative idealism on the one 
hand and direct or scientific realism / materialism on the other, in all possible 
facets and variations, have defined themselves as the main opposing 
positions regarding our grasp of reality and access to reliable knowledge and 
truth. In the context of this analysis I propose to conceptualize a multifold 
model of reality on which the solaristic system emerges and which I claim is 
reproduced by film. 
Although this analysis is referring to the dichotomy of idealism - 
materialism, its main focus lies in the contemporary comeback of materialism 
and realism, which have been presenting a new, speculative twist on the 
knowledge of reality and the problem of human access. This new twist has 
hardly been explored in the context of aesthetics, and even less in the context 
of film. In this context it is to mention that the recent speculative turn in 
materialism and realism has somehow been anticipated by Henri Bergson’s 
twofold stance abrogating the contradiction between realism and idealism. His 
position is often referred as “partial realism”, a term Bergson himself uses in a 
letter to John Dewey.167 It is further fruitful to take into account the appropriation 
of the Bergsonian ‘world as image’ by Gilles Deleuze in the area of philosophy 
of film.  
Karl R. Popper has claimed that reality has a pluralist character, which 
he argues to be composed of three worlds: the first one of physical entities 
and events, the second one of consciousness and mental objects such as 
thoughts or feelings, and the third of objective knowledge and socio-cultural 
                                                
167 See: John Mullarkey, The New Bergson, Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 7 
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infrastructures. 168  His “threefold realism” is often compared to the Greek 
division into physis, psyche and logos.  
According to Popper world 3 presents the abstract objects and 
products of thought like scientific theories or works of art, which after their 
creation gain an existence in world 1 as well, yet their importance lies in their 
content, not the physical form they manifest:  
 
World 3 and world 1 overlap: world 3 encompasses, for instance, books, it 
contains statements; it contains above all human language These are also 
physical objects, objects, events, that take place in world 1. Language 
consists, we may say, of dispositions anchored in nervous structures and 
therefore in something material; of elements of memory, engrams, 
expectations, learnt and discovered behavior; and of books. You can hear my 
lecture today because of acoustics: I am making a noise; and this noise is 
part of world 1. (…) At the same time I would like to show that the immaterial 
aspect of world 3 not only plays a role in our consciousness – in which it 
plays a major role – but that it is real, even apart from worlds 1 and 2. (…) 
there is something immaterial here, namely the content of our statements, of 
our arguments, in contrast to the acoustic or the written, and hence physical 
formulations of these statements or arguments.169  
 
Whereas world 1 and world 2 interact, world 2 (consciousness) 
functions as the mediator between the physical world (World 1) and the 
products of human thought (World 3), for example, the experience of listening 
to a piece of music. What is interesting in Popper’s approach is that he names 
a common denominator of world 1, 2 and 3: their realness. They are equally 
real, and this level of realness I suspect to be the realm of the real of reality: 
somehow a variable with the property to unite the material, the immaterial and 
that which pertains to consciousness. In any case, Popper does not give an 
example of a product belonging to three kinds of worlds at once; according to 
him there is a feedback interaction going on, in which world 2 emerges from 
                                                
168 See: Karl Popper, “Knowledge And The Shaping Of Reality: The Search For a Better 
World” in: Search Of  A Better World 
169 Ibid., p. 22 
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and changes world 1, and world 3 emerges from and changes world 2.  
Film is for some reason not mentioned by Popper (who prefers to refer 
to computer programs) and I will argue that film is the union and re-creation of 
worlds 1, 2 and 3 together; it is different from music, paintings or books, 
different from stories or theatre plays and different from scientific theories. On 
the one hand film clearly belongs to world 3, being a product of thought, 
gaining existence of its own, acting on world 1 and 2. On the other hand, this 
existence is far more complex than the usual products of thought, as not only 
is it to be grasped by consciousness and emotional experience, but it also 
directly enters and even substitutes the physical world: it is not the same kind 
of physical existence which a book has, in its carrying the words suggesting 
worlds of ideas. Since film is the reproduction of reality, it also is a 
continuation of physical reality: different from a book and different from noise, 
the physical reality of film carries world 1 and world 3, and encompasses 
several levels of world 2: the psyches of the film characters and the 
consciousness of the spectator. This means that film’s reality is even more 
complex than the three worlds, because it encompasses all the three at once, 
it creates a world 3 which is also worlds 2 and 1 – even if its materiality is light 
and soundwaves, it is a physical existence to be seen and heard.  
The solaristic system combines, in its understanding of reality, the 
physical reality, sensory perception and the inner processes of the mind as 
well as their products, following Popper; yet the solaristic system seeks for a 
bigger entanglement of the three kinds of worlds and adds an infinity of 
possible worlds: an infinite multifold model of reality, as many worlds as there 
are films. Popper’s model could also be compared to how Maurice Merleau-
Ponty would describe “the world”. Physical reality would be complemented by 
“the natural setting of, and field for all my thoughts and all my explicit 
perceptions.”170 For Merleau-Ponty perceptions are the human relation with 
the outer world (the interaction of World 1 and World 2 in Popper) – which 
actually is accessed by humans as appearance, composed of perceptual 
objects and by consciousness as a projective activity of the mind. Therefore 
                                                
170 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. xii 
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the appearance of objects can conceal their reality and is distinct from reality. 
Merleau-Ponty further fuses the perception and the perceived object when he 
argues: 
 
Perception is precisely that kind of act in which there can be no question of 
setting the act itself apart from the end to which it is directed. Perception and 
the perceived necessarily have the same existential modality, since 
perception is inseparable from the consciousness which it has, or rather is, of 
reaching the thing itself. Any contention that the perception is indubitable, 
whereas the thing perceived is not, must be ruled out. If I see an ashtray, in 
the full sense of the word see, there must be an ashtray there, and I cannot 
forego this assertion. To see is to see something. (…) How can we possibly 
dissociate the certainty of our perceptual existence from that of its external 
counterpart?171  
 
I propose to read Merleau-Ponty in the sense that perception discloses certain 
properties of reality, even if I can only be aware or sense some of them, 
conditioned by my senses, at least its existence is disclosed. And similarly to 
his contemporary Henri Bergson, he gives perception and the perceived “the 
same existential modality”: the object does exist externally of the mind, 
because the perceiver is as well part of the same world. This does not mean, 
for Merleau-Ponty, that the perception corresponds to the whole reality of the 
perceived object, and we can give such a thought a realist reading172. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
171 Thomas Baldwin (ed.), Maurice Merleau Ponty: Basic Writings, p. 173 
172 The further analysis of this assumption goes beyond our scope of analysis. 
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2. The World as Image 
 
Bergson assumes an equality of “the reality of spirit and the reality of 
matter”173, a position between idealism and realism, relating and fusing the 
spheres of concept and percept of reality in an unexpected way. Instead of 
distinguishing appearance and reality, Bergson speaks of image. For him, the 
world is image – it is composed of images which interact: “All these images 
act and react to upon one another in all their elementary parts according to 
constant laws which I call laws of nature.” 174  These images exist 
independently of being grasped by the human mind. They are “images 
perceived when my senses are opened to them, unperceived, when they are 
closed.” 175  The body is thereby an image, which is different from other 
images, because the body filters images via the brain, which is itself “only an 
image among other images”176.  
Therefore, the brain does not contain nor create the other images, but 
is contained in the material world itself, being itself an image: “images 
themselves, they cannot create images.”177  All images continue to exist, even 
without the brain perceiving them. Images are matter for Bergson. Perception 
thereby is defined as follows: “I call matter the aggregate of images and 
perception of matter these same images referred to the eventual action of one 
particular image, my body.”178 But Bergson does not distinguish the reality of 
these ‘perception-images’179 and those images, which exist even unperceived, 
the ‘matter-images’. They are the same images, although they belong to 
                                                
173 Henri Bergson, op. cit., p. vii 
174 Ibid.,  p. 1 
175 Ibid., p. 1 
176 Ibid., p. 2 
177 Ibid., p. 10 
178 Ibid., p. 7 
179 The perception-image I refer to here is extrapolated from the Bergsonian thought and is to 
be distinguished from the perception-image in film, which Deleuze introduces in Cinema 1 – 
The Movement-Image. 
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different systems: 
 
 Here is a system of images which I term my perception of the universe, and 
which may be entirely altered by a very slight change in a certain privileged 
image, - my body. This image occupies the centre (…). Here, on the other 
hand, are the same images, but referred each one to itself; influencing each 
other no doubt, but in such a manner that the effect is always in proportion to 
the cause: this is what I term the universe.180   
 
The main distinction between these two kind of systems is that the perception-
system contains matter-images which have been reacted upon the 
body/brain: they are ‘movement-images’ 181  or perception-images, but not 
images created by our mind. Ultimately Bergson suggests a conflation 
between images inside and outside the human mind. Mind and matter are 
thereby equally real, in the sense of both being images, composed by certain 
kind of images, inner ones and outer ones:  
 
Every image is within certain images and without others; but of the aggregate 
of images we cannot say that it is within or without us, since interiority and 
exteriority are only relations among images.182  
 
Reality is then defined as a multiple of image(s). This idea of image would be 
the unifier of the three worlds of Karl Popper, as interiority and exteriority are 
not distinct worlds, but mere relations among images. Therefore Bergson’s 
theory has a high potential to be applied to the kind of reality that film 
(re)produces. Images for Bergson belong to what Merleau-Ponty refers to as 
“the same existential modality”, although for Merleau-Ponty they are distinct 
from reality. For Bergson, on the other hand, appearance is not to be 
distinguished from reality, but every image is to be seen as part of a bigger 
                                                
180 Henri Bergson, op.cit., p. 12 
181  The movement-image I refer to here is, too, an extrapolation from Bergsonian thought and 
is to be distinguished from the movement-image in film, which Deleuze introduces in Cinema 
1 – The Movement-Image. 
182 Henri Bergson, op.cit., p. 13 
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whole: 
 
My consciousness of matter is then no longer either subjective, as it is for 
English idealism, or relative, as it is for the Kantian idealism. It is not 
subjective, as it is in things rather than in me. It is not relative, because the 
relation between the ‘phenomenon’ and the ‘thing’ is not that of appearance 
to reality, but merely that of the part to the whole.183  
 
Yet it is Gilles Deleuze who will make the attempt to classify with the 
help of cinema – but not only cinema – all the possible kinds, systems and 
layers of images, integrated in a rhizomatic model of thought. Images are 
thereby not equivalent to concepts, but can convey concepts in a more fluid 
way. I will come back to the Deleuzian approach later. For now, let me dive 
into the current return of realism. 
 
 
 
 
3. Overcoming Correlationism 
 
In contemporary philosophy the discussion on reality and its perception has 
taken an ontological turn; speculative realism in particular has given reflection 
on reality a new realist or materialist twist, delineating an ontological 
framework to its epistemological implications. The contemporary French 
philosopher Quentin Meillassoux has thereby coined a stance against 
“correlationism” – correlationism being the Berkeleyian-Kantian idea that:  
 
 
Thought cannot get outside itself in order to compare the world as it is ‘in 
itself’ to the world as it is ‘for us’, and thereby to distinguish what is a function 
of our relation to the world from what belongs to the world alone.”184  
                                                
183 Ibid., p. 306 
184 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, pp. 3-4 
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Meillassoux criticizes this interplay between man and world, which is 
reducing the access to reliable knowledge on being and on reality to human 
thought. His position requires a renovation of our relation with reality and 
thereby evokes, from the solaristic point of view, the achievements of film. I 
will argue that in film (and on Solaris) thought actually gets outside itself, we 
finally can think x from outside x (an assertion I will further explain later). 
Through its reproduction the world can be postulated as it is in itself. 
According to Meillassoux, correlationism is furthermore “the idea according to 
which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and 
being, and never to either term considered apart from the other.”185A pertinent 
question in our context is therefore whether “Solaris” is a correlationist 
proposal or not: I will argue that it is not.  
Firstly, the planet is too big a mystery – it is the exemplification of a 
non-human intelligence. And secondly, visitor Harey, the embodiment of the 
principle of the presence of absence, quickly gains independence from her 
projector Kris – she is a thinking of Kris who becomes an independent being. 
It is further the ability of the planet to let the humans sense the limits of 
conventional (scientific) knowledge versus the unlimited entanglements of 
intuition, which is distinct from correlationism and above all, from 
representationalism. Solaris answers to human thought with non-human 
thought, delineating man’s best human qualities as relying on his perceptions, 
memories and intuition.  
The rejection of correlationism is the lowest common denominator, 
which unites rather different positions within speculative realism, which is 
fractured into currents like transcendental materialism, new realism or object-
oriented philosophy. Bergson would have also rejected correlationism. He 
avoids it by refusing the dualism idealism-materialism as he tries to integrate 
subjectivity (perception) in his approach of reality.  As has been mentioned, the 
challenge in the context of this treatise consists in the fact that speculative 
realism has widely been ignoring film in particular and art in general (apart 
                                                
185 Ibid., p. 5 
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from some selective studies), with the exception of Graham Harman for whom 
“aesthetic reflection and judgment are employed in metaphysical 
speculation into what a mind-independent reality might be like”. 186  He 
further directly claims, that “aesthetics is first philosophy” 187 . Although 
Harman himself does not consider film separately from other forms of art, 
since his position can be considered as an “aesthetic turn”188 in speculative 
realism, it will be engaged with this development of the solaristic system, and 
the central Harmanian concept of allure will be focused on in this regard.  
The history of theory and philosophy of film has persisted in the use of 
a clumsy definition of reality, mostly referring to physical reality, without further 
reflecting on what that means. An exception might be Deleuze, whose 
reflections on film are integrated into an original system of thought 
characterized by a rhizomatic way of thinking establishing multiples of 
assemblages. Deleuze at least avoids the term reality, instead developing the 
concept of virtuality, which for him is just as real as physical presence or 
actuality. Instead of the term “reality” Deleuze uses the concept of a 
complexly constituted plane of immanence consisting of all sort of objects, 
particles, relations and beings, somehow echoing the Bergsonian ideas of 
different kinds and systems of images and movements: 
 
There are only relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness between 
unformed elements, or at least between elements that are relatively 
unformed, molecules, and particles of all kinds. There are only haecceities, 
affects, subjectless individuations that constitute collective assemblages. (…) 
We call this plane which knows only longitudes, speeds and haecceities, the 
plane of consistency or composition (as opposed to the plan(e) of 
organization or development). It is necessarily a plane of immanence and 
univocality. We therefore call it the plane of Nature, although nature has 
                                                
186 Francis Halshall, “Art and Guerilla Metaphysics” in: Speculations V: Æsthetics in the 21st 
Century, p. 383 
187 Graham Harman, Aesthetics as First Philosophy: Levinas and the Non-Human (available 
online) 
188 Francis Halshall, op. cit., p. 383 
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nothing to do with it, since on this plane there is no distinction between the 
natural and the artificial. (…) Its number of dimensions continually increases 
as what happens, but even so it loses nothing of its planitude. It is thus a 
plane of proliferation, peopling, contagion. (…) It is a fixed plane, a fixed 
sound plane, or visual plane, or writing plane etc. Here fixed does not mean 
immobile.189 
 
To come back to the contemporary, ontological turn: Markus Gabriel 
develops a new ontological realism, which is also coined by an idea of 
multiple reality, which is multi-layered yet without totalizing unity. According to 
Gabriel, that which is perceived of an object is a property of the object, 
whether we perceive it or not. Perceptions are “world involving”, but will not 
change the actual object. Gabriel further argues for a multilayered reality and 
“recognizes the existence of perspectives and constructions as world-
involving relations”190 and therefore part of “reality”. In the solaristic system 
perceptions and thoughts are actually properties of the objects as well: we 
only can perceive and think what lies in the nature of the objects. In this 
sense, that which actually happens on Solaris is an anomaly of interaction 
between fields of sense: inner images switch into physical reality. 
Yet Gabriel goes one step further in the understanding of “reality” or 
“world”, which he completely rejects as category: they are “non-existing” as 
belonging to the domain of “metaphysical totalities”, to be rejected. Gabriel is 
against “the idea that there is or ought to be a unified totality of what there is, 
whether you call it ‘the world’, ‘being’ or ‘reality’.”191 Therefore Gabriel claims a 
position, which he defends as ontological, rather than metaphysical. In his 
theory there is no such thing as one unifying domain of one reality, not even 
of realities, whether they are mind-independent or not. Realities belong to 
different contexts, which Gabriel elaborates, designating them as “fields of 
sense”. Some of these fields can be intersecting or overlapping.  
                                                
189 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, pp. 
293-294 
190 Markus Gabriel, Fields of Sense: A New Realist Ontology, 2015, p. 11 
191 Ibid., p. 5 
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Although I find the idea of intersecting fields, which I would call in my 
context “fields of images”, attractive, it does not matter to my analysis whether 
these fields belong to a domain (like for example Deleuze’s plane of 
immanence, which at the same time is multiple) or not. What matters in the 
solaristic system is the reproducibility of the fields: reproducibility set as a 
domain where the fields of images are constituted by frames in movement. 
What of reality is, or which kind of bearers of movement are reproducible? 
Can we reproduce all the fields of sense? The answer is that we cannot 
reproduce them all at the same time, but they are all reproducible. 
Furthermore it is likely to suppose that we reproduce several fields at once. 
Does this common feature of reproducibility or of “being real” put them in a 
unifying domain? And if reality is “all there is”, an infinity of fields of sense, 
where is this “there”, for what does it stand? The answer to this kind of 
question goes beyond the scope of this analysis and must remain without a 
conclusive answer. 
However, the input we can transfer from Gabriel’s approach is that in 
order to be real or to belong to reality, to be a field of sense, it is not 
necessary that this field represents all the other fields, or a totality: each field 
only presents itself as a piece of reality, which is not meant to be a totalizing 
category.  
 Furthermore an allegorical comparison to the cinematographic frame 
is tempting: each frame is a field of sense, yet they all belong to one film, 
another field of sense, containing other fields of sense and overlapping with 
other fields of sense. A film is then more then its duration, it increases with the 
minds of the spectators and with the ongoing discussion about it. On the other 
hand, and opposed to Gabriel’s position, film can also be seen as closed in 
itself, as a metaphysical unity of reality, even if it is only a plane of 
immanence, to put it in Deleuzian terms. Any film has a beginning and it has 
an ending – a fundamental structure of closure on which I propose further 
reflection in Chapter XI.  
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4. The Reproducibility of Multifold Reality 
 
Let me go back to the beginning of this chapter – to the idea of defining 
reality, in order to conclude on its reproduction: Film involves a privileged 
relation towards reality, as it records and doubles reality directly, yet we have 
not considered the full consequences of setting reproducibility as a unifying 
property of reality. As we have seen with the example of Markus Gabriel’s 
fields of sense, integrating the reproducibility of reality into the idea of reality’s 
manifoldness is complex. Is the truly whole manifold being of reality 
reproducible?  What about thought, fantasies, imaginary objects and inner 
movements like affects and perceptions being part of reality and its being, and 
thus reproducible? Since film records image and sound, is there a 
reproducibility besides that which we can see and hear possible, besides the 
field of sense called physical reality?  
Some may object against this hypothesis arguing somewhat as follows: 
“Obviously in film there only can be reproduced what is visible/audible, 
therefore we cannot reproduce thought, fantasies, inner processes or 
relations, because their expression in image and sound would be a mere 
translation, a transfer into another area, and therefore an approximate 
construction.” This objection is similar to a scientific realist view, where the 
concept of reality only implies that which is measurable.  
One possibility to refute this objection would be to recall Popper’s 
model of threefold reality, in which one world emerges from the other: world 2 
from world 1 and world 3 from world 2. This could mean that by reproducing 
world 1, world 2 will emerge and by this world 3, automatically. We cannot 
consider reality in its whole, if we only isolate physical qualities. Also, we only 
can reproduce emotions, if we reproduce the physical entities from which they 
emerge. Bergson’s approach to images would especially strengthen such a 
proposition: images are all there is in action, reaction and interaction and this 
complexity of moving images is not lost in the reproduction. 
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Furthermore, different approaches in film philosophy which I have been 
explaining in the introduction of this thesis have shown how much film is a 
stream of consciousness or thought (according to Deleuze but also Epstein, 
or, more recently, Frampton), which could not be drawn into the recorded 
material had it not been already there in the recording. The editing just molds 
and shapes by assemblage that which is recorded, catalyzing its possibilities 
of thought. Probably it is exactly this inherent thinking capacity of film, which 
makes it so similar to reality and constitutes the reason for it having such a 
strong impact on our mind. This reason consists in the fact that inner fields 
are entangled with outer worlds and never exist on their own. We cannot 
create a withdrawn inner world without reference to the exterior, and vice 
versa. Furthermore, even if we assemble the recorded images and combine 
them into something “new”, we are always making an appropriation of reality: 
even the most elaborated film montage and the most skilled editor, cannot 
change the basic attributes of the recorded material: although you can do 
some construction work in the editing room, you cannot construct any kind of 
film out of any kind of material. You cannot change your bricks. There always 
remains a direct connection of continuity with that (field of sense) which has 
been recorded, a factuality (Tarkovsky) or a “presence of what is present” 
(Heidegger), the latter one to be explored in the next chapter. 
Let me briefly recall in this context the thought of Epstein, for whom 
reality as such is not existing, because it is composed of a “sum of 
unrealities”192, deriving from continuity (time) and discontinuity (coexistence in 
space), the two different “interchangeable modes of unreality”193, which he 
also calls perspectives: 
 
The cinematograph (…) shows time to be merely a perspective resulting from 
the succession of phenomena, the way space is merely a perspective of the 
coexistence of things. Time contains nothing we might call time-in-itself, no 
more so than space comprises space-in-itself.(…) Thus, after having taught 
us about the unreality of both, continuity and discontinuity, the cinematograph 
                                                
192 Jean Epstein, The Intelligence of a machine, p. 15 
193 Ibid., pp. 15-16 
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rather abruptly ushers us into the unreality of space-time.194 
 
It is remarkable that this character of “unreality” of space and time does 
away with the totalizing concepts of “space in itself” and “time in itself” and 
that this conclusion, for Epstein, has become perceivable through film. Film 
explores and thereby discloses a “sum of unrealities” 195, the possibilities of 
unreality of reality itself, that is, film unconceals features of reality which 
otherwise would have remained withdrawn. This example shows well how 
complex the reproduction of reality is and how much the appearance of 
cinema has shaped our understanding and thereby perception of reality: it has 
become multiple and stretchable, beyond a totalizing domain: there is no time 
in itself, no space in itself, no reality in itself, but rather there is unreality.  
In everyday life we got an insight into this multifold unreality of reality, 
the “sum of unrealities” 196  through the omnipresence of audiovisual 
reproduction, which expanded cinema and TV with the mobile internet and 
recently the technique of 3D-video-mapping, to be considered a new form of 
cinema. In the Deleuzian universe of rhizomatic thought, this notion of image 
in which “matter = movement = image = perception”197 is integrated into the 
plane of immanence constituted by an infinitude of images in constant 
movement and interaction: “This infinite set of all images constitutes a kind of 
plane [plan] of immanence.”198 We are in fact constantly switching between an 
infinity of image sequences or fields of sense, to reconnect this to Markus 
Gabriel. 
The above means that we have very different kind of images and that 
                                                
194 Ibid., pp. 24-25 
195 ibid., p. 15 
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197“An image is the expression of matter, its consistency in movement, and not the re-
presentation of that matter; indeed, when Bergson speaks of an image, the connotation is not 
of an illusion but of an affective intensity. Matter is tantamount to perception and Bergson 
maintains that images themselves are the expression of this confluence: matter = movement 
= image = perception.” (Cf. Gregory Flaxman “Cinema Year Zero”, in: The Brain is the screen, 
p. 92) 
198 Gilles Deleuze, CINEMA 1: The Movement Image, p. 61 
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in film, an image is never just an image of reality’s surface, but as complex as 
reality itself. It reproduces all the complexities of the plane(s) of immanence, 
different fields of sense, images of all kinds, continuing what they reproduce, 
interacting with it, and with each other. Despite the factual objectivity of the 
photographic lens which shows that something has factually “been there” and 
done work, the filmed image is as little neutral or objective, as our perception 
is, or as multiple, unreal or non-existing as reality itself.  
Let us think further, about the recording process of the cinematograph. 
It is a very complex procedure as there is an infinity of choices as to how the 
image is to be recorded, its framing and mise-en-scène. We can largely vary 
perspective composed by scale, angle, position, height of camera, inclination 
and camera movement. All the possible different images are equally real and 
equally reproducible. Yet although the recording is the automatic act of a 
machine, the choice of the images is highly subjective and the result of a 
mental operation. This mental operation will always be reflected and shape 
the recorded image, which will be a result of a choice out of an infinity of 
possible perception-images related to the same matter-images. The operator 
of the camera, the cinematographer, by choosing a way of perception 
chooses bits of reality – whether of a fictional performance or not – which are 
subsequently assembled. 
But why is this so? Even knowing about the manifoldness of unreality 
being reproduced, we have, until now, presupposed the reproduction of 
reality, rather than actually defined the what of reproduction. Why do we even 
think a reproduction of reality is taking place, why is there a transfer of reality 
from the thing to its reproduction? What is it that makes the reproduced real? 
In the following chapter we will try to elaborate a definition as to what of reality 
is being reproduced in film, by going back into the the shareability of the being 
of reality, yet moving one step further in the chain of argumentation by 
claiming that the being of reality (in all its possible multiple forms, actions and 
levels) is what makes reality real. Therefore, in the following chapter, the real 
of reality will be introduced, and its cine-being further characterized.  
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X. 
ASKING FOR THE REAL OF REALITY 
 
 
 
 
1. The Concept 
 
Philosophy, since its very beginning, has been relying on allegories 
presenting the elusive character of reality, easily withdrawing from the grasp of 
intelligibility. The most famous example is Plato’s allegory of the cave, 
reflecting on the limitation of our access to truth and frequently employed as 
philosophy’s preferred metaphor of film as an illusionary reality. Yet in my view 
the allegory of the cave is not the best example to describe the nature of film: 
the reproduction of reality is far more complicated than the projection of 
shadows on a wall, set as illusion, because it is the only thing the chained 
cave dwellers discern and know at all. In contrast to them the film spectator 
knows there is another reality beyond the projection. As mentioned in the 
introduction of this analysis I would rather agree with Badiou, who claims:  
 
(C)inema is not a false reality. Cinema is a new relationship to the Real 
itself.199 (…) (C)inema is an illusion, which says that it is an illusion, naturally. 
                                                
199  Compare to: “Cinema becomes the motion of what is real, much more than its 
representation.” (Cf. Jean-Luc Nancy, L'évidence du film : Abbas Kiarostami = The evidence 
of film, p. 26) and: “The reality of images is the access to the real itself” (Cf. ibid., pp. 16-17) 
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So it is a completely different situation from the prisoners in the cave who are 
of the conviction that the images are the only form of the Real.200 
 
This statement brings a new perspective into our analysis. The 
development of the solaristic system entails the proposal to explore this “new 
relationship to the Real itself” by asking for the real of reality in film, which I 
intend to define throughout this chapter. We have already argued that film is a 
privileged medium for reproducing reality and we have introduced multifold 
models of reality, stating the non-existence of one final reality.  Yet we have 
not been able to answer in satisfying terms what of reality (its being) exactly is 
reproduced by film to be recognized as such and what does this 
reproducibility tell us about the real?  
Let me go back to the idea that a film is composed by images and that 
for Bergson the world is image. But what is an image? Isn’t it exactly that 
which bears and carries the real of reality? And is the film-image just a 
machinic perception of this real image, detached from its preceptor, an image 
in itself? Or is the reproduced image we see in film the same as its original? 
Let me focus on how Bergson argues in detail when he defines what an 
image is. According to him, an image lies somewhere between the thing itself 
(in the materialistic sense) and its representation (in the idealistic sense). He 
therefore defines matter as an aggregate of images: 
 
Matter, in our view, is an aggregate of ‘images’; and by ‘image’ we mean a 
certain existence which is more than that which the idealist calls a 
representation, but less than that, which the realist calls a thing, - an 
existence placed half-way between the ‘thing’ and the ‘representation’.201 
 
Furthermore, as Bergson continues in his argumentation, the 
perception of matter and the image of matter coincide in the sense that “it is 
really in P, and not elsewhere, that the image of P is formed and 
                                                
200 Alain Badiou, Cinema and Philosophy, available online  
201 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, p. 7.   
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perceived.”202 Yet this image differs from perception: “It is true that an image 
may be without being perceived”, says Bergson, “it may be present without 
being represented” 203 . Presence and representation of an image are two 
different things, just as matter and perception are. But this means, and here 
Bergson holds a position different from the classical materialists as well as 
from the classical dualists, that matter (and its movements) is not isolated from 
the rest of the world, and neither is perception.  
There are movements of the material world and movements of 
perception, and they interact. On the one hand, there is a mind-independent 
reality for Bergson, yet on the other hand, perception is part of the very same 
reality. “[O]f the aggregate of images we cannot say that it is within us or 
without us, since interiority and exteriority are only relations among images.”204 
Therefore in Bergson’s theory mind and world, subjectivity and reality are 
entangled. Such a position is solaristic (and therefore cinematographic) and 
describes well the fluid nature of the real of reality, recalling the surface of the 
planet Solaris covered by a liquid substance, which changes and shapes itself 
into beings and islands by the influence of the human mind. I will come back to 
this point later on. The film image is again only one possible image out of an 
(infinite) aggregate of images. 
We have already mentioned that Pasolini has considerably been 
advancing the theoretical reflection on film. His main contribution lies in 
analyzing the language (‘linguaggio’ in Italian in opposition to ‘lingua’, based 
on words) of film and reality is based on action and its shots and images 
composed by objects, which he calls “kinemes”. This language of film, so 
Pasolini claims, is the same language as that of life itself and therefore he 
grounds his theory on the difference between film and the other arts: namely 
by claiming that film is not, like the other forms of art, based on mimesis. For 
Pasolini film rather is an art, which expresses reality by directly reproducing 
reality:  
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Cinema does not evoke reality as literary language does; it does not copy 
reality like painting; it does not mimic reality like theatre. Cinema reproduces 
reality: image and sound! In reproducing reality, what does it do? Cinema 
expresses reality with reality205.  
This statement reveals itself as extremely intriguing if one inquires its further 
implications: what does it actually mean to express reality and to do so with 
reality? It is this expressed reality, which Pasolini calls cinema and which 
demands a more exact definition and delimitation, after all different from 
reality? Or should one suppose that the expression of reality called cinema is 
already to be found inside reality - in such a way that it would not be distinct 
from it? But then, how is reality to be expressed with itself? Pasolini further 
expounds: 
 
By studying the cinema as a system of signs, I came to the conclusion, that it 
is a non-conventional and non-symbolic language  [linguaggio] unlike the 
symbolic written or spoken language [lingua], and expresses reality not 
through symbols but via reality itself. (…) So the question is: what is the 
difference between the cinema and reality? Practically none. I realized that 
the cinema is a system of signs whose semiology corresponds to a possible 
semiology of the system of signs of reality itself. So the cinema always forced 
me to remain always at the level of reality, right inside reality.206 
 
I agree with Pasolini’s statement that cinema expresses reality with 
reality and that cinema withdraws from the symbolic order by operating with 
“the system of signs of reality itself”. Cinema is a reality-based language in the 
sense of the Italian linguaggio. Pasolini says “There is no symbolic or 
conventional filter between me and reality, as there is in literature.”207 As we 
will reflect on later, the Lacanian Real is described exactly as withdrawing 
from the symbolic: “The real is that, which resists symbolization absolutely.”208 
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With ‘discernible presence’ of the real of reality, which film reproduces, I refer 
to an immanent presence impossible to be sensed: I cannot necessarily 
touch, see, hear or smell it, yet it is there. It is beyond image and sound, 
although transported by it and in-between, positioned somewhere at the 
interstice between time, matter, spirit, mood or other imaginable dimensions. 
It is my claim that this real becomes only graspable through film by the 
reproduction of reality. Without film reproducing reality, we would not have 
any ontological notion of this real of reality. 
I therefore agree with Pasolini that in cinema we are in reality.  As he 
says, the spectator has the impression to be “right inside reality”209  - but 
where are we actually? Why is the reality of film, cinema, “always at the level 
of reality”210? What is it of reality that makes film reality be as real as reality? 
How can the real of reality be transferred from life to celluloid? I will argue that 
this apparent paradox of cinema and reality is symptomatic for the character 
of the real reality itself: the real of reality lies beyond reality’s physical side 
and is independent of time and space. It is that of reality which persists in 
reproduction and turns film real – although being a different kind of reality – or 
just a different field of sense, to recall Gabriel. 
The only possible solution for the paradox consists in conceiving the 
real of reality as a fluid being integrated in a multifold model reality of special 
characteristics: a model permeable enough to let this fluid real to be 
transferred from one level of reality to the next. The real of reality would be 
then something able to pass from one field of sense to another one in terms of 
presence. Another possibility is to conceive it as that which constitutes the 
“existential modality” of the Bergsonian images, which allows them to always 
be the same image, whether belonging to the system of perception or the one 
of matter. If we further think of Popper’s threefold model, we must appropriate 
this real of reality as that which unites the three worlds – makes them equally 
real and is the corresponding entity designated when we use the word reality. 
                                                                                                                                      
Psychoanalysis, p. 66  
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And if we think of Merleau-Ponty, than this real of reality might be that which 
gives us certainty that appearance is a part of reality: that the perceived object 
is real. 
 
 
 
 
2. Being without Being 
 
In epistemological and ontological terms, we can describe the nature of the 
real of reality as it is expressed by cinema (with different insights) better than 
we could have described reality itself, which does not exist to boot. The main 
reason is that in reproduction we have chosen a perspective on reality and 
embodied a new perspective for thought: we look at reality from the outside of 
reality. We have already mentioned, but it is worth emphasizing here, that this 
shift of perspective for human thought is the most incisive since the 
Copernican revolution. Some of the consequences we can consider by 
analyzing the events on the planet Solaris: to look at our own memories in a 
doubled state of being creates an interactivity. This interactivity ultimately 
reflects the mystery of Harey’s existence, which is not supposed to exist 
independently of Kelvin’s mind. Harey embodies an alluring presence of an 
absent bit of reality, a dislocation which is, according to Stanley Cavell, 
characteristic of film itself: 
 
Objects projected on a screen are inherently reflexive, they occur as self-
referential, reflecting upon their physical origins. Their presence refers to their 
absence, their location in another place.”211  
 
This idea of the presence of objects, which simultaneously is an absence, 
reminds one of Badiou’s aforementioned “absence of the Real” which 
                                                
211 “Objects projected on a screen are inherently reflexive, they occur as self-referential, 
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simultaneously “says something new concerning the Real itself” and thus 
evokes the Real. The reason for this negative subsistence of presence is 
determined by the ontological essence of film, which is entangled with the 
real of reality. The special characteristic of the reproduced real of reality in 
film, to be absent although present, evokes a kind of negation of negation of 
the Real: Film is real by negating the presence of what is real, which is again 
negated. It is referring to an absence, which negates its absence, as it 
simultaneously evokes presence.  
 The main conflict of “Solaris” reflects this absence-referring-presence, 
a condition which I will call a being without being deriving from the negation of 
negation of the Real and which will become clearer throughout. This condition 
is embodied and carried out as a principle by the central character Harey: She 
is the dramatis persona whose aberrant existence is the film’s main conflict 
and thus she is the film’s most important “conceptual persona” (CP). The term 
is borrowed from Deleuze and Guattari (who base the concept on Nietzsche): 
the “conceptual persona” conveys movement of thought and “is the becoming 
or the subject of a philosophy.”212 It is to be understood as the embodiment or 
personified image of philosophical concepts.  Through the dramatic conflicts 
of CPs in “Solaris” we can establish a conceptual field of solaristic tensions 
between the concepts raised by the movie and actualized by the CPs.  
One may argue against Cavell that any pictured object, even on a painting 
or a drawing, provokes this referred presence of absence. Cavell therefore 
suggests: “the world of a painting is not continuous with the world of its frame; 
at its frame, a world finds its limits. We might say: A painting is a world; a 
photograph is of the world.”213 Yet we can argue with CP Harey, who is the 
conceptual embodiment of cine-being, that film generates this presence of 
absence by giving it the same impact as reality because of the special ability that 
film has. This ability is a reinforcing condition for both being real and being taken 
from reality, therefore making the film image a continuation of reality, yet one that 
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is present in a quality other than physical matter. This presence of Harey is the 
key to ask for the real of reality.  
But before going further into the presence of CP Harey, let me recall 
Bazin who claims that “the photographic image is the model” and assumes a 
“transference of reality from the thing to its reproduction” 214 . As I have 
previously argued, Bazin indirectly suggests an ontological equivalence of 
being and reality, presupposing reality as something that gives being its frame 
of existence or, put in other words, as a necessary property of being or even 
its primary condition: there is no being without reality, just as being is a 
necessary property of reality. Consequently I will claim for an intra-active 
reciprocity of being and reality.  
This reciprocity reminds us of Dasein’s being as a ‘being-in-the-world’, 
a term conceived by Heidegger, who has re-introduced the question about 
being in modern philosophy, stressing its temporal dimension. But the term is 
still more complex, even in its relation to cinema, or reproduced being. As we 
will see later, the word being - in German “sein” - implies the meaning of 
dwelling215 for Heidegger who therefore sets Dasein’s being as an existential 
‘being-in’, further its essential structure as ‘being-in-the-world’216. For Heidegger 
Dasein and its environment are inseparable in their coexistence, whereby the 
world is “a characteristic of Dasein itself” 217. This correlationist perspective of 
Heidegger implies at the same time a way for thought to try to grasp the sense 
of being, which is not limited by Dasein’s perspective although accessed by it. 
The German word Dasein literally translated means being-there, 
whereby the ‘there’ (‘Da’) of Da-sein designates the ‘world’. Dasein and world 
cannot be grasped separately, which induces that being-in-the-world is not 
meant as a spatial condition of being, but an ontological one. I propose to 
transfer Heidegger’s being-in-the-world, which entails a multiplicity of 
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215  “ ‘Being’ [Sein] – is the infinitive from I am [Ich bin], which also means ‘to reside 
alongside…’ or ‘to be familiar with’.”(Cf. Martin Heidegger, op. cit., p. 80) 
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possibilities for Dasein (again, we are facing a multifold model), into the 
neologism being-in-film; it designates a possibility of being which Dasein 
enters when watching a movie. This neologism will be further elucidated in the 
chapter I of the third part of this analysis. 
However, on Solaris reality is transferred from being-in-the-world to 
being-on-Solaris. We could even claim that the whole film is the being-in-the-
world as being-on-Solaris of protagonist Kris Kelvin: Solaris is a characteristic 
of Kelvin’s Dasein, a world in which reality and being are entangled, in which 
even immaterial being becomes real, like in film - a phantasmagoric scenery. 
Film is in this sense not representational, but, as Cavell claims, re-
presentational, a characteristic causing “ontological restlessness”, a state of 
mind CP Harey and CP Kelvin are haunted by. Let us recall:  
A photograph does not present us with “likeness” of things; it presents us, we 
want to say, with the things themselves. But wanting to say that may well 
make us ontologically restless. (…) We do not know what a photograph is; we 
do not know how to place it ontologically. 218 
Harey is like a moving photograph – she is its deceased model on 
Earth. We have already traced Cavell’s statement back to Bazin and forward 
to Heidegger. As we have mentioned hereby, the answer to Cavell must be 
that the puzzling part of the question already lies in the ontological condition 
of being itself: we do not know what being is nor “how to place it 
ontologically”, which is why Heidegger has not ceased for a lifetime to reflect 
on being. And that is also why Heidegger’s philosophy and that building on it 
can give us some guidance regarding this question raised by Cavell, which 
again demands an extension of Heidegger’s reflection on being in an 
unexpected way. 
To put it therefore in Heideggerian terms: what significantly changes 
when one supposes film as world and world as film is the nature of time and 
of Dasein. However, before going further into this change of Dasein, I would 
like to introduce the following condition of film: as CP Harey shows, death has 
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been accessed by film. The reproduced image outlives its depicted objects, 
and there are ontological consequences to consider. In film it is no longer 
clear what life and what death are, given that the nature of time has been 
altered - In film I step beyond time — into film-time. Film-time can condense 
and expand, it is relative and does not exist in itself: Although the question in 
this context maybe should not be, whether the nature of time has changed. It 
is more likely instead that film discloses the true nature of time, which 
withdraws from natural perception.  
Furthermore, the hypothesis of film-as-death reassesses Heidegger’s 
concepts of being, time and death. As a being-no-more, death is bound to 
Dasein’s being-in-the-world, and Heidegger even designates death as “a 
phenomenon of life”219. Film-as-death, would be then a possibility for a doubled 
Dasein experiencing a being-in-death: Through film I glide into a spectral 
world. The film-beings (usually called “characters”) are somehow like ghosts 
to us. In chapter II of the third part I will examine more closely this peculiar 
nature of film, which allows Dasein to experience death without dying. 
Cavell brings up yet another point: “That the projected world does not 
exist (now) is its only difference from reality.”220 This idea of a displacement in 
time meets the already mentioned aesthetic theory of Tarkovsky, for whom 
filmmaking is sculpting in time. As we have seen, Tarkovsky further refers to 
film as time in factual form - a moving state in the “actual course of time” in 
which the real objects (or beings or events) manifest themselves221 and which 
can be recorded and brought back:. In the context of our analysis it seems 
that this factuality of time transfers the real of reality in film, which is further to 
be named the real of reproduction. In what follows, this real, the 
aforementioned presence of CP Harey, her being, is going to be compared to 
the idea of presence (of absence) in Cavell and Heidegger. To be exact: 
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Cavell’s idea of being or presence is actually based on Heidegger, whom he 
quotes: “The word [being] says: presence of what is present.”222 But what 
exactly does this mean? The Heideggerian interpretation of being as presence 
is actually an ambiguous and even misleading concept: he distinguishes the 
“present” and “the presence of what is present”. 
 Heidegger’s idea of being is based on the ancient Greek par/ousía, 
translated into German as “Anwesenheit” (presence), originating from a pre-
onotological sense, for Heidegger consisting in a “Being-at” -“Da-Sein” (not to be 
confounded with Dasein from Being and Time). The translator of Being and 
Time explains in this context:  
 
The noun ousia is derived from one of the stems used in conjugating the 
irregular verb eimaí (‘to be’); in the Aristotelian tradition it is usually translated 
as ‘substance’, though translators of Plato are more likely to write ‘essence’, 
‘existence’, or ‘being’. Heidegger suggests that ousia is to be thought of as 
synonymous with the derivative noun parousia (‘being at’, ‘presence’). As he 
points out, parousia has a close etymological correspondence with the 
German ‘Anwesenheit’. 223 
 
The being-at of parousía means a quotidian comprehension, being 
present in the sense of being at your disposition, “lying-before-us”224, being 
there as a practical use for now. For the ancient Greeks, says Heidegger, 
"entities are grasped in their Being as 'presence'; this means that they are 
understood with regard to a definite mode of time – the 'Present; that is they 
are conceived as presence.'"225 This being present also means being close: 
“The Greeks do not conceive of being present and abiding primarily in terms 
of mere duration. (…)To be present is to come close by (an-wesen), to be 
here in contrast and conflict with to be away (ab-wesen).”226  
However, Heidegger still distinguishes another type of presence: the 
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“presence of what is present”227. This is the presence of CP Harey, which 
goes beyond the present moment. This kind of presence is for Heidegger to 
be distinguished from the presence in the present because presence cannot 
be reduced to one mode of time: “It would be a mistake, (…) for us to take the 
view that Being of beings meant merely, for all time, the presence of what is 
present.” 228  This “presence itself” is a concept, which Graham Harman 
develops further by referring to a withdrawing real object (“the third table”229), 
by relying on Heidegger‘s “readiness-to-hand” 230 . As a matter of fact, 
Heidegger sets the presence of what is present as something withdrawing 
from thinking. We cannot even be sure of its disclosure:  
 
(I)t is no assurance that such thinking will also clothe the presence of what is 
present, in words, with all possible clarity and in every respect.  Even more, it 
remains undecided whether in the "presence of what is present“ there will 
appear That which constitutes the presence of what is present.” 231  
 
Even so, according to Heidegger the “presence itself” always remains:  
 
Presence itself is precisely the presence of what is present, and remains so 
even if we specifically stress its various traits. (…) The other traits in the 
Being of beings – the objectivity of the object which we mentioned, the reality 
of the real – are nonetheless still constituted in the fundamental character of 
presence.232 
 
At another point of his work Heidegger explains that “Anwesenheit” as 
parousía also includes in it the word “Anwesen”, which is literally translated as 
possession or house, evoking a sense of permanence. “Presence means: the 
consistent dwelling [Verweilen], concerning Man, reaching him, handed for 
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him.”233 This claim evokes a sense of being permanently present in time, 
different from referring only to the present, but to time, which in Heidegger’s 
understanding is threefold, consisting in the unity of three ecstases234: “We 
(…) call the phenomena of the future, the character of having been, and the 
Present, the ‘ecstases’ of temporality.”235 Therefore, even in the present, the 
two other ecstases remain, although absent – a presence of absence. Yet 
Heidegger calls attention to the fact that “What is characteristic of the ‘time’ 
which is accessible to the ordinary understanding, consists, among other 
things, precisely in the fact that it is a pure sequence of “nows”, (…) in which 
the ecstatical character of primordial temporality has been leveled off.”236 
Presence of what is present evokes time in its threefoldness (or better: 
a dwelling in time) for Heidegger, and thereby also the opposite of “Anwesen”, 
which is the “Abwesen” – which can be translated into English as the process 
of perishing as much as absence. But this absence, just as Cavell has been 
observing for photography, still contains a presence it refers to - to come back 
to Tarkovsky’s term “factuality”. Heidegger argues in this sense: “this not-
present-any-more is immediately present in its absence [west in seinem 
Abwesen unmittelbar an]”237.238 We can only conceive something as absent, if 
we know what its presence is like – that is why its “Wesen” (essence) remains 
in “Abwesen” (decaying) as well as in “Anwesen”, yet as a dynamic 
relationship.  
Being as presence itself thus implies the possibility of its own not-
being-any-more, which in film is a permanence, corresponding to Heidegger’s 
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sense of dwelling presence and implying its absence. Being-in-film is this 
dwelling of that which is not-being-any-more, just as being-on-Solaris is a 
transcendental locus of those who are absent. This dwelling in film we will call 
the presence of what has been present – this is another expression for the 
real of reality. 
Again: being-in-film is being-in-death, which is a being-without-being. 
Heidegger stresses that the signification of being-in-the-world entails 
completeness; “[a] structure that is primordially and constantly whole.”239 A 
fundamental problem for Heidegger is grasping being-in-the-world as a whole: 
death is also that which transforms Dasein’s Being into a whole, in the sense of 
concluding it. Heidegger further points out, that this being-as-a-whole can never 
be ontically experienced by Dasein: “When Dasein reaches its wholeness in 
death, it simultaneously loses the Being of its ‘there’”.240 Film conveys thus the 
impossible death-vision of Dasein as a whole: the romantic longing for death 
may have helped concretize the technical invention of film, as will be further 
elucidated.  
Our inquiry into the presence of the absent evoked by film can thus be 
read as the presence of Dasein’s being after death: the whole of being as a 
‘being-after-death’ emerges as a possibility of Dasein, unique to the filmic 
device. Death and being-towards-death are central in the narrative of 
“Solaris”: Harey embodies a being-without-being, but all her aspiration is to 
change her being into a being-towards-death, a being involved with the 
possibility of its own absence, and not being an absence referring to the 
presence itself: she wants to change her presence to correspond with the 
present mode of time. Similarly to Tarkovsky, filmmaker Hans-Jürgen 
Syberberg claims film to be the “continuation of life with other means and not 
the mirror of life” 241  and in this sense we can understand the material 
transcendence of film: not by referring to an otherworldly entity, but by being 
                                                
239 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 225 
240 Ibid., p. 281 
241 “Der Film ist die Fortsetzung des Lebens mit anderen Mitteln und nicht der Spiegel des 
Lebens.” (Cf. Hans-Jürgen Syberberg, “Film als Musik der Zukunft”, in: Syberbergs Filmbuch, 
p. 12) 
  
148 
inhabited by the factuality of life (beings, objects or events) which is not 
anymore. 
In conclusion: the aforementioed principle of presence of absence 
refers to a spectral and death-driven characterization of film. It also describes 
the filmic principle of transcendence of matter. The idea of the presence of 
that which is not anymore thereby evokes a transcendental materiality of film, 
“as light as light”242. The Latin word solaris means “of the sun” and although 
covered by a fluid and waterlike surface Solaris is the planet of light, which 
beams beings and being. In “Solaris” the visitors embody a materiality 
different from humans, although rematerialized. 
Before inquiring further into the idea of transcendence of matter and 
the material quality of light, let me draw an allusion to transcendental 
materialism. As I will demonstrate, the reflection on and through film may 
reveal an aesthetic perspective, which has not yet been explored: to access in 
film a transcendent mode of reality through an immaterial kind of being, 
residing in the real of reproduction, unfolding the aforementioned “new 
relationship to the real itself”, which Alain Badiou, who has inspired this 
chapter so far, finds so promising. 
 
 
 
 
3. From Badiou’s Ontology of the Void 
to the White Hole of the Whole of Images 
 
How can the idea of a transcendental real of reproduction, simultaneously 
present although absent and immaterial in its being, best be verbalized? And 
what exactly is the real Alain Badiou is referring to and which has lead us to 
think about the real in film? In the context of this analysis it is not possible to 
do justice to Badiou’s elaborated ontological materialism, which he develops 
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in the two volumes of Being and Event. I will therefore raise two central yet 
(cor)related concepts in his thought, which are important for our context: the 
ontology of multiplicity and the void of Lacan’s concept of the Real.  
Performing a radical step Badiou fuses the set theory of mathematician 
Georg Cantor with Heideggerian ontology243 and claims that “mathematics = 
ontology” 244. He thus transforms the ontological question of being into a 
matter of mathematics, an ontological thinking in which “the mathematico-
logical revolution of Frege-Cantor sets new orientation for thought.”245 Badiou 
suggests that the mathematics of set theory rule out the paradox one-multiple 
of being and finds a way to postulate multiplicity as an axiom, a condition of 
being itself. Being is for Badiou not ‘one’ and also not ‘one multiple’ 246 
because ‘one’ simply is not. The number ‘one’ functions as an operational 
idea to count, a point of reference, but not as an absolute entity247. Therefore 
the idea of ‘multiple’ is to be understood not as one entity but rather as “a 
multiple of multiples”.248 Being thus is infinite multiplicity for Badiou, an idea 
grounded in Cantor’s set theory where absolutely infinite multiplicity is 
designated as inconsistent249.  
Badiou stresses that this inconsistency, according to Cantor, refers to 
an absolute or pure non-being and further represents the idea of the 
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unthinkable, evoking God for Cantor. Like God, “the Absolute can only be 
acknowledged but never known”250. Therefore, Badiou argues, the multiplicity 
of being is to be named as the void251 and consequently ontology “can only be 
theory of the void.”252  
Transferring this concept of being into the solaristic system means that 
the multiple being as a void reflects the being-without-being on Solaris as well 
as the death-driven being-in-film. That being is multiple and non-being, or 
better, that being is not and it has no structure, further means that there is no 
difference between being-in-the-world and being-in-film. The void of being in 
film is just a more obvious void, as it is immaterial and infinitely multiple. Non-
being in film is thus a possibility of the multiplicity of being, and so is the 
reproduction of being: infinite reproducibility is no contradiction with multiple 
being as a void. CP Harey is then the embodiment of being as a void. 
Why is this conception of being as an unthinkable infinite multiple void 
further relevant for our context? Because, grounded in Cantor, thinking the 
real for Badiou presents a way to think the impossible: 
 
I think that the impossible is precisely the name of the Real. (…) We 
can perfectly have the conclusion that something of the Real can be known 
under the condition of a displacement concerning the limitations of possibility 
and impossibility. Part of what is impossible can be known if the separation 
between what is impossible and what is possible changes.253 
 
As I have been arguing, film may be one (im)possible tool for thinking such a 
real in terms of its of reproduction: the reproduction of reality through film 
“opens a new access to the Real as such”, as it gives a new relation “between 
what is impossible and what is possible”. 
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As it is widely known, Badiou’s approach to the real is anchored in 
Jacques Lacan’s writing, who has coined a wide-spread contemporary 
reflection on this real in philosophy. Yet the real was a popular term among 
philosophers at the beginning of the 20th century, such as Émile Meyerson, 
who is mentioned in a 1936 paper by the early Lacan. Meyerson referred to 
the real as "an ontological absolute, a true being-in-itself"254. Lacan himself 
has changed his positions on the real throughout his thinking, and in this first 
brief approach, I will start with the best known position. Lacan has also called 
the real "the impossible" because imagining or grasping it symbolically is 
impossible: “The Real is that, which resists symbolization absolutely.”255 It 
further is a void because "it is the world of words that creates the world of 
things”256. This void, as we have seen before, has been set by Badiou as “the 
proper name for being” 257. An equivalence between being and the real is 
thereby drawn. The real of reality or the being of reality is then what is 
conveyed by the “transference of reality” in film, as mentioned by Bazin, “from 
the thing to its reproduction” 258.  
The idea of Cantor’s absolute infinite might have had an influence as a 
parallel contemporary current to the theoretical rise of the real at the 
beginning of the XXth century: both, the infinite and the real, are impossible to 
think, yet are evoking the absolute and can be grasped as a void (this is again 
Badiou’s reading of Cantor). Lacan even suggests a mathematical 
formalization, the “matheme”, as a way to reveal the real, although integrated 
in the subject. As Badiou summarizes: “Lacan, whose obsession with 
mathematics did nothing but grow with time, also indicated that pure logic was 
‘the science of the real’. Yet the real remains a category of the subject.”259  
                                                
254 Dylan Evans, An Encyclopedia of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, p. 162 
255 Jacques Lacan, op. cit., p. 66 
256 Jacques Lacan, “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis”, in: 
Écrits. A Selection, p. 65 
257 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, p. 52 
258 André Bazin, What is Cinema?, p. 14 
259 Alain Badiou, op. cit., pp. 4-5 
  
152 
The Lacanian idea maintained by Badiou to set the real inside the 
subject indicates one more reason for why film is so especially suitable for this 
inquiry on being and reality: film is the pure being of subjectivity (which is a 
void), yet in objectified form: it is recorded and reproducible; its material 
quality discloses an immateriality under very specific conditions of projection. 
When this reproduction as projection occurs, we immerse into the screened 
reality (which might be digital or not). Based on mechanical reproduction, film 
thus constitutes a post-human way to simultaneously be inside reality and 
being, and stand outside them, a way to think x260 from outside of x, a shift for 
human thought.  
The happenings on the planet Solaris reflect this techno-ontological 
possibility: in a cosmic dimension we are simultaneously inside and outside 
Kelvin’s being. The solaristic principle of being without being, or of that, which 
is not there now, describes film’s immanent transcendence of matter. Being 
remains without structure and as a multiplicity which is a void, in the same logic 
as Lacan refers to the real - it is there without being there.  Simultaneously, this 
transcendent non-being of film reveals the transcendental condition of being: 
the void of being, its pure non-being. In this void of being resides the real of 
reproduction, a filmic and solaristic form of being, transcending matter, 
reproducible as a void.  
Yet let me briefly sketch another approach to that which is reproduced 
of being in film, based also on the idea that the Lacanian “real remains a 
category of the subject” 261 , yet going one step further than Badiou by 
assuming a material side of being, whose transcendence can be compared to 
the immateriality of film. Adrian Johnston speaks of a “more-than-materiality” 
of the subject, which not only fits the being-in-film but also the visitors on 
Solaris, regarding their presence-of-absence condition of being. As Johnston 
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puts it: “Transcendental materialism posits, in short, a self-sundering material 
ground internally producing what (subsequently) transcends it.”262  
This definition given by Johnston can be applied to a characterization 
of film as a medium grasping that which transcends the material ground of 
being or reality, although produced by it. Let us thereby think of film not as a 
reproduction of being but as a grasping of that which material being has 
produced and which transcends it. This materialist reading would argue that it 
is not being which is a multiple void and therefore reproducible, but rather 
propose that there is an immaterial and subjective part of being which 
transcends the material side, although produced by it, and which can be 
grasped by film. In this case, being in film would not be the same as being in 
the world, the latter understood in a material way, whereas the first as a 
transcendent entity.  
Concerning such transcendent immateriality of film we can speak in the 
materialist approach of a “more-than-material negativity” that is either of film or 
possibly disclosed by film; a negativity, which, in Johnston’s words, 
“subsequently remains, at least in part, separate from and irreducible to its 
material base/ground.”263 This negative being, which fits CP Harey in “Solaris”, 
presents further characteristics which provide a deeper characterization of 
Harey’s being-without-being: “There are indeed facets of more-than-material 
subjectivity entangled in reciprocal oscillating configurations of movement with 
material being […] as well as facets of subjectivity that subtract themselves 
from and achieve autonomy in relation to being […]”264 Although removed from 
its context of reflection, Johnston’s position describes aptly the state of affairs 
on the planet Solaris, thereby evoking a subjectivity or being which, although 
displaced from its material ground, is graspable through film.  
The material quality of film - “as light as light” 265 - becomes then next 
issue. How does the idea of a more-than-material negativity of film fit the 
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quality of light? What is light? And how are light and the photographic 
(moving) image related? Solaris is a sun-light-beaming planet generating 
beings from memory or dream images via radiation. Common sense grasps 
light as different from matter yet dependent on space, which carries light in 
form of images. Space is dependent on light, in the sense that it is light which 
makes space appear and disappear. In physics imagery or radiation is only 
one property of light – light that has this property is called “visible light” and is 
to be distinguished from “invisible light” constantly travelling and all around, a 
void entity comparable to the Lacanian Real or the multiple being referred by 
Badiou. 
Constant movement of invisible light evokes radiation or visible light, 
exactly when light beats matter: visible light or image thus is an event or fissure 
of the invisible light. Invisible light thus implies an infinity of possible images. It 
is a void at the same time that it is multiplicity. To the event of the image the 
visibility of matter is immanent. Light confronting matter thus constantly 
beams images and is to be understood as a fractural event: it is only possible 
to perceive the image in space and time from one point of view at one certain 
moment. Its being lies in permanence while it becomes real in the fracture. 
Every image is just a single slice, a fissure, out of the whole of all possible 
images, which is a void whose fissure with materiality causes transcendence: 
image. The void of invisible light is then the potential of all possible images; 
not a black hole of dark, but a white hole of the whole of possible images, the 
void before the invisible photons, which when fissured by matter, transform 
into images, perceivable from one subjective point of view, and negative 
towards being. As Slavoj Žižek says: “The flow of light "in itself" is nothing 
actual, but, rather, the pure virtuality of infinite possibilities actualized in a 
multitude of ways.” 266  I will follow this statement up in Chapter XIV by 
introducing the Deleuzian concept of the virtual into the scope of analysis. 
In a Bergsonian sense of ‘image = matter’ it is possible to assert that 
matter becomes a quality of light, which is constantly creating new matter or 
new images out of an aggregate of images, an absolutely infinite set of 
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possible images: a white hole of the whole of images. This white whole of 
invisible light can be understood as a transcendental field, comparable to a 
more-than-material infinite, or as a void. This whole is not a totality, but the 
images would become one, if they would all be visible. 
In this sense, like on the planet Solaris, light can make physical reality 
appear and disappear and it is first the photographic and then – which is even 
more complicated - the filmic image, which grasps this contingent and virtual 
character of an infinitely multiple reality. 
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This part of analysis is a completion of many of the aspects elaborated so far, 
acting out some of its possible ramifications, deepening Heidegger’s 
relevance for the solaristic system and enlarging it with further specifications. 
Thereby Barad’s quantum ontology, Benjamin’s cine-apparatus and his 
concept of technology, Bostrom’s “simulation hypothesis”, Harman’s 
hypothesis of indirect knowledge of the real and Žižek’s claim to consider 
subjectivity a part of totality, even if an incomplete one, are introduced within a 
solaristic frame.  
The chapters further start with the Deleuzian idea of ‘the universe as 
metacinema’, in other words: ‘the world as film’, to unfold a chain of leading 
interrogations: How can we conceptually distinguish the images of film and 
the ones of natural perception? How is the neologism being-in-film exactly 
deduced from Heidegger’s being-in-the-world, and what does it mean in 
detail? And how became this way of escaping the world established? 
Furthermore, are we leaving for Solaris because we are longing for suicide? 
How can we compare being-in-film with being-in-death? And can we be sure 
that we are not living in a film or any other kind of apparatus driven 
simulation? Which kind of apparatus is the planet Solaris? How does the 
solaristic brain entangle matter and meaning? How can subjectivity be part of 
truth? And is love the solaristic way to indirectly know that which is not 
possible to be known? 
 This widespread web of related interrogations is meant to create insight 
into the numerous possibilities of enlarging the solaristic system, to better 
understand its way of reasoning and to add some flesh to its skeleton. The 
complexity of the range of questions serves to create the necessity of a 
systematizing conclusion, which is the main endeavor of the last part of 
analysis. 
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XI. 
MAN’S BROKEN LINK WITH REALITY  
AND BEING-IN-FILM 
 
 
 
 
1. The Real Image and the Broken Link 
 
The ideas of the ‘a whole’ and ‘a totality’ lie close together, yet are two distinct 
terms differing in their meaning. A totality imposes a completeness which is 
an absolute: it can neither be escaped nor reached; it substantially differs 
from a whole – holos in Greek. The whole refers to a unity, which is reached 
by the composition of components, for example several parts of one body, or 
the world as a whole. Wholeness is often conveyed through narrative: every 
whole has a beginning, a middle and an ending, just as Aristotle underlines in 
his “Poetics”. Life and films reach wholeness in this sense, to be completed by 
their ending, which is death. Only the infinite does not end. Yet according to 
Georg Cantor its term is manifest as an absolute, and as such it is 
“unthinkable”, as we have seen: yet it is as much unthinkable as is the finite 
as an experience. This kind of absolute infinite is to be found in the origins of 
cinema as the wishful thinking of a reproduction of reality itself (the one that 
does not exist), the idea of a simultaneous presence of all possible images. 
Bazin calls it the myth of total cinema, which he introduces as a film, which 
would substitute and re-create the world in its integrity:  
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The guiding myth, then, inspiring the invention of cinema, is the 
accomplishment of (…) an integral realism, a recreation of the world in its 
own image, an image unburdened by the freedom of interpretation of the 
artist or the irreversibility of time.267 
 
Let me try to understand this quote by transposing Bazin’s thought into 
the solaristic system. His idea of an image so absolute that it is “unburdened 
by the freedom of interpretation of the artist” presupposes a fusion between 
the real as an infinite absolute and the subject. This fusion happens in form of 
an image: not an image of the real, but the real image, the real of reality in its 
totality as an image, a film of all possible images, the white whole of all 
possible images, not as a possibility, but as an actuality. This real image, 
composed by an infinite number of images (as we have defined with Henri 
Bergson) naturally resembles Cantor’s absolute infinite, and tends towards it 
in terms of time as well: time becomes reversible in its infinity, in its totality. 
We can visit the past “just as it was”, in all its images of actualization, or slow 
it down, change natural perception. This total image is conceived as an ideal 
possibility of cinema relying on Bazin who has emphasized that cinema’s 
origin is rather to be considered as a primordial idea than as a technical 
invention: “The cinema is an idealistic phenomenon. The concept men had of 
it existed so to speak fully armed in their minds, as if in some platonic 
heaven.”268 Furthermore, for Bazin “Cinema has not yet been invented.”269– 
which means the idea of cinema, put into terms by his description of the myth 
of total cinema, is not fulfilled by what had been technically invented as 
cinema; the myth is depicting the recreation of the whole of reality and to be 
experienced similar to how phenomenological reality is. These are very high 
expectations for a medium, whose most intriguing characteristic consists in its 
mesmerizing, hypnotic possession of the spectator’s mind, so absorbing, that 
the physical body is forgotten, the physical reality substituted and the 
spectator’s identity dissolved (an aspect to be elaborated in the next chapter). 
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In fact, even the contemporary audiovisual glasses are still on their way to 
total cinema, and to be considered next steps. 
270 
 
In the movie “Solaris” we are faced with a possibility of such a total 
image of cinema, which has become actual. The visitors announce that which 
the islands of memory later achieve: “the re-creation of the world in its own 
image” and the freedom from “the irreversibility of time” – time is reversible on 
Solaris. The planet has sensed the human real of reality through memories, 
implying its projections and desires. The planet is tending towards a total 
cinema, corresponding to the human longing to overcome linear perception. 
The visitors are our own images in their total potential, whereas the planet is 
the whole of images of total cinema, of all possible images becoming actual. 
However, Bazin’s evocation of total cinema has been inverted into a 
skeptical hypothesis employed by Deleuze in The Time-Image: modern man no 
longer believes in the world and faces it as if watching a (bad) movie:  
 
“The modern fact is that we no longer believe in this world. (…) It is not I who 
make cinema; it is the world that looks to us like a bad film. (…) The link 
between man and the world is broken.”271  
 
Even if Deleuze here describes the human relation to the world as a 
“bad film” in which we cannot believe any more, he relies on the idea of the 
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world as metacinema, which he earlier develops in The Movement-Image 
drawing on Bergson:  
 
This infinite set of all images constitutes a kind of plane of immanence. The 
image exists in itself, on this plane. This in-itself of the image is matter (…) . 
The material universe, the plane of immanence, is the machinic assemblage 
of movement-images.  Here Bergson is startingly ahead of his time: it is the 
universe as cinema in itself, a metacinema.272 
 
The planet Solaris aims this “infinite set of all images”, “the material 
universe” or “the plane of immanence” as a total re-creation, just as the movie 
“Solaris” does to film. However, Deleuze states here that the plane of 
immanence is already a metacinema. If so, what would be the difference 
between a film and reality? Cavell has answered, as we have seen before: the 
difference would be its displacement in time, but Deleuze actually gives 
another answer: his “metacinema” corresponds to Bazin’s real image, the 
totality of all possible images becoming actual, and its re-creation is the myth 
of total cinema, a tendency that cannot be achieved. Therefore the difference 
between reality and film designated in Deleuzian terms would be that a film is 
part of the plane of immanence, even a plane of immanence itself, but it is not 
the infinite set of all images. A film is finite. 
Furthermore, I have previously described how Pier Paolo Pasolini 
identifies a one-to-one relation of film (as audiovisual reproduction) and 
reality— not as a matter of perception but rather quite literally: “Reality is, in 
the final analysis, nothing more than cinema in nature”273. Deleuze concedes 
the point to Pasolini by recalling the important passage in Bergson’s Matter 
and Memory where he conflates image and object through movement: “If 
movement is taken from the moving body, there is no longer any distinction 
between image and object.” 274 Additionally Deleuze refers to Pasolini’s “ur-
code” of cinematic language in which “the objects of reality have become units 
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of the image, at the same time that the movement-image has become a reality 
which ‘speaks’ through its objects”275. Without the slightest skepticism Pasolini 
states, “All of life in the entirety of its actions is a natural, living film”.276 
 In any case, whether this film of life has become bad and senseless or 
not, Deleuze is aware of how a technical invention has imposed itself on natural 
perception, proposing such a powerful form of viewing the world, that the world 
and its perception is compared to the experience of watching a film. Therefore 
Deleuze calls the Bergsonian universe of images in movement a metacinema. 
Bergson would not have approved of this view, but the emergence of cinema 
as a mass medium, which has become omnipresent and imposed on 
perception, was not yet part of Bergson’s experience when he wrote 1896 
Matter and Memory, in a time when cinema was still in a primordial state. With 
his idea of metacinema Deleuze himself becomes a symptom of how the 
perception of film has become more relevant than natural perception, which 
seems less real, less present, so argues Walter Benjamin 1935:  
 
Thus, for contemporary man the presentation of reality by the film is 
incomparably more significant (…), since it offers, precisely because of the 
thoroughgoing permeation of reality with mechanical equipment, an aspect of 
reality, which is free of all equipment. And that is what one is entitled to ask 
from a work of art .277 
 
Benjamin anticipates here a contemporary phenomenon of reception of 
moving-image media, and is therefore often referred to as the “father” of media 
aesthetics. Who has not had the experience of having seen a film a sequence 
from which has remained with one for the rest of one’s days, sometimes more 
persistent, more real, than the memory of a sequence from life? Memories of 
life and images from movie scenes further mix in our mind. How has this 
patchwork of images of reality called cinema so powerfully imposed on natural 
                                                
275 Gilles Deleuze, Ibid., p. 27 
276 Pier Paolo Pasolini, op.cit., p. 203 
277 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility”, Third 
Version, p. 234 
  
163 
view and aesthetic reception? In accordance with our context I propose to read 
Benjamin‘s “immediate reality” as a synonym for the real of reality, which 
becomes graspable through film in a concrete way: 
 
In the studio the mechanical equipment [Apparatur in German, a word kept in 
other English versions as ‘apparatus’] has penetrated so deeply into reality that 
its pure aspect freed from the foreign substance of the equipment [again 
Benjamin refers here to an ‘apparatus’] is the result of a special procedure, 
namely, the shooting by the specially adjusted camera and the mounting of the 
shot together with other similar ones. The equipment-free aspect of reality 
here has become the height of artifice; the sight of immediate reality has 
become an orchid in the land of technology. 278 
 
Since this understanding of film is a special catalyst for the 
manifestation of the real of reality, it reflects the idea of the solaristic claim of 
the real image, which has already been discussed throughout this thesis, yet 
without being spelled out yet. This claim runs as follows: the real of reality 
manifests itself in film and becomes graspable for human knowledge through 
film.  
Benjamin further argues that filmic reality “diminishes the distance”279 (is 
thus more present in the Heideggerian sense of “lying-before-us”) and indulged 
the significance of contemporary mass society, “namely: the desire of the 
present-day masses to bring things ‘closer’ spatially and humanly”280 as well as 
their “bent toward overcoming the uniqueness of every reality [Überwindung 
des Einmaligen in der Gegebenheit] by accepting its reproduction.”281 The 
filmic reproduction of reality then becomes convenient for a mesmerizing 
substitution of reality and provokes a reliance on the virtual reality of film, a 
tendency, which has been increasing during the last 100 years. On Solaris, 
the equipment of interpenetration is the planet itself, its capacity of sensing the 
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remembered human past – the consistent, more real side of time, according to 
Tarkovsky: 
 
Time is said to be irreversible. And this is true enough in the sense that “you 
can’t bring back the past”, as they say. But what exactly is this “past”? (…) In a 
certain sense the past is far more real, or at any rate more stable, more resilient 
than the present. The present slips and vanishes like sand between the fingers, 
acquiring material weight in its recollection.282 
 
Therefore the planet can literally materialize the weight of the past, just as 
cinema can, and necessarily, this past then appears as more real than the 
present. In this sense the film is strikingly in the spirit of Heidegger, who even 
uses the word “facticity” to describe the having been, which constantly forms the 
“is” of Dasein:  
 
“Dasein never ‘finds itself’ except as a thrown Fact. In the state-of-mind in which 
it finds itself, Dasein is assailed by itself as the entity which it still is and already 
was – that is to say, which it constantly is as having been. The primary existential 
meaning of facticity lies in the character of ‘having been’.”283 
 
However, why should we still choose the reality of natural perception if the 
real of reality lies elsewhere, in the infinite of possibilities, and even becomes 
more graspable there? Are we not just permanently switching? Is our natural 
perception at all trustable, believable? Our relation towards reality has changed: 
that which Deleuze calls the link between modern man and the world has broken 
- because (even if Deleuze names other reasons) under the influence of film, of 
reproduced past, we feel reality as it surrounds us a mere contingency of the 
real; reality is one film which wakes the longing for total cinema, for the absolute, 
real image, but cannot achieve it.  
Deleuze, in the context of the world being film, mentions belief as the only 
link between man and the world and refers to a “turning-point in philosophy, (…) 
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to replace the model of knowledge with belief.”284 Deleuze here refers to a crisis 
of truth in philosophy285, which could be formulated in our context as follows: I 
need to believe into the actual film of reality in order to make it real, because my 
knowledge does not make sense of it. To make it real implies: to create sense, 
create a whole. Deleuze attributes this capacity to cinema, to restore the belief in 
the world, which is out of sync: 
 
The link between man and the world is broken. Henceforth, this link must 
become an object of belief. (…) The reaction of which man has been 
dispossessed can be replaced only by belief. Only belief in the world can 
reconnect man to what he sees and hears. The cinema must film, not the world, 
but belief in this world, our only link.286 
 
That is why Deleuze is analyzing cinema in such detailed way, as he 
hopes for a renewal, a salvation of philosophy itself287. In “Solaris” we believe in 
the image, the visitors are the gateway to the real of the planet. This real is 
somehow accessed from a different point of view than on Earth: the fact that 
time is reverted, that memory-images regain actuality, changes the idea of the 
whole. Facing this possibility of accessing the real of reality (as a totality) 
through real images, the naturally perceived reality has lost its magic power: for 
main character Kris Kelvin, the link with the world has broken, so everything 
seems empty and meaningless: he longs for total cinema, he longs to love the 
real image of Harey, he even longs for suicide. Does “Solaris” show “belief in 
this world”? The answer is yes, precisely if we accept the planet Solaris as a 
catalyst of the real image, as well as a part of this world. 
I propose for what follows to leave the aforementioned turn from 
knowledge to belief and instead proceed from and reassess Deleuze’s claim of 
the broken link, to reconsider it not from a perspective of belief or disbelief but 
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to ask precisely how the broken link affects us and what does this affecting 
mean, in Heideggerian terms. The Deleuzian claim correlates reality and film 
while simultaneously inquiring into the meaning of man’s altered relation to the 
world; that is, man’s evolution into a spectator of reality. The tie, the link with 
the world, evoking its presence and realness, became a contingency. We can 
choose: reality is a range of different films, and one of them is the film of our 
life. Yet what would be the philosophical consequences of assuming that we 
live (in) a movie? I have attempted to expose how this question goes deeper 
than the concern about seeing the world as a moving flow, with no material 
body or personal consequences. Now I shall elucidate the concept of being-
in-film, which is a state of Dasein while watching a movie as it at the same 
time becomes, in a certain way, a spectator of reality. 
 
 
 
 
2. Being-in-Film  
 
In the following I seek to further explain the transfer of Heidegger’s being-in-
the-world, which entails a multiplicity of possibilities for Dasein, into the 
neologism being-in-film, which we have briefly introduced in earlier chapters. 
The term designates a state of being which Dasein enters when we watch a 
movie and the world becomes film. But how can we appropriate the meanings 
of the concept being-in-the-world? Heidegger breaks the term being-in-the-
world down and develops his own philosophical system which pivots around 
the following set of correlated terms - being and being-in, Dasein, the world, 
time and death – which I will elucidate in what follows. 
I have already mentioned that being is the leading concept of Being 
and Time, where, for Heidegger, being is time. Dasein thereby designates the 
standpoint from which being is analyzed: With “Dasein” Heidegger denotes 
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both, existence (“Being as essence” 288) and the mode of being of every human 
being. Dasein is therefore ontically the closest of being to us, “We are it, each 
of us”289. Heidegger further stresses that the word being [Sein] in German 
implies the meaning of dwelling290. He therefore sets Dasein’s existential being-
in and its essential structure as being-in-the-world291. For Heidegger Dasein 
and its environment are inseparable in their existence, world is “a characteristic 
of Dasein itself292”. Therefore, being is dwelling and the German word Dasein 
designates being-there. Thus, the there of Dasein is the world. Dasein and 
world are not to be grasped separately which entails that being-in-the-world is 
not spatial. To guarantee the existence of one world shared by all entities (and 
not only existing for one Dasein) he inquires into “the worldhood of the world as 
such”293. Heidegger further stresses that the signification of being-in-the-world 
entails completeness: “A structure that is primordially and constantly whole.”294 
The fundamental problem for Heidegger is grasping being-in-the-world 
as a whole; it is somehow my ambition here to apply the general structure of 
this attempt of grasping-as-a-whole to film and by that, to the solaristic system. 
Heidegger’s problem is that in order to experience being-in-the-world as a 
whole, the ending of Dasein must be fulfilled: “As long as Dasein is as an entity, 
it has never reached its ‘wholeness’ But if it gains such ‘wholeness’, this gain 
becomes the utter loss of Being-in-the-world.”295 Yet Heidegger stresses that 
“the reason for the impossibility of experiencing Dasein ontically as a whole 
which is [als seiendes Ganzes], and therefore of determining its character 
ontologically in its Being-a-whole, does not lie in any imperfection of our 
                                                
288 “The ‘essence’ of Dasein lies in its existence.” (Cf. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 
42) 
289 Ibid., p. 36 
290  “ ‘Being’ [Sein] – is the infinitive from I am [Ich bin], which also means ‘to reside 
alongside…’ or ‘to be familiar with’.”(Cf. ibid., p. 80) 
291 “ ‘Being-in’ is (…) the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has 
Being-in-the-world as its essential state.” (Cf. ibid., p. 80) 
292 Ibid., p. 92 
293 Ibid., p. 92 
294 Ibid., p. 225 
295 Ibid., p. 280 
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cognitive powers [Ekenntnisvermögens].” Rather it lies in the “Being [Sein] of 
this entity [Seiendes]”. 
Despite this blind spot, Dasein “is disclosed to itself in its Being”, 
whereby “the kind of Being, which belongs to this disclosedness is constituted 
by state-of-mind and understanding.”296 The state of mind par excellence in 
which Dasein can unfold itself is anxiety [Angst]: “As one of Dasein’s 
possibilities of Being, anxiety —together with Dasein itself as disclosed in it— 
provides the phenomenal basis for explicitly grasping Dasein’s primordial 
totality of Being.”297 Although anxiety is a possibility of Dasein, anxiety in its 
essence (necessarily) is different from “Dasein’s Being as being-in-the-world”. I 
will address this notion of anxiety below.  
Furthermore, to inquire into the world for Heidegger implies to look for 
that which is in the world: the entities within the world alongside Dasein, the 
things and their thinghood understood as being ready-to-hand or “present-at-
hand within the world”298. The spatial quality of any entity lies in its being part of 
the structure of worldhood and not in an a priori condition of space as “the 
spatial character which incontestably belongs to any environment can be 
clarified only in terms of the structure of worldhood”299. 
As a possibility of Dasein, how does anxiety relate to the world? “Being-
in-the-world itself is that in the face of which anxiety [Das Wovor der Angst] is 
anxious.”300 Thereby “anxiety ‘does not know’ what that in the face of which it is 
anxious.”301 Heidegger distinguishes anxious in the face of and anxiety about 
something, while juxtaposing them: “that about which anxiety is anxious reveals 
itself as that in the face of which (…) one has anxiety.”302 The anxious about 
something is thereby undetermined: “That which anxiety is profoundly anxious 
[sich ängstet] about is not a definite kind of Being for Dasein or a definite 
                                                
296 Ibid., p. 226 
297 Ibid., p. 227 
298 Ibid., p. 90 
299 Ibid., p. 94 
300 Ibid., p. 231-232 
301 Ibid., p. 231 
302 Ibid., p. 233 
  
169 
possibility for it.”303 Anxiety is thus for Heidegger anxiousness about “Dasein’s 
potentiality-for-Being” 304 , in particular about Dasein’s “ownmost” possibility, 
which for Heidegger is death, also designated as the possibility of the 
impossibility of Dasein: Death cannot be overcome and will certainly end all 
Dasein’s possibilities, most particularly as it concerns Dasein’s being-in-the-
world directly: “With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less 
than Dasein’s Being-in-the-world.”305  
According to Heidegger, as we have seen, the mood of anxiety 
discloses Dasein to itself. Matching this line of reasoning, death is also that 
which transforms Dasein’s Being into a whole, in the sense of concluding it. 
Yet, as we have seen, Heidegger points out that this being-as-a-whole can 
never be ontically experienced by Dasein: “When Dasein reaches its 
wholeness in death, it simultaneously loses the Being of its ‘there’”. 306 
Heidegger’s regard lies therefore on how death affects Dasein: Being-in-the-
world becomes a being-towards-death. This being-towards is opened in a 
mode of “Being-towards these possibilities” 307 and shifts Dasein from the mood 
of anxiety to the one of care [Sorge]. Being in concern is thereby constantly 
driven by Dasein always being “ahead-of-itself”, although “Being-towards-death 
is essentially anxiety.”308 
This essential openness of the structure of Dasein is exactly “that which 
makes up the ‘lack of totality’ in Dasein309”, which as “an item in the structure of 
care, tells us unambiguously that in Dasein there is always something still 
outstanding, which, as a potentiality-for-Being for Dasein itself, has not yet 
become ‘actual’.” 310 (The question of the out-standing becoming actual plays a 
                                                
303 Ibid.,  p. 231-232 
304 Ibid., p. 295 
305 Ibid., p. 294 
306 Ibid., p. 281 
307 Ibid., p. 279 
308 Ibid., p. 310 
309 Ibid., p. 288 
310 Ibid., p. 279 
  
170 
crucial role for the determination of presence in the present.) By being “ahead-
of-itself” Dasein projects itself upon possibilities, the condition in which it finds 
itself thrown into Being 311 . Dasein projects the (im)possibility of death as 
something it is inevitably thrown into. Death thereby offers the potentiality of 
Dasein as being-towards-death.  
The latter is thereby “the possibility of authentic existence” and the 
possibility of Dasein to understand itself, because “anticipation turns out to be 
the possibility of understanding one’s ownmost and uttermost potentiality-for-
Being”312. In being-towards-death lies therefore the possibility for Dasein to 
disclose itself as being-as-a-whole, but also to be singularized – death cannot 
be shared with others: “When it stands before itself in this way, all its relations 
to any other Dasein have been undone.” 313  
Before going to our next step and assembling the Heideggerian thinking 
with our departing question (the Deleuzian broken link with the world), I would 
like to summarize: Just as in death (when Dasein is not any more), in anxiety 
we can grasp the whole of the being-in-the-world, which is disclosed to Dasein 
as being-as-a-whole in the projection of being-towards-death (the possibility of 
an authentic existence). This makes anxiety an especially philosophical mood, 
one in which the whole is graspable – something otherwise only enabled by the 
impossible condition, which is when being is not any more. In the following I will 
argue that in film a similar disclosure happens.  
We can grasp the whole of the being-in-the-world, as long as being-in-
the-world is being-in-film. This disclosedness has to do with the deathlike 
nature of film; film is fundamentally closed in itself, forming a whole in the sense 
we have previously set up. 
 
 
                                                
311  “(…) thrownness, as a kind of Being, belongs to an entity which in each case is its 
possibilities, and is them in such a way that it understands itself in these possibilities and in 
terms of them, projecting itself upon them.” (Cf. ibid., p. 225) 
312 Ibid., p. 263 
313 Ibid., p. 294 
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3. World as Film and Film as World 
 
What would exactly be the design of a hypothetical being-in-film, one that 
derives from a Heideggerian being-in-the-world? To determine being-in-film 
means to substitute the term the world with film, insofar as the ontological 
term “‘world’ can become a term for any realm which encompasses a 
multiplicity of entities: for instance, when one talks of the ‘world’ of a 
mathematician, ‘world’ signifies the realm of possible objects of 
mathematics.”314 Moreover, and this seems sufficiently relevant to permit such 
an experimental substitution of film as world: 
 
‘World’ can be understood in another ontical sense —not, however, as those 
entities which Dasein essentially is not and which can be encountered within-
the-world, but rather as that ‘wherein’ a factual Dasein as such can be said to 
live. ‘World’ has here a pre-ontological existentiell signification.315  
 
Dasein’s living in the world becomes then a living in film. If world is film, then 
worldhood would become filmhood. This filmhood of film is not so different 
from the worldhood of the world. Most aspects of Heidegger’s setting of being 
are the same in the world and in film. Let me recall that being remains being 
and that the real of reality is transferred into film. Yet as we have seen before, 
that which substantially changes when we assume film as world and finally 
world as film is the nature of time and of Dasein. Dasein has doubled by 
being-in-film; it is involved twice: as spectator from the outside and as being-
in-film, in film. As we have further seen, this doubling allows Dasein to 
experience death without dying. Film is then the possibility of being-in-death: it 
changes thus the kind of temporality, from being in having been. 
Film is a being-in-time, yet with a different temporality for being and 
Dasein than the one of the world: the more consistent having been. We are 
beyond the present world-time, although film-time (time in film) is reproduced 
                                                
314 Ibid., p. 93 
315 Ibid., p. 93 
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by world-time and simultaneously consumes world-time, thus producing newly 
having been. Film-time furthermore works with ellipses, flashbacks and 
subjective duration. Compared to world-time it possesses relativity and is 
analogous to our usual concept of time-travel. In film, years can pass by, 
while in actuality two hours would have passed. Memory of film-time emerges 
when the film has concluded: We change from the being-in Dasein back to the 
outside spectator Dasein.  
But there is a second temporal dimension in film that derives from death 
as the object of a constant anticipation (being-towards-death): this anticipation 
of non-being and non-time implements the moment as time’s smallest unit. Film 
comprises photographic stills put in a sequence. In a photographic still, the 
stoppage of time has occurred, the moment of time has been frozen in 
presence beyond time; it is death-time. In photography we suddenly grasp that 
which has never been unfolded: A spatial presence of the moment is disclosed 
through its detachment from natural time. It is known now that in Aristotle the 
now does not belong to time (I will come back to this point later). He sets the 
now as that which is not. Yet in spite of this negativity the now guarantees the 
passage from future to past. It is rather mysterious how the photograph 
transports this moment of the “now” from an original context into the time of the 
spectator. The now remains non-temporal, beyond time, yet it is present as 
reproduction —an experience in another time and a presence of absence. A 
photograph is the anticipation of a moment to be resurrected, yet as something 
else: somehow a doubling of time has occurred. 
This idea gets to completion by Roland Barthes in Camera Lucida. 
Barthes assumes the photographed moment to be the depicted objects’ 
anticipation of the instant of death. The film negative is assembled out of 24 
static pictures per second—applied to Barthes’ theory that would be 24 
instances of death; Aristotle’s now would thereby attain the meaning of death. 
The immediate succession of the next frame creates then an apparent 
continuity and an illusion of life. The disclosure of death (or the presence of the 
moment) in film is thus obscured by motion – nonetheless, it is there: We can 
experience death in film indirectly. 
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In “The Science of Logic” Hegel claims: “Everything reasonable is a 
closure [Schluss].”316.  In German the word 'Schluss' encompasses a duplicity: 
closure as completion or ending as well as conclusion. Pasolini connects 
death and film in this Hegelian sense of conclusion as a principle of creating 
sense:  
 
Death does determine life, I feel that, and I’ve written it, too, in one of my 
recent essays, where I compare death to film-montage. Once life is finished, 
it acquires a sense; up to that point it has not got a sense; its sense is 
suspended and therefore ambiguous… For me, death is the maximum of 
epicness and myth.317 
 
Thus, death becomes a narrative principle of closure; it is that which 
creates narration and sense. Filmhood then is to be characterized as narrative, 
while worldhood appears as infinite and opened. Our affinity to see the world as 
film may lie in our own mortality: the ending creates the desire for narrative, the 
search and need for sense and meaning. 
Each one, filmhood and worldhood, are based on a different kind of 
temporality or processing of time, yet both are temporal. Film-time is then 
characterized as narrating world-time yet by doing so it relies on death (you can 
only narrate what is over), just as life does. Each film implies its own death. 
Thus, the world as film and our processing of it as such create narration and 
sense insofar as they include a conclusion (Vollendung). Being-in-film as 
potentiality of Dasein is then the one possibility: Dasein comes to an end, 
experiences itself the end, and continues afterwards; the one, which doesn’t 
lack a whole, the one in which Dasein dies and resurrects permanently. It 
implies death as well as its negation, since Dasein in the world as film is 
doubled: it can experience death and even being-in-death, as it is both —
                                                
316  “The closure is thus not only reasonable, but everything reasonable is a closure.” 
(translation mine – C.R.) - “Der Schluß ist daher nicht nur vernünftig, sondern alles 
Vernünftige ist ein Schluß.” (Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, “Drittes Kapitel. Der Schluß”, in: Wissenschaft 
der Logik, p. 107) 
317 Pier Paolo Pasolini, op. cit., pp. 55-56 
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spectator-being and being-in-film. As spectator-being it accesses film from 
outside, is towards-film. Yet as being-in-film it goes inside and can project 
itself into being-in-death. 
Therefore, the most important conclusion of this chapter is that Dasein 
can experience being-in-the-world as a whole, as long as being-in-the-world is 
being-in-film. In film the being of the entity - as a whole - is reached. The 
assumption “When Dasein reaches its wholeness (Gänze) 318  in death, it 
simultaneously loses the Being of its ‘there’”319 is no longer true. Dasein as 
being-in-film is a kind of self-forgotten existence, where one Dasein represses 
the other one. If the world is film, and film a principle of death, Dasein 
experiences being-in-film in a film in a film… - as an infinitely nested dwelling. It 
only can function if it forgets about its spectator-Dasein and immerses itself 
into being-in-film. It becomes another, which simultaneously it is not. Dasein is 
always still there after the film-death, as it has doubled. The spectator-Dasein 
is a being-towards-film —but still in the world; it connects the nested films.  
This dimension is part of the solaristic system only in a one-sided sense: 
we are in “Solaris” as we are in any film. The movie does not show any specific 
self-reflexivity on this point. What it does show is the longing for death. “Solaris” 
is, in different senses, the projection of death and its anticipation: moment-by-
moment, frame-by-frame.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
318 The German term "Gänze", is best translated as "wholeness" and a proper construction by 
Heidegger, who substantivizes in an own way the adjective "ganz" - total or whole; "Gänze" 
has a sense of inner unity and is to be distinguished from "Ganzheit", which refers to a Iarger 
entity. 
319 Martin Heidegger, op.cit., p. 281 
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4. Being-in as the Link: 
Presence in Reality, Film, Time and Space 
 
Let us return to the starting point of this chapter, to the question about the 
broken link between Dasein and the world as well as about the world being film. 
After having sketched a draft of Dasein’s being-in-film, in which Dasein is in-film 
instead of in-the-world, the next step will focus on Dasein who projects the 
world itself as film. I will argue that Deleuze’s problem of the broken link 
between Dasein and the world-as-film could be reassessed by transferring the 
issue into Heidegger’s system of thought: Deleuze’s approach only takes into 
account the spectator-Dasein, he in fact describes a being-towards-film; the 
Deleuzian problem is that he does not access being-in-film, Dasein’s most 
important catalyst of film as world. I will argue that the main question of the link 
addresses neither film, nor the world, but the “in” of being-in to be considered 
the link of Dasein with one or the other. 
I will develop further aspects of this link, which seem to lie within the 
nature of time, raising a question of actual presence as being-in. For Heidegger, 
Being is time, experienced by Dasein; Dasein’s standpoint on being-in is 
temporality. For Deleuze film is composed of time-images; film is further 
generally considered the art of time – “Sculpting in Time” as Tarkovsky 
designates it, for example. A missing link between Dasein and world would then 
imply a lack of actuality or temporal presence. The following questions emerge: 
What in time makes the actual real be present in both film and world? (This 
question somehow asks for the real of reality, although it is now applied to the 
dimension of time.) And what consequences follow from the substitution of world 
by film, or the becoming film of the world?  
Film is world and world is film in the following two ways: First, we 
approach existence with an attitude that projects possibilities within the world. 
Dasein is always ‘ahead-of-itself’: We project our own being into the future; 
world and world-projection are interdependent. Film is such a world-
projection. The projecting attitude of Dasein is thus an ontological principle of 
cinema processing the future. Secondly, film depends on the world as 
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ontologically equiprimordial320; thus Pasolini claims reality to be like cinema in 
nature, and Bazin speaks of the myth of total cinema.  
Yet, with the shift into Heideggerian terminology, and the doubling of 
Dasein, I propose to think in terms of double negation when discussing film as 
world and world as film:  Through the process of recording images a negative of 
the world is created, and the negation of this negative is its positive by 
reproduction. We have defined this negation of negation in film before, in 
relation to the reproduced real of reality in film: Film is real by negating the 
presence of what is real, which again is negated. It is referring to an absence 
which negates its absence, as it simultaneously evokes presence. Hegel 
applies a similar principle of the negation of negation to time and space, thus 
paving the way for Derrida’s principle of the trace [le trace]: a becoming-space 
of time and a becoming-time of space. 
 I will argue here that the trace is exactly that characteristic of time 
which shapes film into reality and reality into film, an aspect we have not 
addressed yet. I therefore propose to regard the trace as the Deleuzian link 
between Dasein and world, and the link between Dasein and film, the in of 
being-in of Being as time. Filming is tracing and tracing is filming. Film grasps 
this constant processing, and in its reproduction, reintegrates this very 
process. As we will see, film captures and reproduces the presence of the 
moment of the now. Being-in-the-world is tracing, as is being-in-film. 
To better understand this link, which conditions Dasein’s Being as an 
actual reality, let me have a brief look at some aspects of Derrida’s essay 
“Ousia and Grammé”. Derrida reaffirms that Heidegger introduces presence in 
the context of being and evokes the presence in the reduced temporal sense 
(not in sense of the presence itself, which is temporally threefold, as we have 
                                                
320 ‘Equiprimordial’ is an English adaptation of the attempt to translate Heidegger’s created word 
“gleich-ursprünglich” used in Being and Time. It means that two entities are both, primordial and 
interdependent; we cannot think one without the other – like for example Dasein and world, time 
and space etc. Of course the equiprimordiality of world and film is conceptually conditioned by 
the rise of film. Yet as Bazin has suggested, cinema rather corresponds to a primordial idea 
than to a technical invention. Therefore I argue that the world may have been conceptually 
grasped as cinema without knowing the term. 
  
177 
seen): “Entities are grasped in their Being as ‘presence’; this means that they 
are understood with regard to a definite mode of time — the ‘Present’.”321 In this 
context Derrida evokes Aristotle’s concept of negativity of time (picked up later 
by Hegel and then by Heidegger), which describes this presence in the present 
as non-existent: time is that which is not — it always has been or is yet to 
come. As Derrida points out, for Aristotle, the kernel of time, the moment of the 
now, is non-temporal, a limit. It simultaneously is a catalyst to transform the 
future into past.  
According to Derrida, Hegel has applied the same principle of 
negativity to space. Furthermore, space is time for Hegel.322 The starting point 
thus is the negativity of time, whereas the now is “its nonbeing [Nichtsein] in 
itself and becomes immediately something other than itself”323. Hegel sets the 
point (the smallest spatial entity) as a non-spatial reference in relation to 
which spatial extension functions as negation: “It negates itself by itself in its 
relation to itself, that is, to another point. The negation of negation, the spatial 
negation of the point is the line.”324 (And in continuation, the negation of the 
line is the plane).  
As Derrida emphasizes, this lifting [Aufhebung] is for Hegel furthermore 
“the truth of the point”325, just as the nonbeing of the present moment, the 
now, is the essence of time, or “the absolute this of time (das absolute Dieses 
der Zeit)” or “the absolutely negatively simple”326. These smallest units of 
space and time, the point and the now, are always in process of negating 
themselves, becoming something other while “the truth of the other-Being is, 
however, negation of negation”327. According to Derrida, space is time, and 
                                                
321 Martin Heidegger, op. cit., p. 47 
322 Furthermore, according to Derrida, Bergson’s ‘time is space’ would be “in accord with 
Hegel’s thesis that space is time, in spite of the very different reasons that they have given.” 
(Cf. Jacques Derrida, “Ousia and Grammé: Note on a Note from Being and Time”, in: Margins 
of Philosophy, p. 37) 
323 G.W.F. Hegel, Jenaer Systementwürfe II, quoted in: Jacques Derrida, ibid., p. 41 
324 Jacques Derrida, op. cit., p. 42 
325 Ibid., p. 42 
326 Ibid., p. 41/42 
327 Ibid., p. 42 
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this equalization lies exactly in the negation of negativity, which already is 
time. It “relifts [relève] space”328, is the truth of space – thus it spaces itself:  
 
The negation at work in space or as space, the spatial negation of space, 
time is the truth of space. To the extent that it is, that is, to the extent that it 
becomes and is produced, that it manifests itself in its essence, that it spaces 
itself, in itself relating to itself, that is, in negating itself, space is time. It 
retemporalizes itself, it relates itself to itself and mediates itself as time. Time 
is spacing. It is the relation of space to itself, its for-itself.329  
 
Based on this Hegelian principle of posited negativity, time and space 
do not only have an equiprimordial relation, but are creating each other. 
Therefore the Aristotelian principle of presence as simultaneous absence is to 
be considered as a principle of both time and space. In the photographic 
image (and therefore in film) this principle passes through what André Bazin 
calls the “transference of reality from the thing to its reproductions330”, still 
stemming from the ancient Egyptian “mummy complex”331, out of time and 
space. In photography, while we access presence, absence is also manifest 
through the now that was captured. Cinema overcomes the constant dying of 
the now mechanically, imitating the principle of life in projecting movement, 
thus raising continuity. Ultimately, we are facing the real of reality here again. 
This question remains: How does the now catalyze the future into the 
past? Why the constant necessity of negating the negation, to make the 
fading presence a permanence? How can Dasein come to process 
constantly towards that which it projects? In an Aristotelian sense of 
negation, Heidegger claims that to live means to be “constantly dying”332 and 
assumes in this sense the negation and its negation, its living inscription as 
                                                
328 Ibid., p.43 
329 Ibid., p. 42-43 
330 André Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image”, in: op.cit., p. 14 
331 Ibid., p. 14 
332 “In being towards its death, Dasein is dying factically and indeed constantly, as long as it 
has not yet come to its demise.” (Cf. Martin Heidegger, op. cit., p. 303) 
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a persistent characteristic of Dasein:  
 
The ‘connectedness of life’, in which Dasein somehow maintains itself 
constantly, is precisely what we have overlooked in our analysis of Being-a-
whole. (…) [Dasein] is ‘actual’ only in the ‘now’, and hops, as it were, through the 
sequence of ‘nows’ of its own ‘time’.333  
 
This “connectedness of life” makes Dasein temporal and resides in time 
itself. Deleuze’s broken-link reverses this sense; that is, he stresses an un-
connectedness of and from life. Therefore, I propose to call Deleuze’s 
unconnected world not film but photography, frozen in a state beyond time, 
without the ‘connectedness of life’ that film produces exactly by the succession of 
stills in motion. 
But how is this principle of life, which persists as a secret of time and 
space, that which makes the real of reality real? How is it possible that the 
visitors in Solaris can stabilize out of practically nothing – out of neutrinos, 
which are reflected human energy? And exactly here, a last question remains 
persistently unresolved: How does the now catalyze the future into the past? 
How is the present suddenly past and how, as such, does it present 
connectedness, being threefold time? Why the constant necessity of 
negating the negation to make the actual present? How can Dasein come to 
process constantly towards that which it projects? And is this projection a 
solaristic principle?  
We have raised a series of new questions to follow up. I would like to 
refer to Martin Hägglund who, although he addresses neither film nor 
photography, has inspired this reflection by his reassessment of Derrida’s 
concept of the trace. Hägglund’s work addresses exactly the survival 
movement of the trace. He defends an “arche-materiality” of time, which 
describes the trace as deriving logically from succession (of moments) and 
therefore has spatial inscription already implicated as its survival mechanism, 
and persistence as spatial temporization:  
                                                
333 Ibid., p. 425 
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The notion of arche-materiality follows from the structure of the trace that we 
derive from the logical implications of succession. (…) For one moment to be 
succeeded by another, it cannot first be present in itself and then be affected 
by its own disappearance. (…) Every temporal moment therefore depends on 
the material support of spatial inscription, since the latter enables the past to 
be retained for the future. The material support of the trace, however, is itself 
temporal. Without temporization a trace could not persist across time and 
relate the past to the future. Accordingly, the persistence of the trace cannot 
be the persistence of something that is exempt from the negativity of time.”334 
 
In the set of considerations exposed until now, life and film, reality and 
cinema have become interchangeable and both appear as the result of 
Dasein’s persistent tracing in being. Dasein as being-in-film makes this tracing 
graspable, but not yet intelligible: that which makes the actual real in the 
sense of its presence in the present, even if only in the moment now, even if 
in film through illusion kept in motion, must await further examination. Yet the 
actual real in presence is that which makes being’s temporality spatial, so we 
can ask the question from a slightly different perspective: Why does being 
trace at all and how can there be this constant succession and overcoming of 
negativity in the principle of life? 
 
 
 
 
5. “Solaris” as Suicide-Machine 
 
For now, we only can guess that the withdrawing principle of life, as well as 
the constant negativity of being, is linked to the domain of the real of reality – 
the presence of what is absent. The present moment confronts us constantly 
with our own death, and throws us permanently ahead, into the abyss of the 
                                                
334 Martin Hägglund interviewed by Robert King, “Radical atheism and ‘the arche-materiality of 
time’”, in: Journal of Philosophy: A Cross-Disciplinary Inquiry, p. 63/64 
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still-outstanding. Anxiety is thereby our true mood towards this nothing, which 
we are constantly covering up to avoid remembering, although anxiety 
“provides the phenomenal basis for explicitly grasping Dasein’s primordial 
totality of Being.”335. In prefacing further parts of this analysis, I propose to ask 
for the negation of being in Solaris, which could be a hint as to the 
withdrawing principle of life and Dasein’s constant being thrown.  
The question of worldhood and filmhood would find its equivalent in the 
next neologism “solarishood”: by grasping these principles new conclusions 
on filmhood and worldhood will emerge. Furthermore, the mood of anxiety is 
the mood present in the movie Solaris par excellence. It penetrates each 
scene and unfolds each time people are isolated; indeed they are much more 
anxious than they would ever be on earth.  
The notion of death as a principle for closure, for completeness and 
meaning, and for escape from the abyss of nothing designs a real as nothing. 
In this nothing being is the most withdrawing secret. Death, together with and 
mirrored in the presence of absence and displacement, is the guiding principle 
of “Solaris” as a film and as a narrative: Harey is the resurrection of a dead 
person and she constantly tries to kill herself. The longing for death is thus an 
active leitmotif of the movie, nearly a natural consequence, a way out of 
anxiety and a way to come to being as a whole. About film as a longing for 
death I propose to reflect in the next chapter, having the following question in 
mind: is our constant motivation to risk to go on living in truth our longing to 
reach the end, the longing for suicide?  
As I have mentioned, Heidegger describes something always still 
outstanding in our existence, “But to that which is thus outstanding ‘the end’ 
itself belongs. The ‘end’ of Being-in-the-world is death.”336 Death or the ‘end’ of 
being-in-the-world (which for Heidegger is linked to Vollendung – perfection) 
                                                
335 Martin Heidegger, op.cit., p. 227 
336 Quote in German: “Zu diesem Ausstand aber gehört das Ende selbst. Das ‘Ende’ des In-
der-Welt-seins ist der Tod.” (Cf. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 234; translation mine – 
C.R.) 
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“limits and determines in every case whatever totality is possible for Dasein”337 
and enables being-a-whole (being at an end).  
In “Solaris” Harey’s main plan becomes an obsession to die, to 
accomplish being-as-a-whole. Her desire of an authentic Dasein, of being-
towards-death, depends thereby on her individuation, her subjectivity, her being 
more than a reflected image of something other in time – to get objective 
existence she has to step out of time and to close her life, to commit suicide. 
The hope to succeed in dying, to eventually conclude life, transforms her 
identity. This voluntary liquidation of herself is a cinematographic act.  
 
In the following chapter I will claim that the longing for death is a 
cinematographic principle anchored in Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk, the ‘total 
work of art’, which is regarded as the precursor of cinema, anticipating its main 
aesthetic principles, and fulfilling the solaristic longing for death.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
337 “Dieses Ende, zum Seinkönnen, das heißt zur Existenz gehörig, begrenzt und bestimmt 
die jemögliche Ganzheit des Daseins.” (Cf. ibid., p. 234; translation mine – C.R.) 
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XII. 
THE MYTH OF TOTAL CINEMA  
AND THE CINEMATIC SUICIDE OF WAGNER’S 
GESAMTKUNSTWERK 
 
 
 
 
1. Total Enchantment:  
An Ontological Principle of Cinema 
 
There are three associations that immediately come to our mind when we 
think of the musical work of Richard Wagner: first - the “Gesamtkunstwerk”, 
the total work of art, uniting all different forms of arts - visual arts, theater, 
dance, music, poetry; second - the redemption of the viewer through the form 
of the ‘music drama’, in which the protagonists are furthering the mythological 
narrative and revealing their motives and inner states; and third - a modern 
music ahead of its time, which affects our nervous system. These features 
ground an intense aesthetic experience originating change in the state of 
mind of the viewer. The dense audio-visual interplay of music and dramatic 
staging causes a mesmerizing effect, often referred as 'overwhelming' or as 
an ‘aesthetic attack’. This smashing impact induces the dissolution of the 
individual consciousness of the spectator. Peter Sloterdijk characterizes the 
same effect as “Totalverzauberung” (which I have opted to translate with ‘total 
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enchantment’), and establishes a bridge between the Wagnerian aesthetics 
and the cinema of violence: 
 
 
"[There is] a generation of moviegoers who are after the 'total enchantment' 
and assume the unreality of the genre at the outset, but then wants actually to 
be 'flooded'. Especially in Germany there is a tradition of 'overwhelming art' 
(Überwältigungskunst), and this is an aesthetic habitus since Wagner; 
whereby it is also a part of culture, [one says], that the subject dissolves in 
the theatre by facing the portrayed violence, but also by facing the smashing 
power of music and image, and only recovers on the way home." 338 
(translation mine – C.R.) 
 
I propose to comprehend this conversion of total enchantment in film 
and in Wagner’s music drama from the viewpoint of film. More specifically, I 
suggest to conceptualize the term as an ontological principle of cinema: total 
enchantment is the bond that cinema establishes with the viewer, the catalyst 
of the being-in of being-in-film - this gives us a hint on the withdrawing principle 
with which the continuity of being-in-the-world originates: the link of being-in, 
the constituent of the “being-there” of Dasein. Cinema is apprehended as an 
involving art that substitutes the natural perception of the viewer by combining, 
just as the Wagnerian music drama, the visual and the audible. As we have 
previously seen, according to Bazin, cinema’s genesis is pre-established in the 
human mind, in Plato’s Cave and especially in the myth of total cinema.  
                                                
338 “Es ist eine Generation von Kinogängern da, die mehr auf ‘Totalverzauberung’ setzt und 
die Irrealität des Genres von vornherein einräumt, und dann aber auch überschwemmt 
werden will. Gerade in Deutschland gibt es ja eine Tradition von solcher 
Überwältigungskunst, von Wagner her, einen ästhetischen Habitus; wo man sagt, das ist ja 
auch ein Teil der Kultur, daß sich das Subjekt im Zuschauerraum angesichts der 
dargestellten Gewalt, aber auch angesichts der überschwemmenden Kraft von Musik und 
Bild auflöst und erst auf dem Heimweg wieder sammelt.” (Cf. Peter Sloterdijk, interviewed by 
Michael Althen, “Perlen des kollektiven Wahnsinns - Ein Gespräch mit Peter Sloterdijk über 
Kino und andere Bilder”) 
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Furthermore, total enchantment assumed as an ontological principle 
presents affinity with Martin Heidegger’s theory of death (despite Heidegger’s 
disapproval of Wagner's works). The cinematic principle of total enchantment 
exists due to an overarching aesthetic experience and I will argue that it 
derives from an essential desire to continuously transcend our existential 
state, our being-in-the-world. This desire is equivalent to an epistemic search 
for cognition, for truth or for some manifestation of the real of reality; it longs 
for the disclosure of that which Heidegger calls "Sein als Ganzes" - the 
"being-as-a-whole", and that, only is (im)possible through death or its 
disclosure in anxiety, as we have seen. We have further observed how the 
term 'whole' relies on a conceptual presupposition of death as completion and 
conclusion.  
The argumentative founding on Heidegger still raises the question of 
how the total enchantment affects us: what happens to being-in-the-world 
when it is facing total enchantment’s impact?  
Total enchantment is founded on a replacement of physical and natural 
experience by favoring an aesthetic experience that immerses the mind into a 
state comparable to that of hypnosis or dream, resembling reports of ‘after-
death experiences’ or certain esoteric reports describing the existence of an 
‘astral body’: the mind seems to leave the body, while it remains still and 
cramped for hours in a dark room – an authentic movie viewer as if chained in 
Plato's cave, which is somehow the ontological origin of cinema - even if the 
comparison fails, that cinema is an illusion of reality: the cinema spectator is 
actually the one who seeks the light outside the cave.339 
                                                
339 “What Plato is giving us is a metaphor, not a literal account of the epistemic faculties 
needed to grasp the reality of Forms. (…) My suggestion, then, is that it is our experience of 
the empirical world outside the movie theater that is analogous to Plato’s cave dwellers (as he 
himself supposed), and our experience within the movie theater is analogous to the 
escapee’s experience outside the cave. That is, we gain a special insight into reality by 
watching movies that we don’t obtain by means of our ordinary empirical experience. To put it 
in Platonic terms, we can gain access to Truth, Goodness, and Beauty by watching films—
they give us a conduit to those “higher” realities.”  (Cf. Colin McGinn, “A Multimodal Theory of 
Film Experience”, in: Thinking Reality and Time through Film, pp. 156-157) 
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Plato has developed a concept of knowledge, where the truth is difficult 
to grasp, allegorically compared to a world of illusionary projections, which 
replaces the world itself, and which resembles the situation in a movie theater. 
Yet in the allegory, the humans are trapped in the cave, "here they have been 
from their childhood and have their legs and necks chained so that they 
cannot move"340. They look forward to a wall, where they see shadows. The 
important thing to Plato is that they are not having any notion of their 
condition: "To them, the truth [reality] would be literally nothing but the 
shadows of the images.” 341 
To the usual reading of the allegory (you have to leave the cave to 
know the truth, even if it is difficult) I want to add the following idea: This 
projection of shadows is characterized by a higher degree of reality than the 
actual situation (chained and looking at a wall), and ties a link between man 
and world, creating a situation of total enchantment. What interests me in our 
context is the human susceptibility to be man-as-spectator: to fully enter a 
projected universe, whereby this entering corresponds to a search for 
transcendence. This human availability constitutes the archi-possibility of 
cinema inherent in the human condition. 
 Bazin takes this possibility of total cinema to lie at the origin of cinema, 
a response to an idealized need intuited in the human mind: "The cinema is 
an idealistic phenomenon. The concept men had of it existed so to speak fully 
armed in their minds, as if in some platonic heaven (…)" 342 That is, since we 
imagine worlds and philosophize, we envision a connection between 
perception and the will to overcome reality. We even favor a reality more real 
than the world - to Bazin "a myth, the myth total cinema"343. As we have 
mentioned previously, this myth pictures the utopia of a perfect, 
multidimensional re-creation of the world, which has not been yet realized, not 
even by cinema:344 "cinema has not yet been invented.”345  
                                                
340 Plato, translated by Benjamin Jowett, The Allegory of the Cave, p. 1 
341 Ibid., p. 2 
342 André Bazin, op. cit., p. 17 
343 Ibid., p. 22 
344 Ibid., p. 21 
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In this perspective, the total enchantment becomes a manifestation of 
total cinema. Both act on us because we desire it, prefer it to the real world. In 
a primordial way, there is an impulse to escape from here to the afterlife, a 
desire for dissolution, a longing for death - 'Todesdrang', a term, which arises 
during German Romanticism, simultaneously with the development of 
photography. In what follows we will seek to better understand this longing, 
focusing on its meaning in the work of Wagner, in film and also in Heidegger's 
thought: in the center of the inquiry into being lies anchored in Heidegger’s 
theory of death again, projected as the possibility of impossibility, always yet 
to come. Are we, after all, going to the movies because we want to die, like 
CP Harey on the planet Solaris? 
 
 
 
 
2. Death Wish and Total Enchantment 
 
As we have seen, total cinema and the ontological principle of total 
enchantment rely on the viewer’s ability to completely enter a projection, a 
work or a medium. This entry is motivated by the need for uniting with the 
world, an answer to our desire for an experience in which inner and outer 
being do not oppose. It also corresponds to a search for truth or for 
knowledge, absolute in its tendency to create a relationship with the world 
from object to object or from subject to subject, substituting the subject-object 
dualism. Such a meeting is only possible as an aesthetic or ontological 
experience and not an empirical one, because it would imply a dissolution of 
the subject. The musical drama of Wagner reacts to this yearning for such an 
absolute aesthetic experience, so overwhelming that it kills: by dissolving the 
individual consciousness of the viewer within the work of art. 
The Festspielhaus of Bayreuth is the theater designed for Wagner on 
purpose to provide this experience of collective suicide, a kind of prototype of 
                                                                                                                                      
345 Ibid., p. 21 
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the later cinema theatre: the audience is seated on an inclined plane, the 
room completely darkened during the performance, thus the audience 
disappears. The viewer's mind is receiving the projection of the stage directly, 
entering it, escaping the surrounding dark. In hiding the orchestra in the so-
called "mystic abyss'' (mystischer Abgrund), the composer anticipates sound 
cinema whereas the audio dimension joins directly the visual dimension (the 
mise-en-scene), there is no intermediary visible. This interplay intensifies the 
overwhelming power of the aesthetic experience. We are facing the death of 
the spectator, who becomes the virtual or ghostly inhabitant of a musical and 
scenic work, which later finds its perfection in cinema. Susan Sontag states: 
 
What Wagner wanted was an ideal theatre, a theatre of maximal emotions 
purged of distractions and irrelevancies. Thus Wagner chose to conceal the 
orchestra of Bayreuth Festspielhaus under a black wooden shell, and once 
quipped that, having invented the invisible orchestra, he wished he could 
invent the invisible stage. (...) And Wagner’s fantasy of the invisible stage was 
fulfilled more literally in that immaterial stage, cinema.346 
 
By suggesting an "invisible stage" Wagner becomes an unwitting 
carrier of the myth of total cinema, the not-yet of cinema, which Bazin 
mentions. The implied will of dissolution, of full union with the work, emerges 
during the romantic era of which Richard Wagner is a late representative, 
even if prematurely modern. Romanticism aims to transcend the limits of 
reality in favor of a ‘becoming poetry’ of life itself: to dissolve the physical 
reality in order to access another, higher one; to achieve a union between 
man and nature and to project a fusion of reality and dream, in which death 
would be the cancellation of all limits. Consequently there emerges in the 
romantic era the 'Todessehnsucht' – the longing or yearning for death, and 
the 'Todesdrang' - the urge for death. In both the individual feels a strong 
attraction to death, caused by poetic impulses. One really desires to die, longs 
to dissolve reality and oneself, to encounter death: the romantic "endless 
                                                
346 Susan Sontag, “Syberberg’s Hitler”, in: Under the Sign of Saturn, p. 157 
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sleep", a "homecoming" as formulated by Novalis347. This impulsive, yearning 
attraction to death is the key to understand the powerful impact of total 
enchantment. 
Paradoxically, the preserved moment of death appears in art as a 
resistance against time. André Bazin associates art, from its inception, from 
Egyptian mummies, to the psychological need of man to oppose death. The 
embalming of the Pharaohs allows them apparently to resist and to survive 
time, and can be considered the origin of painting and sculpture, or the first 
photographs. According to Bazin, this association between time and human 
condition – the psychological desire to prolong life, to overcome death, to 
achieve, at least in appearance, immortality – generates art. 348 
I have previously mentioned how Roland Barthes develops in his 
theory of photography the concept of death of the photographed subject-
object, when he tries to assimilate the essence, or that which he calls the 
noema, of photography. According to Barthes, the photograph anticipates and 
saves the instant of a premature death: The picture turns the photographed 
subject into an object.  The subject feels this transformation as its own "I then 
experience a micro-version of death […]: I am truly becoming a specter"349 or 
"I have become Total-Image, which is to say, Death in person." 350  
The photographed object is the referent, but by emanating a kind of 
specter, it acquires the nature of a simulacrum. According to Barthes the 
expression “spectrum of the photograph” is related to the word spectacle and 
adds the return of the dead to photography: 
 
                                                
347 “Praised be eternal night for us - and praised eternal slumber. (…) Foreignness has lost 
attraction, we long for our Father's home.” (translation mine – C.R.) - “Gelobt sei uns die 
ew'ge Nacht, - Gelobt der ew'ge Schlummer. (...) - Die Lust der Fremde ging uns aus, - Zum 
Vater wollen wir nach Haus.” (Novalis (Friedrich Freiherr von Hardenberg), “Sehnsucht nach 
dem Tode”, in: NOVALIS Hymnen an die Nacht – Kommentierte Studienausgabe, p. 16 
348 André Bazin, op. cit., p. 13 
349 Roland Barthes, op.cit., p. 14 
350 Ibid., p. 14 
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And the person or thing photographed is the target, the referent, a kind of little 
simulacrum, an eidolon emitted by the object, which I should like to call the 
Spectrum of the photograph, because this word retains, through its root, a 
relation to “spectacle”, and adds to it that rather terrible thing, which is there 
in every photograph: the return of the dead.351 
 
Barthes refers here to the transformation of an object into an image, calling it 
a ghost, since the word “specter” comes from “spectrum” in Latin, which 
means “image” or “apparition”. By still adding the word “spectacle”, which has 
together with “spectrum” its origin in the Latin verb “specere” – “to see” 
Barthes conceptually describes a show of specters, as “spectacle” in French 
designates “show”. What is a specter? It is a ghost, also defined as an 
“apparition of a dead person that is believed to appear or to become manifest 
to the living, typically as a nebulous image”352. 
The contact with image as death in the form of specters is a very 
principle of cinema. The anticipation of death in photography, when applied to 
cinema, happens 24 times per second, a serial phantasmagoria, which is set in 
motion. This movement, in cinema, is the transcendence of death itself, 
accomplished through constant dying, just as being constantly dies. The 
spectral aspect of photographic reproduction is further evoked by the visitors in 
“Solaris”: they are specters, which somehow have entered matter: an 
embodiment coming from memory. The very fact that some of these specters 
still have living models on Earth, like the giant boy that Berton had seen 
decades before Kelvin’s arrival on Solaris, means that an anticipation of death 
has taken place. 
This ongoing materialization on Solaris concerns any character in any 
movie: we can call it materialization, reification or reincarnation. It 
corresponds to a transformation from an imaginary into an immaterial and 
projected reality. Movie characters are brought to life, mortality is denied to 
them and infinity is their destiny. At the same time they embody death: If the 
movie is playing, the character’s actor is often already dead, and the filmed 
                                                
351 Ibid., p. 9 
352 Definition found in: Oxford Dictionoraries, available online 
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reality no longer exists, but its replica does. This feature fits the CP Harey in 
“Solaris”; later in the film entire pieces of memory materialize, like the 
earthlike island where we find Kelvin in the closing part of the movie, with his 
father: Solaris becomes total cinema for its own characters, a metacinema. 
Cinema conveys a spectral logic in eidetic and kinetic form, the 
presence of the absent as returning dead ones. The longing for death finds 
satisfaction in the encounter with that which has already died. Jean-Louis 
Leutrat describes this achievement as the revival of that which has already 
died. This experience, even if immaterial, recovers in image and time a reality, 
which already has passed. The viewer, who was dissolved with the closing 
lights in the cinema theatre, meets other dead ones: a party of ghosts. 
 
The return is a great cinematographic theme, the eternal return ... Bring back 
to life, give a second chance to live, to reinfuse usable, dead material with 
life, and to set in motion the living-dead, the zombies, the mummies. 353  
(translation mine – C.R.)  
 
This meeting with the mummies corresponds to, in the musical dramas 
of Wagner, the immersion of the viewer into the staged, into the represented 
scenes with the characters. Hereby the theatre room turns into a suggestive 
automatographer354 of dreams: the not-yet-cinema. 
Consequently, the relationship between the spectator and the filmic 
universe is shaped by "gravity of death" – we have considered many aspects, 
namely, the principle of total enchantment, the suicide machine, the doubling of 
Dasein, the desire for death and dissolution, unification with the world, the 
longing for knowledge and truth. Film has a death-driven, post-mortem 
character and is already literally past reality. The viewer thus faces death, as if 
                                                
353 The original quote in French: “Le retour est un grand thème cinématographique, l’éternel 
retour… Ramener à la vie, donner une seconde chance de vivre, réinsufler la vie à un 
materiel usable, mort, mettre en mouvement les morts-vivants, les zombies, les momies.” (Cf. 
Jean-Louis Leutrat, op. cit.,, p. 41) 
354 ‘Automatographer’ is composed of the Greek words automaton (from autos - "self" and 
matos "thinking, animated, willing,") and graphein (“to write”). 
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a change of perspective would happen - as projection of a spectral apparition, a 
ghostlike image, which has survived being. In film we actually glide through a 
disembodied world we cannot touch, a matterless reflection of the world made 
of light and shadow. The reality, objects and beings in movies, have a 
transcendental character. Just as any after-death universe, film constitutes a 
parallel world that is based on its own time and space. 
 
 
 
 
3. The Not-Yet-Cinema: 
Projection, Death and Conclusion 
 
This desire to meet death in cinema (or to meet that which has already 
passed or them who have already died – enabled and produced by the total 
enchantment), stems from our ontological desire to die, which meets our own 
biological as well as ontological condition: we are constantly dying, a thought 
Heidegger stresses. The desire for death also exists epistemologically, just as 
Heidegger indirectly assumes in Being and Time: to obtain the knowledge of 
the world as a whole, achieve all the knowledge about the real of being, is 
only possible when we die. Being as a whole will always elude us because it 
only becomes complete in death. The romantic longing for death thus 
becomes a desire for knowledge, an access to that whole or actual real, and 
with it our desire of cinema: we go to the movies because we want to die, but 
wanting to die means wanting to know, desiring the real image.  
Death conditions the temporality of being, yet Dasein raises the 
question of its being from this temporal point of view. As we have seen, 
ontologically we cannot understand our real existence, our being as a whole, 
because Dasein is mortal: "When Dasein reaches its wholeness in death, it 
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loses simultaneously the 'being' of its 'there'."355 For Heidegger death is that 
which transforms the being of Dasein into a closed entity: Dasein becomes 
complete, as death is its closure. Being-in-the-world becomes a being-
towards-death, which is always a being-not-yet. Dasein is thus open in its 
condition of permanent incompleteness. 
This openness of Dasein itself lies in its ‘being-towards’ its own 
possibilities. Dasein “‘as long as it is’, right to its end, it comports itself towards 
its potentiality-for-Being [Seinskönnen]." 356  The openness makes Dasein 
always "‘ahead-of-itself’ [Sichvorweg] 357, as an item in the structure of care. In 
Dasein there is always something still outstanding.  I will now go still one step 
further than in the previous chapter in applying this unsettledness to film and 
to cinema, remaining in the context of Wagner’s total work of art and total 
enchantment.  
Regarding what has been said, death becomes the vehicle of the 
constant not-yet of cinema, which reveals its ontological status as a not-yet-
cinema – a projection, the realization of which costs us our lives. In cinema 
we are constantly dying and being resurrected, just as the visitors in “Solaris”, 
as we learn with Harey: she revives after suicide attempts several times. Her 
nature is immortality, but her true desire is death. 
                                                
355 “But if it gains such ‘wholeness’, this gain becomes the utter loss of Being-in-the-World.” 
(Cf. Martin Heidegger, op. cit., p. 280). The translators have chosen a description here, 
because Heidegger, literally translated, states that “If Dasein reaches this wholeness it 
simultaneously loses the being of its there.” (translation mine – C.R.) 
356 Ibid., p. 279 
357 ‘Sichvorweg’ is a proper term of Heidegger, composed by the words ‘vorweg’ – anticipating 
or ahead, and 'sich' - the reflexive form of yourself; but 'vorweg', as well, is composed of 'vor' 
– before or in front of, and 'weg' - absent, be it a person, a lost object or someone who died. 
In a further reading, the German noun ‘der Weg’ would add the meaning of ‘pre-path’- ‘Vor-
Weg’ a path, which we can predict or which still lies ahead, or even of being towards a path. 
Considering all these interpretations we should translate literally the Heideggerian term by 
‘ahead-of-yourself’ or ‘being-on-the-way-in-front-of yourself”, though those do not immediately 
include the missing mortal sense of the term that Heidegger sets for use in this context: "even 
when it still exists but has nothing more 'before-it' and has 'settled [abgeschlossen] its 
account', its Being is still determined by 'the-ahead-of -itself '." (Cf. Ibid., p. 279) 
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In order to be "ahead-of-itself" Dasein projects itself (entwirft sich 
auf)358 in possibilities, a condition in which Dasein is thrown (geworfen) into 
Being359. “Solaris” as well as cinema in general is a carrier of this condition, 
which is implicit to its existential nature: death-drivenness. Dasein also 
projects itself into the (im)possibility of death as being inevitably thrown into 
it360 and offers the potentiality of Dasein as being-towards-death. This being-
towards-death is "the possibility of authentic existence"361, the possibility of 
Dasein to understand itself, because "anticipation becomes the possibility of 
an understanding of ones ownmost (eigensten) potentiality-of-Being"362. 
From there derives a continuing need for Dasein to close or conclude 
this "permanently-unsolved" of being to understand itself as "being-as-a-
whole" (Seiendes im Ganzen). This will to understand causes in Dasein an 
existential desire for death, an anticipation of the realization of that which is 
still pending: as if it could make us connect with ourselves and with the world, 
                                                
358  Heidegger uses in his own way the terms 'entwirft sich auf' and 'Entwurf' which is 
commonly translated ‘projecting yourself’ and ‘projection’, containing the nature of projection, 
of project, as well as of draft: something is drafted and thrown/ projected as a possibility by a 
projector (which is Dasein). As I mention in other texts of mine, this projection principle is of 
cinematic nature and processes time itself for the future, and film for the screen: both are 
thrown in the sense of the Heideggerian 'Geworfenheit' – frequently translated as thrownness. 
To-be-thrown (in Heidegger the one of Dasein into Being) is of the same family, deriving from 
throw - 'Wurf'. Hence, film, being itself is being processed - is a principle that is based on 
throwing. 
359  “But thrownness, as a kind of Being, belongs to an entity which in each case is its 
possibilities, and is them in such a way that it understands itself in these possibilities and in 
terms of them, projecting itself upon them.” (Martin Heidegger, op. cit., p. 225) - “Die 
Geworfenheit aber ist die Seinsart eines Seienden, das je seine Möglichkeiten selbst ist, so 
zwar, daß es sich in und aus ihnen versteht (auf sie sich entwirft).” (Martin Heidegger, Sein 
und Zeit, p. 181) 
360 “On the contrary, if Dasein exists, it has a eady been thrown into this possibility.” (Cf. 
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 295) 
361 My translation of: “Möglichkeit eigentlicher Existenz” (Cf. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 
p. 263) 
362  My translation of: “Das Vorlaufen erweist sich als Möglichkeit des Verstehens des 
eigensten Seinkönnens” (Cf. ibid., p. 263) 
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create an object-object relationship or a subject-subject one. As we have 
seen, in cinema this relationship happens to be actual: death becomes a 
possibility from which we simultaneously resurrect, as Dasein has doubled. 
Death implies in cinema its own transcendence, constantly, a double negation 
of Hegelian character: it is precisely our finitude, which makes us look for 
transcendence of any kind and at any instant– our ticket to the future; the 
principle of life. As Slavoj Žižek points out, this assertion of finitude is to be 
found in Heidegger's thought: 
 
(…) [The] assertion of finitude as the unsurpassable predicament of being-
human: it is our radical finitude, which exposes us to the opening of the future, 
to the horizon of what is to come, for transcendence and finitude are two 
sides of the same coin.363  
 
This future is, for the present, the projection of the possibilities yet to 
come, of this still-unsolved, which death solves. The not-yet-cinema 
constitutes this human condition and leads to a temporality in which total 
cinema is always the future, which returns from death; and conversely, the 
future is this cinema, the full realization of the projected possibility. This 
openness for the future corresponds to our constant motivation to risk to go 
on living as well as the longing for reaching a conclusion. Therefore projection 
and conclusion present themselves as equiprimordial principles. 
The discussions of the scientists in “Solaris” around the question 
whether Harey is to be called a human being or not mirrors this duplicity: we 
only have a human future if we die. Harey’s non-human body - consisting of 
neutrinos instead of atoms – contradicts her identity becoming more and more 
human. Death is literally her only way out; only through death she can 
humanize herself and let her existence become a whole; she uses death as 
the possibility to come to the “very being” of her Dasein 364. Her suicide also 
                                                
363 Slavoj Žižek, Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism, p. 866 
364"Death is Dasein’s ownmost possibility. Being towards this possibility discloses to Dasein 
its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, in which its very Being is the issue." (Cf. Martin Heidegger, 
Being and Time, p. 307) 
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stands for the doubled Dasein of any spectator who wishes to die and dies 
through film. The very meaning of life is here in stake – as a narrative as well 
as an ontological principle. 
 
 
 
 
4. Closure, Myth and Cinema: 
Death and the Total Work of Art 
 
As we have seen, the aforementioned concept of death as closure alludes to 
the Hegelian claim “everything reasonable is a closure" whereas “closure” 
acquires the sense of “conclusion”. I propose to delve into this context in more 
detail: The duplicity of the German “Schluss” is picked up by Byung-Chul Han. 
As Han adds, Hegel can be grasped in a narrative sense.  
 
For Hegel, 'Schluss' is not a formal logical category. A 'Schluss' arises when 
the beginning and end of a process form a meaningful context, a union with 
sense, as they intertwine Thus, the narrative is a 'Schluss' - [ here: a 
conclusion]. Due to its 'Schluss' - [here: a completion] it produces a 
meaning.365 (translation mine – C.R.) 
 
Han’s observation philosophically shifts the narrative character of cinema and 
the music dramas of Wagner, transforming them into special agents of 
reason: both imply double closure – as ending and as death. Let me, in this 
context, once more recall Pasolini’s words emphasizing the special bond 
between death and cinema: 
                                                
365 “Für Hegel ist der Schluss keine formallogische Kategorie. Ein Schluss ergibt sich, Inn der 
Anfang und das Ende eines Prozesses einen sinnvollen Zusammenhang, eine sinnvolle 
Einheit bilden, Inn sie ineinandergreifen. So ist die Narration ein Schluss. Aufgrund ihres 
Schlusses bringt sie einen Sinn hervor.” (Cf. Byung-Chul Han, “Bitte Augen schließen”, in: 
Philosophie_Magazin, February/ March, Berlin, 2013, p. 60) 
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Death does determine life, I feel that, and I’ve written it, too, in one of my 
recent essays, where I compare death to film-montage. Once life is finished, it 
acquires a sense; up to that point it has not got a sense; its sense is 
suspended and therefore ambiguous… For me, death is the maximum of 
epicness and myth. 366 
 
Death thus becomes a narrative principle of finitude and closure 
reflecting the Hegelian idea of 'Schluss' as ending or closure, also as a 
principle of creation of meaning. Death creates myth and narration, and 
makes conclusion and meaning possible. Every movie implies its own death. 
At the end, the spectator attends to this determining conclusion: 'Vollendung' 
in German, deriving from 'Ende' (end) in German, but designating the 
completion as much as the perfection or fulfillment. A film dies and revives 
permanently due to its inherent constant possibility of projection. Film 
necessarily involves death along with its negation. The assumption "When 
Dasein reaches its wholeness in death, it simultaneously loses the Being of its 
‘there’" 367 has been overcome by cinema as every movie reaches wholeness.  
The Being of Dasein appears in the world as something infinite and 
open to be closed in death.  Its constant projection of death as the always still 
outstanding reflects the assertion of final achievement. From the same 
etymological family of 'Schluss' in German are the Heideggerian terms 
'Abgeschlossenheit ' - the state of being settled of something that was 
pending - and 'Erschlossenheit' - something whose meaning has been 
revealed. Cinema implicates this narrative principle of death, where I operate 
with something closed (geschlossen), solved (abgeschlossen) and disclosed 
(erschlossen), something which already is dead – in the sense of past and 
completed.  
                                                
366 Pier Paolo Pasolini, op.cit., p. 55-56 
367 Martin Heidegger, op.cit., p. 281; the original quote in German: “Das Erreichen der Gänze 
des Daseins im Tode ist zugleich Verlust des Seins des Da.” (Cf. Martin Heidegger, Sein und 
Zeit, p. 237) 
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To dissolve this apparent contradiction, l suggest the following idea: as 
we have seen, while watching a movie, Dasein in fact doubles. In cinema 
being-in-the-world is substituted by being-in-film; worldhood becomes 
filmhood, only Dasein’s being remains the same: “The ‘essence’ of this entity 
[Dasein] lies in its existence”368, although as being-in because of its conditional 
being-there. In the duplication of Dasein in cinema lies the ground for the 
disclosure of the ontological principle of total enchantment. As soon as the 
cinematic Dasein, which is in the film, dies (at the end of the film), the other 
Dasein – the one which had previously been dissolved when the lights in the 
showroom were powered down - resurrects. Dasein’s double had access to a 
whole, lived an experience of death, and Dasein returns to the showroom. 
The presence-absence principle becomes a switching game. We are able to 
switch realities because of total enchantment.  
Yet, as long as we are mortal, we will search for meaning and for 
narrative. I propose to delve further into this correlation of narration and death 
in film: Richard Wagner himself outlines a link between death and narration 
(on stage), in which the "artistic representation" needs distance from life – this 
distance is death. Death becomes then an artistic condition for the vision of 
everything as a whole, similar to Heidegger: 
 
Only such action can be suitable for artistic representation, as has already 
come to its conclusion in life, about the pure fact of which there is no doubt 
present, (...). Only as to that which has come to its closure in life are we 
capable to grasp the necessity of its appearance, to understand the context of 
its individual moments: an action is only first completed if the person 
committing the act, (...) is no longer subjected to involuntary assumptions 
about his possible action as well, (...) only with one’s death, one is exempt from 
that subjection, for I now know everything that he did and that he was. 369 
(translation mine – C.R.) 
                                                
368 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 67 
369  “Zur künstlerischen Darstellung geeignet kann nur eine solche Handlung sein, die im 
Leben bereits zum Abschluß gekommen ist, über die als reine Tatsache kein Zweifel mehr 
vorhanden ist, (...). Erst an dem im Leben Vollendeten vermögen wir die Notwendigkeit seiner 
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Wagner further states that death is the ideal object of cathartic exploration on 
stage. Thus, form and content complement and automate in the total work of 
art in a cinematic way: 
 
 "Yet I secure the recognized [das Erkannte] most perfectly in the conscious 
representation of that death itself, and this in order to explain it [death] to 
ourselves through the representation of that action, of which the necessary 
conclusion has been death itself."370  (translation mine – C.R.) 
 
Cinema has created its own continuation of Wagner’s total artwork. Its 
pre-cinematographic features are on a concrete level the total enchantment 
and on an abstract one a foreshadowing imaginary projection of a real; both 
are perfected in cinema as the same visionary dream. In the film “Solaris” we 
have the impression of being indeed inside a total artwork, a total cinema, a 
complete substitution of reality by a projected one: the space station near the 
planet Solaris is somehow the recreated prolongation of Earth. Death is 
explored on all possible levels here: as a film, as a reality on a space station, 
as the mise-en-scène of life and resurrection of the main characters and their 
representers, since long gone by, yet eternalized in the myth of their 
representations. There is the possibility that Kris dies on Earth and that the 
whole Solaris scenario is an afterlife mental state to conclude that love is the 
only thing that matters, which is one of Tarkovsky’s tasks as a director: “to 
stimulate reflection on what is essentially human and eternal in each 
                                                                                                                                      
Erscheinung zu fassen, den Zusammenhang seiner einzelnen Momente zu begreifen: eine 
Handlung ist aber erst vollendet, Wenn der Mensch, von dem diese Handlung vollbracht 
wurde, (...) unwillkürliche Annahmen über sein mögliches Tun ebenfalls nicht mehr 
unterworfen ist; (...) erst mit seinem Tod ist er von dieser Unterworfenheit befreit, denn wir 
wissen nun alles, was er tat und was er war.” (Cf. Richard Wagner, “Das Kunstwerk der 
Zukunft”, in: Dichtungen und Schriften, p. 218-219) 
370  “Am vollkommensten versichern wir uns des Erkannten aber in der bewußtvollen 
Darstellung jenes Todes selbst, und, um ihn uns zu erklären, durch die Darstellung 
derjenigen Handlung, deren notwendiger Abschluß jener Tod war.” (Cf. ibid., p. 220) 
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individual soul”371. The refection on love is thereby a central concern, which 
for Tarkovsky is valid for all his films. 
 
In the end everything can be reduced to the one simple element which is all a 
person can count upon in his existence: the capacity to love. That element 
can grow within the soul to become the supreme factor which determines the 
meaning of a person’s life. My function is to make whoever sees my films 
aware of his need to love and to give his love.372 
 
In that sense the dimension of love gives a kind of essence of human 
need and capacity, which he carries on into other worlds, or into afterlife. 
 
To step for some moments off “Solaris”: the filmic work of Hans - 
Jürgen Syberberg373  is another aesthetically strong example where we can 
contemplate an application and somehow an improvement of the Wagnerian 
theories introduced so far. Syberberg engages in a special relationship with 
death, expressed in his portrayal of characters who have died and others, 
who have have been granted a mythic dimension. 
 
 
Stills of the film “Ludwig – Requiem für einen Jungfräulichen König” by Hans-Jürgen 
Syberberg 
                                                
371 Andrei Tarkovsky, op. cit., p. 200 
372 Ibid., p. 200 
373 Susan Sontag calls Syberberg the perfect follower of Wagner as a filmmaker: “Syberberg 
takes very literally, more literally than Eisenstein ever did, the promise of film as a synthesis 
of the plastic arts, music, literature, and theater—the modern fulfillment of Wagner’s idea of 
the total work of art. (It has often been said that Wagner, had he lived in the twentieth century, 
would have been a filmmaker).“  (Cf., Susan Sontag, op. cit., p. 156-157) 
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The intent of his aesthetic cinema project conveys an inherent 
conceptual weight of death (Todeslastigkeit). There is an interconnectedness 
of all that is perceivable in a movie, a claim for a totality overwhelming in its 
opulence and detailed combination of all elements. This concept involves the 
development of a total work of art, in the sense of the implicit longing for death 
and underlying total enchantment, which is heading for a total cinema, for the 
not-yet-cinema. But we also face a perfection in the stage performance 
presuming to continue life itself without resorting to mimesis. Syberberg is 
stating that "Cinema is the continuation of life by other means and not the 
mere mirror of life" and thus assumes a symbolist position374. 
As Susan Sontag points out, symbolism is an artistic current, which 
achieves the invisible Wagnerian stage as "an invisible theater of the mind". 
Syberberg "construes cinema as a kind of ideal mental activity, being both 
sensuous and reflective, which takes up where reality leaves off."375 The film 
“Ludwig - Requiem für einen Jungfräulichen König” is a self-reflective example 
of film’s death-driven nature, especially because it was conceived as a 
cinematic requiem. We are facing a filmic manifesto declaring war on forms 
and dominant traditions (Hollywood), an death wish orgy, a party of ghosts 
and total enchantment, a combination and interconnection of all possible 
elements, the smallest to the grandest, forming a work, which is both a 
language, a dance, a stage, a dream and a body, a movie that retrieves the 
aura of myth, and crushing the entire interplay: 
 
 This 'Requiem' should be described as: (...) a monologic language in blocks, 
individual or like text scores, in chorus. Calm, long shots, epic clarity, 
alienations, pathos and irony, the character of dream and vision besides 
clarity and schema, a relational and structural technique without randomness 
in prop, clothes, music, sounds, etc. (...) Chapters create paragraphs and 
chronology, chains of associations are keeping the adjacent blocks of the 
acoustic and optical strictly together, nothing should stand alone, (...) 
                                                
374 “Der Film ist die Fortsetzung des Lebens mit anderen Mitteln und nicht der Spiegel des 
Lebens.” (Cf. Hans-Jürgen Syberberg, “Film als Musik der Zukunft”, in: op. cit., p. 12) 
375 Susan Sontag, op. cit., p. 158 
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everything emits signals which vary in repetitions and thus turn into a 
leitmotif; they can characterize characters, situations, theme or plot. 376 
(translation mine – C.R.)  
 
With this type of film, as Syberberg’s “Requiem”, a total work of art in 
form of cinema has been realized, a world of projected shadows, which 
occupy the mind and replace the perception of reality, but which also are 
expressions of a desire for the knowledge of that world whose real escapes 
us. The film’s tendency is the myth of total cinema. But this cinema of 
Bazanian myth, by nature, is always a not-yet-cinema. This not-yet contains a 
totality, its permanent projection of death. This projection corresponds to a 
human need for transcendence and to the utopian desire for a full re-creation 
of the world, more a potential than an accomplishment, a limit towards which 
the utopian desire of a more completed and concluded world. However, this 
cinema is more graspable than reality, a vector towards the possibility of 
exceeding finitude, a projection of the impossibility of Dasein. This 
impossibility, in its dynamism and its precedent condition, permits a distancing 
of life but also a resurrection, a dead without dying, dying in order to know, 
opening the possibilities of the not-yet to come: a cinematic philosophy of the 
future. 
 
 
  
                                                
376 “Dieses ‘Requiem’ sollte heißen: (...) eine monologische Sprache, in Blöcken, einzeln oder 
wie im Chor, Textpartituren. Ruhe, lange Einstellungen, epische Deutlichkeit, Verfremdungen, 
Pathos und Ironie, Traum- und Visionscharakter neben Klarheit und Übersicht, eine 
Beziehungs- und Gefügetechnik ohne Zufall in Requisit, Kleidung, Musik, Geräuschen usw. 
(...) Kapitel schaffen Absätze und Chronologie, Assoziationsketten halten das nebeneinander 
der Blöcke akustisch und optisch streng zusammen, nichts darf allein stehen, (...) alles 
sendet Signale aus, die in, die in Wiederholungen variiert zu Leitmotiven werden und 
Personen, Situationen, Thema oder Handlung charakterisieren können.“ (Cf. Jürgen 
Syberberg, op.cit., pp. 11-12) 
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XIII.  
THE SOLARISTIC APPARATUS 
 
The ultra-fast computers of the future will be based on 
beams of light that exploit the strange properties of 
the sub-atomic or quantum mechanical world. Using 
light and quantum mechanics offers the prospect of 
computers trillions of times more powerful than we 
have today.377 
 
Throughout this chapter my arguments will serve to conceptually set the 
planet Solaris as a techno-organic apparatus and thereby base on Benjamin’s 
cine-apparatus as well as Karen Barad’s intra-actively entangled apparatus, 
which she develops from Foucault’s “dispositif”. It is thereby my aim to 
transpose Barad’s theory into the context of film and to the solaristic system. 
In respect to Benjamin, I aim to deepen his conception of cine-apparatus by a 
brief look on his idea of technology. Bringing both theoretical approaches 
together I will develop the idea of Solaris as an organic, biomimetic machine, 
tending towards total cinema: solely an organic machine, in which 
technology has become as sophisticated and as intra-actively entangled as 
nature, can fulfill the conditions to recreate reality in its integrity. Solaris 
therefore forms a new kind of apparatus, the brain-apparatus, which is 
                                                
377 David Whitehouse, "Q&A: Teleportation", in: BBC News, June 14, 2004, quoted by: Karen 
Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, p. 384 
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techno-organic, a bio-mimetic cinema-apparatus of cosmic origin. Within the 
solaristic system Solaris itself is a conceptual persona, coining the principle 
of an intra-active entanglement of film and reality by diffraction instead of 
reflection: not only is film an organic part of reality, but film is worldmaking 
and changes reality and equally is Solaris. A diffractive approach seems in 
fact adequate to grasp the solaristic kind of reasoning. As Barad says: 
Haraway notes that " [reflexivity or reflection] invites the illusion of essential, 
fixed position, while [diffraction] trains us to more subtle vision" (1992). 
Diffraction entails "the processing of small but consequential differences," and 
"the processing of differences . . . is about ways of life" (ibid.). (…) I further 
develop and elaborate these ideas (…). Ultimately, I argue that a diffractive 
methodology is respectful of the entanglement of ideas and other materials in 
ways that reflexive methodologies are not.378 
 
However before delving into Barad’s diffractive approach and its 
application in our context, let me briefly refer an earlier attempt to transpose 
Barad’s quantum ontology into the context of cinema. Patricia Pisters, in her 
essay “Temporal Explorations in Cosmic Consciousness: Intra-Agential 
Entanglements and the Neuro-Image“ tries to analyze her proposal of the 
neuro-image based on Deleuze’s thought379, in the light of Barad’s position. 
However, Pisters does not attribute a special cinematographic relevance to 
the concept of apparatus. Rather her proposal implies a transposition of 
Barad’s thought into the area of film in a strictly Deleuzian sense: „Both Barad 
and Deleuze have argued against representationalism and have proposed a 
more complex understanding of the connections between the world, science 
                                                
378 Ibid., p. 29 
379 Pisters summarizes the idea of the neuro-image based on Deleuze as follows: “Following 
from Gilles Deleuze’s distinction between classical film as movement-images and modern 
postwar film as time-images, I propose calling contemporary cinema of the digital age ‘neuro-
images’.“ (Cf. Patricia Pisters, “Temporal Explorations in Cosmic Consciousness: Intra-
Agential Entanglements and the Neuro-Image“, in: Cultural Studies Review Volume 21, 
Number 2, September 2015, p. 120)  
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and philosophy.“ 380  Furthermore, according to Deleuze “in the classical 
cinema of the movement-image relations between body, brain, world and 
screen are organic.“381 By transposing then Barad’s method to the Deleuzian 
topology of cinema „we can see that Deleuze’s conception of images is 
fundamentally intra-agential in this new materialist sense“382, Pisters argues. 
We have seen how much Deleuze’s concepts of cinema and different type of 
images are inspired by Bergson’s thought where image = matter. In what 
follows I propose to recall Bergson’s concept of the universe as an aggregate 
of images, to integrate Barad’s thought into our scope of analysis. 
 
 
 
 
1. On the Entanglement of Mind and Matter 
 
As we have mentioned, the rejection of correlationism is the lowest common 
denominator, which unites the different positions within speculative realism, 
including new forms of materialism, wherein Barad’s theories are appreciated. 
We have further suggested that Bergson can also be considered a premature 
pioneer of speculative realism as he withdraws from correlationism by refusing 
the dualism idealism-materialism and by trying to integrate subjectivity 
(perception) in his approach of reality.  
Let me recall: For Bergson the world is image and thereby he defines 
matter as an aggregate of images383. He further argues that the perception of 
                                                
380 Ibid., p. 121 
381 Ibid., P. 122 
382 Ibid., p. 125 
383  “I call matter the aggregate of images and perception of matter these same images 
referred to the eventual action of one particular image, my body.” (Cf. Henri Bergson, op.cit., 
p. 7) 
  
206 
matter and the image of matter coincide in the sense that “it is really in P, and 
not elsewhere, that the image of P is formed and perceived.”384 Yet this image 
differs from perception: “It is true that an image may be without being 
perceived”, says Bergson, “it may be present without being represented”385. 
Therefore, for Bergson, presence and representation of an image are two 
different things, just as matter and perception are.  
This means, and here Bergson holds a position different from the 
classical materialists as well as from the idealists386  and the dualists, that 
matter (and its movements) is not isolated from the rest of the world, and 
neither is perception. There are movements of the material world and 
movements of perception, and they interact387. On the one hand, there is a 
mind-independent reality for Bergson, yet on the other hand, perception is part 
of the very same reality. Both are part of the same whole, the universe of 
images, in which a distinction between images of the mind and those exterior to 
it does not make sense: “[O]f the aggregate of images we cannot say that it is 
within us or without us, since interiority and exteriority are only relations among 
images.”388  
Therefore, in Bergson’s theory mind and material world, subjectivity and 
reality are entangled and not to be separated. Such a position is solaristic (and 
therefore cinematographic) and describes aptly that which I propose to call 
flowing reality, reminiscent of the surface of the planet Solaris, covered by a 
fluid substance which is moving and thereby changing reality. This model can 
also be called an “intra-actively entangled model of reality” and I will argue 
throughout this chapter that Bergson’s theory can be correlated with Barad’s 
                                                
384 Ibid., p. 38 
385 Ibid., p. 27 
386  “My consciousness of matter is then no longer either subjective, as it is for English 
idealism, or relative, as it is for the Kantian idealism. It is not subjective, as it is in things 
rather than in me. It is not relative, because the relation between the ‘phenomenon’ and the 
‘thing’ is not that of appearance to reality, but merely that of the part to the whole.” (Cf. ibid., 
p. 306) 
387 “All these images act and react to upon one another in all their elementary parts according 
to constant laws which I call laws of nature.” (Cf. ibid., p. 1) 
388 Ibid., p. 13 
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diffractional approach on matter and meaning.  
According to Barad, mind and world, meaning and matter, are intra-
actively entangled by diffraction. In Meeting the Universe Halfway she 
describes diffraction as follows: 
 
Diffraction is a material-discursive phenomenon that challenges the 
presumed inherent separability of subject and object, nature and culture, 
fact and value, human and non-human, organic and non-organic, 
epistemology and ontology, materiality and discursivity. […] Diffraction is not 
merely about differences, and certainly not differences in any absolute 
sense, but about the entangled nature of differences that matter. (…) 
Diffraction is a material practice for making a difference, for topologically 
reconfiguring connections. 389  
 
What is argued here has huge consequences for scientific and ontological 
thought, as well as for ethics and politics, because: “We are not merely 
differently situated in the world; ‘each of us’ is part of the intra-active ongoing 
articulation of the world in its differential mattering.” Such a view creates a 
network of responsibility towards the world, the opposite of assuming that we 
are mere spectators of the film of life, because it means that any kind of 
thought has material consequences within a large topology of elements, 
equivalent to the images in the Bergsonian system of thought. The 
happenings on Solaris such as the materialization of the visitors become a 
symptom of Barad’s diffractional entanglement of mind and matter, actually 
based on Niels Bohr’s quantum physics. Barad relates to Bohr by stressing 
his position as being non-dualist and adding perception to realism, anyway, a 
position close to the Bergsonian theory: 
 
(W)hile Bohr's understanding of quantum physics leads him to reject the 
possibility that scientists can gain access to the "things-in-themselves", that is, 
the objects of investigation as they exist outside human conceptual 
frameworks, he does not subscribe to a Kantian noumena-phenomena 
                                                
389 Karen Barad, op. cit., p. 381 
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distinction. And while Bohr's practice of physics shows that he holds a realist 
attitude toward his subject matter, he is not a realist in any conventional 
sense, since he believes that the interaction between the objects of 
investigation and what he calls "the agencies of observation" is not 
determinable and therefore cannot be "subtracted out" to leave a 
representation of the world as it exists independently of human beings. 390  
 
However, the following reflection is not meant as a comment on Barad’s very 
complex theory but as the attempt to transpose some aspects of Barad’s 
quantum-ontology to the solaristic system. Such an endeavor constitutes a 
way to reassess cinema as an apparatus-based art and as a form of intra-
active entanglement with reality; a concept going beyond that of the 
cinematographic apparatus of mechanical reproduction, which Walter 
Benjamin refers to391, and which we will inquire into in this context.  
In “Solaris” reality is actually reproduced while a mysterious process is 
taking place, in which the reproduced reality starts to interact in form of the 
visitors who materialize by intra-action, so I will argue. That which processes 
this reproduction of reality is the planet Solaris, from now on to be considered 
as a conceptual persona (the same function we have attributed before to 
Harey): the planet acts with its own purpose, even if in puzzling ways. Solaris 
embodies the being of a giant brain, a processor of past human reality 
apparently reacting to x-rays. However, I propose the planet to be a cosmic 
apparatus, an unknown form of organic machine. I further suggest to think 
about the planet (and of cinema) as an ‘intra-active apparatus’, entangled with 
the scientists (filmmaker/spectators) via the agency of the visitors (film 
characters). Solaris (re)produces fragments of reality in the form of objects and 
beings by sensing into the mind of the humans while they sleep. This dynamic 
situation strangely resembles Barad’s agential realism, which also operates 
with the term apparatus, although coming from a different context: 
                                                
390 Karen Barad, op. cit., pp. 30-31 
391 Benjamin proposes that through the intensive permeation of reality by the cinematographic 
apparatus, we would have an access to “immediate reality”. See: Walter Benjamin, The Work of 
Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, Third Version, p. 233 
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Apparatuses are specific material reconfigurations of the world that do not 
merely emerge in time but interactively reconfigure space-time matters as 
part of the ongoing dynamism of becoming.392 
 
Solaris is literally “reconfiguring space-time matters as part of the ongoing 
dynamism of becoming.” Yet to elaborate a solaristic relation between Barad’s 
apparatus and the one of film and cinema, it is firstly necessary to distinguish 
both concepts. I will therefore start with the concept of technological 
apparatus in film-theory, stemming from Walter Benjamin. In what follows then 
I will extend the term of the “cinematographic apparatus”, which Benjamin has 
coined to refer to specific technological equipment, to encompass any 
instrument that interpenetrates reality, and briefly analyze Benjamin’s relation 
to technology. 
 
 
 
 
2. From Benjamin’s Apparatus to the Solaristic Brain 
 
In earlier chapters, I have explained Benjamin’s claim that we are facing in 
cinema and film the images of a techno-apparatus, which does not integrate 
but penetrate into that which is natural human perception. This apparatus is 
selecting, recording and shaping a tissue of reproduced and assembled 
reality, producing thereby immediate reality, more real for the viewer than the 
reality it depicts. However, the term is used by Benjamin in a positive sense of 
seeing technology as a utopian device (I will follow up this idea later) to 
access something we would not have accessed without. I recall: 
 
In the studio the mechanical equipment [Apparatur in German, a word kept in 
other English versions as ‘apparatus’] has penetrated so deeply into reality 
                                                
392 Karen Barad, op. cit., p.142 and p. 146 
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that its pure aspect freed from the foreign substance of the equipment [again 
Benjamin refers here to the ‘apparatur’] is the result of a special procedure, 
namely, the shooting by the specially adjusted camera and the mounting of 
the shot together with other similar ones. The equipment-free aspect of reality 
here has become the height of artifice; the sight of immediate reality has 
become an orchid in the land of technology. 393 
 
However, Benjamin’s concept has evolved into a different reading: 
during the 1960ies, the so-called apparatus theory394, which inquired critically 
into the technology of cinematographic reproduction, describing the 
construction of the “impression of reality” as an ideological illusion. Jean-Louis 
Baudry introduces this idea based on a special reading of Plato’s “Allegory of 
the Cave”, which he proposes to reassess “from the special perspective of the 
cinematographic apparatus”395: “Plato’s prisoner is the victim of an illusion of 
reality, (…) he is the prey of an impression, of an impression of reality.”396 
Thereby Plato “is careful to emphasize the artificial aspect of reproduced 
reality. It is the apparatus that creates the illusion, and not the degree of 
fidelity with the Real: here the prisoners have been chained since childhood, 
and it will therefore not be the reproduction of this or that specific aspect of 
that reality, which they do not know, which will lead them to attribute a greater 
degree of reality to the illusion to which they are subject.” 397  
According to apparatus theory the illusory effect of cinema is based on 
the invisibility of the cine-apparatus and functions due to a subject-centered 
effect, which satisfies an archaic need or desire398 and is “more-than-real”399: 
                                                
393 Walter Benjamin, op. cit., p. 233 
394  Apparatus theory was introduced by Jean-Louis Comolli and Jean-Louis Baudry; it 
emerged in France and Germany in the 1960ies and 70ies. 
395 Jean-Louis Baudry, “The Apparatus: Metapsychological Approaches to the Impression of 
Reality in Cinema”, Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology, p. 303 
396 Ibid., p. 303 
397 Ibid., p. 305 
398 “It is indeed desire as such, i.e., desire of desire, the nostalgia for a state in which desire 
has been satisfied through the transfer of a perception to a formation resembling 
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“the cinematographic apparatus is unique in that it offers the subject 
perceptions ‘of reality’ whose status seems similar to that of presentations 
experienced as perception.”400 
The idea of such an apparatus intervention and ‘reality-effect’ seems 
constitutive for the solaristic system at first sight, as the planet Solaris seems 
such an apparatus creating a “Solaris-effect”. Yet the comparison fails if we 
think about the illusion of reality that Solaris would provide: the cave dweller in 
Plato’s cave is chained and has no reference to outer reality, which is known 
to the spectator of cinema. In a more contemporary reading, the cinema 
spectator is actually the one who seeks the light out of the cave, as Colin 
McGinn suggests:  
(I)t is our experience of the empirical world outside the movie theater that is 
analogous to Plato’s cave dwellers (as he himself supposed), and our 
experience within the movie theater is analogous to the escapee’s experience 
outside the cave. That is, we gain a special insight into reality by watching 
movies that we don’t obtain by means of our ordinary empirical experience. 
To put it in Platonic terms, we can gain access to Truth, Goodness and 
Beauty by watching films—they give us a conduit to those “higher” realities.401 
 
This reading of the allegory in the context of film philosophy is actually 
much closer to Benjamin’s reasoning: the apparatus gives us access to “truth” 
or to that which we have called the real of reality, the ground for the “solaristic 
claim”. The claim says that the real of reality manifests itself in film and 
becomes graspable for human knowledge through film. We have argued for 
this by taking Benjamin’s “immediate reality” 402 as a synonym of the real of 
reality. In this sense film is, in the solaristic philosophy, regarded as the 
representative of how apparatus-produced images of reality and reality itself 
                                                                                                                                      
hallucination, which seems to be activated by the cinematographic apparatus.” (Cf. ibid., p. 
314) Jean-Louis Baudry appropriates this concept of desire from Freud. 
399 Ibid., p. 314 
400 Ibid., p. 314 
401 Colin McGinn, op.cit., pp. 156-157 
402 Walter Benjamin, op. cit., p. 233 
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are correlated, inquiring into the real of film as a placeholder for ontological 
truth. This conception of truth withdraws from the area of the symbolic.  
In contrast to the advocates of apparatus theory, for Benjamin, this 
special characteristic of the cine-apparatus does not constitute an illusion. 
The reality of the cine-apparatus is just of a different kind than natural 
perception and eventually brings “things ‘closer’”403. It presents reality on the 
basis “of the thoroughgoing permeation of reality with mechanical 
equipment”404. This penetration of reality by technology is, just as the one of a 
surgeon at work, a penetration “deeply into its web”405. This enables the idea 
of a real image from the inside of reality, which only film can provide and 
which Walter Benjamin calls “immediate reality” or “an orchid in the land of 
technology”406. Cinema is more-than-real, as Baudry claims, but for reasons 
opposite to those he gives. Cinema is more than real because we are 
confronted in it with something, which lies in the deep ground of the paradox 
of reproduction. What from reality is exactly reproduced? It is this more-than-
real or immediate reality, which I have called “the real of reality” and tried to 
explain throughout.  
Integrated into a different tradition, Barad refers to a concept of 
apparatus independent from film, as an agent of intra-active entanglements, 
relying on Foucault’s concept of “dispositif”, which is frequently translated as 
apparatus and defined as “a system of relations that can be established 
between (…) [its] elements” 407 . I will show in what follows that even 
Benjamin’s apparatus, which clearly refers to a machine, can be interpreted 
as the carrier of such a system of relations: the planet Solaris is both, device 
and dispositif in one. The solaristic system may even be regarded as the 
                                                
403 Ibid.,  p. 223 
404 Ibid., p. 234 
405 Ibid., p. 233 
406 Ibid, p. 233. Note: In German Benjamin refers to the blue flower (instead of an orchid), 
which is a symbol of the era of German romanticism, symbolizing the metaphysical aspiration 
of eternity. 
407 Michel Foucault, “The Confession of the Flesh” (1977) interview, in: Power/Knowledge 
Selected Interviews and Other Writings, p. 194 
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attempt to clarify the intra-active entanglements of the cine-apparatus, which 
on Solaris has a nature similar to Epstein’s question: “Will images created 
from this other optical system, this kind of robot-brain that is the 
cinematographic apparatus, have as great an influence upon the evolution of 
culture and civilization?”408 
Benjamin’s filmic apparatus is actually the conceptual result of an 
approach, which designates a special relation between technology and man. 
The apparatus has the characteristic that it can be operated by human 
intervention, but there is no such necessary condition. In order to better 
understand this apparatus I propose to briefly inquire into how Benjamin 
relates Man and Technik – translated as technics - in general.409 Technik is 
for Benjamin divided between a first and second one410. The first one only 
exists “in fusion with the ritual” 411 – it is still related to magic rituals and the 
human body, thus apparently “underdeveloped” when compared to the one of 
machines, the second Technik412, which is best translated with “technology”. 
The difference between the two sets Benjamin in the following: “the first 
Technik completely relies on the human, whereas the second one as less as 
possible.”413 Here Benjamin describes the switch from human to post-human. 
Yet he emphasizes that the objective of technology (the second Technik) is 
not the domination of nature. This is indeed the “perspective of the first 
Technik” 414, whereas the second Technik (technology) involves art and is not 
                                                
408 Jean Epstein, op. cit., p. xi 
409 I refer hereby to Hyun Kang Kim who inspired me with her essay “The Blue Flower in the 
Land of Technology”, in: Thinking Reality and Time Through Film, pp. 128–137. Her essay 
has emphasized the need to understand Walter Benjamin’s theory of film in the larger context 
of his work; his concept of technology linked to a utopia of an interplay between nature, Man 
and technology thus came to my attention. 
410 This division is present in the second edition of the Artwork essay, see: Walter Benjamin, 
Gesammelte Schriften VII, pp. 350 – 384 
411 Ibid., p. 359 (translation mine – C.R.) 
412 Ibid., p. 359 (translation mine – C.R.) 
413 Ibid., p. 359 (translation mine – C.R.) 
414 Ibid., p. 359 (translation mine – C.R.) 
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opposed to nature, but rather constitutes “an interplay between nature and 
man.” Furthermore, according to Benjamin:  
 
the function of art today to be socially decisive is the practice of that interplay. 
This is especially true for film. Film is there to train Man in those 
apperceptions and reactions, which are conditioned by the handling of an 
apparatus, and whose role in his life increases nearly daily.415 (translation 
mine – C.R.) 
 
Benjamin anticipates here not only the contemporary tendency of our 
yet increasing reliance on apparatus-generated realities, but also emphasizes 
a switch of perspective, in which film constitutes the practice. As a footnote in 
the Artwork essay shows, Benjamin believes that the utopia of the first 
Technik concerning the human body, love or death will be “discarded in favor 
of the ones [the utopias] concerning society and technology”416 but later be 
retaken: Benjamin somehow anticipates a reconciliation between technology, 
which is “as little human as possible”, and the human body, which is the 
operator of the first Technik. As Hyun Kang Kim evokes417 Benjamin has thus 
anticipated the concept of cyborgs much later introduced into theoretical 
reflection by Haraway418.   
Important to underline in this context is the switch of perspectives from 
the human to the post-human or even the non-human – all to which the 
human suddenly has access. It means a possibility to overcome the 
subjective condition. Kim points out: “Technology makes precisely this change 
of perspective from in-itself to for-itself possible. According to Hegel, this 
change in perspective means the truth. In this spirit, technology is for 
Benjamin the place of truth par excellence.”419 This change for human thought 
                                                
415 Ibid., p. 359 - 360 
416 Ibid., p. 665 (translation mine – C.R.) 
417 Hyun Kang Kim, op.cit., p. 131 
418  See: Donna Haraway, “A Manifesto for Cyborgs. Science, Technology and Socialist 
Feminism in the 1980s.”, in: Feminism, Postmodernism 
419 Hyun Kang Kim, op.cit., p. 130 
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will again and again be the issue of this thesis, as it is considered to be 
probably the most important consequence of the emergence of film for 
philosophy. It enables a new reliance of philosophy on film, in order to take a 
perspective beyond the human. It took philosophy nearly one hundred years 
to understand this new aspect of its intrinsic relation with film.  
This is probably also the reason why it has become so popular in the 
last two decades to use movies for philosophical reflection – as a complement 
or as a device for thinking. The attraction of film for philosophers consists in 
this very fact that we finally can see what we see through the eyes of a non-
human apparatus, which penetrates into reality in a way human perception 
cannot do; thus Benjamin describes, as we have seen throughout, the 
apparatus being a device to enable the “equipment-free aspect of reality”, 
providing through the procedure of “interpenetration of reality” the “vision of 
immediate reality”. Although it may seem like a contradiction, this invisibility of 
the technical apparatus in the resulting images is a post-human vision, a 
perspective, which is not purely human any more, achieved through the fusion 
of human perception and technological possibilities of a machine. 
What are the consequences of this overcoming of the human 
condition? Cinema can be designated as a post-human extension, a 
technological tool of such nature that it extends human consciousness, in the 
manner Marshall McLuhan addresses a century after film’s invention on 
technological media in general:  
 
Today (…) we approach the final phase of the extensions of man – the 
technological simulation of consciousness, when the creative process of 
knowing will be collectively and corporately extended to the whole of human 
society, much as we have already extended our senses and our nerves by 
the various media. 420 
 
In our context I want to stress that the invention of film has been the pioneer 
of the technological media-extension of human senses, nerves and, so I have 
to add, human thinking. Let me make this last point clear – it is crucial to close 
                                                
420 Marshall Mac Luhan, op. cit., p. 3 
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the first step of this chapter’s analysis: the cinematic extension deeply affects 
the entangled human relation between reality and mind; such that the 
recorded and reproduced sense transports the subject outside itself and 
becomes a new device for cognition. The implicit shift for human thought is 
based on a change of the subject’s stance towards reality.  
As I have mentioned, there is a link between Benjamin’s vision of 
apparatus and his utopia of reconciliation between technology and the human 
body. The concept of apparatus for Benjamin is not just the filmic apparatus, 
but a technological device to enable post-human capacities. Thereby the 
filmic apparatus performs an interpenetration with reality and records reality 
making it reproducible and thus accessible to human perception. Film is 
considered by Benjamin a practice to deal with the new and non-human 
perspective of technology provided by the apparatus. The apparatus can even 
lead us to undertake time travel and to access new forces. Benjamin 
describes, at another point of his work, a vision of a new cosmic dimension for 
humankind, achieved through technology at the service of humanity: 
 
For it [humankind] a physis is emerging in technology, in which its contact 
with the cosmos takes a form, which is new and different from that in nations 
and families. Enough to remind the experience of speed, to give energy for 
readying humankind for unforeseen travels into the interior of time, to find the 
rhythms at which those deemed incurable would recuperate like in former times 
in high mountains or southern shores.”421 (translation mine – C.R.) 
 
This cosmic dimension and travels exploring time are for Benjamin a 
further stage of technology. Cinema, as we have seen, by subscribing it to 
Bazin’s utopia of total cinema, is a certain substitution of nature. At the same 
time, this substitution is a conflation with nature, the reconcilement of 
technology and nature in a further developed stage. Yet are we not already, in 
a certain sense, time travelers when we watch movies? What makes the 
apparatus develop into a time-travel-machine?  
Most fascinating to mention in this context is Barad’s idea of intra-
                                                
421 Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften IV, p. 147 
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active time, incorporating a truly cinematographic dimension:  
 
(S)pace and time (like matter) are phenomenal, that is, they are intra-actively 
produced in the making of phenomena; either space nor time exist as 
determinate givens outside of phenomena. As a result of the iterative nature 
of intra-active practices that constitute phenomena, the "past" and the "future" 
are iteratively reconfigured and enfolded through one another: phenomena 
cannot be located in space and time; rather, phenomena are material 
entanglements that "extend" across different spaces and times. (…) Neither 
the past nor the future is ever closed. 422 
 
This implies of course that „the past is open to change. It can be 
redeemed, productively reconfigured in an iterative unfolding of spacetime 
matter’. (...)The ‘past’ was never simply there to begin with, and the ‘future’ is 
not what will unfold, but ‘past’ and ‘future’ are iteratively reconfigured and 
enfolded through the world’s ongoing intra-activity“.423  
Maybe the movie “Solaris” can give a further answer, because the 
planet Solaris is somehow intra-actively non-human: it is beyond the human, 
yet with capacities humans would acquire through technology. Benjamin’s idea 
of contact with the cosmos is further reminiscent of “Solaris”, in a completely 
unexpected way. Time is restituted in a new way on the planet: somehow the 
past has changed by Harey’s second existence on Solaris. Being her different 
or not from the first one, it is the meaning of this existence, which changes the 
first existence. 
I will suggest that Benjamin’s utopia to reconcile technology and the 
human body / nature sets Solaris as an apparatus of a new kind: a non-human 
yet organic apparatus, which dominates the relation between Man and 
nature/reality in a way that puzzles the human, because control is lost: nature is 
                                                
422  Karen Barad, op. cit., p. 383 
423  Rick Dolphijn, Iris van der Tuin, “’Matter feels, converses, suffers, desires, yearns and 
remembers’ - Interview with Karen Barad”, in: New Materialisms: Interviews and 
Cartographies, p. 67 
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presented through the planet in a completely new way, just as Benjamin’s 
apparatus does.  
In this context let me recall the opening scenes of the film “Solaris” on 
Earth: the camera penetrates into nature thereby achieving, based on time, a 
beautiful portrait. Hereby the camera conflates organically with what is filmed. 
A bit later the conflict between Kris Kelvin and his father specifically 
represents the conflict between nature and man: “the cosmos is too fragile” 
says the father, being concerned about the technological devices that Kelvin 
would use to destroy the planet. Yet the Solaris brain, a form of cosmic 
nature, somehow reconciles Kelvin through love with nature: Kelvin has to just 
accept how things go and science is powerless. He loves Harey and knees 
before his father, asking for forgiveness. He does so on Solaris, on Earth he 
would not have acted this way. 
In this context I propose to consider the contemporary digital worlds as 
apparatus-produced and therefore as a logical consequence of film, part of 
the tending towards an actualization of Bazin’s total cinema. Bazin’s myth 
designates the desire of a total re-creation of the world, an idea, which 
according to Bazin only partly has been fulfilled by film: “cinema has not yet 
been invented” 424  he argues, and the contemporary evolution of digital 
computation has shown him right.  
Following this line of thought, if we comprehend film’s reproduction as 
an extended sphere of human perception of reality – a technological doubling 
of reality, constituting an own virtual reality – then film has been the first 
medium providing us with post-human capacities. Photography and, as a 
second stage, film are the first apparatus-based media making us think on 
their techno-ontological consequences. Film permits us to look at human 
perception from the outside, a perspective of thought until then considered 
impossible. “Technology makes precisely this change of perspective from in-
itself to for-itself possible.”425  The consequences are intra-active.   
The described tendency is of special contemporary pertinence as film 
                                                
424 André Bazin, What is Cinema?, p. 21 
425 Hyun Kang Kim, op. cit., p. 130 
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and real-image-based media in general are constitutive of our techno-
globalized world in which reality appears as contingent, multiple and virtual, 
extended and exchangeable by apparatus-like machines: we can switch from 
one reality to the next one. The consequent permanent switch of contexts 
absorbing our mental and sensory attention has deepened as a contemporary 
phenomenon: the omnipresence of a mobile cyberspace has changed 
everyday life; the continuous reliance on virtual media in entertainment, 
culture, social life and information has become a mobile reality of global 
dimension, grown out of our sci-fi-imagination in the shadow of control 
society.  
However, our conscious thinking about the referred change is slowed, 
our contemporary media technological condition of being is a process we like 
to ignore. The underlying need for discursive intelligibility underpins solaristic 
philosophy as a necessary tendency. Our reliance on technology-generated 
virtual media worlds is constantly growing: they further have a physical 
connection to our fingertips as a prolongation of our thoughts, received by an 
apparatus-based device. In “Solaris” the apparatus reads the mind directly 
and confronts man with his subconscious desires, the most human part of 
human beings. One may protest that the apparatus in “Solaris” is a brain, an 
organic planet and thus part of cosmic nature; it obviously refuses the 
knowledge of science, doesn’t act in logical rules and offers self-reflection of 
the human condition via the power of conscience and love.  
I argue in response that nothing speaks against the hypothesis of 
Solaris being a super-intelligent, organic machine, in the post-human cyborg 
sense mentioned before. 426 Solaris is not human yet creates post-human and 
                                                
426 The technological advances of during the last fifteen years have proved that such a 
machine might be possible in not such a distant future: “New paradigms will use advances in 
quantum computation and molecular and nano-electronics to devise radically faster 
computers to solve problems previously described as "uncomputable," such as full-scale 
simulations of our biosphere or surgical simulations. Viewing cells as computational devices 
will help enable the design of next generation computers that feature self organization, self 
repair, and adaptive characteristics that we see in biological systems.” (Cf. Karen Barad, 
Meeting the Universe Halfway, p. 384; referred to as “NSF (National Science Foundation) 
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trans-human circumstances, tending towards Bazin’s total cinema. Solaris 
may be claimed to be the achievement of the myth of total cinema, as 
mysterious and entangled as cinema itself. If its vision is to be an entire re-
creation of the world – how can something as complex as the organic world 
not be part of it?  
A solaristic precursor might be the idea of the internet of the mind, the 
“total brain” which would link humans, nature and machines in one stream of 
consciousness, which would share feelings as well as information and 
thoughts, a human utopia since the 18th Century (mesmerism, telepathic 
communication, etc.). The essay-film “Worldbrain” by Stéphane Degoutin and 
Gwenola Wagon approaches this total utopia, which lies not only at the origin 
of cinema, but also the one of the internet: 
 
Mankind is building an infrastructure in which we store the content of our brains. 
We call this infrastructure the internet. The internet is not an abstraction. It exists 
in a physical space, made up of data centers spread around the world and 
linked together by fiber-optic cables. Data centers can be seen as the result of 
an attempt to externalize our brains. They can be seen as a network of 
warehouses, storing the content of our brains. This physical space can be seen 
as a gigantic machine, that contains fragments of our thoughts, of our emotions, 
of our lives…As for now, this machine is very basic. (...) but the machine's 
engine is still under construction. Its immense size makes one realize the 
hugeness of what could soon be put into action.427 
 
                                                                                                                                      
TESTIMONYTO CONGRESS, March I, 2000”) 
427 Stéphane Degoutin, Gwenola Wagon, op. cit. (available online)  
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Solaris is such a universal brain. Its origins are unknown but its reactions to 
the human condition are beyond the human grasp of intelligibility – it reacts to 
x-rays and energy waves in the most unexpected ways. Solaris is somehow 
an organic, living machine, a quickly mutating cyborg and replica world 
producer. There even might be the possibility that Nick Bostrom’s claim for a 
computer-simulated world preconceived by the character’s ancestors, finds its 
application on Solaris (I will follow up on this later, in the next chapter). 
Indeed, main character Kris Kelvin could very well be a post-human visitor 
without being conscious of his own condition. It would be then a world where 
the human being is dispensable - a total cinema in which not only the world 
but also its habitants are a re-creation, so perfect that it is as organic as film 
images are, yet stimulating our tactile as well as our visual and audible 
senses. 
 
 
 
3. Worldmaking Measurements 
 
I have argued so far to understand Barad’s quantum-ontology as a way to 
reassess cinema as an apparatus-based art and form of intra-active 
entanglement with reality, going beyond the concept of apparatus and 
                                                
428  Hannah Devlin, “Scientists bring telepathy closer with brain-to-brain interface”, in: The 
Times,  February 18, 2013 (available online)  
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mechanical reproduction that Benjamin refers to. With what follows I attempt 
to deepen Barad’s theory by expanding on how the filmic apparatus and the 
Solaris apparatus will conceptually extend each other. I will thereby deepen 
the intra-active apparatus nature of the planet Solaris: it refuses to be 
measured by the human methods of science, but the planet is, inversely, an 
agent that measures the humans in its own way. Two aspects are important to 
conceive the apparatus of intra-active agentialism: 
Firstly Barad develops her concept of intra-active, dynamic apparatus 
by interrogating and expanding the concept of Foucault’s “dispositif”, 
designating an organized “system of relations” between the elements of a 
“heterogeneous ensemble” (all kind of possible thoughts and forms)429. To this 
concept of apparatus Barad critically proposes the necessity to deliver an 
explanation on the nature of the established relations between matter and 
thought. Furthermore, she criticizes Foucault’s notion of biopower as 
antiquated:   
 
(…)Foucault does not articulate, including the precise nature of the 
relationship between discursive practices and material phenomena; a 
dynamic and agential conception of materiality that takes account of the 
materialization of all bodies (nonhuman as well as human and that makes 
possible a genealogy of the practices through which these distinctions are 
made); and the ways in which contemporary technoscientific practices 
provide for much more intimate, pervasive, and profound reconfigurings of 
bodies, power, knowledge, and their linkage than anticipated by Foucault's 
notion of biopower (which might have been adequate to eighteenth-century 
practices, but not contemporary ones)."430 
 
                                                
429 “What I’m trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble 
consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, 
administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic 
propositions–in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the 
apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between 
these elements.” (Cf. Michel Foucault, op.cit., p. 194). 
430 Karen Barad, op. cit., p. 200 
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Barad searches for a more encompassing, diffractional and agential 
kind of concept than the one in Foucault – a concept which would not enter in 
contradiction or stand behind the level of contemporary techno-science 
research. That is why she tries to adapt the ontological method of thought 
from quantum physics, transferring it into philosophy. Barad thus proposes a 
new form of quantum-ontogical “intra-active” and diffractional thinking, to be 
distinguished from reflection.431 It calls for a new kind of causality based on 
Bohr’s ideas of quantum physics, wherein measurement plays a central role, 
yet in a new non-dualist sense:  
 
Bohr's epistemological framework (…) offers a new understanding of 
fundamental philosophical issues such as the relationship between knower 
and known, the role of measurement, questions of meaning making and 
concept use, (…) the nature of causality, and the nature of reality. (…) He is 
explicit in stating that in his opinion quantum physics shows that the world 
surely does not abide by the ontology of Newtonian physics.432 
 
What does this contradiction with “Newtonian physics” mean and how 
does its rejection renew ontology? Let me add one further remark to better 
understand the context of such thinking within our scope of analysis, which so 
far engages in a cross-thinking between the entangled condition of film and 
philosophical methods of “reflection”, although tending towards its limits: the 
understanding of the real of reality in terms of a sphere for truth withdraws 
from intelligible grasp. Yet should that which I can assume as true in terms of 
scientific knowledge not be the same as that which is measurable?  
The origin of the common claim to equate truth (reality) and science 
goes back to the physician Max Planck who famously asserted: “That which 
                                                
431 “In contrast to reflecting apparatuses, like mirrors, which produce images-more or less 
faithful-of objects placed a distance from the mirror, diffraction gratings are instruments that 
produce patterns that mark differences in the relative characters (i.e., amplitude and phase) 
of individual waves as they combine.” (Cf. ibid., p. 81) 
432 Ibid., pp. 30-31 
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can be measured exists – Was man messen kann, das existiert auch.“433 This 
sentence frequently is understood by switching “exists” with “is real”, as 
Heidegger famously does 1953 in a lecture in Munich indirectly quoting Max 
Planck with the reference: “Real is what can be measured – Wirklich ist was 
sich messen läßt.”434  
Heidegger does so in a critical sense: he is against the claim of natural 
science that existence or reality are considered to be graspable by 
measurement. But is that kind of measurement of existence the same kind of 
being of reality which I grasp by filming – that kind of truth, on which I rely by 
reasoning? Is the film camera an apparatus of measurement transforming 
Max Planck’s sentence into: That which can be filmed exists or is real? 
“Solaris” clearly challenges the usual demand of graspability for objective 
knowledge put by natural science: in the narrative the planet Solaris is 
diffractional. It is a brain, which is intra-actively entangled with the human 
subconscious. The scientists have no possibility to know or understand the 
planet or read the mysterious manifestations of its intra-activity. However 
Barad’s theory seems to enable the understanding of this characteristic of the 
planet by calling attention that meaning and matter intra-act: thoughts, 
emotions and feeling, according to Barad have physical consequences435. 
Somehow, the surface of the planet is symptomatic for this intra-action, 
moving and changing colours, while the emotional density on the planet 
increases. 
                                                
433 Max Planck, Wege zur physikalischen Erkenntnis: Reden und Vorträge, p.44 
434 Martin Heidegger, „Wissenschaft und Besinnung“, in: Vorträge und Aufsätze 1929 – 1953, 
p.54  
435 Rick Dolphijn, Iris van der Tuin, “’Matter feels, converses, suffers, desires, yearns and 
remembers’ - Interview with Karen Barad”, in: New Materialism: Interviews & Cartographies 
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Barad’s non-representational approach, by enhancing the entangled 
relation of matter and meaning, words and objects, confirms the endeavor of 
the solaristic system: the cinematograph as well as the Solaris apparatus 
could be seen as a “tool for measurement” of the real, understood in the 
following way: 
 
Measurements are agential practices, which are not simply revelatory but 
performative: they help constitute and are a constitutive part of what is being 
measured. In other words, measurements are intra-actions (not 
interactions): the agencies of observation are inseparable from that which is 
observed. Measurements are world-making: matter and meaning do not pre-
exist, but rather are co-constituted via measurement intra-actions.436 
 
In this sense the filmic apparatus as well as the Solaris apparatus are 
world-making and go beyond reflection: films are not mirrors but the 
continuation of life (to recall Syberberg). On the one hand we apparently 
have the image of reality, but on the other hand this image dominates reality, 
and tends to substitute it, becoming real in itself. Thus film/the planet Solaris 
enables us to double our being-in-the-world, to overcome the subjective 
condition by reproducing it:  we reach the condition of being-in-film or being-
on-Solaris. Mind and world are one, and the cinematographic apparatus 
helps this new kind of causality, which Barad claims as based on Bohr’s 
quantum physics: 
 
For example, while Bohr's understanding of quantum physics leads him to 
                                                
436 Karen Barad, “What is the Measure of Nothingness? Infinity, Virtuality, Justice”, in: 100 Notes – 
100 Thoughts, dOCUMENTA (13), p. 6 
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reject the possibility that scientists can gain access to the "things-in-
themselves, " that is, the objects of investigation as they exist outside human 
conceptual frameworks, he does not subscribe to a Kantian noumena-
phenomena distinction. And while Bohr's practice of physics shows that he 
holds a realist attitude toward his subject matter, he is not a realist in any 
conventional sense, since he believes that the interaction between the objects 
of investigation and what he calls "the agencies of observation" is not 
determinable and therefore cannot be "subtracted out" to leave a 
representation of the world as it exists independently of human beings.437  
 
Barad’s non-representational approach, by enhancing the entangled 
relation of matter and meaning, words and objects, influences our entire 
endeavor of analysis: language itself must ultimately be seen as a kind of 
“tool for measurement”, and like any of its kind, it conditions its results and 
sets the production of what it talks about.  
In this context it is worth to mention Paul Watzlawick, the author of 
How real is reality?, in which he speaks of the discoverer of the uncertainty 
relation, the quantum physicist Werner Heisenberg, contemporary of Niels 
Bohr, who establishes a link between language and its sphere of reference 
as an example of how we explore a reality conditioned by our way of 
exploration: 
 
The reality of which we can speak is never reality in itself but a ‘known’ 
reality, in many cases even a reality we have designed. If it is objected 
against this latter formulation that, after all, there is an objective world 
completely independent of our thoughts, which takes place or can take place 
without our intervention, and which we really mean to approach in [scientific] 
investigation, so to this first so obvious objection must be hold against that, 
nevertheless, the very word "there" is derived from the human language and 
therefore cannot mean something that is not related to our ability of cognition. 
For us, there is only is the world in which the word there is has a sense. 438 
(translation mine – C.R.) 
                                                
437 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, pp. 30-31 
438 Werner Heisenberg, Ordnung der Wirklichkeit, p. 59 
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Therefore Watzlawick grasps reality as a potential, something we do 
not find but create, merely in the sense of an intra-active entanglement 
(“measurements are worldmaking” 439 ) and comparable to Heidegger’s 
possibilities of Dasein, which are always yet to come. However, this condition 
is a correlationist one, because it does claim that we cannot distinguish 
between our perception of the world and the world itself; although it offers a 
way out: that we are a creative part of the world by our perception and 
cognition, which is part of the world. It further refuses the static dualism of 
representationalism: It would mean that the apple becomes an apple with the 
meaning of apple because of us. There might be other meanings of the apple 
we will not explore.  
Another example might be that we hear sound because we can, we are 
biologically constituted to hear, and we see images for the same reason. Both 
are properties of the being of reality and are reproducible in their very being, 
as measured by certain apparatuses. This would also imply that we are co-
creators of the real of reality – understood as a flowing solaristic substance, 
visible on the surface of the Solaris ocean. 
Barad further adds, that the exact same real even presents different 
physical being (in terms of its properties) when measured, as it is the case of 
light: 
 
If the measurement intra-action plays a constitutive role in what is measured, 
then it matters how something is explored. In fact, this is born out empirically 
in experiments with matter (and energy): when electrons (or light) are 
measured using one kind of apparatus, they are waves; if they are measured 
in a complementary way, they are particles. Notice that what we are talking 
about here is not simply some object reacting differently to different probings 
but being differently. What is at issue is the very nature of nature. A quantum 
ontology deconstructs the classical one: there are no pre-existing individual 
objects with determinate boundaries and properties that precede some 
interaction, nor are there any meanings that could be used to describe their 
                                                
439 Karen Barad, op. cit., p.6 
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behaviors; rather, determinate boundaries and properties of objects-within-
phenomena, and determinate contingent meanings, are enacted through 
specific intra-actions, where phenomena are the ontological inseparability of 
intra-acting agencies.440 
 
That the very nature of reality is at stake means that there is a quality of 
being to be measurable and in consequence, reproducible as that by which it 
is measured. Film is the example here. Reality becomes image and sound 
because we measure it as such. This does not make image and sound a 
property of our mind, but indicates an intra-active relation of matter and 
meaning: reality becomes reproducible in image and sound, because we are 
there to see reality in image- and sound-worlds and because of the 
cinematographic apparatus. But that does not mean that the transfer of the 
real of reality from the thing to its reproduction would not take place, for all 
the reasons we have elaborated in the previous chapters. 
 
 
  
                                                
440 Karen Barad, op.cit., p. 6-7 
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XIV. 
THE REAL, THE VIRTUAL  
AND THE SUBJECTIVE SIDE OF KNOWLEDGE 
 
 
 
 
1. The Virtuality of Reality 
 
Plato’s allegory of the cave is frequently associated with film as a principle of 
illusion of reality and we have opposed to such reading so far. Yet what further 
observations in extension of our analysis are still to be drawn from this tale? 
That which actually is described with Plato’s allegory indeed corresponds more 
to a metaphor of our relation to reality, than being a characterization of the 
principles of film: the narrative opposes light and shadow: we have on the one 
hand the world of shadows, a delusionary reality, which is actually taken to be 
real by the cave dwellers, and, on the other hand, there is the light of the real or 
of truth, shining so clear and so bright, that the escaping philosopher has to let 
his eyes adapt in order to see. The one who seeks the truth has to learn how to 
see. However the doubting question remains open - does that which the 
philosopher sees now, after adapting, correspond to the truth? 
But what if the other people, those who stayed in the cave, would argue 
the following: that due to their habituation, they are able to comprehend the 
shadows as a key to the real, because the shadows, at least, are a property of 
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reality. But in order to argue so they would need the notion of their limitation of 
perception, and this notion fits the one of the film spectators. (Therefore, the 
only possibility for employing the allegory as a metaphor for film as an 
ontological principle is if we were to rewrite its ending.) 
Plato’s Cave insinuates that we are deluded by our perception, starting a 
certain philosophical tradition, which corresponds to a persisting doubt haunting 
us when facing sensible reality. This doubt is part of the human condition of 
perception, our way to access the external world. In everyday life we 
continuously have the impression of the world as a whole, a consistent reality 
composed by certain characteristics and laws, which we seem to know – yet 
can we be sure of this perception? Could we not, in truth, be sitting in Plato’s 
Cave? Let us examine this doubt closer, relying thereby on René Descartes in 
the Meditations on First Philosophy and look at the way how he argues to 
resolve it. One argument of Descartes’ skepticism questions whether we can 
distinguish the actual reality from dreaming.  
In what follows I will argue that the old Cartesian doubt can be read as a 
doubt describing a general ‘virtuality of reality’. I argue so by designating the 
Cartesian dreamworld as a virtual reality, a term frequently used in 
contemporary theory to characterize the computer generated realities, yet 
which could also be referring to film. Descartes’ dreamworld is, in fact, a strong 
virtual reality in the sense of depicting an illusionary, mind-generated presence, 
which cannot be distinguished by perception from actual, physical reality. 
Therefore, it casts doubt on the true character of reality. Reality could be virtual. 
Descartes argues: 
 
At the present moment, however, I certainly look upon this paper with eyes 
wide awake; the head which I now move is not asleep; I extend this hand 
consciously and with express purpose, and I perceive it; the occurrences in 
sleep are not so distinct as all this. But I cannot forget that, at other times I 
have been deceived in sleep by similar illusions; (…) I perceive so clearly that 
there exist no certain marks by which the state of waking can ever be 
distinguished from sleep (…).441 
                                                
441 Renée Descartes, “Of the things of which I may doubt”, in: Meditations 1, p. 113 
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Descartes then assumes that thought can master perception: 
 
And finally, considering that all the same thoughts that we have when we are 
awake can also come to us when we are asleep, without any one of them 
then being true, I resolved to pretend that nothing which had ever entered my 
mind was any more true than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately 
afterwards I became aware that, while I decided thus to think that everything 
was false, it followed necessarily that I who thought thus must be something; 
and observing that this truth: I think therefore I am, was so certain and so 
evident.442 
 
Descartes assumes here that, although I cannot be sure whether I am 
awake or dreaming, my thoughts are true and give me a clue as to the truth of 
my existence. Thinking means reliable existence to Descartes: thinking 
guarantees being real in the sense of existing and from there on Descartes 
can distinguish virtual reality (dreaming) and real reality (being awake). We 
should know by thinking, so he would argue, that the virtual state (dream in 
his case) is a state of delusion. That which is virtual thus belongs to an 
illusory, unreal domain for Descartes, in clear opposition to the “real domain” 
he is in when he is awake. In that sense Descartes stands for what Barad and 
Haraway would call thinking based on reflection. Descartes sets up the dualist 
thought of modernity, setting all these oppositional dichotomies like interior and 
exterior, body and mind, the illusional (and fictional) as opposed to true reality 
and knowledge.  
Consequently, Descartes is doubting the reliability of sensory 
perception and questions our sensory relationship with that which is real in 
order to inquire into our capability of knowledge. The only way out for 
Descartes is to trust thought and logic. In that sense, the Cartesian “cogito 
ergo sum” shows a way to overcome the virtuality of reality by which the 
difference between the virtual and the real becomes nested in the following 
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sense: we cannot distinguish anymore whether reality is ‘real’ or virtual 
(dream).  
With the term virtuality of reality I allude to a dominant postmodern idea, 
questioning whether we can at all distinguish between reality and fiction 
influenced by the omnipresence of mediated reality. Mediated reality presents 
fiction and non-fiction with the same kind of language; film is one of the most 
striking examples, together with the cyberspace. Reality and fiction are here 
entangled in a labyrinth where the truth of reality has a withdrawing nature, 
seeming more and more indistinguishable from fictional content to us. The 
term virtuality of reality is then based on a notion of the fictional as virtual, as 
known in the context of the so-called virtual worlds, designating the computer 
generated, fictional realities. In these contemporary, computer simulated 
realities we make use of the mental mechanism described by Descartes: our 
mind is making the virtual worlds actual for us.  
The virtual hereby designates that which does not belong to reality, is 
thus fictional, although displaying qualities of what we perceive as sensible 
reality, relying on an artificial stimulation of our sensory perception. The 
virtuality of reality is a skeptical hypothesis since it is asking whether this kind of 
sensory perception is not part of the nature of reality, i.e. by assuming that 
reality feels the same way as virtuality. Is reality not itself a virtuality? If we stop 
demonizing virtuality as something bad, an illusion or deception, which 
ultimately could be controlled by an evil demon, as Descartes notoriously 
argues, the dichotomy between the virtual and the real does not make sense. 
This also applies to the dichotomies between unreal and real, interior and 
exterior etc. 
However, could we not assume about film that which Descartes claims 
of dreams, that they are so real we cannot distinguish them from sensible 
reality? It would mean: I cannot be sure whether I am in a film or in real life, but 
I can know that my thoughts are true in both states, and so on. I will argue that, 
regarding film, such an assumption does not apply. In spite of certain currents of 
film theory arguing in that direction, my claim is that film is different from dreams. 
Film is not an internal stream of consciousness deceiving our senses. Film is 
displaced reality, a continuation of reality with audiovisual means and processed 
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by the mind as such. Being-in-film does not mean being-in-dream, as well as 
being-on-Solaris, does not mean being-in-dream. Rather, regarding the model of 
multiple reality we have designed so far, film is intra-actively entangled with the 
whole of reality it belongs to.  
I will then try to apply an argumentation of diffraction on film, instead 
of Cartesian reflection, fitting our scope of analysis so far. Watching a movie 
does not make me question the reliability of my perception of reality, it is 
rather that the nature of reality is at stake: reality discloses a multiple 
character through film and we are facing not illusion but truth, a part of the 
real of reality or just a void. Dasein’s being-in-film is shaping reality as just 
one more possibility out of an infinity of films, and this thereby changes our 
view on what we thought reality was like. For Descartes’ chain of 
argumentation (if we could rewrite it in our sense) this could mean the 
following: Life could be other, because the similitude of the experience of life 
and dream creates a multiple potential of possibilities of reality – exactly 
because of the virtuality of reality. Reality and dream would not be 
oppositions any more, instead reality could become a possibility of dream, or 
of virtuality. Put in other words and as a preliminary conclusion: through the 
experience of dreams or of the virtual, reality becomes a possibility of the 
virtual, which is not opposed to reality, but which is the real, because it implies 
all the possibilities of reality. Such a thinking leads us to the inversion of the 
term virtuality of reality and through this into the Bergsonian-Deleuzian 
universe of the “reality of the virtual”443. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
443 Compare to Keith Ansell Pearson, “The Reality of the Virtual: Bergson and Deleuze”, in: 
MLN, Vol. 120, No. 5, Comparative Literature Issue, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore 2005 
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2. The Reality of the Virtual 
 
Deleuze does not oppose the virtual to the real; instead he opposes the virtual 
to the actual and the real to the possible. For Deleuze the virtual, rather than 
aiming its realization, is fully real and aims for actualization. “What we call 
virtual is not something that lacks reality but something that is engaged in 
a process of actualization following the plane that gives it its particular 
reality.”444 Thereby both, the virtual and its actualizations, belong to the 
plane of immanence. The term “reality of the virtual” is then picked up by 
Slavoj Žižek as he reverts the hypothesis of the “virtual reality” (of computer 
generated worlds) into the “reality of the virtual”: 
 
Today, everybody is talking about virtual reality but I think, (…) crucial to 
understand what goes on today, is the opposite: not virtual reality, but the 
reality of the virtual. That is to say: reality - by this I mean efficacy, 
effectiveness, real effects - produced, generated, by something, which does 
not yet fully exist; which is not yet fully actual.445  
 
Žižek indeed takes the idea of reality of the virtual directly from Deleuze, 
whom he calls the philosopher of “the Virtual” and assumes that:  
 
(T)he first reaction to it should be to oppose Deleuze's notion of the Virtual to 
the'all-pervasive topic of virtual reality: what matters to Deleuze is not virtual 
reality, but the reality of the virtual (which, in Lacanian terms, is the Real). (…) 
The reality of the Virtual (…) stands for the reality of the Virtual as such, for its 
real effects and consequences.446 
 
In his filmed interview with Ben Wright, Žižek describes this reality of the 
virtual as isomorphic to the Lacanian triad of the Real - imaginary real, symbolic 
real and “real” real - becoming in this specific context an imaginary virtual, 
                                                
444 Gilles Deleuze, “Immanence: A Life”, in: Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life, p. 31 
445 Ben Wright, The reality of the virtual, filmed interview with Slavoj Žižek (available online)  
446 Slavoj Žižek, Organs Without Bodies, p.3 
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symbolic virtual and a real virtual. The three are interwoven with each other, 
meaning for Žižek that the entire triad is reflected into each of its elements447. In 
Organs Without Bodies as well as in the filmed interview Žižek gives an 
example for the “real real” of the virtual real taken from mathematics. He is 
describing the virtual real as a shape, which does not exist in itself: 
 
Let us take an attractor in mathematics: all positive lines or points in its 
sphere of attraction only approach it in an endless fashion, never reaching its 
form - the existence of this form is purely virtual, being nothing more than the 
shape towards which lines and points tend. However, precisely as such, the 
virtual is the Real of this field: the immovable focal point around which all 
elements circulate. 448 
 
Might this not be what we have been searching for in order to describe that 
which is transferred in film (and photography) from the thing to its reproduction? 
It is there, yet it, although virtually real, does not exist in itself. It has not yet 
become fully actual, but it does as soon as the film is screened. The attractor 
thereby is the real, which exists in the sense that it is being approached by 
infinite possibilities of images. But is that the “real real”, the one withdrawing 
from symbolization? Žižek quickly turns to quantum physics and evokes the 
example of light, describing a hypothesis, which strikingly resembles the white 
hole of the whole of all possible images we have outlined before, if we 
substitute, in the Deleuzian sense, the ‘possible images’ with ‘virtual images’.  
 
Žižek says: 
 
Perhaps, the ontological difference between the Virtual and the Actual is best 
captured by the shift in the way quantum physics conceives of the 
relationship between particles and their interactions (…). This brings us to the 
constitutive ambiguity of the relationship between actual and virtual: (1) the 
human eye reduces the perception of light; it actualizes light in a certain way 
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448 Slavoj Žižek, Organs Without Bodies, p.3  
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(perceiving certain colors, etc.), a rose in a different way, a bat in a different 
way... The flow of light "in itself" is nothing actual, but, rather, the pure 
virtuality of infinite possibilities actualized in a multitude of ways; (2) on the 
other hand, the human eye expands perception - it inscribes what it "really 
sees" into the intricate network of memories and anticipations (like Proust 
with the taste of madeleine), it can develop new perceptions, and so forth. 
(…) It is the infinite potential field of virtualities out of which reality is 
actualized.449 
 
Moreover Žižek claims, at another point of his work, that reality is 
supplemented with fiction, an idea I will elucidate further. But before 
immersing into Žižekian philosophy and drawing its meaning for the 
solaristic system, let me take a break and step back to the Cartesian 
skepticism and its contemporary applications. In what follows I want to ask 
the question if the model of “Solaris” could not be the one of a virtual 
computer simulation, that is a virtual reality – which after all could provide 
new clues on the virtuality of the real. 
 
 
 
 
3. “Solaris” as a Simulation Hypothesis 
 
Regardless of our questioning, the Platonic as well as the Cartesian discussion 
about human access to reliable knowledge of reality has coined a philosophical 
tradition, which has found its modern adaptation in the brains-in-a-vat 
hypothesis450 designating the following situation: a conscious brain lies in a vat 
and a computer is generating neuro-stimulations, in such an elaborate way, 
that the brain thinks it is living in a world, where it does all kind of things, when 
in truth, it is lying in a nutritive liquid and connected to a machine.  
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450 Hillary Putnam, “Brains in a Vat”, in: Reason, Truth and History, pp. 1-21 
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451 
This dystopia resembles Plato’s cave and is most elegantly transformed 
into cinema by Lana and Andy Wachowski with their “Matrix trilogy”, where 
people think they live in “the real world”, yet in truth their minds are imprisoned 
by a computer simulation called the matrix, and controlled by evil machines. Of 
course, these machines bring to mind Descartes hypothesis of the existence 
of an evil demon, who misleads the mind by creating the illusion of an external 
world, including a body and even other minds. Dissatisfyingly enough, the 
only way out Descartes charts is his argument for the existence of a 
benevolent god. His undeniable existence Descartes believes to prove in a 
chain of argumentation afterwards criticized as circular (the so-called 
Cartesian circle). 
The first part of the “Matrix-trilogy” (1999) had a thrilling cognitive impact: 
a futuristic philosophical tale assuming the apparently irrefutable philosophical 
hypothesis 452  that we could be living in a very sophisticated computer 
simulation, was received and discussed by a worldwide mass public. The 
recent rapid development of the internet and first steps in the computer 
simulated stimulation of our nervous system, seemed to increase the realism of 
such hypothesis presented as a dystopia for humanity. In consequence the film 
                                                
451  David Chalmers, “The Matrix as Metaphysics”, in: Philosophers Explore the Matrix; 
available online 
452 David Chalmers develops this claim, which he calls “The Matrix Hypothesis”. See: Ibid. 
  
238 
had a wide range of philosophical papers analyzing its multi-layered 
philosophical potential and discussing the nature of reality. 
Two years before Chalmers’ “Matrix hypothesis” Nick Bostrom came up 
with his “simulation hypothesis”, which is part of a threefold “simulation 
argument”453. Although it is related, the simulation argument differs from the 
aforementioned discussions of skepticism (doubting that we are not dreaming, 
that we are not a brain in a vat, that we are not in Plato’s Cave, that we are 
not living in a film, etc...). The simulation argument is indeed more interesting 
for our scope of analysis, since it does not proceed from a position of doubt. 
Instead we can rely on our empirical experience, scientific explanation and 
models of thought, assuming that we have computers in the external world, 
which are evolving at an astonishing velocity. So for Bostrom (who actually is 
the Director of the Future Humanity Centre at the University of Oxford) the 
enquiry goes into the future development of these computers in some future 
civilization, characterized as “posthuman” and “technologically mature”: “what 
kind of technological capability would eventually be available?”454 
This question is also linked to our previous chapter on the planet 
Solaris as a posthuman organic machine, similar to an all-encompassing, 
universal or total brain, which is intra-actively sensing the humans. Yet we 
have not been considering the following hypothesis, which now comes to our 
mind in light of Bostrom’s simulation hypothesis: what if the whole trip of Kris 
Kelvin to Solaris, is not just a trip to another planet, but to a world which is 
entirely simulated by the solaristic brain, which could exactly have emerged 
from such a future posthuman civilization, following the rules of a 
superintelligent entity. Kris Kelvin then is reduced to a brain, which somehow 
connects with his own brain and therefore artificially simulates the visitors and 
the earthlike island of memory at the ending. That would be then the reason 
for the intra-activity and retro-activity of time. 
                                                
453 Nick Bostrom, „Are You Living in a Computer Simulation?“, in: The Philosophical Quarterly 
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To enrich this line of thought, let me add some further information on 
Bostrom’s simulation argument. Its threefold structure is very simple to sum 
up, as Bostrom does in a couple of sentences in his conclusion: 
 
A technologically mature “posthuman” civilization would have enormous 
computing power. Based on this empirical fact, the simulation argument 
shows that at least one of the following propositions is true: (1) The fraction of 
human-level civilizations that reach a posthuman stage is very close to zero; 
(2) The fraction of posthuman civilizations that are interested in running 
ancestor-simulations is very close to zero; (3) The fraction of all people with 
our kind of experiences that are living in a simulation is very close to one. If 
(1) is true, then we will almost certainly go extinct before reaching 
posthumanity. If (2) is true, then there must be a strong convergence among 
the courses of advanced civilizations so that virtually none contains any 
relatively wealthy individuals who desire to run ancestor-simulations and are 
free to do so. If (3) is true, then we almost certainly live in a simulation. In the 
dark forest of our current ignorance, it seems sensible to apportion one’s 
credence roughly evenly between (1), (2), and (3). Unless we are now living 
in a simulation, our descendants will almost certainly never run an ancestor-
simulation.455 
 
Bostrom’s paper in fact does carefully introduce and explain each of the three 
hypotheses, from which the third one is the most interesting for our context. In 
the case of “Solaris” the possibility (1) seems already refuted as “not true” (the 
planet is in a posthuman stage of super-intelligent, techno-organic 
development). Also (2) seems not to be true: the planet is apparently interested 
in creating ancestor simulations, the case (3). It has to be mentioned in our 
context that this kind of simulation would have to be a re-creation of the world, 
similar to the idealization of Bazin’s myth of total cinema. On the planet, Kris is 
immersed into the solaristic simulation of reality, comparable to such a 
computer simulation. Alternatively, the Solaris station could be a computer 
simulated world and the planet the simulation’s control center. 
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 Bostrom even refers to the hypothesis of a selective computer 
simulation, which actually would fit the situation we find in film and on Solaris 
very well. These selective simulations “include only a small group of humans or 
a single individual. The rest of humanity would then be zombies or ‘shadow 
people’ – humans simulated only at a level sufficient for the fully simulated 
people not to notice anything suspicious.” 456  This description makes the 
selective simulations comparable to film, where a certain reality is designed in 
order to focus on a certain story. In “Solaris”, on the space station, only a very 
few people are left, on which the story is build. 
Furthermore, by applying the idea of selective simulations to the 
situation designed in the movie “Solaris”, we could come to the following 
conclusion: that the life on Earth, which we get to know in the first part of the 
movie, is an ancestor computer simulation within another computer 
simulation, which is the solaristic space station, run by the solaristic 
posthuman superintelligence. This hypothesis in fact resembles Bostrom’s 
paper: “It may be possible for simulated civilizations to become posthuman. 
They may run their own ancestor-simulations on powerful computers they 
build in their simulated universe.”457  
What we are seeing in the film could be such a case of a simulation 
inside a simulation. Solaris aims at measuring the experience in an ancestor 
computer simulation (Earth), and is therefore making Kelvin change the level 
of simulated reality: he transfers from simulated Earth into the simulated 
spaceship; thus he is repeating a selective simulation on the upper level 
(Solaris Space Station). That would mean that the Space Station had only be 
designed to upload Kelvin. In fact, somehow the situation between Kris and 
Harey cruelly resembles the one of mice in a laboratory, which they cannot 
leave. “I have the feeling that we are being fooled”, says Harey during one of 
the bedroom conversations, when she is asking Kris to tell her the truth about 
her identity. 
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It is worth asking how Kelvin actually arrives on Solaris. The passage 
from Earth to space is in fact not perceived by Kelvin as a flight. “When am I 
leaving?” he is asking, and the answer is: “you already have”. We then see 
Kelvin being turned around, at least his head covered by a helmet, and then 
he faints. The scene is ambiguous: it might be not a space passage but an 
uploading of Kelvin’s mind (including its conscious as well as unconscious 
level) we are viewing. As soon as Kelvin is conscious, some of the formerly 
experienced simulation elements are repeated in order to study psychic, 
emotional and cognitive response, changing physical laws, etc. because “the 
posthumans running a simulation are like gods in relation to the people 
inhabiting the simulation” 458  argues Bostrom. They are “omnipotent” and 
“omniscient”, they can change whatever they want and display on the 
monitors all the necessary information about the inhabitants they would need.  
The movie also closes with a selective simulation: Kris has maybe 
been transferred into another simulation, which is this time earthlike, but with 
inverted physical laws: it is raining inside his father’s house and the fact that 
the father does not notice the raining of steaming water as something 
disturbing makes us suspect whether he is not a solaristic simulation, like 
Harey. Yet Kris does not distininguish between the identity of a true human 
being and a simulated one. For him the emotional experience makes these 
simulations real. 
This situation is like the one of a filmmaker. Tarkovsky would be then 
the superintelligent posthuman entity, who has set up a nesting of multiple 
simulations, as multifold as the character of reality becomes: “Reality must 
thus contain many levels”459, says Bostrom. What we have refused before 
with Descartes, to doubt whether we are in a virtual (dreaming) experience, or 
in a real one, finds now its most intriguing application: the model of computer-
generated, nested simultaions (onion structure) seems like a film within a film 
within a film…. This idea turns the hypothesis (3) of Bostrom’s argument the 
most powerful: “If we do go on to create our own ancestor-simulations, this 
                                                
458 Ibid., p. 12 
459 Ibid., p. 12 
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would be strong evidence against (1) and (2), and we would therefore have to 
conclude that we live in a simulation.”460 In this sense, the film is telling us that 
we are living in a reality which is simulated by a superintelligent posthuman 
structure.  
Yet what would be the consequences of assuming that we live in such a 
computer simulation? Bostrom stresses that such a knowledge would affect our 
daily life or ambitions in terms of treating the simulators as responsible for laws. 
The comparison with a god-controlled reality becomes evident: 
 
 (I)f nobody can be sure that they are at the basement-level [of 
reality], then everybody would have to consider the possibility that their 
actions will be rewarded or punished, based perhaps on moral criteria, by 
their simulators. An afterlife would be a real possibility. Because of this 
fundamental uncertainty, even the basement civilization may have a reason 
to behave ethically. The fact that it has such a reason for moral behavior 
would of course add to everybody else’s reason for behaving morally, and so 
on, in truly virtuous circle. One might get a kind of universal ethical 
imperative, which it would be in everybody’s self-interest to obey, as it were 
“from nowhere”.461 
 
In a similar way the scientists in the space station do worry and speculate about 
the intentions of the planet Solaris and their behavior is influenced by what 
might be the reason for them facing simulated human beings. For example, 
Kris speculates about the reason they are there:  
 
Until today, humanity, Earth were simply beyond love. Do you understand 
what I mean, Snaut? There are so few of us! Just a few billions – a mere 
handful! Perhaps we are here to feel, for the first time, people as a cause for 
love, eh?462  
 
                                                
460 Ibid., p. 12 
461 Ibid., p. 12 
462 Andrei Tarkovsky, „Solaris“, in: Collected Screenplays, p. 179 
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Hoewever, the focus of Bostrom’s argument does lie in the threefold structure 
and not in the guess whether (3) is the case or not. Therefore, for Bostrom, we 
even “may hope that (3) is true since that would decrease the probability of 
(1)”463, although the best hope may still be (2). Yet what could be the reasons 
for (2) to happen? Why would such a posthuman and technologically mature 
civilization lose interest in setting an ancestor simulation? The point is that they 
would very likely be different from humans and that the ancestor simulation is a 
human fantasy.  
The solaristic brain, covered by an ocean, is an unknown superintelligent 
entity, yet it is not human.  This could be the precise reason for a solaristic 
brain to create the simulation of a space station or even of earthlike islands, to 
get to know and measure what human is. Therefore, it is creating the space 
station as a situation in which a few scientists are confronted with their past and 
emotions. This confrontation raises a deep conflict between science, which is 
helpless in its attempts to explain the planet Solaris, and human moral values 
like truth and love. Harey keeps insisting that she is becoming human and that 
it is an unhuman situation they are all in.  
Actually, under this unhuman pressure (exercised by the solaristic 
brain), suddenly the truly human prevails. In saying so, a further question 
remains implicit: which kind of knowledge can the non-human 
superintelligence take from the humans? What would be its research aim, 
which kind of knowledge of reality and human cognitive capability would it like 
to obtain? As Tarkovsky (who runs the “Solaris”-simulation) says: “My function 
is to make whoever sees my films aware of his need to love and to give his 
love.”464 But love can be used precisely as a way to approach that which we 
cannot know.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
463 Nick Bostrom, op. cit., p. 13 
464 Andrei Tarkovsky, Sculpting in Time, p. 200 
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4. On Solaristic Love and Subjective Knowledge 
 
In chapter XV I will focus on Graham Harman’s object oriented ontology, yet 
let me do a short preview of some of his concepts here, since it fits our 
context. For Harman objects always have a dimension of their own, a kind of 
depth remaining inaccessible for the human perspective. Thereby he defines 
objects as every thing there is: living entities and non-living ones. Further the 
determination of object “must include those entities that are neither physical 
nor even real. Along with diamonds, rope, and neutrons, objects may include 
armies, monsters, square circles, and leagues of real and fictitious nations.”465 
In a small essay Harman explains this central idea of the inaccessibility 
of the real object and introduces the third table as an example for the real 
table, lying beyond the grasp of science as well as beyond the “humanist” 
view466. The third table exists independently from us, I may never know as it 
really is. Harman refers in this context to love as a philosophical principle of 
indirect access to the knowledge of the real:  
 
By locating the third table (and to repeat, this the only real table) in a space 
between the ‘table’ as particles and the ‘table’ in its effects on humans, I have 
apparently found a table that can be verified in no way at all, whether by 
science or by tangible effects in the human sphere. Yes –and this is precisely 
the point. Any philosophy is unworthy of the name if it attempts to convert 
objects into the conditions by which they can be known or verified. The term 
philosophia, possibly coined by Pythagoras, famously means not ‘wisdom’ but 
‘love of wisdom’. The real is something that cannot be known, only loved. 
This does not mean that access to the table is impossible, only that it must be 
indirect.467 
 
                                                
465 Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object, p. 5 
466  “The scientist reduces the table downward to tiny particles invisible to the eye; the 
humanist reduces it upward to a series of effects on people and other things. […] The real 
table is in fact a third table lying between these two others. […]” (Cf. Graham Harman, The 
Third Table, p. 7) 
467 Ibid, p. 11 
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‘What cannot be known can be loved’ is an idea that matches with the 
storyline of the movie “Solaris” and is therefore to be designated as an 
allusional principle of solaristic philosophy. “Solaris” questions the 
epistemological limits of science, its incapacity to grasp and to deal with that 
which is real. The movie inquires into existential issues like death, love, 
existence, conscience or nature, juxtaposing imagination and actuality, emotion 
and reason in order to reflect on what is really going on: the planet withdraws 
and human existence somehow changes rules.   
Emotions reveal the hidden perspective of things, and how an 
understanding of that which is real becomes graspable even without 
intelligible knowing. This proposal of Harman not to understand the real but to 
love it is exactly the kind of thinking that permits fusion between the humans 
and the planet in “Solaris”. The Solaris-brain has chosen an emotional way of 
discerning and comprehending the humans: the visitor Harey loves Kelvin 
from the first instant although he needs a further step to simply embrace this 
love, instead of searching for an intelligible explanation for her existence. 
Harey and Kelvin do not understand each other, but they love each other, 
grasp the other by intuition. In a climactic monologue, when Kelvin’s fever 
starts and he is wandering down the corridor, he speaks about the power of 
love withdrawing from explanation: “Well then, I love you… But love is a 
feeling you can experience, but never explain.”468 This reflects our relation to 
the real as Harman describes it and adds the subjective experience as a key; 
simultaneously love closes the gap between object and subject, an idea, 
which I will further explain in what follows.  
Mary Hesse (who is frequently quoted by Paul Ricoeur in La 
Métaphore Vive) depicts the Kantian-Hegelian premise of subject-object 
opposition as attached to a presupposed idea of objective reality opposing the 
subject469. The knowing subject is thus separated from the natural reality and 
                                                
468 Andrei Tarkovsky, „Solaris“, in: Collected Screenplays, p. 179 
469 “In a philosophical tradition deriving from Kant and Hegel, this reality has been expressed 
in terms of the‚ separation of subject and object’ and the consequent ‚objectification’ of the 
natural word.“ (Cf. Mary Hesse, The Construction of Reality, p. 159) 
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"supposed to ‘reflect’ the world in knowledge"470 when in fact, according to 
Hesse, the way we grasp reality in form of knowledge depends on a 
construction, shaped by our applied model of analysis: “Scientific theory provides 
constructed models of scientific reality that are distinguished from other types of 
social and poetic construction by being constrained by feedback loops involving 
experimentation in the natural world.” 471  Hesse further describes our 
relationship with the world as subjectively interactive and assumes 
knowledge, just as Barad, not as a reflective description of the world (which 
she refuses), but, and here Hesse strikingly differs from Barad, as a mental 
projection on the world: 
 
There is an essential interaction between the knowing subject and the world, 
both in terms of linguistic categories brought to the world in describing it, and 
in the activity of the subject in physical relations with the world, […]. If this is 
how the subject is in the world, then the attempt to represent the world in 
knowledge as a neutral independent object is not like a mirror image; rather, it 
is a projection on the world of a mental model whose framework is given by 
the schemas of kinesthetic activity and by the categories of language.472  
 
Hesse thus delineates an open concept of reality oscillating between inside 
and outside, interceding at the gap between subject and object, complementing 
the world interactively by a pre-defined model of explanation. Although her 
claim is not based on diffraction, she refuses representationalism and mentions 
something which resembles Žižek’s claim that the “human eye EXPANDS 
perception” 473, because “it inscribes what it ‘really sees’ into the intricate 
network of memories and anticipations (like Proust with the taste of 
madeleines), it can develop new perceptions, and so forth.” 474 
                                                
470 Ibid., p. 158 
471 Ibid.,,p. 159 
472 Ibid., p. 159 
473 Slavoj Žižek, op. cit., p.4 
474 Ibid., p.4 
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The Bergsonian side of what Žižek formulates, and which we have not 
been mentioning yet, has to be emphasized here. Memory is a key-concept in 
Bergson; it induces time as the subjective side of knowledge, in the following 
sense: according to Bergson time is duration, la durée in French. It does not 
designate the mathematical, spatial time of science, but rather describes an 
individual, contracted time, where past, present and future are not separated, 
but coexist; duration, similar to that which we have considered as the “totality 
of matter” (all interaction of all elements) is for Bergson a concept of 
qualitative plurality – of moments. 475  Memory is thereby an aggregate of 
imprinted memory images and enables us to comprehend a “subjective side 
of knowledge” – a kind of “contraction of the real”.476  This definition of an 
image as a temporal slice able to contract a plurality is quite close to our 
definition of an infinite real image, the one cinema conveys, and which is 
distinct from perception, although the latter is a part of it: 
 
As I shall endeavor to show, even the ‘subjectivity’ of sensible qualities 
consists above all else in a kind of contraction of the real, affected by our 
memory. In short, memory in these two forms, covering as it does with a 
cloak of recollections a core of immediate perception, and also contracting a 
number of external moments into a single internal moment, constitutes the 
principal share of individual consciousness in perception, the subjective side 
of the knowledge of things.477 
 
This is how we then select only some images in order to be able to see 
something: by interacting constantly with our past, combining inside and 
outside.478  
                                                
475 “However brief I suppose any perception to be, it always occupies a certain duration, and 
involves consequently an effort of memory which prolongs one into another a plurality of 
moments.” (Cf. Henri Bergson, “The Choice of Images”, in: op. cit., p. 25 ) 
476 Ibid., p. 25 
477 Ibid., p. 25 
478  In Film Theory, Hugo Münsterberg refers to perception being drawn by subjective 
attention: “I recognized that, in every case, the objective world of outer events had been 
shaped and molded until it became adjusted to the subjective movements of the mind. The 
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At a later point of his work Žižek has deepened his claim that the 
“human eye expands perception”479. It is an idea, which includes subjectivity 
in the way we attain knowledge. Žižek’s next step consists in assuming 
subjectivity as an incompleteness, and as such a part of totality, yet an 
incomplete one. Therefore, Žižek sets subjectivity as a form to approach the 
Absolute, a term he takes from German idealism (relying mostly on Fichte and 
Hegel). Remarkably he compares his position with the one of Heideggerian 
correlationism:  
 
(…) incompleteness [is] already in itself a mode of subjectivity, such that 
subjectivity is always already part of the Absolute, and reality is not even 
thinkable without subjectivity (as in Heidegger, where there is no Sein without 
Da-Sein as its locality) (…). 480 
 
As I have tried to show before, Heidegger approaches the puzzling question 
of being by examining the ontological and epistemological conditions of 
Dasein. For Heidegger Dasein is the only possible perspective to analyze 
being and to try to grasp being as a whole. The existence of the visitors in 
“Solaris” shifts this question into an even more complex one. Since Harey 
claims her subjectivity as part of the truth of her existence, it still is a doubled 
subjectivity we are confronted with: how can we truly know an existence or 
presence of an entity, which is obviously the projection of the subjectivity of 
another entity?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
mind develops memory ideas and imaginitive ideas; in the moving pictures they become 
reality.” (Cf. Hugo Münsterberg, Hugo Münsterberg on Film, p.110) 
479 Slavoj Žižek, op. cit., p. 4 
480 Slavoj Žižek, Less Than Nothing, p. 905  
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5. The Nothing as an Open Concept of Reality 
 
In “Solaris” the conceptual persona Harey induces a way of thinking that 
integrates subjectivity in the search for truth, clearly challenging science and 
the dominant idea of objective scientific knowledge. Therefore, the film 
“Solaris” is to be seen as a critique of an absolute belief in modern science, 
opposing scientific knowledge with intuitive truth and cognition, intelligible for 
the kind of thought, which is located in the realm of diffraction. Such a critique 
clearly sets a difference between knowledge and thought.  
In his lecture “What is Metaphysics?” Heidegger questions scientific 
logic as the dominant instrument for the search of truth: he evinces the limits 
by defining the term “Das Nichts” - "the nothing". The nothing is hereby 
introduced as a concept, which science cannot grasp or understand in theory: 
because nothing can never be. Rather the nothing is for Heidegger active, it is 
in action, it “nihilates”481, and it does so incessantly, although in a hidden way. 
We normally have no awareness of this permanent action of the Nothing. 
Anxiety - which we already have emphasized as the philosophical mood to 
grasp being as a whole – reveals the nothing as well:  
 
The nothing reveals itself in anxiety — but not as a being. Just as little is it 
given as an object. Anxiety is no kind of grasping of the nothing. All the same, 
the nothing reveals itself in and through anxiety, although, to repeat, not in 
such a way that the nothing becomes manifest in our malaise quite apart from 
beings as a whole.482 
 
 For Heidegger, the question about the nothing also determines our 
understanding of being. Heidegger concludes his essay with the "fundamental 
question of metaphysics which the Nothing itself produces: Why are there 
                                                
481 Nichten is in German a verb invented by Heidegger to attribute an activity to the Nothing: 
“das Nichts nichtet” – “the Nothing itself nihilates”, literally to be translated as “the Nothing 
nothings”. 
482 Martin Heidegger, What is Metaphysics?, § 28; available online 
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beings at all, and why not rather nothing?" 483 This question seems to be a 
solaristic one: why are there visitors at all? 
As we have learned throughout this treatise, Alain Badiou, designates 
a "void" as a kind of omnipresent nothing, which corresponds to the definition 
of the Lacanian Real. The Real for Lacan is a void (comparable to the 
Heideggerian nothing, as I claim) because it is impossible to think: a nothing 
retrieving and escaping, when I try to grasp it; yet it is acting in-between - us and 
the world. It is making reality open for projection, the possibilities of Dasein. This 
is a thought Žižek would complete: “Reality is less than Nothing. That is why 
reality has to be supplemented by fiction: to conceal its emptiness.”484 I will pick-
up this last implication: open for projection or supplemented by fiction. 
The existence of the visitors on Solaris evokes the Kantian "gap" 
(between object and subject as Žižek designates it), but in a reverse 
perspective: how can I reliably measure an existence or presence of being 
[Dasein in German] which is obviously the external prolongation of our own 
subjectivity? Žižek underlines that the major problem would be to "think the 
subjective perception as anchored in reality" 485  – the same challenge 
Heidegger faces when he tries to grasp being – and a principle, which fits the 
solaristic system. Žižek mentions hereby, as a possible way out, a hypothesis 
formulated by Adrian Johnston (inscribing the line of thought into the 
overcoming of correlationism formulated by Meillassoux) that: 
 
 All reality is transcendentally constituted, ‘correlative’ to a subjective position, 
and to push this through to the end, the way out of this ‘correlationist’ circle is 
not to try to directly reach the In-itself, but to inscribe this transcendental 
correlation into the Thing-In-itself and for us.486   
                                                
483 “Die Grundfrage der Metaphysik, die das Nichts selbst erzeugt: Warum ist überhaupt 
Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts?” (Cf. Martin Heidegger, Was ist Metaphysik?, Vittorio 
Klostermann, Frankfurt a.M., 2007, p. 27; translation mine – C.R.) 
484 Slavoj Žižek, op. cit., p. 4 
485 Slavoj Žižek, “The ontology of quantum physics and transcendental materialism”, in: ibid., 
p. 905 
486 Ibid., p. 906 
  
251 
 
It is thus the proposal to reconsider the subjective gap as a part of the 
absolute, as we have seen: that which is incomplete tends towards 
completion. Žižek further asks then about the possible structural relation 
between the subjective and the Real: 
 
Like thought, the subject (Self) is also immaterial: its One-ness, its self-
identity, is not reducible to its material support. I am precisely not my body: 
the Self can only arise against the background of the death of its substantial 
being, of what it is “objectively.” So, again, how can one explain the rise of 
subjectivity out of the “incomplete” ontology, how are these two dimensions 
(the abyss/void of subjectivity, the incompleteness of reality) to be thought 
together? I should apply here something like a weak anthropic principle: how 
should the Real be structured so that it allows for the emergence of 
subjectivity (in its autonomous efficacy, not as a mere “user’s illusion”)?487 
 
What Žižek formulates here as a question might be symptomatic in the 
solaristic system. In “Solaris” Harey struggles to be mortal – for her Dasein to 
become human, become a whole, reach completeness, and thereby aims at 
the “real” real, the "absolute" of her existence – paradoxically through death. 
And that which is questioned by the Solaris scientists is precisely her being, 
whether it is to be considered a Dasein or rather a void. To Heidegger, death 
gives Dasein a determination; it completes Dasein as a whole and is the 
ultimate realization of its potential. This seems a fusion of the very subjective 
– even Heidegger claims that we cannot share death - and the absolute, a 
completeness withdrawing from subjectivity. Žižek further asserts: 
 
Far from indicating a radical externality resisting the subject, the thickness of 
objectivity resisting the subject’s grasp is precisely the subjective moment, 
the most elementary „reifying“ illusion of subjectivity, what the subject adds to 
the real-in-itself.488 
                                                
487 Ibid., p. 905 
488 Ibid., p. 807 
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Žižek claims here a real impossible to grasp for the subject, but that 
which is grasped, namely the materiality or “thickness of objectivity”, is exactly 
a “reifying illusion” added by the subject: the subject tries to grasp that which it 
adds and cannot do so. This fits exactly the idea of reification present in 
“Solaris”: “I do not want to get to know other worlds, I want mirrors” says Snout 
to Kelvin in the library. It also grasps the image as real, but this reality is always 
the real plus the subjectivity of the beholder.  
In the movie “Solaris” the real (in form of the solaristic brain) further 
resists the attempts to be known, but it acts, it performs, it interacts and reveals 
itself in images and materializations, and this in a double sense: as a film 
projection and as a reality of its own. It is the real of image – image as an event 
or even accident in its singularity, the accident of visibility. The real of Solaris, 
which is active, generates matter in reaction to the humans. The visitors and - 
as the ending of the film shows - even other islands of memory physically 
emerge.  
I will argue that such an open concept of reality – whether constructed 
or supplemented by fiction - is a cinematographic condition sustained by the 
desire to escape into another reality, to die, or to enter a film, just as we have 
argued in chapter XII. CP Harey is the embodiment of this projection principle. 
Just as a film-projection, she is the positivity of the negative, reflected reality, 
more than material. As we have seen, Heideggerian thought directly relates 
projection (Entwurf) with the possibilities of Dasein: there is always something 
still outstanding in our existence, namely the possibilities yet to come. This 
raises a question of projection as a way to process the future, to transform it 
from the Aristotelian negativity of the now directly into being.  
The premise of ‘projection of reality’ as a cinematographic principle, as 
claimed before, enables a transformation of Heidegger’s being-in-the-world, 
which entails a multiplicity of possibilities for Dasein, into a being-in-film – itself 
containing an infinity of possibilities. It is then the engagement with an arche-
principle of projection, which is cinematographic in its praxis, yet “ontokinetic” in 
its nature. This term “ontokinetic” is raised by Peter Sloterdijk, who proposes 
the concept by reassessing Heidegger’s thrownness into the world: Dasein is 
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thrown into a movement489, the one of the world, and which we substitute with 
film, the movement of film: the world turns around, just as life, just as a movie 
does.  
Like Deleuze we must believe in projections (cinema) in order to close the 
gap (of nothingness) between us and the world, and in order to keep on going – 
to process the future again and again. The aim is the escape from the constant 
incompleteness of the world; an incompleteness confronting Nichtung – 
nihilation, the Heideggerian nothing in action, revealed in anxiety just like 
“Dasein’s primordial totality of Being”490. Projection is needed for Dasein to 
escape nihilation as it is needed to escape death. The confrontation with such 
nihilation is to be compared with the constant incompleteness of the world, 
which we desire to be complete.  
The world-as-a-whole would be then a mix of world-projection and world-
perception. In Heidegger’s philosophy this necessity of completion or even 
conclusion corresponds, as we have seen, to the impulse of death as well as to 
the search of knowledge: because in death we complete all that has been. Death 
is the utmost possibility of projection, the permanently still outstanding, which at 
the same time is as real as nothing. Heidegger’s nothing – which is realized for 
Dasein in death – is the domain of the real, and as such a concluding claim of 
this chapter. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
489 “Heidegger is the thinker of movement. His original idea or quasi his criminal act is the 
jump or the ‘Letting-yourself-go’ (Sichloslassen) into a condition, in which he finds in himself, 
and 'under his feet' nothing more than motion. For him, kinetics precedes logic, or, if you will 
tolerate the paradoxical turn: movement is its foundation." (translation mine – C.R.) - 
“Heidegger ist der Denker der Bewegung. Sein Urgedanke oder quasi seine Tathandlung ist 
der Sprung oder das Sichloslassen in eine Befindlichkeit, bei der er in sich selbst und ‘unter 
seinen Füßen’ nichts anderes mehr findet als Bewegtheit. Bei ihm geht die Kinetik der Logik 
voraus, oder, wenn man die paradoxe Wendung dulden will: Die Bewegung ist sein 
Fundament.” (Cf. Peter Sloterdijk, in: Nicht gerettet, p. 29) 
490 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 227 
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XV. 
RAISING A SOLARISTIC FOURFOLD 
 
 
 
1. Point of Departure: Heidegger’s Fourfold 
 
Heidegger’s fourfold – “Das Geviert” is part of his late work and is developed 
in the Bremen lectures “The thing” (1950) and “Building Dwelling Thinking” 
(1951). It basically describes the oneness of the world and things as 
consisting of four quadrants – named as Gods, Sky, Mortals and Earth. 
According to Harman, who relies in his object-oriented philosophy (commonly 
referred to as OOO – object oriented ontology, although Harman also speaks 
of object-oriented metaphysics 491 ) on Heidegger’s fourfold as well as on 
Heidegger’s tool analysis, the fourfold is frequently underestimated and often 
neglected within Heidegger’s oeuvre, referred to as a vague concept or 
esoteric expression, too opaque to decrypt. In Harman’s understanding the 
opposite is the case; for him the fourfold represents the kernel of Heidegger’s 
philosophy: it completes the tool analysis, and has a special impact on the 
future of philosophy. These ideas of Harman function as a catalyst for the 
conclusions of the solaristic system and will be deepened throughout this 
chapter. 
 Thereby, since Heidegger’s fourfold will be the basis for a solaristic 
fourfold to come, I have decided to quote a larger part of “The Thing” where 
he summarizes the fourfold in a quite poetic way: 
                                                
491 Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object, p. 48 
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Earth is the building bearer, nourishing with its fruits, tending water and rock, 
plant and animal. When we say earth, we are already thinking of the other three 
along with it, by way of the simple oneness of the four. 
The sky is the sun’s path, the course of the moon, the wandering glitter of 
the stars, the year’s seasons, the light and dusk of day, the gloom and glow of 
night, the clemency and inclemency of the weather, the drifting clouds and blue 
depth of the ether.  
When we say sky, we are already thinking of the other three along with it, 
by way of the simple oneness of the four. 
The divinities are the beckoning messengers of the godhead. Out of the 
hidden sway of the divinities the god emerges as what he is, which removes 
him from any comparison with beings that are present. When we speak of the 
divinities, we are already thinking of the other three along with it, by way of the 
simple oneness of the four. 
The mortals are the human beings. They are called mortals because they 
can die. To die means to be capable of death as death. Only man dies. The 
animal perishes. It has death neither ahead of itself nor behind it. Death is the 
shrine of Nothing, that is, of that which in every respect is never something that 
merely exists, but which nevertheless presences, even as the mystery of Being 
itself.  
As the shrine of Nothing, death harbors within itself the presencing of 
Being. As the shrine of Nothing, death is the shelter of Being. We now call 
mortals mortals – not because their earthly life comes to an end, but because 
they are capable of death as death. Mortals are who they are, as mortals, 
present in the shelter of Being. They are presencing relation to Being as Being. 
Metaphysics, by contrast, thinks of man as animal, as a living being. Even 
when ratio pervades animalitas, man’s being remains defined by life and life-
experience. Rational living beings must first become mortals. 
When we speak of mortals, we are already thinking of the other three along 
with it, by way of the simple oneness of the four. 
Earth and sky, divinities and mortals – being at one with one another of 
their own accord – belong together by way of the simpleness of the united 
fourfold. Each of the for mirrors in its own way the presence of the others. 
This appropriating mirror-play of the simple onefold of earth and sky, 
divinities and mortals, we call the world. The world presences by worlding. That 
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means: the world’s worlding cannot be explained by anything else nor can it be 
fathomed through anything else. (…) The united four are already strangled in 
their essential nature when we think of them only as separate realities, which 
are to be grounded in and explained by one another. 492 
 
The preservation of the fourfold’s oneness comes as dwelling, the 
mode under which “mortals are in the fourfold” 493: “In saving the earth, in 
receiving the sky, in awaiting the divinities, in initiating mortals, dwelling 
occurs as the fourfold preservation of the fourfold.” 494  We have seen before 
how the term dwelling is for Heidegger linked to the Greek parousia - being in 
the sense of “Anwesen”, implying always its own “Abwesen” - decay and 
absence. In the “thing-lecture” Heidegger further underlines how the fourfold 
is present in the thing, which is thinging: the thing is fourfold in its thinging, 
which simultaneously is a worlding: the world’s oneness is fourfold. The 
"union" of "the fourfold" is present in the experience of things: “If we let the 
thing be present in its thinging from out of the worlding world, then we are 
thinking of the thing as thing.”495 To dwell is what mortals do under the sky 
and on Earth and simply means to let the fourfold be, to stay with things. 
 
496 
                                                
492 Martin Heidegger, “The Thing”, in: Poetry, Language, Thought, pp. 176 -178 
493 Martin Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking”, in: ibid., p. 148  
494 Ibid., p. 149  
495 Martin Heidegger, “The Thing”, in: ibid., p.178 
496 Graham Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects, p. 203 
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Harman stresses that the fourfold does not refer to concrete entities, 
but consists in four poles. The important deduction for him from the fourfold 
thus is that reality is made of quadrants, of four poles in a constant duel, 
building bonds, tensions and interactions between themselves, although he 
laments the vagueness with which Heidegger describes them.  
The fourfold is, in my understanding, to be read as a metaphor, an 
allusive approximation to the real, a term which plays a major role in 
Harman’s object-oriented approach. Heidegger describes the fourfold as an 
interplay of relations and bonds, whereby each one mirrors the others: 
 
Each of the four mirrors in its own way the presence of the others. Each 
therewith reflects itself in its own way into its own, within the simpleness of 
the four. This mirroring does not portray a likeness. The mirroring, lightening 
each of the four, appropriates their own presencing into simple belonging to 
one another. Mirroring in this appropriating-lightening way, each of the four 
plays to each of the others. The appropriative mirroring sets each of the four 
free into its own, but it binds these free ones into the simplicity of their 
essential being toward one another.497 
 
Due of this interplay of the fourfold poles with and into each other, speaking 
about reality and about the real is very complex. What is furthermore of 
special relevance here is the fact that the thinking of the world is 
presupposed, but can never grasp the fourfold as such – which would be the 
world as a whole, the real or truth. “As soon as human cognition here calls for 
an explanation, it fails to transcend the world’s nature, and falls short of it. The 
human will to explain just does not reach to the simpleness of the simple 
onefold of worlding.”498 
The fourfold is experienced by the mortals in their mode of being as 
dwelling - in a state of caring and preserving the fourfold. Furthermore they try 
to think about the dwelling, whereby “thinking itself belongs to dwelling” 499 in 
                                                
497 Martin Heidegger, op. cit., p. 177 
498 Ibid., pp. 177-178 
499Martin Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking”, in: ibid., p. 158 
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the following sense: “The real dwelling plight lies in this, that mortals ever 
search anew for the nature of dwelling, that they must ever learn to dwell.” 500 
Therefore, the fourfold is accessed indirectly by being as dwelling. 
As we will see, Harman, in his fourfold proposal of OOO does 
appropriate the idea of four-poled structures in constant strife, yet redevelops 
the four poles. With his reflection on fourfold structures Harman intends to 
draw a way for philosophy into the future. Heidegger is for Harman the 
example for the ground of this approach, as he becomes more and more 
poetic with time. Harman says: 
 
In the present day, Heidegger’s fourfold structure appears to be merely a 
quirky and arbitrary outgrowth of his late system. But imagine a scenario in 
which, two centuries from now, all ontologies are built of fourfold structures 
descended from his own. If that were to happen, then the status of the 1949 
Bremen lectures would shift from ‘isolated and inexplicable oddity’ to ‘classic 
ancestral text of quadruple ontology’. The greatest compliment I can pay to 
our ancestors is not to imitate their words and gestures endlessly, but to turn 
them into the forerunners of something different.501 
 
In this sense I propose to think of a solaristic fourfold, also because 
Heidegger’s model seems to specially match the movie “Solaris”. We are 
dealing here with four poles quite identical to the ones Heidegger names: 
humans, visitors, earth and the planet, and it will be interesting to consider the 
philosopher’s musing on the mortals’ relation with death, presented as “the 
shrine of Nothing”. It is hereby worth to recall the comparison we have 
established between the Heideggerian Nothing and the Lacanian Real as a 
void. I will go deeper into this point at the end of this chapter. To lay out the 
solaristic system then does not mean to transpose Heidegger’s or Harman’s 
fourfold into our context, but it does mean that I will try to think about a 
solaristic fourfold based on a structure of four poles, taking insights from 
                                                
500 Ibid., p. 158 
501 Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object, p.94
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Heidegger (who already is the main reference of this analysis) as well as from 
Harman. 
By doing so, I firstly propose a closer look on Harman’s fourfold, which 
seems to present a consistent approach to the real of objects by introducing a 
completely new way to read Heidegger’s tool analysis. While doing so, 
Harman is designating Heidegger a pioneer for the contemporary currents of 
realism. 
 
 
 
 
2. Drawing the Idea of a Solaristic Fourfold 
 
The idea of a solaristic fourfold consists in the attempt to appropriate 
Heidegger’s fourfold into the solaristic system. At the same time this attempt 
preludes the conclusions of this analysis, which aim to outline the solaristic 
system. Based on a four-poled structure its tenets and concepts will be 
unfolded, deduced from what has been elaborated so far. In order to picture 
such a fourfold arrangement of relations in a sustained way, I will depart from 
Harman’s reflection on fourfold structures. By relying on Heidegger’s fourfold, 
Harman establishes a structure of four poles, interacting with each other in 
terms of “bonds” and “tensions”.  
Naturally it would exceed the scope of our analysis to do justice to all 
particular parts of Harman’s object oriented philosophy. Yet before focusing in 
detail on those concepts, which it would make sense to integrate into our 
analysis, let me give a short summary of Harman’s main positions.  
Harman’s approach takes its place in the framework of speculative 
realism. As we have seen so far, besides the rejection of correlationism (or 
the attempt to overcome it), another common denominator of speculative 
realism is to admit the existence of the real or of a domain of the real, 
independent from the human mind or presence (even if materialism integrates 
the human perspective into this domain of the real). Such a real exists 
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whether we can access or perceive it or not. Furthermore, human ability to 
perceive reality captures certain features of a whole spectrum of properties – 
but at least it captures properties of reality, and not properties the mind reads 
into reality. Harman apparently starts from a correlationist position, defining 
the domain of the real as sealed. Yet this position is then reformulated: the 
real is sealed, yet there are ways to access it indirectly, zones where the real 
becomes manifest. Harman tries to reassess the real by an object-based 
thinking: he defines reality as composed by objects. As we have mentioned, 
objects – whether elements, living beings like people or animals, inanimate 
things like tables or imaginary entities like demons or fictitious nations502 - are 
all there is.  In an online essay Harman further elaborates: 
 
By ‘objects’ I mean unified realities – physical or otherwise – that cannot fully 
be reduced either downwards to their pieces or upwards to their effects. We 
know that human and inanimate bodies cannot exist without tiny physical 
subcomponents. Yet we also know that objects have a certain degree of 
robust reality that can withstand changes in those components. An object is 
emergent beyond its subcomponents, and cannot be explained exhaustively 
by its pieces alone.503 
 
As I have mentioned before, Harman explains the core of his approach 
in a small essay in which he focuses on the inaccessibility of the real object 
and introduces as an example the third table (actually standing for the real 
table). This table lies beyond the grasp of science as well as beyond the 
“humanist” approach: “The real table is in fact a third table lying between 
these two others.”504 Furthermore, the third table exists independently from 
us, it lies “in a permanent autonomous zone, where objects are simply 
themselves”505.  
                                                
502 See: Graham Harman, op. cit., p. 5 
503 Graham Harman, “Art Without Relations”, in: Artreview, September 2014, available online  
504 Graham Harman, The Third Table, pp. 6-7 
505 Ibid., p. 10 
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Yet by further immersing into his work, we discover that Harman’s 
theory has a rather complex structure, as he actually distinguishes between 
sensual and real objects. An object, according to Harman, “has reality in the 
world” (real objects) or “only in the mind”506 (sensual objects).  As I will explain 
later, this object-oriented theory relies on Heidegger’s theory of tools and on 
Husserl’s phenomenology. Real objects are “autonomous forces in the 
world”507 for Harman, whereas sensual objects need perceivers, therefore 
Harman also calls them “images”: “Sensual objects exist only insofar as some 
perceiver is occupied with them. These perceivers need not to be human.” 508  
The domain of the real he proposes is thereby characterized by withdrawal. 
We may never know reality as it really is, since “we have apparently found a 
table that can be verified in no way at all” 509. Real objects are inaccessible, 
sealed, as well as deep: deeper than their appearance to the human mind, 
deeper than their relations to one another, deeper than any theoretical or 
sensual encounter with them. This “depth” of real objects is the core enquiry 
of Harman’s ontology, which substantially differs from the materialist approach 
of Žižek’s or Badiou’s Lacanian Real (see footnote 510). 
The most striking difference to such materialism is that Harman refers 
neither to a multiple nor to a void and is mostly interested in the relations 
between the four poles of the real and the sensual. These poles are real 
objects, real qualities, sensual objects and sensual qualities. From there on 
he establishes a network of ten possible bonds, dominated by four main 
tensions designated as time, space, eidos and essence. The solaristic 
transposition of Harman’s fourfold which I propose to explore further is then 
centered on the difference between real images and sensual images, 
although Harman never mentions the idea of image other than as sensual (he 
actually calls the sensual objects images). Yet (as we will see) Harman’s idea 
of ‘essence’, defined as the tension between real objects and real qualities, 
becomes most interesting for us and will be compared to the solaristic real of 
                                                
506 Graham Harman, Bells and Whistles, p. 60 
507 Ibid., p. 60 
508 Ibid., p. 60 
509 Graham Harman, The Third Table, p. 11 
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reality. In fact this ‘essence’ manifests a form of access to the withdrawing 
real, and the way it interacts. 
 
 
 
 
3. Contextualizing Harman’s Real Object 
in our Scope of Analysis 
 
Within our scope of analysis the attempt to access the withdrawing real 
reflects, once more, what Cavell describes as the “unfathomable abyss” (see 
Chapter VIII of this analysis), which lies between the thing and its existence 
as a photographic image, comparable in our view to the Kantian gap between 
subject and object (a void in Žižek’s approach, or the Real, which has to be 
supplemented by subjectivity or fiction510). For Harman the Kantian opposition 
                                                
510  In spite of Harman’s explicit dispraise towards the Žižekian line of transcendental 
materialism I compare Žižek and Harman here. Even if Žižek gives an apparently anti-realist 
line of argumention, his enquiries aim to overcome correlationism, as I have tried to show. 
Harman further criticizes Žižek by quoting him as follows: “The true formula of materialism is 
not that there is some noumenal reality beyond our distorting perception of it. The only 
consistent materialist position is that the world does not exist… The notion of the world as a 
positive universe presupposes an external observer.” (Slavoj Žižek in conversation with Glyn 
Daly (2004), quoted by Graham Harman in: The Quadruple Object, p. 61) 10 years later this 
very same argument, that the world does not exist because its existence would presuppose 
an external observer, is transformed by Markus Gabriel into a realist claim. As we have seen 
in chapter IX of this analysis, Gabriel is against “the idea that there is or ought to be a unified 
totality of what there is, whether you call it ‘the world’, ‘being’ or ‘reality’.” (Markus Gabriel, 
Fields of Sense: A New Realist Ontology, p. 5). Instead of a non-existing reality, for Gabriel 
there are “fields of sense”, which do exist. I have further tried to show that Žižek aims to 
overcome the Kantian gap between subject and object by his claim that reality is less than 
nothing, to be supplemented by fiction, therefore he proposes to think subjectivity as being 
part of the absolute. Even so these are striking differences of approach, I believe that 
Harman’s criticism of Žižek’s theory reduces it to something like “we cannot think something 
without thinking it” (Graham Harman,op. cit., p. 62), and  should be ignored, because it is 
reductive and does no justice to a far more complex position.) 
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or gap constitutes a wrong question: to him there are innumerable relations 
between the sensual and the real objects, as they both pertain to a network. 
Therefore, for Harman, it is not that the abyss withdraws from our access, but 
that the real object withdraws. Even so, we could say that the abyss conveys 
the domain of the real in terms of relations.  
Let us now come back to Heidegger’s theme, which he also mentions 
when discussing the fourfold – that being implies thinking about being. We 
have argued so far that this necessity of knowing being as a whole is what 
brings us to the cinema, watching film.  We have not mentioned yet that in this 
context Cavell too argues that the reason why we watch movies goes back to 
our desire for knowledge of the world as a whole, or to see reality as it really 
is. According to Cavell, this is of course an impossible perspective. His 
argumentation recalls indeed what we have mentioned before on Bazin’s 
myth of total cinema. Cavell says: 
 
I have spoken of film as satisfying the wish for the magical reproduction of the 
world by enabling us to view it unseen. What we wish to see in this way is the 
world itself – that is to say, everything. Nothing less than that is what modern 
philosophy has told us (whether for Kant’s reasons, or for Locke’s, or Hume’s) 
is metaphysically beyond our reach or (as Hegel or Marx or Kierkegaard or 
Nietzsche might rather put it) beyond our reach metaphysically. To say that 
we wish to view the world itself is to say that we are wishing for the condition 
of viewing as such.511 
 
For Cavell film further “recognizes the hard Berkeleyan-Kantian truth 
that an event in which we participate is not knowable apart from our 
knowledge of our participation in it.”512 This makes for Cavell, that film is a 
confirmation of skepticism, which integrates Cavell’s interest on film (which he 
also designates as “a moving image of skepticism” 513) into his philosophical 
                                                
511 Stanley Cavell,  op. cit., pp. 101-102 
512 Ibid., p. 128 
513 “It is because I see what is not before me, because our senses are satisfied with reality, 
while that reality does not exist, that in The World Viewed I call film ‘a moving image of 
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reflection. Cavell insists that even if we would have a piece of total cinema in 
front of us, we would face the same problems: reality as a whole withdraws 
from our grasp and so must film: “In screening reality, film screens its 
givenness from us; it holds reality from us, it holds before us, i.e., withholds 
reality before us.” 514 What Cavell argues here, does not fit our view; his 
position actually opposes Walter Benjamin’s claim of the access to 
“immediate reality” 515  (emerging from the inside of reality), due to the 
interpenetration of reality with the film apparatus. In film we access the real, 
as I have argued.  Nonetheless Cavell’s position confirms us to reassess the 
core question of this analysis, into which we aim to inquire in this chapter 
once more under a slightly different perspective: which part of the withdrawing 
domain of the real (or of “the world itself” 516) is actually accessed when we 
are watching a movie? Is it the subjective part as being the incomplete part of 
the real, or can we specify something further? 
Apparently, such a question contradicts our hypothesis formulated 
before via Heidegger. We have so far elaborated in chapter XI that Dasein 
can access being-as-a-whole in film, because Dasein doubles by viewing film, 
being-in-the-world becomes being-in-film, dies at the film’s end and resurrects 
in the world, having had the experience to access a whole. Yet in what follows 
I will argue that this experience of a whole reality in film is one of a possibility 
of reality, but not one of all possibilities of reality, because that total reality 
either does not exist, or will have to remain sealed for us: it is a void in this 
sense. This would mean that film is so real to us not because we can access 
something real, but because it reproduces our very condition: We merely have 
access to a sphere of the real of reality, but never to the real of reality itself. 
But what does this mean? And how would Heidegger himself answer this 
question? 
                                                                                                                                      
skepticism.’ This version of hallucination is not exactly mad, but it suggests, as skepticism 
does, my capacity for madness.” Stanley Cavell, Cavell on Film, p. 117 
514 Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed, p. 188 
515 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”, Third Version, 
p. 233 
516 Stanley Cavell, op. cit., pp. 101-102 
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We will see, by unfolding Heidegger’s philosophy of the tool in the 
context of Harman’s OOO, that Heidegger supports the aforementioned 
question by distinguishing in his tool analysis between Zuhandenheit” 
(readiness-to-hand) and “Vorhandenheit” (presence-to-hand), whereby 
readiness-to-hand, according to Harman’s interpretation, corresponds to what 
we have analyzed so far as “presence itself” to be distinguished from 
presence-to-hand, corresponding only to a part of the tool’s properties, the 
ones that matter for human access. 517  
I propose to recall in this context Žižek’s claim that subjectivity is part of 
reality and therefore integrated in the “Absolute”, a claim through which Žižek 
too refers to Heidegger: 
 
(…) incompleteness [is] already in itself a mode of subjectivity, such that 
subjectivity is always already part of the Absolute, and reality is not even 
thinkable without subjectivity (as in Heidegger, where there is no Sein without 
Da-Sein as its locality) (…). 518 
 
I further propose to integrate this observation of Žižek into our context rather 
than opposing it, in the following sense: what is present-at-hand shall be 
understood as that which Žižek proposes as “subjectivity”, whereas the 
readiness-to-hand is proposed to be the things as they are in themselves, 
“reality”. I argue so relying on Heidegger: “Readiness-to-hand is the way in 
which entities as they are ‘in themselves’ are defined ontologico-categorically. 
Yet only by reason of something present-at-hand, is ‘there’ anything ready-to-
                                                
517 Harman is conscious that with this kind of reading of Heidegger he inverts the usual 
interpretation of Heidegger’s tool analysis: “The typical reading of tools and presence for 
Heidegger, sometimes supported by the philosopher’s own remarks, is that vorhanden refers 
to things in their supposed independence from humans, while zuhanden refers to things as 
wrapped up in human purposes. But in fact the opposite is the case: the ready-to-hand must 
always be independent, and the present-at-hand must be dependent. If tool-beings are 
worthy of greater esteem than the images in consciousness, this is not because they are 
more dependent on human Dasein, but the opposite.” (Cf. Graham Harman, op. cit., p. 52) 
We will support in our analysis this view of Harman on Heidegger. 
518 Slavoj Žižek, op. cit., p. 905  
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hand.” 519  This statement, interpreted in the way Harman does (and now 
modifying his argumentation), would support Žižek’s position that “reality is 
not even thinkable without subjectivity”: according to Heidegger readiness-to-
hand depends on presence-at-hand, and not the other way around.  
New experiments in quantum physics seem to confirm again such a 
position by explicitly asserting that “at the quantum level, reality does not exist 
if you are not looking at it".520 What this means, physics cannot tell us, but 
Barad’s claim - “If the measurement intra-action plays a constitutive role in 
what is measured, then it matters how something is explored.”521 – can give 
us a clue, as I have tried to show in chapter XIII. The most important 
conclusion is the intra-active constitution of “reality”, and measurement being 
one form of intra-active intervention, such as film. 
Let me now rethink Žižek’s observation in the context of film. The 
possibility of the concluded whole, of the Heideggerian Being concluded by 
Dasein in death, is what distinguishes the experience of film from that of 
reality. Dasein’s being-in-the-world is deprived (by the destroying nature of 
death) from the conclusion of Dasein’s “being as a whole”. Yet is this being as 
a whole of Dasein different from reality as a whole, as a totality, which even in 
film must remain completely sealed or a void? We have concluded before, 
that film is always a slice of subjectivity tending to create a whole, providing 
the subjective side of knowledge or, similar to memory, as visible in Bergson’s 
memory-image, a kind of “contraction of the real”522. Film is also, so we have 
argued, an intra-active way of measuring reality, in which the world becomes 
film. 
I propose, in what follows, to immerse ourselves deeper into the details 
of Harman’s theory. His notorious attempt to analyze the withdrawing and 
“ghostly” area of the real, “withdrawing from all human and inhuman access,” 
                                                
519 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 101 
520  Australian National University, "Experiment confirms quantum theory weirdness.", in: 
Science Daily, 27 May 2015; available online  
521 Karen Barad, op. cit., p.6 
522Henri Bergson, “The Choice of Images”, in: op. cit., p. 25 
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523  although “accessible only by allusion and seducing us by means of 
allure”524 allows us to approach the described problematic from a different 
angle. His idea of access through “allusion” and “allure” will be compared to 
our claim of the real of reality, which we believe to become graspable through 
film. It is thereby the endeavor to transpose Harman’s OOO to the area of 
philosophy of film, determining the area of the real image.  
We have previously considered the claim of the real image, relying on 
Bazin’s total image, his “myth of total cinema”, and given the following 
formula: the real of reality manifests itself in film and becomes graspable for 
human knowledge through film. What brings us to the movie theatre is the 
desire to access the real, in the form of image. Yet which part of the 
withdrawing domain of the real (or of “the world itself” 525) is actually accessed 
when we are watching a movie? 
 
 
 
 
4. Solaristic Allusion 
 
Still as an introduction and in order to understand the possibilities for 
applying Harman’s approach to the solaristic system, let me further explain 
Harman’s concept of allusion, before sketching the core of his philosophy, the 
quadruple object. What is most striking about Harman’s position is that he 
tries to deal with the real of objects and suggests an indirect form of 
encounter, which lies beyond their physical properties and beyond their effect 
on the human mind. Harman thereby claims an allusion to the real (we have 
mentioned the example of love), which he refers to together with “allure”. 
Since allure for Harman is connected to art, it will become one of the key 
concepts to focus on in our context. But let me address now the concept of 
                                                
523 Graham Harman, The Third Table, p. 12 
524 Ibid., p. 12 
525 Stanley Cavell, op. cit., pp. 101-102 
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allusion. In The Quadruple Object Harman elucidates that with allusion he 
means to indirectly designate that which lies beyond thought: 
 
We all know a way of speaking of a thing without quite speaking of it: namely 
we allude to it. To say ‘the tree that lies outside thinking’ is neither a 
successful statement about a thought nor a failed statement about a thing. 
Instead, it is an allusion to something that might be real but which cannot 
become fully present. And that is why philosophy is philosophia: love of 
wisdom rather than wisdom itself. The Philosophy of Access wants 
philosophy to be a wisdom about thought, when really it is a love of wisdom 
about that which lies beyond thought.526  
 
 “That which lies beyond thought” may then correspond to what other 
philosophers call the unthinkable – the Absolute (void), the Lacanian Real, 
and so on. Following this line of thought, allusion would then correspond to 
the solaristic principle of being without being, yet in the sense of a presence, 
which is absent because it lies beyond - “it cannot become fully present”. Is 
this the kind of presence, which has been designated as an “unfathomable 
abyss” (Cavell) and which lies between the thing and its reproduction (Bazin) 
in form of image? We have tried throughout to identify the abyss as 
something, which does not split, but unites the thing and its photographic 
depiction: it characterizes that from reality, which is reproduced in the 
photographed image, the mysterious transference of reality (Bazin). This real 
of reality in fact lies beyond and is never fully present: neither in the object, 
nor in its reproduction – yet it belongs to the being of entities. 
  Photography and film would then play out allusion in a special way: 
they refer to something beyond the presence of the picture and of the object, 
which is the real of the photographed object and not our sensory perception of 
it, in contradiction of what is generally thought about a photograph – that it 
reproduces the visually sensible. This kind of allusion is solaristic: the visitors 
refer to something beyond themselves, something which lies beyond thought, 
and which for Kelvin is accessed indirectly (the solaristic love). 
                                                
526 Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object, p.68 
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Yet film also is displaced perception, substituting the individual 
perceiver (the machine’s eye) by a collective, appropriating this perception. As 
such it gains independence from the perceiving subject, and is manifest as a 
real of its own: the domain of the sensual in film becomes object, gaining 
reality, just as Harey in “Solaris” learns to exist independently from Kelvin. 
The speculative real (in difference to the Lacanian Real) becomes then a 
solaristic concept in a cinematic way: On the planet Solaris, it is said that the 
visitors are stabilized neutrinos, in contemporary science called the “ghost 
particles” – a reification of the nothing. Such a mysterious existence 
challenges the rules of natural science, and is skeptically doubted by the 
humans in very different ways: as hallucination, evil trick and illusion. Love is 
thereby the allusive way of embracing the visitors, motivated by “allure”. 
   
In what follows I propose to introduce in more detail Harman’s quadruple 
structure of objects and their qualities. “Causation” and “allure” are thereby 
the two concepts of accessing the real, and thus become the most important 
ones in our context. They will be elaborated throughout this chapter. 
 
 
 
 
5. Harman’s Fourfold 
 
Harman emphasizes that the most important aspect when setting fourfold 
structures is the choice of the two main crossing axes, in order to determine 
pertinent tensions between them. He shows how for example Heidegger very 
early started to think in opposing poles and dual structures like light and 
shadow, veiling and unveiling, being as a whole and being something specific 
to another. Harman’s fourfold, which he mostly develops in his book The 
Quadruple Object is then grounded basically on the different analysis of 
“things” and “tools”, terms which Harman summarizes and extends as 
“objects”. On the one hand he is thereby relying on Edmund Husserl whom he 
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calls a “philosopher of presence”527, as he establishes a threefold between 
sensual objects and real and sensual qualities. On the other hand Harman 
refers to Heidegger whom he calls a “philosopher of absence”528.  
According to Harman, Heidegger establishes a threefold between real 
objects and real and sensual qualities. Through the example of the hammer 
he distinguishes “readiness-to-hand” (“Zuhandenheit” in Heidegger’s German 
terminology) and “presence-to-hand” (“Vorhandenheit”, a Heideggerian word 
creation as well). “The key difference is that he [Heidegger] replaces 
Husserl’s sensual objects with his own unique model of real ones. But these 
real objects complement sensual objects rather than replacing them.” 529 
Harman’s step consists in designating readiness-to-hand of tools (entities) as 
the real of objects, and their presence-to-hand as their sensual properties. He 
actually refers to the following quote of Heidegger in order to define 
readiness-to-hand: 
 
The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-
hand, it must, as it were, withdraw [zurückziehen] in order to be ready-to-
hand quite authentically. 530  
 
In fact (and supporting Harman’s position here), Heidegger refers, with this 
withdrawing of “readiness-to-hand”, to the “Being” of “these entities” (which is 
exactly not presence understood as the present). He elucidates the way in 
which he distinguishes the modes of presence-at-hand and readiness-to-
hand: 
 
 The kind of Being which belongs to these entities is readiness-to-hand. But 
this characteristic is not to be understood as merely a way of taking them, as 
if we were talking such ‘aspects’ into the ‘entities’ which we proximally 
encounter, or as if some world-stuff which is proximally present-at-hand in 
                                                
527 Ibid., p. 35 
528 Ibid., p. 35 
529 Ibid., p. 36 
530 Martin Heidegger, op. cit., p. 99 (quoted by Graham Harman, op. cit. p. 38) 
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itself were ‘given subjective colouring’ in this way. Such an interpretation 
would overlook the fact that in this case these entities would have to be 
understood and discovered beforehand as something purely present-at-hand 
(…). To lay bare what is just present-at-hand and no more, cognition must 
first penetrate beyond what is ready-to-hand in our concern. Readiness-to-
hand is the way in which entities as they are ‘in themselves’ are defined 
ontologico-categorically. Yet only by reason of something present-at-hand, is 
‘there’ anything ready-to-hand. 531 
 
This means that Heidegger’s enquiry into the “Being” of tools (as 
entities) reflects his philosophy in arguing against the present of presence, in 
maintaining that being is not presence in the sense of referring to one mode of 
time – the present. The Being of the entities “as they are in themselves” is 
readiness-to-hand. They have a mode of being in themselves, and that is why 
we can compare the term with that which we have elaborated in chapter X of 
this analysis as “presence of what is present”, “presence itself” or as dwelling 
in the ecstases of temporality. In opposition their present presence is 
presence-to-hand. Curiously Heidegger sets a relation of dependence 
between something being present-at-hand and it being ready-to-hand: 
presence-at-hand conditions readiness-at-hand and not the other way around. 
This means that readiness-to-hand is completely secluded, so secluded that it 
is void or nothing, yet it can come into existence by presence-at-hand. 
Harman deduces: “entities withdraw into a silent underground while also 
exposing themselves to presence.” 532 He underlines that this is not only true 
for tools, and this gives ground for his signification “objects”. Thereby he 
shows that Heidegger establishes a threefold between real objects and real 
and sensual qualities, ignoring thereby the sensual objects (of Husserl). As 
the following graphic shows, the real object has sensual features (which are 
present-at-hand), but also real features (and this relation Harman compares to 
the Leibnizian monads). 
                                                
531 Martin Heidegger., op. cit., p. 101 
532 Graham Harman., op. cit., p. 39 
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533 
 
Yet for Harman, Husserl’s idea of a sensual object complements the notion of 
Heidegger’s real objects.   He argues that “while there may be an infinity of 
objects in the cosmos, they come in only two kinds: the real object that 
withdraws from all experience, and the sensual object that exists only in 
experience.” 534  The sensual object as Husserl describes it, according to 
Harman, appears in consciousness. It thereby is establishing complementary 
relations to the ones of real objects, as the next graphic shows: sensual 
objects have real features (“eidetic traits”), which only can be accessed 
indirectly, and “various shifting sensual profiles”, which are accidental. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            535 
 
                                                
533 Ibid., p. 48 
534 Ibid., p. 49 
535 Ibid., p. 33 
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In fact, Harman joins real objects and sensual objects and joins both of them 
into one fourfold structure, relying on a network of relations. Harman then 
counts four main relations composing this fourfold structure: “time (SO-SQ) as 
in Husserl’s adumbrations, space (RO-SQ) as in Heidegger’s tool-analysis, 
essence (RO-RQ) as in Leibniz monads, and eidos (SO-RQ) as in Husserl’s 
eidetic intuition.” 536     
 537   
 
Yet all together, the whole structure is based on ten possible links or tensions:                                                              
 
 538 
                                                
536 Ibid., p. 99 
537 Ibid., p. 114  
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In what follows I will ignore the detailed names and descriptions Harman gives 
as to this network of relations. Although Harman’s system is interesting as an 
example of dynamic tensions and relations in quadruple structures on reality, 
in the solaristic system, we will rely on the relations and concepts we have 
been determining so far.  Yet I consider it useful to explain the four main 
tensions, including – again – the most basic terms, in the following summary, 
in spite of the danger of becoming repetitive. According to Harman there are: 
 
- Real objects – they are in the world, yet they are mysterious, deep, 
independent from perception; they withdraw, are secluded, even from 
each other, they are “devoid of  contact”. 539 
- Sensual objects – images: they only exist insofar as a perceiver is 
occupied with them, they are mental and can be even imaginary, like 
for example monsters. 
 
These two kind of objects have then two kinds of qualities associated with 
them, real and sensual ones, and tensions exist between all four. Thereby 
Harman distinguishes four main tensions: 
 
- The struggle between real things and real qualities is called essence. 
“(E)ssence is never directly knowable.” 540 It “happens elsewhere” 541. 
Thereby I propose that essence is the kind of real, which we can never 
reach, but which is there, the real of reality of the solaristic system. 
This is of course an idea to be followed up later. 
- Sensual objects and sensual qualities “do not withdraw from access” 
542. They are part of experience and as such they are vacillating. The 
                                                                                                                                      
538 Ibid., p. 78 
539 Graham Harman, Bells and Whistles, p. 63 
540 Ibid., p. 62 
541 Ibid., p. 66 
542 Ibid., p. 63 
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“fissure” 543  between them is time (guaranteeing stability from one 
moment to the next one).  
- The tension between sensual objects and real qualities is called eidos 
(“Gestalt” in German) and is accessed by allure in form of fusion. 
- The tension between real objects and sensual qualities is space, 
described as “tension between the accessibility of things at any 
distance” 544  
 
But this is not all. These main links can break, be disturbed or paired, in 
short: become their opposites. The disturbances of the tensions appear 
then in the form of fission or fusion and happen when “a real or sensual 
object is paired with real or sensual qualities” 545, for example when real 
objects are pairing with real qualities. Furthermore “the disturbance in the 
bond between a sensual object and its real or sensual qualities can occur 
only by splitting a bond that already exists – a kind of fission.” 546  A 
disruption to the regular condition of the domain of the real would be then 
not a fissure, but a fusion with the domain of the sensual: “Thus, instead of 
breaking a pre-existent bond between an object and its qualities, we must 
produce a tension that did not pre-exist its production. I can call this 
process fusion.”547 Fusion occurs in the kind of links, which have formerly 
been characterized as struggling with each other. 
 
 
 
 
 
             
                                                
543 Ibid., p. 65 
544 Ibid., p. 78 
545 Ibid., p. 68 
546 Ibid., p. 68 
547 Ibid., p. 69 
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                      548 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fusion occurs in two different ways: 
 
1. In form of “causation”: At another point of his work Harman also speaks 
of “vicarious causation” 549 , which has to do with the indirect and 
allusive access to objects. Harman summarizes causation as the 
opposite of essence: “When real objects are fused with real qualities 
allied with it for the first time, we can speak of causation, since this is 
where consequences unfold for the world.” 550  
2. In form of “allure”: “As a general term for the fusion of withdrawn real 
objects with accessible surface [sensual] qualities, we can use the 
word allure.”551  It is the opposite of essence defined as the tension 
between real objects and real qualities, which is beyond of any kind of 
experience. Allure is the most interesting tension for the solaristic 
system, as it is described as a seductive power alluding to the 
mysterious depths of things beyond its sensual qualities and 
descriptive thought (– truth beyond thought). It is a kind of fusion, which 
                                                
548 Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object, p. 107 
549 Graham Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things, p. 
169 
550 Graham Harman, Bells and Whistles, p. 69 
551 Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object, p. 104 
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occurs in works of art. “Allure is the presence of objects to each other 
in absent form.” 552 
 
In what follows we will see how essence, causation and allure are closely 
related and how these concepts matter for the solaristic system. 
 
 
 
 
6. On Essence, Causation and Allure 
 
We have seen how two aspects of Heidegger’s being-in-the-world are of 
special importance for the solaristic ontology of film: on the one hand there is 
the inevitable finitude of Dasein and on the other hand we have the “mode of 
sight from which Heidegger begins his analysis of Being-in-the-world”553, as 
Stanley Cavell puts it. A sight where, according to Cavell, the “worldhood of the 
world” would be “announcing itself”, is exactly where disruption takes place, for 
example a tool breaking. There “the mode of sight then brought forth discovers 
objects in what Heidegger notes as their conspicuousness, their obtrusiveness, 
and their obstinacy.”554 This obstinacy of objects is, according to Cavell, to be 
found in film (although not “All cinematic images carry this force” 555  of “the 
worldhood of the world announcing itself” 556), and I will consider this aspect 
from a slightly different angle: I will argue, following Harman – who gives the 
broken tool a reading opposite to Cavell’s557 – the ensuing: that which Cavell 
                                                
552 Graham Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things, p. 
245 
553 Stanley Cavell, Cavell on Film, p. 2 
554 Ibid., p. 2 
555 Ibid., p. 2 
556 Ibid., p. 2 
557 “A second scenario that Heidegger describes as present-at-hand is that of the ‘broken 
tool’, which no longer functions invisibly but now intrudes or awareness. The broken lamp, 
desk, or hammer now lying before me are perhaps independent of my invisible practical 
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states concerning objects present-at-hand should be applied to the objects 
ready-to-hand. Therefore I would rather compare the “obstinacy of objects” 
(carrying the force of “the worldhood of the world announcing itself” 558) to 
Harman’s idea of essence: the tension between real objects and real qualities.  
Harman calls Heidegger a monotonous philosopher: “Heidegger has 
almost no other subject than the constant reversal between absence and 
presence, or tool and broken tool.”559 Yet this monotony highlights Harman’s 
ambition to let Heidegger emerge in a completely new light: “Instead of a 
pragmatist, a philosopher of time, or a thinker who reduces reality to its 
accessibility to human Dasein, he emerges as a realist metaphysician.” 560 This 
idea would free Heidegger in the sense that “Heidegger leads us to realism” 561 
from his being read as a correlationist philosopher – but maybe Heidegger could 
equally lead us to transcendental materialism as well? As we have mentioned, 
but will emphasize here, the crucial point for both hypotheses is that 
Heidegger’s presence-at-hand of the object corresponds, according to Harman, 
to the Husserlian phenomenon, which is “reducing a thing to its accessibility to 
consciousness”. 562  
Yet Harman underlines, that this is only one side of Husserl’s 
phenomenon. The other is the one designated in Harman’s fourfold as the 
relation between sensual objects and real qualities, called eidos. Yet as we 
have already sketched, eidos is completely different from allure – the broken 
link between real objects (readiness-to-hand) and sensual qualities (presence 
to hand) - which is the term with which Harman introduces aesthetics in his 
structure. 
According to Harman, the domain of the real is withdrawing from any 
possible relation of access: “If there were nothing but real objects and real 
                                                                                                                                      
activity, but in no way are they independent of me.” (Cf. Graham Harman, The Quadruple 
Object, p. 53) 
558 Stanley Cavell, op. cit., p. 2 
559 Graham Harman, op. cit., p. 51 
560 Ibid., p. 51 
561 Ibid., p. 51 
562 Ibid., p. 52 
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qualities, there would be no experience and no causal relations at all. Everything 
would withdraw into private seclusion, devoid of contact.” 563  But then he 
continues: “We know them [the real qualities of real objects] indirectly, 
allusively.”564 That is why, a disruption to the regular condition of the domain of 
the real is needed, although not as a fissure, but as a fusion with the domain of 
the sensual. This kind of fusion is what Harman names allure: “When this occurs 
between a withdrawn real object and its sensual qualities, we can speak of 
allure, since there is something allusive about the way the object signals to 
us.”565  
That the alluring qualities can only be grasped indirectly would then be 
our way to know the real object allusively: “Allure is the presence of objects to 
each other in absent form.” 566 This reminds of course the solaristic principle of 
being without being, and the presence of absence of the objects in film, 
mentioned by Cavell. Harman is, in fact, very interested in works of art as a 
form of producing a special kind of allure, aesthetic perception would then be 
that which goes beyond thought and a way to access the impossible. 
However, Harman does not refer to film in any of his texts. Let us therefore try 
to understand better what Harman means with his definition of allure that 
seems to fit so well into the solaristic system: 
 
What we find in allure are absent objects signaling from beyond—from a level 
of reality that we do not currently occupy and can never occupy, since it 
belongs to the object itself and not to any relation we could ever have with it. 
Allure is the presence of objects to each other in absent form. It is the alpha 
factor of the universe, found in all objects from the ground up, but gradually 
built up into increasingly larger and more intricate shapes. (…) Allure is the 
fission of sensual objects, replacing them with real ones. It is also the 
                                                
563 Graham Harman, Bells and Whistles, p. 63  
564 Ibid., p. 64 
565 Ibid., p. 69 
566 Graham Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things, p. 
245 - 246 
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principle of all concreteness, insofar as it points to objects apart from all 
relational impact that they have on us.567  
 
This is exactly what happens on the planet Solaris with the visitors: they were 
sensual objects, perceptive memories, and by human allure, they have 
become real images, real objects. This is how Harey emerges. We might as 
well speak of solaristic causation here. Indeed, allure and causation are 
nearly the same for Harman: “causation and allure are so closely related that 
they turn out to be one and the same.” 568  
Harman calls causation the fusion between real objects and real 
qualities, which normally withdraw in essence. This inaccessible essence, for 
Harman, “can never come to view”.569 Yet causation is different from essence, 
as it is not the withdrawing tension, but the fusion, thus the disturbance of 
essence; and in this sense an event in an area, which has to remain 
eventless, yet occurring in this domain of the real: “But when real objects are 
fused with real qualities allied with it for the first time, we can speak of 
causation, since this is where consequences unfold for the world.”570 
Allure and causation as solaristic tenets should be thought further. In 
what follows I will claim that the real image (carrying the real of reality) results 
from an event of disruption and thus I propose to conceive the real image as a 
consequence of causation. The real image has sensual qualities itself: it is the 
part, which I perceive of it. In order to transfer the image as an event into 
Harman’s vocabulary I could argue the following: ‘invisible light fuses with 
matter’ is to be set equal to Harman’s formula ‘the real quality (invisibility) 
fuses with the real object’.  
Through causation the cinematic image emerges; the cinematic is not, I 
have to emphasize, as the Harman’s approach would suggest, a sensual 
quality of a sensual object, “reducing a thing to its accessibility to 
                                                
567 Ibid., p. 245 -246 (our emphasis) 
568 Ibid., p. 214 
569 Graham Harman, Bells and Whistles, p. 69 
570 Ibid., p. 69 
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consciousness” 571 (Husserl). Would it be such a sensual quality, even of a 
real object, no disruption or event would cause its existence. The film image 
thus conceals essence, and I break into this essence allusively by allure. I 
think that somehow this claim is not very different from the claim of Cavell we 
have quoted in the beginning of this passage. I recall: “All cinematic images 
carry this force” 572  of “the worldhood of the world announcing itself” 573 – a 
term which in Heidegger’s “Thing” lecture and the fourfold has turned into the 
worlding of the world. 
 
 
 
 
7. The Hypothesis of a Solaristic Fourfold 
 
The solaristic system consists in the proposal to establish cinema as a special 
catalyst to sense the real of reality or the real of objects, a domain, which is 
sealed, at the same that it is carried by the real of film image. This domain of 
withdrawal is also the domain of the planet Solaris. The reasons are manifold, 
and lie in the consonance of this thesis with the philosophy of Heidegger, the 
philosopher of presence and absence, and already this confers on him a 
special relevance for film. Yet the primary resemblance with Heidegger’s 
fourfold structure stands out as the main reason why I propose to consider the 
hypothesis of a solaristic fourfold, that is, to consider the possibility for 
presenting a schematized summary of the solaristic system as a fourfold 
structure.  
Just as “Solaris”, Heidegger’s fourfold is described in an allegoric way: 
The jug, through which he introduces the thing and its fourfoldness work like a 
metaphor for reality, or for “the world’s worlding” 574 , which remains 
                                                
571 Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object, p. 52 
572 Stanley Cavell, op. cit., p. 2 
573 Ibid., p. 2 
574 Martin Heidegger, “The Thing”, in: Poetry, Language, Thought , p. 175 
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inexplicable, unless explained by the fourfold, which is onefold at the same 
time. I recall: 
 
This appropriating mirror-play of the simple onefold of earth and sky, divinities 
and mortals, we call the world. The world presences by worlding. That means: 
the world’s worlding cannot be explained by anything else nor can it be 
fathomed through anything else. (…) The united four are already strangled in 
their essential nature when we think of them only as separate realities, which 
are to be grounded in and explained by one another. 575 
 
The description of mortals, gods, sky and earth are the allegoric, poetic as 
well as a narrative outline of the world’s worlding. In “Solaris” this worlding 
reaches its cinematic version: it is reproduced worlding. Yet the film functions 
as a catalyst of this reflection in the sense that the fourfold reminds the 
narrative of “Solaris”. Its structure relies on the fourfold of humans, visitors, 
planet and earth, and each object in the film reflects this fourfold.  
The solaristic poles correspond to the ones of Heidegger’s fourfold as 
follows: 
 First, Earth – it remains earth in the solaristic system. It is the dwelling 
place of the mortals, which are described in the Thing-lecture as being on 
Earth and under the sky. Simultaneously Earth “is the building bearer, 
nourishing with its fruits, tending water and rock, plant and animal.” 576 As 
Harman underlines, Earth will always exist without the human presence and 
therefore its real remains withdrawing. Yet it is the experience of Earth, which 
permits an indirect access. Maybe earth in the movie corresponds to nature or 
the cosmos, which is fragile, as Kelvin’s father says, yet impossible to be 
known. 
 Second, the sky: In Heidegger’s fourfold it opposes Earth. The sky is full 
of sensual objects, we see images on the sky. This is the planet Solaris in the 
film, from which we always see the sensual, liquid surface: “The sky is the 
sun’s path, the course of the moon, the wandering glitter of the stars, the 
                                                
575 Ibid., pp. 177-178 
576 Ibid., p. 176  
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year’s seasons, the light and dusk of day, the gloom and glow of night, the 
clemency and inclemency of the weather, the drifting clouds and blue depth of 
the ether.”577 
 Third, the gods/divinities of Heidegger’s fourfold are the visitors in 
“Solaris”, not in an individual shape like Harey, but that which all of them 
(even all the multiple Hareys, the girl, the mother, etc. have in common. In 
fact, Heidegger’s description would fit perfectly a description of them: “The 
divinities are the beckoning messengers of the godhead. Out of the hidden 
sway of the divinities the god emerges as what he is, which removes him from 
any comparison with beings that are present.” 578 The godhead in the movie is 
the solaristic substance, which is different from the planet: maybe the real of 
reality. 
 Fourth: Heidegger’s mortals. They are the human beings, the scientists 
in the movie, but again they do not present individuals, but the principle of 
mortality. They tend for being as a whole – and thus they always are driven by 
the need for understanding, they study the planet and the visitors. The human 
beings are characterized as those who die, and this is astonishingly true for 
the scientists in “Solaris”. Harey has to learn how to die, presence finally 
“Being as Being”, just as Heidegger describes: 
 
The mortals are the human beings. They are called mortals because they can 
die. To die means to be capable of death as death. (…) Death is the shrine of 
Nothing, that is, of that which in every respect is never something that merely 
exists, but which nevertheless presences, even as the mystery of Being itself. 
As the shrine of Nothing, death harbors within itself the presencing of Being. As 
the shrine of Nothing, death is the shelter of Being. We now call mortals mortals 
– not because their earthly life comes to an end, but because they are capable 
of death as death. Mortals are who they are, as mortals, present in the shelter 
of Being. They are presencing relation to Being as Being.579 
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The whole of “Solaris” presents the world’s worlding as film, Being as Being in 
a film. Due to its deathlike nature, film then becomes the shelter of Nothing, 
as well as the shelter of Being. The complex interaction of four poles has 
been developed by Harman as a network of bonds between sensual objects 
with sensual qualities and real objects with real qualities. Yet the solaristic 
fourfold of space station, planet, scientists and visitors involves bonds and 
dualities of its own, embedded in the solaristic ontology of film. The main 
concepts of the solaristic system and that which has been described in it so 
far as conceptual personae will be outlined as a solaristic fourfold structure, in 
the next chapter, concluding this analysis. 
As a conclusion of this chapter, I will give some preview of the solaristic 
fourfold structure, namely concerning the underlying question that drives this 
chapter: What happens to objects in film? And relying on the perspective of 
this chapter - what happens to Harman’s fourfold when applied to film? What 
remains of Harman’s objects when they become reproduced as photographic 
images in motion? The answer that they capture the pure sensual qualities of 
sensual objects is by far too flat. In accordance with my preceding analysis I 
will argue that the image of film is something different and much more 
complex, yet I will still try to retain some of Harman’s terminology.  
Similarly to Harman, I propose to understand objects in the solaristic 
context as the interface between us as sensory perceivers and reality as it is; 
objects are all entities there possibly are and their real withdraws from our 
intelligible grasp. The solaristic real of reality resembles the infinite and void 
real (“the shrine of Nothing”) we have been dealing with so far; an infinite 
Being as manifold as the perceptions, sensual properties or images that we 
can make of it, inaccessible in its infinity, tending towards the impossible real 
image (an image of the whole of reality, which does not exist). It is my aim to 
ground, within the solaristic system, this withdrawal of the infinite, which 
composes the real and which changes the concept of image: just as light is, in 
our comprehension, a dimension of its own that belongs neither to matter nor 
to time, so is the photographic image in film not just a sensual object or 
property, but a fusion of the real. In this sense I think it is possible to apply 
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Harman’s terminology to our concept of the real image. I thus have proposed 
to try to think about the real image as a causation as well as allure. 
The real image itself has sensual qualities: it is the part of it which we 
perceive. Yet not even an image of reality can be reduced, as in Harman’s 
approach, to the sensual object or to the Husserlian phenomenon, “reducing a 
thing to its accessibility to consciousness”.  
I will then propose to continue with the following question: What is an 
image for the solaristic fourfold? I will argue that an image is an own pole in 
the quadruple solaristic structure, that of the messengers, that of the gods or 
of the ghosts: they are images and they come from the sphere of the real. 
How does such an idea emerge? From memory, as a contraction of the real 
(in the sense of Bergson). Harey is image, with all its cinematic, ontological 
implications.  
I further propose that we can think of the visitors not only as neutrinos 
(ghost particles of nothing), but as photons, also known as the particles of 
light; new experiments in contemporary science point out that photons can be 
created out of the vacuum or out of nothing. The metaphor of light (as 
reflection on matter as well as of matter) relies on physical science where 
visible and invisible light is distinguished. Physics explains visible light as 
disrupted invisible light, as a kind of accident: the rupture is due to a 
confrontation with matter. Invisible light is a constant and infinite traveler in 
time and space. As it cannot pass matter, it has to transcend matter: light then 
bears image. This event of the image causes the visibility of matter and is a 
source of truth. Light hitting matter constantly emits images, thereby pointing 
the existence of matter. An image is nevertheless just a single slice out of an 
invisible multifold, which in the solaristic system, is the whole of all possible 
images, the real – or a white hole of the whole of images. This brings us to 
formulate the next solaristic tenet, one regarding image and light: the idea of 
the real image as an event. It complements the solaristic claim of the real 
image, which has been determined as follows: the real of reality manifests 
itself in film and becomes graspable for human knowledge through film.  
In order to transfer the image as an event into Harman’s vocabulary 
one could argue the following: ‘the fusing of invisible light with matter’ is to be 
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equated with ‘the real quality (invisible light) fusing with the real object 
(matter)’. The image would then be the result of causation, and not, I have to 
repeat this, as the common understanding proposes, a sensual quality of an 
object. The image is the object in the solaristic system, which expands its 
Bergsonian grounding. Moreover, we have reflected on being and the sense 
in which we can say the following: the image conveys that which Harman 
would describe as essence of the real object and its real qualities, but is 
accessible in form of allure. We know this essence allusively. Artworks 
operating with the sensual qualities of images would then produce allure.  
Cinema possesses thereby this double nature of being real in a double 
sense: as film reproduces the real image made of light, conveying essence, 
and it alludes, as a work of art, to the real object. Cinema does not only 
reproduce the sensual qualities of real objects – it searches in its own 
reproduction of objects for the real of objects, including that which we have 
called the real of reality. Cinema reproduces essence - the tension between 
real qualities of real objects – it seeks to write reality with reality, and awakens 
in the spectator a desire for this essence, the love and desire for the real, the 
irresistible search for truth, thereby producing allure.  
In the history of Western thought light is often regarded as a metaphor 
for truth; I understand truth as that which I have called and developed 
throughout as the real of reality. Light as a metaphor for truth and as the 
material quality of film establishes the solaristic system as a philosophy of 
light. Solaris is literally a radiating film and a radiating planet and the visitors 
might as well be not neutrinos, as the scientists in the film suggest, but 
photons or what I call the real image.  
It is at this point and in this sense, that solaristic philosophy suggests a 
completion of Harman’s fourfold. The guiding question thereby is: does an 
image need a perceiver in order to exist? The solaristic system, designed by 
an understanding in which real objects are images, rejects such a hypothesis.  
Trying to refute such rejection, one could argue that Harman describes 
sensual objects as emanating sensual qualities; he distinguishes certain 
qualities, which do not vary, and which transmit permanence. These are 
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“certain invariant qualities for experience”580 of sensual objects. Harman calls 
them eidoses, inspired by Husserl’s “eidetic reduction: “Thus we can use the 
term eidos for the tension between sensual objects and their real qualities”581.  
I will argue against such an interpretation: If the image would transport 
eidoses, real qualities of sensual objects, then it would be detached from the 
real object, and there would be no real image – which in our understanding 
transports essence. Solaristic philosophy, and I have attempted to give 
different approaches throughout this treatise to sustain such a thesis, argues 
that image is essence (in the sense of Harman): a tension between real object 
and real quality. Consequently, an image cannot be known in its totality, which 
echoes Tarkovsky’s claim: “The image is an impression of the truth, a glimpse 
of the truth permitted to us in our blindness.”582  
 
The endeavor of solaristic philosophy literally aims at a philosophy of 
light and infinity, of image and immateriality, of presence and projection, of 
absence and the void, and finally, also that of death and finitude. In the next 
chapter we will draw the outline of the solaristic system as a fourfold structure, 
describing its links and relations between the four poles. 
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Chapter XVI. 
Conclusions and Cardinal Tenets  
of the Solaristic System 
 
 
 
1. Philosophy and Fiction 
 
Any fictive system relies on imagined principles but cannot do so in an 
unstructured or in an arbitrary way – it has to do so intentionally. Even a fictive 
system requires logical coherence and credibility.  It can work in terms of 
metaphorical connotation as a model of explanation of reality, just as 
Heidegger’s fourfold does. The solaristic proposal of ontology of film relies on 
that possibility; it appropriates a fictional film (the movie “Solaris” by 
Tarkovsky) to develop a model of explanation of reality as a metaphorical 
system with an epistemological outcome. This idea actually goes back to Paul 
Ricouer, who has shown that reality adapts to our models of explanation: 
concerning reality, the models of science would function like metaphors in 
poetry. By “redescribing” reality they modify what they refer to. Ricouer 
grounds his theory on Mary Hesse:  
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[S]he says that ‘the deductive model of scientific explanation should be 
modified and supplemented by a view of theoretical explanation as 
metaphoric redescription of the domain of the explanandum’ (249).  
This thesis incorporates two special emphases. The first applies to the word 
explanation. If the model, like the metaphor, introduces a new language, its 
description equals explanation. (…) The second emphasis of the thesis of 
Mary Hesse focuses on the word redescription. ‘Things themselves are ‘seen 
as’; they are identified, in a way that remains to be specified, with the 
descriptive character of the model. The explanandum as ultimate referent is 
itself changed by adoption of the metaphor. One must be willing, therefore, to 
reject the idea of an invariance of meaning with respect to the explanandum 
and move towards a ‘realistic’ view of the theory of interaction. Not just our 
conception of rationality, but at the same time that of reality is thrown open to 
question: as Hesse says, ‘rationality consists just in the continuous adaptation 
of our language to our continually expanding world, and metaphor is one of 
the chief means by which this is accomplished’.583 
 
What Ricoeur explains here underpins the epistemological viability of our 
model of analysis. Ricoeur asserts that we actually shape reality by 
metaphorical models of explanation. What he deduces resembles an intra-
active model, which reminds Barad’s proposal of intra-activity of thought and 
matter (see chapter XIII of this analysis). Yet Ricoeur’s assertion implies that 
we do not measure but make up these explanations, which seem to fit reality 
as they shape reality, in a metaphorical way, i.e. by fictional input: We create 
reality by the way we think about it. This hypothesis also evokes Žižek’s 
position that the Real is partially fiction because “reality has to be 
supplemented by fiction: to conceal its emptiness”584, as well as his claim that 
“reality is not even thinkable without subjectivity”.585 
 At the same time, the metaphorical redescription of reality is reminiscent of 
Harman’s concept of allusion. 
                                                
583 (Cf. Paul Ricoeur, The rule of Metaphor: The Creation of Meaning in Language, pp. 286-
287) 
584 Slavoj Žižek, op. cit., p. 4 
585 Ibid., p. 905  
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The solaristic system is building on the implications of Ricoeur’s 
assertion, since it is deliberately setting a fictional system as a metaphor for 
the ontological nature of film and as a model of explanation of reality. The 
“solaristic conclusions” are grounded on a set of insights received from the 
analysis of the movie “Solaris” in dialogue with certain, well-selected positions 
of contemporary and modern philosophy. The obtained insights are treated as 
philosophical models of explanation of reality and will be summarized in a 
fourfold structure.  
This method obviously implies that we have been “reading” into a film, 
a piece of fiction, in a way as we would have been reading into a written work 
of philosophy. It also means that we are raising, in dialogue with other works 
of philosophy, new kind of philosophical input, impossible to access without 
the film. This input is about the nature of reality, reflecting on the nature of film 
as a reproduction of reality, as well as a production of reality. 
Our endeavor therefore has been to process the movie’s inherent 
aesthetic sentiments and principles of thought into an epistemic setting 
centered on correlated concepts like matter, motion, being, reality, world, 
objects, time, space, image, light, projection, reflection, diffraction, perception, 
death, the (in)finite, the real, the void and nothing. These concepts are 
fundamental if we are to dwell on the nature of film and simultaneously 
determine our understanding of reality. We have regarded “Solaris” so far to 
be self-reflexive on the medium of film and therefore to unfurl questions on the 
nature of reality, which can only be raised by a film. These questions are 
enquiring into film’s ontological nature and into that of reality.  
What we have been describing in chapter III (in the introduction of this 
analysis), makes more sense now: Following Cavell and Epstein we have 
asserted that film makes us think about certain antagonisms (we have 
complemented the list and named 13 pairs), i.e. that film catalyzes certain 
principles of thought. Film is constituted and well characterized by these 
principles of thought. I would like to conclude this analysis by dividing the 13 
listed antagonisms into four major groups. As has been confirmed throughout, 
these groups reflect the scope of analysis and help us to structure the 
summary outline of the solaristic fourfold.  
  
292 
The first group is focused on being and non-being, the second on the 
opposition between inner and outer reality, the third on reality and appearance 
or presence and absence whereas the fourth is based on the opposition of 
flow and break. The four groups of oppositional pairs are as follows: 
 
I. Existence and inexistence of any reality, being and nothing 
II. Matter and mind, objects and perception, subject and object, 
world and thought 
III. Appearance and reality, image and reality, presence and 
absence 
IV. Continuity and discontinuity, movement and stasis, space and 
time, life and death 
 
The movie “Solaris” as a self-reflexive device of cinema conveys these 
antagonisms in a double sense. It questions the epistemological limits of 
knowledge and of exact science - as a film and as a narrative work of art. The 
movie emphasizes the incapacity of science to grasp and to deal with what is 
real – similar to how Heidegger in What is metaphysics? uncovers the inability 
of science to deal with the nothing. In order to understand what is really 
happening on this mysterious planet Solaris, the movie “Solaris” inquires into 
existential issues which are “on the edge” like death, love, existence, nothing 
and truth, juxtaposing imagination and actuality, emotion and reason. The 
movie therefore mirrors the purpose of this analysis, whose conclusions aim to 
write out a summary of the cardinal tenets of the solaristic system as a 
fourfold structure.  
Do the four groups of antagonist pairs we have just named correspond 
to the solaristic fourfold as has been developed in the last chapter by relying 
on Heidegger’s fourfold? I propose to assess the pairs by providing the 
following fourfold attributions: 
 
I. Existence and inexistence of any reality, being and nothing – is 
attributed to “earth” 
II. Reality and mind, objects and perception, subject and object, 
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world and thought – is attributed to “the planet” 
III. Appearance and reality, image and matter, presence and 
absence – is attributed to “the visitors” 
IV. Continuity and discontinuity, movement and stasis, space and 
time, life and death – is attributed to “the mortals” (the human 
beings) 
 
Why do I propose at all to keep antagonisms within the four poles of this 
structure? Besides Epstein and Cavell, this choice has to do with the 
oppositional structure Harman deduces from Heidegger’s tool analysis, 
opposing readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand, the sealed and the 
unsealed, the withdrawn real and the sensual actual. The presence-absence 
dichotomy is also one of the most important concepts for Heidegger, Harman 
going so far as to defend the claim that it is the “monotonous” principle of 
Heidegger’s whole oeuvre. We have been reflecting on Heidegger’s parousia 
for being as dwelling, therefore as conditioning its own presence and absence 
in various terms. The constantly antagonizing dichotomy is reflected within 
each of the four poles of the solaristic system. In the solaristic system reality 
exists and does not exist, image and matter as well as presence and absence 
do not oppose, death is a part of life (for we are constantly dying) and vice 
versa, being and nothing shelter each other, and so on.  
We have seen that Harman compares Heidegger’s “readiness-to-hand” of 
tools with what he calls the real objects, and “presence–at-hand” with the 
sensual objects. For the solaristic system, we propose a comparison of these 
Heideggerian’s terms with Deleuze’s virtuals and actuals of the plane of 
immanence. Presence-to-hand would then correspond to the actuals and the 
virtuals would correspond to readiness-to-hand in the following sense:  
 
The actual is defined by this passing of the present. But the virtual's 
ephemerality appears in a smaller space of time than that which marks the 
minimum movement in a single direction. This is why the virtual is 
'ephemeral', but the virtual also preserves the past, since that ephemerality is 
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continually making minute adjustments in response to changes of 
direction.586  
 
The solaristic system does not propose directly to compare the ephemerality 
of Deleuze’s virtual with Harman’s withdrawing real. It establishes its bridge to 
Heidegger’s concepts, in order to approach the mysterious ‘being without 
being’ that dominates the ontological character of the film image.  
 
In what follows I will elucidate the implicit solaristic principles of each 
pole of the fourfold structure in form of a catalogue of theses, based on what 
has been said throughout the thesis, filling in some aspects which emerge in 
consequence of the fourfold structure. These solaristic theses constitute a 
concluding summary of the solaristic philosophy of film. What there is to say 
about it has been said before, although I will complement it with some further 
perspectives for future analysis. The network of relations designed for defining 
the solaristic system also brings it closer to the network described by 
Foucault’s apparatus or “dispositif”, designating an organized “system of 
relations” between the elements of a “heterogeneous ensemble” (all kind of 
possible thoughts and forms)587.  
 
 
 
  
                                                
586 Gilles Deleuze, Claire Parnet, “The Actual and the Virtual“, in: Dialogues II, Continuum, pp. 
112-5 
587 See: Michel Foucault, op.cit., p. 194 
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3. 45 Theses on the Solaristic System 
 
1. Solaristic philosophy processes the inherent principles of thought of the 
movie “Solaris” of Andrei Tarkovsky into an epistemic infrastructure, which 
is centered on film and called the solaristic system; film is thereby 
understood as the reproduction of reality. Therefore, the solaristic system 
enquires into what is understood as reality. 
2. It is a property of reality to be reproducible through film; thereby it does not 
make sense to speak of reality as a closed entity. It should rather 
conceptually be established as open, in constant change and expansion by 
measurement, subjectivity and fiction. In this sense the solaristic system 
defines an openly void and multiple real, infinitely divisible in images, also 
referred to as a white hole of the whole of images. Some images are equal 
to matter, others remain immaterial, such as the images of film.  
3. Film is a part of reality, as well as a producer. The cinematograph is an 
intra-active agent of worldmaking measurement, in the sense of Karen 
Barad’s quantum ontology. 
4. The solaristic system is structured as a fourfold. 
5. Each of its four poles, which are earth, planet, visitors and humans, 
contain an oppositional tension in itself. Therefore, each of the four poles 
behaves like a principle rather than a static entity.  
6. The four poles correspond to the four main conceptual personae of 
“Solaris”: they embody and convey the conceptual solaristic key-notions.  
7. Through the dramatic conflicts between the conceptual personae we can 
establish a conceptual field of solaristic tensions. These tensions are 
oppositional and lie in each of the four poles. 
8. The pole of the visitors has Harey as conceptual persona. Harey is the 
presence of that which is absent. Harey is immortal, she cannot die by 
herself. She is annihilated with the help of the scientists; thus her condition 
of being is dissolved. 
9. The pole of the planet is the fluid surface, the solaristic ocean and its foggy 
emanations and shining radiations, but also the solaristic brain. As a 
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conceptual persona it is the antagonist to Kelvin and an organic apparatus 
machine. Part of the solaristic brain lies in the visitors. 
10. The conceptual persona, which has not been named so far as such is 
earth, another pole of the solaristic system. Earth is nature in the movie, 
the unknown which is feared and loved: the moving seaweed, the bushes 
and grasses in the opening, the horse the boy sees in the stables, the rain 
in which Kelvin gets wet. It is also referred to as “cosmos” and associated 
with fragility – so Kelvin’s angry father asserts in the beginning, by 
claiming that one has no right to destroy that, which one cannot 
understand.  
11. The humans, who are the fourth pole, apparently come to Solaris to study 
other worlds. But that which they do not understand is nature, earth, that 
which stands for the world.  As Snaut says: “I have to say that we don’t 
want to conquer any cosmos. We want to extend the earth to the utmost 
frontiers of the cosmos. We don’t know what to do with other worlds. We 
need a mirror. We’re struggling to make contact, but never find it.”588 That 
is why the earth is sealed in the solaristic system. 
12. Earth is the place where humans are dwelling, where their being-in-the 
world unfolds. Humans are driven to understand and to dwell on their 
dwelling. That is why they go and study the planet Solaris. To live means 
to prepare for death, to try to know, to understand. 
13. As in Heidegger’s fourfold, the humans are mortal, their being is a being-
towards-death. Only humans die. Visitors cannot die. To die means to 
achieve knowledge.  
14. Kris Kelvin is the conceptual persona who embodies this principle of 
preparation for death. Everything Heidegger has said about Dasein in 
Being and Time is true for Kris Kelvin. What is unsealed is the being-in-the 
world, the dwelling on earth.  
15. The planet Solaris is the solaristic apparatus, an organic machine sensing 
the humans, interacting with and defying them. The planet has the 
character of an intra-active agent of measurement. The planet unites 
                                                
588 Andrei Tarkovsky, “Solaris”, in: Collected Screenplays, p. 172 
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subject and object, it closes the gap in between, since it is the 
cinematograph. 
16. The filmic apparatus as well as the Solaris apparatus are world-making 
and go beyond reflection: films are not mirrors but the continuation of life 
(to recall Syberberg). On the one hand we apparently have the image of 
reality, but on the other hand this image dominates reality and tends to 
substitute it, becoming real in itself.  
17. This apparatus gives us access to “truth” or to that which we have called 
“the real of reality”, defined by the following solaristic principle: the real of 
reality manifests itself in film and becomes graspable for human 
knowledge through film.  
18. The real images of film are the visitors. Harey is one image, part of all the 
real images. Harey’s origin is causation, based on what Harman 
understands as causation (see pp. 288-289 of this analysis), which is very 
close to allure. Harey’s causation is only possible because of Kris.  
19. The planet holds the real of reality and is the producer of images of a 
certain kind – the visitors. Therefore, Solaris is already an issue before 
Kelvin goes there. The planet holds the mystery of reproduction and of the 
ability to reproduce even that, which is past. Deleuze says in The Time-
Image that all images are set in a plane of immanence where present, past 
and future co-exist; linearity is only one possible order. 
20.  Harey is then an image in the following Deleuzian sense:  
 
In Bergsonian terms, the real object is reflected in a mirror-image as in the 
virtual object, which, from its side and simultaneously, envelops or reflects the 
real: there is “coalescence” between the two. There is a formation of an 
image with two sides, actual and virtual. It is as if an image in a mirror, a 
photo or a postcard came to life, assumed independence and passed into the 
actual, even if this meant that the actual image returned into the mirror and 
resumed its place in the postcard or photo, following a double movement of 
liberation and capture.589 
                                                
589 Gilles Deleuze, “The Crystals of Time”, The Time-Image, pp. 71-2 
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Harey behaves like a living photograph, the one she finds of the human 
Harey in Kelvin’s baggage. 
21. The planet is beaming invisible light; even if its surface seems to be 
covered by a fluid substance it is radiating. The planet is the void. Harey 
embodies a being of the void: a being without being.  
22. The planet is the shelter of nothing and the shelter of Being, in the sense 
of "being-as-a-whole" (Seiendes im Ganzen). This makes the planet into 
that which Heidegger names, in the fourfold, death. 
23. Death is then a worldmaking agent. 
24. The planet is a transcendent place – as much as film is. It is human 
finitude which makes the humans look for transcendence. This 
transcendence is death. 
25. Film conveys the impossible death-vision of the world as a whole. The 
romantic longing for death may have helped to concretize the technical 
invention of film: the wish to go to the cinema corresponds to a wish for 
knowledge as well as a wish for death. The spectator meets the dead ones 
in film and indirectly experiences death. Film then concludes the 
"permanently-unsolved" state of being. 
26. Death as finitude of being does only exist for the humans. From any other 
perspective it is the infinite, unamenable to thought, or just the void. 
27. Death is the measurement of life – like light is the measuring agent of 
matter. 
28. The two poles of “planet” and “earth are like two sides of the same coin: 
Together they are the real of reality. 
29. The two poles of “planet” and “humans” are both sensing and 
worldmaking. Harey would not exist without Kelvin. 
30. “Visitors” and “humans” can feel attraction by allure. Harey is allure for 
Kelvin and causes love. In other cases the allure of the “visitors” towards 
the “humans” may be antagonistic.  Harman says: “Allure is the presence 
of objects to each other in absent form.” 590 
                                                
590 Graham Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things, p. 
245 - 246 
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31.  Being-without-being is a cardinal tenet, which belongs to Harey as allure. 
It is the presence of something, which is absent, something being there 
without being there. 
32. This transcendent characteristic is reminiscent of the spectral and also 
death-driven character of film itself; it describes the cinematographic 
principle of transcendence of matter towards immateriality. 
33.  The solaristic philosophy does not deal with a kind of transcendence 
which alludes to a divine entity. To transcend in the context of cinema 
means to transform the material into immaterial and vice versa, and in 
“Solaris” the same happens: yet both, film in general and “Solaris” 
specifically, do not demand that we change reality or switch worlds. 
34. In transcendental materialism, Adrian Johnston refers to a negative more-
than-materiality591  of the subject. The difficulty thereby is (according to 
Žižek) to think immateriality as a correlate to materiality, as an immanent 
transcendence. This more-than-materiality is where the real of reality, as 
well as its cinematographic reproduction, moves. In “Solaris”, Harey is 
rematerialized. How is the question of such a real, simultaneously material 
and immaterial, best to be rounded up? 
35. The real of reality is something, which belongs to any kind of objects: its 
being makes things real, whether they are material or not. That is why 
there is no mystery in the reproduction of reality. We also can think things 
as many times as we want. 
36. The inquiry into the presence of the absent evoked by film and by the 
planet is the presence of Dasein’s being after death: the whole of being as 
a ‘being-after-death’ emerges as a possibility of Dasein unique to the filmic 
device.  
37. The film image is distinct from the real image of total cinema, which has 
not yet been invented and which is impossible. The film image is a 
persistently incomplete part of the real image. It carries the real of reality. 
                                                
591  See: Adrian Johnston, Žižek's Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of 
Subjectivity,  p. 209 
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38. The real image is the real of reality thought as image. Bazin’s myth of total 
cinema helps understand this twist. 
39. This real alludes to a kind of truth, which is open in its totality, although a 
whole; it unites object and subject, oscillates between projection and 
presence, past and future yet to come; it is never absent. The 
cinematographic image is thereby considered to be a kind of magnifying 
glass; it frees presence from physical being. Tarkovsky claims: “The image 
is an impression of the truth, a glimpse of the truth permitted to us in our 
blindness.” 592  
40. Being on Solaris means being on a planet, which constantly beams light 
and images; it does so in a way that inside and outside, future and past, 
death and life cannot really be separated. 
41. The event of image causes the visibility of matter.593 Images are the visible 
emerging from the invisible by rupture or fissure, as an event. In summary, 
the image is a fissure of the real and thus differs from sensory perception. 
The image emerges from the real and should thus always revert to it, be a 
key to the real. An image is a single slice out of an invisible multifold void. 
An image is not, as common sense often suggests, a mere sensual object 
from which the real completely withdraws.  
42. This fits with Tarkovsky’s take on the image: “what is known as the 'idea' of 
the image, many-dimensional and with many meanings, cannot, in the very 
nature of things, be put into words. But it does find expression in art.” 594 
43. The image as an event finds an unexpected application in the late 
Heidegger, who refers to event – Ereignis – in Identity and Difference as 
                                                
592 AndreiTarkovsky, op.cit., p. 106 
593 To recall what has been said before: Physics distinguishes between visible and invisible 
light. Visible light is born by accident; it is disrupted invisible light: the rupture is the 
confrontation with matter itself; light is hindered by matter to travel. Invisible light is therefore 
a constant and infinite traveler in time and space; as it cannot pass matter, it has to transcend 
matter: light bears than image. To the event of the real image the visibility of matter is 
immanent. Light confronting matter thus constantly beams images, indicating the existence of 
matter, and is to be understood as a fractural event. 
594 Andrei Tarkovsky, op. cit., p. 104 
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an appropriation through sight. There is this double etymology to Ereignis: 
on the one hand, it comes from “to make something your own or 
appropriate”, aneignen, which in German has the root of eigen, own; on 
the other hand the eyes come in. The ancient word eräugen, to regard, is 
the second root of Ereignis in German, according to Heidegger.595 
44. The idea of a solaristic ontology of film - experimentally seeking to directly 
appropriate a fiction film as a system for philosophy - is conceivable itself as 
a model of conceptual art, or as an artistic gesture. 
45. The endeavor of solaristic philosophy proposes a philosophy of light and 
infinity, of image and immateriality, of presence and projection, of absence 
and nothing in action, and finally, also of death and finitude. 
 
 
 
 
3. Further Perspectives 
 
What does the solaristic system mean?  
I have aimed to develop a philosophy of film, based on setting a film in 
emancipated dialogue with recognized works of philosophy. Of course I have 
not included all that can be said about “Solaris”. I have opted to primarily 
focus on those aspects which best support new insights on the nature of 
reality, and on those elements to be considered self-reflective on the nature of 
                                                
595 “The event of appropriation (Ereignis) is a word belonging to common language and 
means “event”. But Heideggers use of it is more (1) ‘abstract’ in the sense of being infinitely 
removed from everyday events and yet of being that which is so close to us that we cannot 
see it, and (2) ‘concrete’ in its use of the very roots of that word: er-eignen (eigen= own, thus 
to come into one’s own, to come to where one belongs) and er-äugnen (Auge=eye. This is 
the real etymological root of er-eignen), thus to catch sight of, to see with the mind’s eye, to 
see face-to-face.” (Cf. Joan Tambauch, “Introduction”, in: Martin Heidegger, Identity and 
Difference, p. 14); see also: “Das Wort Ereignis ist der gewachsenen Sprache entnommen. 
Er-eignen heißt ursprünglich: er-äugen, d.h. er-blicken, im Blicken zu sich rufen, an-eignen”. 
(Cf. ibid., p. 100-101). Therefore the translator has chosen to translate Ereignis with ‘event of 
appropriation’. 
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film, and inquiring into the nature of reality. This is the main endeavor of 
solaristic philosophy of film. 
 
What further might be missing?  
During my investigation I have been asked several times about the role 
of the music in “Solaris”, which has been astonishing in its time. Composer 
Eduard Artemiev has worked with electronic music, developing own devices 
to do so, long before our time in which a sound-effect is a mere computer 
plug-in. Opting not to undertake my own analysis of the music, I also have 
avoided a classical analysis of formal elements to substantiate my reading of 
“Solaris”. I have opted to do so to avoid a descriptive thesis. 
What I did instead was basing my analysis on the movie as an organic 
whole, where all elements play together to narrate what I have been 
describing in the introduction as the plot of the film. This is also the reason 
why this plot description (part of the introduction) is unusually long and 
complemented with images: I have tried to narrate what one sees by watching 
“Solaris”. The meaning of the film lies in its narrative, which is conveyed by 
image and sound, which are in turn showing characters in certain 
environments in action.  
As in any movie, there are many elements shaping the film’s form: 
actions and dialogues, music, camera movements, angles and framing, as 
well as rhythm and light. All these elements construct the meaning of each 
sequence together, in a constant interplay, followed by the next sequence and 
following the one before. Analyzing the movie, nothing can be considered out 
of context. As any film, “Solaris” is a complex Gesamtkunstwerk, and in my 
presentations about the film and about the solaristic system I am frequently 
using video-clips to support what I am saying. An interactive, digital e-book, 
linking to clips from the film, would be certainly the right form of publication. 
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What could some issues for further analysis be? 
I must admit that I have not been exploring all possible references and 
cross-connections of “Solaris” with the wide range of philosophers that one 
could include to sustain and further develop the solaristic system. In that 
sense the solaristic philosophy is incomplete. Yet I have been trying to 
develop its main aspects by carefully choosing a network of philosophers to 
be considered as especially relevant. I also have justified my choice in terms 
of special relevance and aptness for this dissertation’s purpose. Moreover, 
part of the development of the solaristic system was to show where it is 
positioned within philosophy of film, and which kind of philosophical insight 
into film such an analysis can rely upon. Heidegger has thereby become 
central for the dialogue with “Solaris” and the solaristic system can be read as 
a Heideggerian system. This is an innovation, in the sense that most of 
philosophy of film is explicitly based on Cavell or on Deleuze, which have 
used film within a certain system of philosophical thinking. In order to use their 
insights on the subject of film, one has to thoroughly frame what they say 
about it within their broader projects of philosophy. In this dissertation, I have 
shown that there are other philosophers, who can contribute to the major 
philosophical problems raised by film – and I am sure that there are even 
more. 
Therefore, rather than complementing the solaristic analysis with other 
possible references, I would propose a second volume of philosophy of film, 
based on another, similarly relevant and complex film, where other aspects of 
philosophy raised by film can be investigated further and in the end be put into 
dialogue with the solaristic system. 
  
  
  
304 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
MAIN 
 
• BADIOU, Alain, translated by Oliver Feltham, Being and Event, 
Continuum, New York, 2006 
 
• BADIOU, Alain, interviewed by Peter Hallward, “Politics and 
Philosophy”, in: Angelaki - Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, 
Volume 3, Issue 3, Routledge Open Select, 1998 
 
• BAUDRY, Jean-Louis, “The Apparatus: Metapsychological Approaches 
to the Impression of Reality in Cinema”, in: Philip Rosen (ed.), 
Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology, Columbia University Press, New York 
 
• BARAD, Karen, Meeting The Universe Halfway – Quantum Physics 
and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning, Duke University Press, 
London, 2007 
 
• BARAD, Karen, “What is the Measure of Nothingness? Infinity, Virtuality, 
Justice”, in: 100 Notes – 100 Thoughts, dOCUMENTA (13), Hatje Cantz, 
Ostfildern, 2012 
 
• BAZIN, André, Qu’est-ce que le Cinéma?, Les Éditions du Cerf, Paris, 
1985 (12ème edition) 
 
• BAZIN, André, translated by Hugh Gray, What is Cinema?, University 
of California Press, Los Angeles, 1967 
 
• BENJAMIN, Walter, Gesammelte Schriften, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 
1991 
  
305 
• BENJAMIN, Walter, translated by Harry Zohn, “The Work of Art in the 
Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (Third Version), in: Hannah Arendt 
(ed.), Illuminations, Schocken Books, New York, 2007 
 
• BERGSON, Henri, translated by Arthur Mitchell, Creative Evolution, 
HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY, New York, 1911, available online at 
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/26163/26163-h/26163-h.htm 
 
• BERGSON, Henri, translated by N.M. Paul and W.S. Palmer, Matter 
and Memory,  Cosimo Editions, New York, 2007 
 
• CANTOR, Georg, Gesammelte Abhandlungen mathematischen und 
Philosophischen Inhalts, Verlag von Julius Springer, Berlin, 1932 
 
• CARROLL, Noel and CHOI, Jinhee, Philosophy of Film and Motion 
Pictures - An Anthology, Blackwell Publishing, Malden/Oxford/Victoria, 
2006 
 
• CAVELL, Stanley, Cavell on Film, State University of New York Press, 
New York, 2005 
 
• CAVELL, Stanley, Reflections on a Life of Philosophy: An Interview 
with Stanley Cavell, Harvard Journal of Philosophy, VII, 1999 
 
• CAVELL, Stanley, The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of 
Film, enlarged Edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1974/ 
1979 
 
• COHEN-SÉAT, Gilbert, Essai sur les principes d'une philosophie du 
cinéma : notions fondamentales et vocabulaire de filmologie (1946), 
Presses Univ. de France, Paris,1958 
 
  
306 
• DELEUZE, Gilles, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, 
CINEMA 1: The Movement Image, Continuum, New York, 2005 
 
• DELEUZE, Gilles, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, 
CINEMA 2: The Time Image, Continuum, New York, 2005 
 
• DELEUZE, Gilles, PARNET, Claire, translated by Eliot Ross Albert, 
“The Actual and the Virtual“, in: Dialogues II, Continuum, London, 2002 
 
• DELEUZE, Gilles, translated by Paul Patton, Difference and Repetition, 
Columbia University Press, New York, 1994 
 
• DELEUZE, Gilles, translated by Ane Boyman, Pure Immanence: 
Essays on A Life, Zone Books, New York, 2001 
 
• DELEUZE, Gilles, GUATTARI, Félix, translated by Brian Massumi, A 
Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1987), Continuum, 
Lonon/New York, 2004 
 
• DELEUZE, Gilles, GUATTARI, Félix, translated by Hugh Tomlinson 
and Graham Burchell, What is Philosophy?, Columbia University 
Press, New York, 1994 
 
• DERRIDA, Jacques, translated by Alan Bass, Margins of Philosophy, The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1984 
 
• DESCARTES, René, translated by F. Stuttcliff , Discourse on Method 
of Rightly Conducting the Reason and Seeking the Truth in the 
Sciences (1637), Penguin Books, London 1968/2005  
 
• DESCARTES, René, Meditations 1 (1640), Anchor Books Editions, 
New York, 1974 
  
307 
 
• EPSTEIN, Jean, “Bonjour Cinéma” (1921), in: Ecrits sur le cinema, 
Cinéma Club/ Seghers, 1974 
 
• EPSTEIN, Jean, Bonjour Cinéma und andere Schriften zum 
Kino, SYNEMA Gesellschaft für Film und Medien, Wien, 2013 
 
• EPSTEIN, Jean, translated by Christophe Wall-Romana, The 
Intelligence of a machine, Univocal Publishing, Minneapolis, 2014 
 
• FOUCAULT, Michel, “The Confession of the Flesh” (1977), in: Colin 
Gordon (ed.), Power/Knowledge - Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings, 1980 
 
• GABRIEL, Markus, Fields of Sense: A New Realist Ontology, 
Edinburgh University Press, 2015 
 
• HAN, Byung-Chul, “Bitte Augen schließen” [Please close eyes], in: 
Philosophie_Magazin, Edition February/ March, Berlin, 2013 
 
• HARAWAY, Donna, “A Manifesto for Cyborgs. Science, Technology 
and Socialist Feminism in the 1980ies.”, in: Linda Nicholson, (ed.): 
Feminism, Postmodernism, Routledge,New York, 1990 
 
• HARMAN, Graham, Bells and Whistles, Zero Books, London, 2013 
 
• HARMAN, Graham, Guerrilla Metaphysics, Carus Publishing, Illinois, 
2005 
 
• HARMAN, Graham, Heidegger Explained: From Phenomenon to 
Thing, Open Court, Chicago 2007 
 
  
308 
• HARMAN, Graham, The Quadruple Object, Zero Books, London, 2011 
 
• HARMAN, Graham, The Third Table, Hantje Cantz / dOCUMENTA 
(13), Ostfildern, 2013 
 
• HARMAN, Graham, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of 
Objects, Carus Publishing, Illinois, 2002 
 
• HEGEL, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Jenaer Systementwürfe II -  Logik, 
Metaphysik, Naturphilosophie, Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 1982 
 
• HEGEL, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, translated by George di Giovanni, 
The Science of Logic, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010 
 
• HEGEL, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Wissenschaft der Logik, Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt am Main, 1990  
 
• HEIDEGGER, Martin, translated by John Macquarrie & Edward 
Robinson, Being and Time, Harper & Row, New York, 1962 
 
• HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 79 - Bremer Vorträge 1949, Vittorio 
Klostermann, Frankfurt a.M., 1994 
 
• HEIDEGGER, Martin, translated by Joan Stambaugh, Identity and 
Difference, The University of Chicago Press, New York, 2002 
 
• HEIDEGGER, Martin, translated by Alfred Hofstadter, Poetry, 
Language, Thought, Harper Perennial Modern Thought, New York, 
1971/2013 
 
• HEIDEGGER, Martin, Sein und Zeit, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen, 
1976 
  
309 
 
• HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 6 – Was Heisst Denken?, Vittorio 
Klostermann, Frankfurt a.M., 1954/2002  
 
• HEIDEGGER, Martin, Was ist Metaphysik?, 16th edition, Vittorio 
Klostermann, Frankfurt a.M., 2007 
 
• HEIDEGGER, Martin, translated by J. Glenn Gray, What Is Called 
Thinking?, Harper & Row, New York, 1968 
 
• HEIDEGGER, Martin, Vorträge und Aufsätze 1929 – 1953, Verlag 
Günter Neske, Pfullingen 1978  
 
• HEIDEGGER, Martin, Zur Sache des Denkens, 4th Edition, Niemeyer 
Verlag, Tübingen, 2000 
 
• HEISENBERG, Werner, Ordnung der Wirklichkeit, München, Piper, 
München, 1989 
 
• HESSE, Mary, The Construction of Reality, Cambridge University 
Press, New York, 1986 
 
• JOHNSTON, Adrian, Žižek's Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist 
Theory of Subjectivity, Northwestern University Press, Ivanston, Illinois, 
2008 
 
• KANT, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, B14, translated and edited 
by Paul Guyer, Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, 
1998/2009 
 
• LACAN, Jacques, translated by Alan Sheridan, Écrits: A Selection, 
Tavistock, London, 1977 
  
310 
 
• LACAN, Jacques, The Seminar. Book II: The Ego in Freud's Theory 
and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-1955, W.W. Norton & 
Co., New York, 1988 
 
• LACAN, Jacques, The Function and Field of Speech and Language in 
Psychoanalysis,1977 
 
• LEUTRAT, Jean-Louis, Vie des fântomes – Le Fantastique au Cinéma, 
Éditions de l’Étoile / Cahiers du Cinéma, Paris, 1995 
 
• MCLUHAN, Marshall, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man 
(1964), MIT-Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts/ London, 1994 
 
• MERLEAU PONTY, Maurice, BALDWIN,Thomas (ed.), Maurice 
Merleau Ponty: Basic Writings, Routledge, New York, 2002 
 
• MERLEAU-PONTY, Maurice, translated by Colin Smith, 
Phenomenology of Perception (1945/1962), Routledge, London/New 
York, 2002, p. xii 
 
• MEILLASSOUX, Quentin, translated by Ray Brassier, After Finitude: 
An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency (2008), Continuum, 
London/New York, 2009 
 
• MULHALL, Stephen, On Film, Routledge, London, 2002 
 
• MÜNSTERBEG, Hugo, “The Photoplay: A Psychological Study” (1916), 
in: Allan Langdale (ed.), Hugo Münsterberg on Film, Routledge, New 
York, 2002 
 
  
311 
• PISTERS, Patricia, “Temporal Explorations in Cosmic Consciousness: 
Intra-Agential Entanglements and the Neuro-Image“, in: Cultural 
Studies Review Volume 21, Number 2, September 2015 
 
• PANOFSKY, Erwin, “Style and Medium in the Moving Pictures”, in: 
Daniel Talbot (ed.), Film, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1959 
 
• PANOFSKY, Erwin, Stil und Medium im Film, Frankfurt a. M., Fischer 
Verlag, 1999 
 
• PASOLINI, Pier Paolo, translated by Ben Lawton, Cinema, New 
Academia Publishing, Washington, 2005  
 
• PASOLINI, Pier Paolo, translated by Ben Lawton, Heretical Empiricism, 
Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1988 
 
• PASOLINI, Pier Paolo, interviewed by Oswald Stack, Pasolini on 
Pasolini: Inter-views with Oswald Stack, Indiana University Press, 
London, 1969 
 
• PLATO, translated by Benjamin Jowett, The Allegory of the Cave, P & 
L Publications, Brea, 2010 
 
• PLANCK, Max, Wege zur physikalischen Erkenntnis: Reden und 
Vorträge, 2 . Aufl., Verlag S. Hirzel, Leipzig, 1934 
 
• POPPER, Karl, Search of a Better World, Routledge, London/New 
York, 1984 
 
• PUTNAM, Hillary, „Brains in a Vat“, in: Reason, Truth and History, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981 
 
  
312 
• RICOEUR, Paul, translated by Robert Czerny, The rule of Metaphor: 
The Creation of Meaning in Language, Routledge, Toronto, 1997/2003  
 
• SLOTERDIJK, Peter, Der ästhetische Imperativ, Philo Fine Arts, 
Hamburg, 2007 
 
• SLOTERDIJK, Peter, Nicht gerettet, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 2001  
 
• SLOTERDIJK, Peter, interviewed by Michael Althen, “Perlen des 
kollektiven Wahnsinns - Ein Gespräch mit Peter Sloterdijk über Kino 
und andere Bilder”, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, Stuttgart, 26th of April 
1993 
 
• SONTAG, Susan, “Syberberg’s Hitler”, in: Under the Sign of Saturn, 
First Vintage Books Edition, New York, 1981 
 
• SYBERBERG, Hans-Jürgen, La societé sans joie, Éditions Christian 
Bourgois, Paris, 1981 
 
• SYBERBERG, Hans-Jürgen, Syberbergs Filmbuch, Nymphenberger 
Verlag, München, 1976 
 
• TARKOVSKY, Andrei, translated by Kitty Hunter-Blair, Sculpting in 
Time, University of Texas Press, 1989  
 
• TARKOVSKY, Andrei, translated by William Powell and Natasha 
Synessios, „Solaris“, in: Collected Screenplays, Faber and Faber, 
London, 1999 
 
• WAGNER, Richard, Dichtungen und Schriften, Vol. 6, Insel Verlag, 
Frankfurt a. M., 1983 
 
  
313 
• ŽIŽEK, Slavoj, Organs Without Bodies, Routledge Classics, New York, 
2012 
 
• ŽIŽEK, Slavoj, Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of 
Dialectical Materialism, Verso, New York, 2012  
 
• ŽIŽEK, Slavoj, Event – Philosophy in Transit, Penguin Books, London, 
2014 
 
 
 
SECONDARY 
 
• ANDREWS, Dudley (Ed.), Opening Bazin: Postwar Film Theory and its 
Afterlife, Oxford University Press, 2011 
 
• CAPURRO, Rafael, “Die Welt ein Traum?”, in Wechselwirkung Nr. 98, 
Rothemühl, Verlag Wechselwirkung, 1999, available online at: 
www.capurro.de/luzern.html 
 
• DOLPHIJN, Rick, TUIN, Iris van der, New Materialisms: Interviews and 
Cartographies, Open Humanities Press/ MPublishing, Ann Arbor, 2012 
 
• EVANS, Dylan, An Encyclopedia of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, 
Routledge, London, 1996 
 
• FLAXMAN, Gregory (editor), The Brain Is The Screen, University of 
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2000 
 
• GIANVITO, John, (ed.), Andrei Tarkovsky: Interviews, Jackson, 
University Press of Mississipi, 2006 
 
  
314 
• HALSHALL, Francis, “Art and Guerilla Metaphysics” in: Ridvan Askins, 
Paul J. Ennis, Andreas Hägler, Philipp Schweighäuser, Speculations V: 
Æsthetics in the 21st Century, Punctum Books, New York, 2014 
 
• HAN, Byung-Chul, “Bitte Augen schließen” [Please close eyes], in: 
Philosophie_Magazin, February/ March, Berlin, 2013 
 
• KIM, Hyun Kang, “The Blue Flower in the Land of Technology”, in: 
Christine Reeh, José Manuel Martins, Thinking Reality and Time 
Through Film, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017 
 
• MCGINN, Colin, “A Multimodal Theory of Film Experience” in: Christine 
Reeh, José Manuel Martins, Thinking Reality and Time Through Film, 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017 
 
• MULLARKEY, John, The New Bergson, Manchester University Press, 
1999 
 
• NANCY, Jean-Luc, L'évidence du film: Abbas Kiarostami = The 
evidence of film, Klinksieck, Paris, 2007 
 
• PEARSON, Keith Ansell, “The Reality of the Virtual: Bergson and 
Deleuze”, in: MLN, Vol. 120, No. 5, Comparative Literature Issue, 
Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 2005 
 
• RODOWICK, D.N., Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, Duke University 
Press, Durham and London, 1997 
 
• SCHAUB, Mirjam, Gilles Deleuze im Kino – Das Sichtbare und das 
Sagbare, Wilhelm Fink Verlag, München,2003 
 
• SCHWARTZ, Louis-Georges “Deconstruction avant la lettre – Jacques 
  
315 
Derrida Before André Bazin”, in: ANDREWS, Dudley (Ed.), Opening 
Bazin: Postwar Film Theory and its Afterlife, Oxford University Press, 
2011 
 
• RUCKER, Rudy, Mind Tools: The Five Levels of Mathematical Reality, 
Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1987 
 
• WOLLEN, Peter, Signs and Meaning in the Cinema (1969), 5th Edition, 
British Film Institute, London, 2013 
 
 
FICTION 
 
• NOVALIS (Friedrich Freiherr von Hardenberg), “Sehnsucht nach dem 
Tode”, in: Bjørn Ekmann, NOVALIS, Hymnen an die Nacht: 
kommentierte Studienausgabe, Nordisk Forlag A.S., Copenhagen, 
1983 
 
 
FILMS 
 
• DEGOUTIN, Stéphane, WAGON, Gwenola, Worldbrain, the concept is 
available online at http://worldbrain.arte.tv/#/ 
 
• MCMULLEN, Ken, Ghost Dance, 1983  
 
• MURNAU, F.W., Nosferatu, 1922 
 
• SYBERBERG, Hans-Jürgen, Ludwig – Requiem für einen 
jungfräulichen König, 1972 
 
  
316 
• TARKOVSKY, Andrei, Solaris, 1972 
 
• WIENE, Robert, Das Kabinett des Dr. Caligari, 1920 
 
 
IMAGES 
 
• Most of the photographic images used are film stills from the film 
“Solaris” by Andrei Tarkovsky, cinematography by Georgy Rerberg; 
these images do not have a footnote 
 
• All the other images and graphics have a footnote of their source, 
which is listed in its respective bibliographic category 
 
 
ONLINE-LECTURES (video format) 
 
• BADIOU, Alain, Cinema and Philosophy, keynote lecture given on 27th 
of November 2014 at UNSW Arts & Social Sciences, Australia, 
available online at http://www.videodownload.cc/youtube/professor-
alain-badiou-cinema-and-philosophy 
 
• BOSTROM, Nick, The Simulation Argument, interview at the Future of 
Humanity Institute Oxford University, available online at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nnl6nY8YKHs 
 
• ŽIŽEK, Slavoj, interviewed by Ben Wright, The reality of the virtual, 
2010, film available online at: 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=KdpudWL5i68 
 
 
  
  
317 
ONLINE-LECTURES (text format) 
 
• BADIOU, Alain, The Critique of Critique: Critical Theory as a New 
Access to the Real, Conference given at Global Center for Advanced 
Studies, January the 8th, 2014, Available online at: 
https://dingpolitik.wordpress.com/2014/01/09/the-critique-of-critique-
critical-theory-as-a-new-access-to-the-real/ 
• DELEUZE, Gilles, Qu’est-ce que l’acte de création?, Paris, Conference 
at the Femis Foundation, 17th of May 1987. Available onine at: 
www.webdeleuze.com; http://www.lepeuplequimanque.org/acte-de-
creation-gilles-deleuze.html 
 
• HEIDEGGER, Martin, What is Metaphysics?, § 28, translated by David 
Ferrell Krell, available online at: 
http://www.naturalthinker.net/trl/texts/Heidegger,Martin/Heidegger.Marti
n..What%20Is%20Metaphysics.htm 
 
 
ONLINE-ARTICLES 
 
• Australian National University, "Experiment confirms quantum theory 
weirdness", in: Science Daily, 27 May 2015. Available online at: 
www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2015/05/ 150527103110.htm 
 
• BOSTROM, Nick, „Are You Living in a Computer Simulation?“, in: The 
Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 53, No. 211, Oxford University Press, 
2003, pp. 243-255; available online: http://www.simulation-
argument.com/simulation.pdf 
 
  
  
318 
• CHALMERS, David, “The Matrix as Metaphysics”, in: Christopher Grau 
(ed.) Philosophers Explore the Matrix, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2005 (first version: 2003); available online at: 
http://consc.net/papers/matrix.html 
 
• DEVLIN, Hannah, “Scientists bring telepathy closer with brain-to-brain 
interface”, in: The Times, February 18 2013, available online at: 
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/science/physics/article3691071.ece 
 
• HÄGGLUND, Martin, interviewed by Robert King, “Radical atheism and 
‘the arche-materiality of time’”, in: Journal of Philosophy: A Cross-
Disciplinary Inquiry, Edition Winter 2011, Vol.  6, No. 14; available 
online at: http://www.martinhagglund.se/files/InterviewHagglund.pdf 
 
• HARMAN, Graham, Aesthetics as First Philosophy: Levinas and the 
Non-Human, available online at: 
http://www.nakedpunch.com/articles/147, 2012 
 
• HARMAN, Graham, “Art Without Relations”, in: Artreview, September 
2014, available online at: 
http://artreview.com/features/september_2014_graham_harman_relatio
ns/ 
 
• Oxford Dictionoraries, available online at: 
www.oxforddictionaries.com/de/definition/englisch/ghost 
 
 
 
 
 
 
